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A THEOLOGICAL EXPLORATION OF THE RELEVANCE 
OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE FOR TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY 
Abstract 
The overarching aim of this work is to develop a new account of the doctrine of the 
Trinity that is more attentive to human experience. It will be argued that such an 
approach is overdue because contemporary trinitarian theology pays insufficient 
attention to the fact that theology as linguistic discourse is inescapably embedded in 
human experience. This neglect is particularly worrying because many theologians who 
favour a kind of social doctrine of the Trinity claim that the Trinity is a doctrine with 
practical consequences for human life. The main thrust of this project, therefore, is to 
link the doctrine of the Trinity more creatively with human experience and to develop 
an understanding of how and who the triune God is in relation to human life as it is 
lived and experienced by human beings. 
The discussion is divided into five chapters. Chapter One highlights the need for a 
new approach engaging in a critical discussion with some trinitarian theologians. By 
giving close attention to the concepts of experience and revelation and their 
embeddedness in language, Chapter Two aims at establishing an understanding of 
experience that underlies all human linguistic discourse. This account will lead to the 
conclusion that trinitarian discourse must pay proper attention to both the human 
condition as experienced by human beings and religious experience which is expressed 
in biblical narratives. Consequently, while Chapter Three, drawing on contributions 
from contemporary literature, the human sciences (Frankl, Weizsacker) and philosophy 
(Levinas), gives an account of what it is to be human, Chapter Four, engaging with 
biblical narratives, tries to spell out how biblical experience might inform trinitarian 
discourse. In conclusion, Chapter Five offers an interstitial trinitarian theology that 
maintains such discourse as creative tension. An account of'the Trinity in relation to 
human life will emerge and draw the whole argument to a close. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The overarching aim of this work is to develop a new account of the doctrine of the 
Trinity that is more attentive to human experience. It will be argued that such an 
approach is overdue because contemporary trinitarian theology pays insufficient 
attention to the fact that theology as linguistic discourse is inescapably embedded in 
human experience. This neglect is particularly worrying because many theologians who 
favour a kind of social doctrine of the Trinity claim that the Trinity is a doctrine with 
practical consequences for human life. However, one might ask how one can relate the 
doctrine of the Trinity to human life if neither the role of human experience nor the 
question of what it is to be human is adequately addressed? The main thrust of this 
project, therefore, is to link the doctrine of the Trinity more creatively with human 
experience and to develop an understanding of how and who the triune God is in 
relation to human life as it is lived and experienced by human beings. Hence the title 
Human Experience and the Triune God. 
Current debates about the doctrine of the Trinity, it is my contention, suffer from 
one-sidedness. Some take place on purely philosophical levels deeply involved with the 
task of unravelling the confused threads of traditional doctrinal formulations and 
modem philosophical questions. These debates usually tend to give precedence to the 
notion of the one God over the notion of the three persons. Other works start from 
salvation history, taking it simply for granted that God is three persons, hence 
prioritising the notion of communion. What all of these discussions lack, however, 
despite their different agendas, is not only a proper engagement with the complex 
relationship between the concepts of revelation and experience but also a productive 
imagination, namely that theological discourse is not so much in need of logical 
conclusions but rather of sustaining a creative tension between the notions of the One 
and the Three. 
In order to establish that contention, there is much in what follows not only about 
the close relationship between experience and revelation, but also about the creative 
tension within theological discourse between the concept and the narrative and the 
notions of one ousia and three hypostaseis. Much will be said about both the 
inappropriateness of logical conclusions that simply prioritise one perspective over 
against the other and the tendency either to downplay human experience in favour of 
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metaphysics or to give precedence to revelation history over against conceptual starting 
points. What I am attempting to offer, therefore, is an alternative approach towards 
trinitarian theology and to establish what I want to call an interstitial theology that 
moves in the interstices between revelation and experience. As a corollary of this basic 
argument, I want to persuade the reader that in order to link the doctrine of the Trinity 
with, and to be able to draw, practical implications for human life, contemporary 
trinitarian theology (if it wants to be truthful not only to the triune God as the giver and 
sustainer of creation but also to Scripture and the Christian tradition) needs to pay more 
attention to the general nature of the human condition and to biblical experience. To this 
end, much will be argued in favour of the integration of both general human experience 
as it is conceptualised within the human sciences and religious experience as it comes to 
speech in biblical narratives as life lived in relation to God. 
The discussion that follows is divided into five chapters. Chapter One is 
concerned with the general context of the above-mentioned issues. Focusing on the 
connection between the Trinity and human life within contemporary trinitarian 
theology, the need for a new approach that is more attentive to human experience will 
be highlighted. Chapter Two then establishes a new argument, retrieving human 
experience for a trinitarian hermeneutics. By giving close attention to the concepts of 
experience and revelation and their embeddedness in language, an understanding of 
experience will emerge that underlies all human linguistic discourse. This account will 
lead to the conclusion that trinitarian discourse must pay proper attention to both the 
human condition as experienced by human beings and religious experience which is 
expressed in biblical narratives. Consequently the following two chapters will focus on 
these issues. While Chapter Three, putting emphasis on general human experience, 
gives an account of what it is to be human, Chapter Four, engaging with biblical 
narratives, tries to spell out how biblical experience might inform trinitarian discourse. 
Drawing all the threads together in Chapter Five,' building on the findings from the 
previous chapters, I will attempt to propose a trinitarian interstitial theology that 
maintains discourse as creative tension. An account of the Trinity in relation to human 
life will emerge and draw the whole argument to a close. In a brief conclusion, looking 
back at the whole discussion and also offering a note of prospect, I will claim that the 
theology here proposed is not only needed but also most promising if trinitarian 
theology wants to sustain the conviction that the doctrine of the Trinity is a doctrine 
with practical consequences for human life. 
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It should therefore be noted from the very outset that this thesis is concerned 
neither with a justification of the doctrine of the Trinity nor with an attempt to vindicate 
the triune understanding of God in confrontation with modem philosophy. I write as a 
committed Christian and engage here in an exercise of systematic theology. It is my 
belief, not only in view of my own religious experience and theological-philosophical 
reasoning but also in accord with the Christian tradition, that the trinitarian 
understanding of God, who revealed himself in Jesus Christ through the Holy Spirit, is 
the appropriate content of the Christian faith. 
Finally, two technical points have to be mentioned. First, to avoid any 
terminological confusion in regard to the structure of my chapters: chapters are divided 
into parts and parts are divided into sections and subsections. Secondly, footnotes in this 
work are not merely used as a reference system. Now and then, in order to keep the 
overall argument flowing, I also use footnotes to discuss, or to refer to, other works 
more extensively where I feel that the reader should know more about the reasons why 
certain decisions were made. Related discussions, therefore, that are relevant as 
background information but do not directly contribute to the flow of the argument will 
be briefly assessed in footnotes rather than in the body of the text. 
3 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE NEED FOR A FRESH APPROACH 
4 
1 
THE NEED FOR A FRESH APPROACH 
1.1 INTRODUCTION: 
THEPRON.DSEOF~TAruANTHEOLOGY 
'The doctrine of the Trinity is ultimately a practical doctrine with radical consequences 
for Christian life.' 1 This conviction of Catherine LaCugna summarizes the underlying 
attitudes of many theologians who have worked on the Trinity over the last three 
decades. 2 Many theological works have emerged and many discussions have taken place 
on the academic level to re-conceive and re-consider the importance of the doctrine of 
the Trinity for our understanding of God and, as many theologians have pointed out, to 
shed new light on Christian understanding of personhood, community and human life. It 
is the merit of Karl Barth's salient work that there exists wide agreement among 
theologians that, if we want to develop a doctrine of God, we need to look at God's self-
revelation in salvation history and there is therefore set before us the problem of 
conceiving God in a triune way as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.3 Subsequently Karl 
Rahner formulated the much-debated phrase, 'the "economic" Trinity is the "immarient" 
Trinity and the "immanent" Trinity is the "economic" Trinity.'4 The works ofthese two 
theologians promoted an enriching ecumenical discussion about the doctrine of God. 5 
Many followed this path and enlightened the understanding of God through profound 
studies of the doctrine of the Trinity within church history as well as through engaging 
in a dialogue with modem philosophy. Robert Jenson, for example, summarizes: 'All 
that can be said about the point that trinitarian theology has, will be false unless we 
simultaneously think the point that trinitariari theology is.'6 Here, Jenson indicates quite 
1 Catherine M. LaCugna, God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (New York: Harper Collins, 1993}, 
1. See also Gerald O'Collins, The Tripersonal God: Understanding and Interpreting the Trinity (London: 
Geoffrey Chapman, I999), I; Patricia Fox, God as Communion: John Zizioulas, Elizabeth Johnson, and 
the Retrieval of the Symbol of the Triune God (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 200I), I-3. 
2 For a brief overview: Fred Sanders, 'Trinity Talk, Again', Dialog: A Journal of Theology 44 (2005}, 
264-72. 
3 Cf. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, III (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, I975), 299. 
4 Karl Rahner, The Trinity (New York: Crossroad, I999), 22. Cf. Fred Sanders, 'Entangled in the Trinity: 
Economic and Immanent Trinity in Recent Theology', Dialog: A Journal of Theology 40 (200I), 175-82. 
5 However, the wider come~t shoyld not be. (orgotten,.as.Sam:uel,Powell has recently pointed out,.namely, 
; '.V· •-,:··1J··•d-"';l-. ~-"'~··'.~-o.;."'---.---:' 1 '<:· .. -~-:_.';q;,...-'"l' '>!JJ-'"1;(, ..• ·~-"<:""o...,_.:.:....;i,.<!·•'"U::., _-_..,._;;:._=--- ---~-- ~· -·· · ' 
·•tfiat Tfiiiitarirul'·tliouglit would not have enjoyed its twentieth-century revival without Hegel's prior 
setting of the stage': The Trinity in German Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
258. 
6 Robert Jenson, 'What Is the Point of Trinitarian Theology?', in C. Schwobel (ed.), Trinitarian Theology 
Today (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, I995), 43. 
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clearly that we have no choice whether we want to deal with the Trinity or not. God as 
the triune God simply is. Moreover, if the language of the doctrine of the Trinity 
enables us in the most appropriate way to speak of God and to comprehend and describe 
his being, then this language should influence and determine our elaboration of vital and 
relevant teachings for the shaping of Christian life. The underlying motivation for many 
theologians is that, by deducing their concepts of God from an understanding of the 
perichoretical communion of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, they can 
overcome a Christian monotheism, based on a sharp distinction between the concepts of 
nature or essence and persons or relations (which puts the principle of the One over the 
principle ofthe Three). 
To escape this dilemma, the dualism between the One and the Many, the dialectic 
between unity and plurality which lies at the heart of much of trinitarian discussion thus 
seems to be a promising way, when one realises that the so-called post-modem world is 
to a large degree a world of paradox, in which people praise their individual freedom 
and at the same time are more entangled than ever in conditions of dependence. It is a 
world that has never known more about the multiplicities and differences of people, 
personhood, human races and cultures and simultaneously wants to standardize and 
homogenize this world in a dangerous way - be it on an economical, a political or even 
a sporting level - and thereby often creates new forms of oppression and exploitation. 
We have a world that thought it could eliminate belief in God through a vast increase of 
scientific research and by substituting God with the "modem self', but in the meantime 
it is confronted with a boom in all different kinds of religious and esoteric movements, 
an increase of natural disasters or new fatal diseases, not to forget a widening gap 
between poor and rich. Regarding these problems, it seems to me that the question of 
how we can conceive ourselves as human beings in relation to God and to the human 
other and consequently how we can create and organise human community without 
falling into the fatal pit of absolutism by putting the One over the Many or the Many 
over the One, is extremely pertinent. 
To perceive the being of God as an everlasting commuruon rather than an 
unmoveable, unchangeable substance or nature has become the crucial point for doing 
trinitarian theology, to do justice to the kind of divine self-disclosure as it appears in 
Scripture as well as to f~ce the problems of modem society :rpore r~l~vantly in offepng. 
new and hopefully more accurate answers in the search for a better understanding of 
creation, humankind and salvation. A theology that endeavours to take up accountability 
6 
in such a way attempts to elaborate different realms of theological discourse through a 
dialogue with a trinitarian understanding of God without - to speak with the Great 
Tradition- succumbing to the dangers of subordinationism, modalism or tritheism. To 
put it in a nutshell: Trinitarian theology with its emphasis on the concept of communion 
has become for many theologians a framework for doing theology.7 
In view of this, the main focus of this chapter will be to scrutinize and challenge 
this highly praised "promise of trinitarian theology." My aim is to highlight the need for 
a new approach by revealing major blind spots and inconsistencies within contemporary 
theology in regard to this claim that emphasis on notions of communion and 
relationality leads to practical implications for human life. It is not that the practical 
conclusions drawn are always wrong, but that they are inadequately founded. Hence my 
main concern, although not exclusively, lies with theologians who favour a kind of 
social doctrine of the Trinity. Nonetheless, the legitimacy of the title 'The need for a 
fresh approach' is grounded in fmdings that penetrate a wider range of contemporary 
trinitarian discourse. The discussion that follows is divided into three parts. Part one 
(1.2) looks through the prism of contemporary theology. My goal is to engage in a 
critical dialogue with three theologians - JUrgen Moltmann, Catherine LaCugna and 
Colin Gunton - and to examine their understanding of God as being-in-communion and 
the implications they draw. This discussion will, on the one hand, identify primary 
convictions within trinitarian discourse and, on the other, highlight some common 
weaknesses and inconsistencies. In part two (1.3) I would like to change the perspective 
and look through the prism of the Church and human experience. My aim is to reflect 
on the correlations between ministry and theology, faith and Church, then move on to 
address two major concerns, namely the problems of what I would call ecclesiological 
and metaphysical captivity, and fmally highlight the neglect of biblical and general 
human experience. This investigation will support and enforce the findings of the 
previous part. Drawing the threads together in the third part (1.4), I will briefly 
summarize the discussion and single out the main issues that will lead the way into the 
following chapters. 
7 C. Schw6bel, 'Trinitlitslehre als Rahmentheorie des christlichen Glaubens', Marburger Jahrbuch fiir 
Theologie 10 (1998), 129-54. 
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1.2 THROUGH THE PRISM OF CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY 
1.2.1 Moltmann: The inappropriate integration of power structures 
Jtirgen Moltmann takes the New Testament traditions as the point of departure for his 
trinitarian theology in order to develop a historic doctrine of the Trinity.8 It is his 
conviction that the New Testament speaks of God by narrative proclamation of the 
communitarian relations between the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit that are open 
to the world.9 With this premise in mind he pursues the form and appearance of the 
Trinity within the different realms of Jesus' life and asks about the understanding of the 
sending, the giving up, the exaltation and the future of the Son. By doing this it becomes 
clear in all these realms of investigation that Jesus' life can only be adequately 
understood in trinitarian terms. In particular, this is highlighted by Moltmann's 
interpretation of Jesus' death on the cross. The giving up of the Son reveals pain and 
suffering in God which can only be perceived in trinitarian terms or not at all. 10 
Consequently we have to interpret the cross-event from a trinitarian perspective; 
otherwise we are ultimately not able to speak of God's love and accordingly God does 
exist on the cross. Thus, Moltmann describes the shape and the appearance of the 
Trinity as a relational event in which Father, Son and Holy Spirit form an interwoven 
and interdependent community: the Father gives his own Son up for us to absolute death 
and the Son gives himself up for us. This joint sacrifice of the Father and of the Son in 
turn happens through the Holy Spirit who unites the Son in his forsakenness with the 
Father. 11 
An essential part in Moltmann's approach plays on the insight that he discovers 
different orders of the trinitarian communion within the distinct realms of the history of 
God. In virtue of this one can assert that in respect of the sending of the Son, it is the 
Father who sends the Son through the Spirit. According to the biblical narratives it is 
the Spirit which comes to the Son from the Father. But if one looks toward the 
exaltation of the Son, an alteration of this order can be observed. The conditions are 
turned upside down in such a way that now the risen Christ sends the Spirit. This means 
that the Trinity is open in the sending of the Spirit. 12 God's history with the world and 
8 Jtlrgen Moltmann, Trinitat und Reich Gottes (GUtersloh: Kaiser, 1994), 34. Hereafter: [Trinitat]. 
9 Trinittit, 80. 
10 Trinitat, 99. 
11 Trinitat, 99. 
12 Trinitiil, 106. 
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with humanity remains open; God remains turned toward us. Furthermore, Moltmann 
notices another alteration of the trinitarian order within eschatology, when he explains 
that all activity flows from the Son and from the Spirit and that the Father is the receiver 
of the kingdom and the glory. 13 
Out of these considerations, Moltmann argues that the dogmatic tradition with its 
fixation on the trinitarian order "Father - Son - Spirit" is not in accordance with the 
New Testament testimony. A vital implication for the concept of God, therefore, is that 
the unity of the Triunity is not a monadic one. Thus he concludes that the unity of the 
divine Triunity lies in the union of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and not 
in a numeric unity. Rather the unity lies in their communion and not in the identity of a 
singular subject.14 This understanding shapes Moltmann's idea of a social doctrine of 
the Trinity, in which he conceives God 'as three divine subjects in interpersonal 
relationship with each other- a fellowship of love' and portrays the life of God as 'a 
life of living fellowship and a process of expression of the divine life through mutual 
manifestation.' 15 
Although Moltmann's social approach to the doctrine of the Trinity is deeply 
grounded in his concern for liberation, political injustice and the experience of 
suffering, and thus deals very passionately with human experience and the underside of 
history, 16 there are some inconsistencies which should not be overlooked. Moltmann 
uses his social model of the Trinity as a paradigm for human sociality and community, 
which leads him to the conclusion that it is not the perfected single individual but the 
perfected and fully developed human community of persons that should be called the 
image of God on earth. 17 But in order to do so and to draw implications for the human 
community as the image of God he ultimately has to apply the term "person" to the 
three divine persons in the same way we do to human persons. 18 It seems to me that -
only in virtue of such a strong analogy - is he subsequently able to state that the 
correspondence with the unity of the divine perichoretic community of the Father, the 
Son and the Holy Spirit lies precisely in a human community of persons without 
13 Trinitiit, 109. 
14 Trinitiit, 111. 
15 Richard Bauckham, 'JUrge11 Mo1tm~mn'sTh~. :Z:ririty a~d tl;l_e Kingdom .of God and the Question of ~ 
PIUialism', ili kevin J. Vaithoour (~(f), 'fiie ·r;int,Y in a Pluralistic Age: Theological Essays on Culture 
and Religion (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1997), 158. 
16 See especially his The Crucified God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993). 
17 Trinitiit, 173. 
18 Cf. Bauckham, 'JOrgen Moltmann's The Trinity', 161-2. 
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privileges and without dependencies.19 This statement is puzzling not only because 
Moltmann himself warns that such parallels and analogies are misleading, 20 but also 
because he insists on the conclusion that, after rejecting different patterns of Christian 
monotheism, it is theologically more significant to take the biblical narratives as a point 
of departure for developing an understanding of the unity of the three divine persons 
and not a philosophical postulate?1 But as he himself demonstrates by his close 
examination of the New Testament testimony, there is not only, for instance, talk about 
obedience between the Father and the Son, but also a strong sense of particularity which 
distinguishes the divine persons from one another.22 Consequently, Moltmann's 
observation of the alteration of the trinitarian order seems to make sense only if we 
assume at the same time interdependence between the three divine subjects in 
interpersonal relationship. At least from this perspective one might ask Moltmann why 
the notions of particularity and dependence, obviously inherent in God's trinitarian 
relationship, and which automatically give rise to the question of power and authority, 
are not appropriately elaborated in his subsequent description of human sociality. 
Relationship and the notion of particularity in the sense that a person fulfils a unique 
task, which another does not, automatically involve structures of dependence?3 
Moltmann's use of the New Testament testimony, therefore, seems only to function as a 
criticism of the hierarchical order of the three divine persons within the discourse of the 
traditional doctrine ofthe Trinity. Furthermore, beside Moltmann's own warning of the 
inadequacy of any analogy between the divine persons and human persons, he himself 
uses a particular understanding of divine communion - namely a social model of the 
Trinity, which in turn depends exactly on a concept of interpersonal relationship and 
thus on an analogy between divine and human communion (and in his case this is 
developed in opposition to a strict monotheism with monarchical and hierarchical 
structures)- in order to justify his conception of human sociality.24 
19 Trinitiit, 114. 
20 
'Die ,drei Personen" sind verschieden nicht nur hinsichtlich ihrer Relationen zueinander, sondern auch 
hinsichtlich ihrer Personalitllt, wenn anders die Person in ihren Relationen und nicht abgesehen von ihnen 
zu begreifen ist. Wollte man konkret bleiben mflsste man ftlr den Vater, den Sohn und den Geist einenje 
anderen Personenbegriffverwenden': Trinitiit, 205. 
21 Trinitiit, 167. 
22 See his History and the Triune God (London: SCM Press, 1991 ). 
23 Molbnann himself speaks of dependency: 'Die drei Personen sind als gfittliche unabhilngig, als 
Pe~~~en ~~r auf c:!as ef!~~~ IJlit~J~I!!J,g«:!.,.Y,E!R'!!JsJ~n.c !ID,d.,,Y'!O~inan4er ~tbhliJlgig. Oieses. rel~ttionale 
Verstllndnis der Personen setztjedoch das substantielle Verstllndnis ihrer lndividualitllt voraus und ersetzt 
es nicht': Trinitiit, 188. 
24 In History and the Triune God Molbnann strongly sets the image of a patriarchal Lord-God against a 
Jesus like Abba-Father-God. Samuel Powell suggests that this emphasis is also rooted in a rejection of 
Barth's theology: The Trinity in German Thought, 228-9. 
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Moltmann, in his search for a just world and liberation, substitutes too quickly for 
an ontology of the One an ontology of communion, which in the end does not solve the 
problems he wants to solve. This becomes obvious when one looks at his depiction of 
freedom where he sets the understanding of 'freedom as lordship' against 'freedom as 
communion' ?5 But even the best human communion depends on the division of jobs, 
duties and responsibilities and therefore cannot live and organize its communion 
without power structures. Moltmann puts the concept of power in opposition to the 
concept of agreement and consensus, arguing that an appropriate doctrine of the Trinity 
constitutes the Church as a community that is free from lordship. The trinitarian 
principle, Moltmann insists, substitutes the principle of power with the principle of 
agreement leading to the disappearance of authority and obedience, and finally giving 
rise to the practice of dialogue, consensus and harmony?6 But this is surely a false 
opposition and demonstrates clearly some of the problems in analogy inherent in 
trinitarian theology. It is at this point that it becomes obvious that Moltmann's approach 
is one-sided. He treats human encounters and the dynamics of communitarian 
interactions too superficially. There is in fact no community without power structures. 
The conscious recognition of authority and its spheres of influence, for instance, if 
agreed upon by the parties involved, can certainly also be a sign of freedom, dialogue 
and consensus precisely as a way of overcoming accumulation of power or oppression. 
The search for a just and truly human account of sociality in our modem society and 
within our church communities, which are used to democratic structures and 
parliamentary power sharing, is however better conceived of as the search for an 
appropriate interpretation of the concepts of power and authority. It is misleading to 
neglect this interrelation and to label the concepts of power and authority as bad and 
evil in themselves or opposed to God's trinitarian being. To do so seems odd because in 
Moltmann's case one could argue the other way round and favour a more "power-
dependent" trinitarian reading precisely because, as Moltmann himself emphasises, the 
alteration of order between the three divine persons implies also a change of the centre 
of activity and this of authority that moves from the Father to the Son and then to the 
Spirit. In other words, one could speak of a distribution of power with changing centres. 
25 Trinittit, 230-5. Cf. Henry Jansen, Relationality and the Concept of God (Amsterdam - Atlanta: 
Editions R9dopi B.V., 1995), l)_6: 'TPe most fulldamental difficulty is Moltmann's distinction between 
freedom as lordship or the absolute power of disposal and freedom as community or generosity and his 
philosophical presupposition that the one excludes the other.' See also John O'Donnell, Trinity and 
Temporality: The Christian Doctrine of God in the Light of Process Theology and the Theology of Hope 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 156-8. 
26 Trinittit, 219-20. 
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Moltmann fails to treat the concepts of power and authority in an appropriate way 
(inherent even in his model of freedom as communion) and thus is not able to develop a 
more fruitful description of human sociality?7 In conclusion then it must be maintained 
that Moltmann's idea of a social doctrine of the Trinity fails paradoxically precisely in 
respect of his analogy of sociality and the notion of community. He ultimately neglects 
his own warning of misleading analogies and consequently is not able to integrate the 
indispensable concepts of power and authority into his model of sociality. A model of 
sociality without the notions of power and authority, especially when viewed through 
the prism of human experience, will not enhance a richer understanding of human 
personhood and communion but rather support a purely utopian view. 
1.2.2 LaCugna: The cOnfusion of theologia and oikonomia 
In her investigation, 28 the American Catholic theologian Catherine LaCugna regains the 
significance of the Nicene Creed and highlights the theological work of the Greek 
Fathers and the one-sided development within Latin theology, which led to a 
deformation of the concept of God and subsequently relegated the doctrine of the 
Trinity ultimately to a sphere of insignificance. The merit of the Cappadocian 
theologians was (this is her claim) to separate and distinguish between the terms ousia 
and hypostasis, terms which up to their time had been used as synonyms for the 
discourse about God's being and subsequently contributed to the confusion and 
obscurity of the interpretation of the Nicene homoousion. At this point, one can observe 
a theological innovation. The precision of language, the separation of two synonyms 
and their subsequent fme and accurate distinction, enabled the Greek Fathers to think 
and conceive something new. The consequence of this move was that the Cappadocians 
could think of God's being as an everlasting and inseparable community. The 
significance of the phrase mia ousia, treis hypostaseis, therefore, depended exactly on 
the accurate distinction between ousia and hypostasis. While hypostasis explained the 
distinction within the being of God (God's being precisely as three persons, as Father, 
27 This weakness also permeates his The Spirit of Life (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992). Under the 
heading of "The Fellowship and Person of the Spirif' Christian fellowship is too superficially 
characterized as friendship and solidarity. 
28 God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (New York: Harper Collins, 1993). 
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Son and Spirit), ousia emphasised the one divine essence and the common divine 
substance. 29 
For the Greek Fathers, LaCugna contends, it was decisive to hold firm to this 
distinction in its inexchangeability, because otherwise we would not be able either to 
confess the particularity of the divine persons, which we must because of the biblical 
traditions, or to assert unity despite distinction, as a confession to the one and only God. 
In order not to succumb to the dangers of Arianism and Modalism, this clarification in 
language and thought was of great importance. 3° Furthermore, it must be stressed that 
for the Cappadocian theologians the one could not be thought of without the other. The 
three divine persons constitute and manifest ultimately the ineffable being of the one 
God. Words by Gregory Nazianzen impressively highlight this notion, when he 
poetically writes: 'I cannot think of the One without immediately being surrounded by 
the radiance of the Three; nor can I discern the Three without at once being carried back 
to the One. ' 31 It is the merit of these theologians that the elaboration of the concept of 
God was not subordinated to a dangerous one-sidedness by giving priority either to the 
notion of unity or to plurality. Rather their theology expressed a dynamic 
interpenetration of the oneness and the threeness of God. 32 
LaCugna connects this approach with the conviction, that '[t]heological 
statements are possible not because we have some independent insight into God, or can 
speak from the standpoint of God, but because God has freely revealed and 
communicated God's self, God's personal existence, God's infinite mystery.'33 Because 
God revealed himself in Jesus Christ through the Holy Spirit and precisely in this way 
showed us his love, we know about God's trinitarian being. Our speech about God, 
thus, has to take up this trinitarian revelation as its starting point. Our speech about God 
is necessarily speech about the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit and therefore a 
speech about God in communion. This consideration leads LaCugna to the conviction 
29 Cf. LaCugna, 'God in Communion with Us. The Trinity', in C. LaCugna (ed.), Freeing Theology: The 
Essentials of Theology in Feminist Perspective (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 83-114. However, 
some disagree with this interpretation of the Greek Fathers and the Latin West: Richard Fermer, 'The 
Limits of Trinitarian Theology as a Methodological Paradigm', Neue Zeitschrift for Systematische 
Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 41 (1999), 158-86; Joseph Lienhard, 'Ousia and Hypostasis: The 
Cappadocian Settlement and the Theology of "One Hypostasis"', in S. Davis, et. al. (eds.), The Trinity 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 99-121. 
30 Godfqr l.fs, 66-7. _ 31 .. "'- ,,_., . ' _, . 
Oratio 40.41, quoted in Thomas Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives: Toward Doctrinal Agreement 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1994), 26. 
32 God for Us, 68. See also Colin Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 150. Hereafter: [The One]. 
33 1bid., 3. 
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that the doctrine of the Trinity and the perception of God as the triune 'is not ultimately 
a teaching about "God" but a teaching about God's life with us and our life with each 
other. It is the life of communion and indwelling, God in us, we in God, all of us in each 
other. ' 34 Central for conceiving theo/ogia (modestly understood as the mystery of God) 
and oikonomia (the comprehensive plan of God reaching from creation to 
consummation) therefore are the concepts of relationship, personhood and 
communion. 35 A relational ontology consequently focuses on these concepts as a 
modality of all existence. In view of this LaCugna concludes: 'This relational ontology 
follows from the fundamental unity of oikonomia and theo/ogia; God's To-Be is To-Be-
in-relationship, and God's being-in-relationship-to-us is what God is. ' 36 
Obviously, LaCugna wants to highlight that the Christian concept of God is a 
relational one. God's being is a being in relation, persons in communion and in virtue of 
that our understanding of God's nature, of his attributes and how God relates to us and 
to the world, must be developed on these grounds. But at this point several problems 
arise. LaCugna, following very closely Raimer's verdict that the economic Trinity is the 
immanent Trinity and vice versa,37 does not give due stress to the otherness of God and 
subsequently puts enormous stress on oikonomia for her elaboration of human 
personhood and community in the image of God. This leads her to the following 
conclusion: 'First, person, not substance, is the ultimate ontological category.' And 
'[t]he ultimate ground and meaning of being is therefore communion among persons.'38 
One is surprised that suddenly Gregory Nazianzen's statement seems to be forgotten 
and the balance between the One and the Three, between essence and persons is lost. In 
virtue of the unity between theologia and oikonomia and the subsequent shift towards 
the priority of persons in communion, LaCugna grounds her concept on the assertion 
that the revelation of divine personhood in the face of Christ is normative for a 
trinitarian ontology.39 It seems to me that this assumption is grounded in a revelation 
positivism, which finds support in the following quotation: 
The clarification of personhood must always be referred to Jesus Christ, who is the 
communion of divine and human, and to the Holy Spirit, who transfigures and deifies 
human beings, uniting all persons, divine and human, in communion. While theology 
34 Ibid., 228. 
35 Ibid., 246. Cf. Stanley Grenz, Rediscovering the Triune God: The Trinity in Contemporary Theology 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004), 153. 
36 Ibid., 250. 
37 For a critique of Rahner's Rule, Randal Rauser, 'Rahner's Rule: An Emperor without Clothes?', 
International Journal ofSystematic Theology 7 (2005), 81-94. 
38 God for Us, 14-5. 
39 Ibid., 15. 
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stands to learn a great deal from cultural, anthropological, philosophical, and 
psychological approaches to personhood, the doctrine of the Trinity ultimately must 
measure its reflection on personhood by the revelation of divine personhood in the face of 
Christ and the activity of the Holy Spirit.40 
Here we are facing the methodological problem of an inappropriate order or 
juxtaposition of theology and human experience as it comes to speech within the human 
sciences. On the one hand, LaCugna wants to measure anthropological claims by the 
revealed truth of Jesus Christ but is, on the other, not reflecting the anthropological 
dependency of any revelatory experience and thus subsequently the fallibility of 
Scripture. One is not surprised, therefore, that the implications drawn are more or less 
reconsiderations and interpretations of scriptural texts and liturgical practices. Thus 
LaCugna ends her study 'by reflecting on the life of communion preached by Jesus 
Christ and undertaken by his followers in baptism.'41 This leads her to some 
questionable implications. One example might suffice at this point when she writes: 
'The theoretical perspective opened out by the doctrine of the Trinity, therefore, was not 
simply theoretical but also political: the primacy of communion among equals, not the 
primacy of one over another, is the hallmark of the reign of the God of Jesus Christ. ' 42 
But how do we shape this communion, if 'God's arche is the shared rule of equal 
persons'cf3 This answer still remains open. In my opinion, it is not adequate when she 
writes in regard of ecclesial life: 'The doctrine of the Trinity reminds us that in God 
there is neither hierarchy nor inequality, neither division nor competition, but only unity 
in love amid diversity. The Christian community is the image or icon of the invisible 
God when its communitarian life mirrors the inclusivity of divine love. '44 In this 
context, too little reflection is offered on the notions of hierarchy, division, competition 
and the significance of responsibility from the angle of human experience. One might 
well ask LaCugna if she can imagine a human community without hierarchy, divisions 
and competitions - and at this point I am not asking the question why these concepts 
only seem to be conceived in a negative way. But if these concepts are part of our 
human condition, then it is questionable what shall be made of such an analogy that the 
Christian community as the image of God should actually be a community, which it 
cannot possibly be, namely a communion without hierarchy, division and competition. 
40 Ibid., 292-3. 
41 Ibid., 382. 
42 1bid., 391. 
43 Ibid., 394. 
44 Ibid., 403. 
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In sum, although she emphasises the importance of the reconception of the 
doctrine of God from a trinitarian perspective, LaCugna is not able to enhance our 
understanding of human life in connection with politics, ethics and ecclesiology in the 
way she promised to do. This is most likely due to a blurred distinction between 
theo/ogia and oikonomia.45 There is a confusion in the conceptions of revelation, 
scripture and human experience where she leaves us in amazement as to where and how 
she ultimately anchors her strong conviction of an objective and normative view of the 
divine personhood in the face of Christ. Thereby she neglects vital insights of human 
experience, which are indispensable for the elaboration of practical implications for 
human life. 
1.2.3 Gunton: Perichoresis and conceptual captivity 
Colin Gunton is a theologian who tries to structure his whole theological enterprise 
from a trinitarian perspective. Gunton is convinced that from a trinitarian point of view 
everything looks different. 'Theology . . . is the enterprise of thought which seeks to 
express conceptually and as well as possible both the being of God and the implications 
of that being for human existence on earth. '46 Subsequently trinitarian theology has to 
fulfil two tasks, first, to help Christians to express their faith in God in a more 
appropriate and intelligible way and, second, explain the content and the meaning of the 
Christian faith to people who are outside the Church. Accordingly Gunton seeks with 
his enterprise to find a way out of some of the dead ends of antiquity and of modern 
times and to search for new and inspiring ways to regain a theological understanding of 
God, humanity and creation in a post-modern world. It is precisely at this point where 
the modern battle between theology, philosophy and modern science takes place. It is 
here where the modern critique of Christianity takes its starting point and Christianity is 
challenged to respond and give answers to the question how human beings might live in 
the modem world despite their experience of suffering and evil. Despite its knowledge 
of being encompassed by a vast universe, theology can still speak in a responsible and 
45 . • . • . ..· ··"·. ~- .. . .,_, ...... . • •. . . .. - •. ·'".. '··- ' ,. 
'Marty of those who understand the subtlety of LaCugna's terminological innovation nevertheless 
remain concerned that the LaCugna corollary collapses God into the economy of salvation ... blurring the 
distinction between Creator and creature ... ': Grenz, Rediscovering the Triune God, 160. 
46 Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1997), 7. Hereafter: 
[Promise]. 
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intelligible way about this universe as creation, about the cross event as salvation and 
about the human being as being created in God's image.47 
In agreement with Moltmann and LaCugna, Gunton is clear about the fact that 
trinitarian theology, not neglecting biblical revelation, must go back behind the failures 
and one-sided developments within the doctrine of God and regain the strength of the 
Greek Fathers in language and theology. Consequently, the vital insight for him is that 
God is a Being-in-communion. In line with the Orthodox theologian John Zizioulas he 
can argue, that '[t]he substance of God, "God", has no ontological content, no true 
be~ng, apart from communion. ' 48 This statement emphasises that the theology of the 
Cappadocians rightly observed that God could not be pressed into the conception of a 
mathematical "one", but rather has to be conceived as a continuous and indivisible 
community.49 The concept ofperichoresis thus gains great significance, a concept which 
originally expressed - in agreement with the Nicene Creed and the theology of the 
Greek Fathers- the mutual dependency and inter-relatedness of the three divine persons. 
The notion "perichoresis" expressed that what one particular divine person is, it is only 
through its relation to the other two, so that ultimately for the understanding of God 
neither the number "one" and thus the monas, nor the plural ''three" could claim 
priority. In this way the concept of perichoresis describes the unity of God as an 
interpenetrating plurality of the three divine persons. The importance of the concept of 
perichoresis lies in its safeguarding function in preventing theology from falling off to 
one or other side of the balance, leading either to a strict monotheism (with the result of 
subordinationism) or to tritheism. Perichoresis supports and conveys the understanding 
that the three persons of the Trinity only exist eternally in mutual interdependency and 
interrelatedness. 'The three do not merely coinhere, but dynamically constitute one 
another's being', they exist in 'reciprocal eternal relatedness.' 50 
Due to his conceptual starting point and his dialogue with traditional theology and 
modem philosophy Gunton' s implications remain to a large degree on a theoretical and 
conceptual level. 51 Writing about the human creation as reflecting the image of God, for 
instance, he concludes after developing a trinitarian framework: 'To be a person is to be 
47 Promise, 26-9. 
48 Promise, 9. 
49 Promise, 10. so--·- ~-··.-'~""t"'·,,._ -· = ~ • , ... _. · 
Gunton, The One, 164. For a critique, Fermer, 'The Limits of Trinitarian Theology as a Methodological 
Paradigm', op. cit. 
51 This is also due to Gunton's overall ambition to develop "open transcendentals" as marks of being 
grounded in the concept of relationality. See especially his sections on the problem of substantiality and 
the particular: The One, 188-204. 
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constituted in particularity and freedom - to be gtven space to be - by others in 
community. Otherness and relation continue to be the two central and polar concepts 
here. ' 52 And in context with the non-personal world, he comments: '[B]eing in the 
image of God has something to do with the human responsibility to offer the creation, 
perfected, back to its creator as a perfect sacrifice of praise. It is here that are to be 
found the elements of truth in the claims that the image of God is to be found in the 
human stewardship of the creation. ' 53 These implications are surely important as 
theological statements but they still remain very abstract and are in need of a more 
concrete and relevant completion. 
Similar observations can be made when Gunton wants to 'move toward an 
ecclesiology of perichoresis: in which there is no permanent structure of subordination' 
but rather the space for 'overlapping patterns of relationships.' 54 It is precisely at this 
point where it becomes clear that Gunton pays too little attention, if at all, to the 
significance of experience in doing theology. Approaches that try to integrate, for 
example, human suffering - and at this point Gunton obviously has Moltmann in mind 
as a writer in the Hegelian tradition - are too easily branded as projectionist. Gunton 
explains: 'Their chief defect is that they tum Christ into a world principle at the expense 
of Jesus of Nazareth, and often construe his cross a focus for the suffering of God rather 
than as the centre of that history in which God overcomes sin and evil. That is to say, 
the doctrine of the Trinity must not be abstracted from the doctrine of the atonement.' 55 
Here we can observe that a conceptual framework is more important to him than the 
need to deal with human experience as the ground for the elaboration of conceptual or 
doctrinal frameworks. Gunton seems to marginalize the human person of Jesus as the 
incarnate God, regarding the doctrines of atonement and salvation as the proper point of 
departure for dealing with the significance of Jesus Christ. He is already presupposing a 
certain doctrinal interpretation of the cross. But from the perspective of human 
experience, the cross is a culmination point of suffering and people who do suffer find it 
very helpful to meditate upon Jesus on the cross as the suffering God. It appears 
paradoxical that Gunton criticises Moltmann who is really concerned about the 
suffering Jesus of Nazareth as a human being and as the Son of God for using trinitarian 
categories 'in order to discern the work of the divine Spirit largely or chiefly from 
52 Promise, 114. 
53 Promise, 115. 
54 Promise, 80. 
55 Father, Son and Holy Spirit: Toward a fully Trinitarian Theology (London: T. & T. Clark, 2003), 25. 
18 
immanent patterns of modem history and social development. ' 56 Christ is not at all 
turned into a world principle in Moltmann at the expense of Jesus of Nazareth, but 
rather Jesus of Nazareth as a human person is his point of departure. One feels inclined 
to ask Gunton from where he draws his analogies discerning the work of the divine 
Spirit and the significance of Jesus' death if the possibility ofthe immanent patterns of 
history seems to be ruled out. Gunton himself seems to be inconsistent precisely at this 
point when he states, that 'it remains the case that any identification of God apart from 
Jesus of Nazareth is in danger of becoming an abstraction,' and that 'we must place 
ourselves theologically where the action is, because if we turn away from God's actual 
historical self-identification in Jesus, we simply manufacture an idol, or a series of 
idols.'57 But his Jesus of Nazareth and his understanding of God's 'action' appear to be 
identical with the doctrine of atonement and not with the life of Jesus as a human being. 
Gunton's whole approach is in danger of abstraction! Furthermore, what about the Old 
Testament images of God, what about the narratives which convey many theological 
depictions of how and who God is? Are they simply idolatrous because they do not 
stand on Gunton's conceptual presuppositions? However that may be, what does 
become obvious is that the centrality of Jesus of Nazareth is for Gunton a conceptual 
one and the emphasis on the notion of God's action is conceived in terms of the 
doctrines of creation, redemption (atonement) and consummation. Not surprisingly, 
notions such as fear, suffering, power or the search for meaning, which are vital 
concepts for human persons in their everyday struggle with life, hardly tum up at all in 
his exploration of the concepts of personhood, relatedness and otherness. 
In conclusion then and without denying the promise of trinitarian theology, one 
has to be clear about the underlying conditions and presuppositions one makes in order 
to apply the concepts of relationality and communion to the doctrine of God and 
subsequently to anthropology or ecclesiology.58 To put the matter in more general 
terms, a mere substitution of an ontology of being with an ontology of communion just 
will not do. First, there is the problem of direct analogy which conceives the divine 
persons in the same way as we understand human persons and, second, it is too easily 
assumed that putting sociality over individualism solves the problem of domination and 
56 Ibid., 25. 
57 Ibid., 26. . . 
58 Siiriiiar problems occur especially in concepts.ofthe fifi.tiiy which use relationality as an ontological 
category and speak of God as relationality: Ted Peters, God as Trinity: Relationality and Temporality in 
Divine Life (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993); Elizabeth Johnson, She Who Is: The 
Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse (New York: Crossroad, 1994 ); David Cunningham, 
These Three Are One: The Practice of Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998). 
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hierarchy.59 Instead of a proper relational approach this often seems to me more like 
giving the notion of the Three priority over the One. Finally, the weight put on the 
notion of communion is gained without any deep encounter with human experience. 
Doctrinal and philosophical reflections come first, neglecting to a large degree the fact 
that human experience plays epistemologically a vital role in our perception of 
relationality, communion and personhood. Regarding this, it is not surprising that the 
conclusions drawn do not yet illustrate adequately the promised implications for human 
life. 
1.3 THROUGH THE PRliSM OF THE CHURCH AND 1liUMAN EXPERIENCE 
1.3.1 Inadequate correlation between theology and ministry 
Despite all the new and helpful conceptions which so many theologians over the last 
thirty years have elaborated in giving the doctrine of the Trinity their full attention, one 
is still left uneasy when searching for the promising and challenging implications for 
Christian life. Many of the contemporary trinitarian studies stay within the realm of 
dogmatic theology trying to reform the traditional formulations of the doctrine of the 
Trinity. Probably as a result of this main theological thrust, theologians who try to 
depict implications are too readily applying their kind of communitarian pre-
understanding to society or the Church. Moltmann, as we have already noticed above, 
seems to ground his trinitarian implications too simply on a critique of political and 
clerical monotheism, which suggests that a communitarian view is the answer to 
oppression. LaCugna, in a similar way, under the headline of "Living Trinitarian Faith", 
grounds her implications on the conclusion: 'Entering into the life of God means 
entering in the deepest way possible into the economy, into the life of Jesus Christ, into 
the life of the Spirit, into the life of others .. . Entering into divine life therefore is 
impossible unless we also enter into a life of love and communion with others. ' 60 Again, 
the key word "communion" seems to be the answer for a new revival of the Church and 
for overcoming hierarchical and oppressive structures. This is not to say that I do not 
appreciate what Moltmann and LaCugna try to do. But a substitution of an ontology of 
being by an ontology of communion (emphasising the notions of love, freedom and 
dialogue) does not autoniaticaiiy'cilange~lliecnatllre of a<htmicill comirlunlon as long as 
59 Cf. Bauckham, 'JOrgen Moltmann's The Trinity', op. cit. 
60 God for Us, 382. [Italics original.] 
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the inherent problems of any human community - posed by the concepts of rule, 
structure, power and inter-dependence - are not adequately addressed and dealt with. 
From another perspective, this "uneasy-ness" is also rooted in the observation that 
the ordinary Christian in the local church is more or less indifferent to the doctrine of 
the Trinity. If one looks towards developments within church bodies and is attentive to 
discussions about "how we should fulfil our mission as the people of God", then there is 
often more attention paid to propositions derived from social management than from 
theology. Has this something to do with a gap between theology and ministry? 
Theology seems to be responsible for elaborating Christian doctrines which build the 
ground for ecclesial confessions and liturgy, but once it comes to so called "practical 
questions", about ministry and subsequently how to structure churches, how to deal 
with offices, financial problems or how to counsel people, one is inclined to surmise 
that much more reliance is put on sociological, economical and psychological insights. 
Even within universities and seminaries, there still seems to be a gap between 
systematic theology and practical theology. Yet the former, concerned with Christian 
doctrine, is seen as the core of theology, while the latter, concerned with ministry, 
pastoral care and homiletics, is subordinated as an appendix to theology, where one only 
has to apply theological insights. 
But doing theology has everything to do with asking the right questions. The 
outcome of an investigation depends to a large degree on the questions that the 
investigator poses and engages with. But how can theology ask the right questions, if it 
does not engage in a mutual dialogue with Christians at the local base of the Church or 
at least with practical theology? Looking at contemporary trinitarian theology and the 
promising statement of radical consequences for Christian life, one is compelled to 
conclude that the wrong questions are being put forward. If the Trinity 'is not regarded 
as one doctrine among others in the doctrinal scheme of Christian dogmatics', but 'is 
seen as determining the systematic structure of Christian dogmatics and its content in all 
its parts', and 'radically affects the exposition of who is the God in whom Christians 
believe, and the presentation of what can be asserted about God's being and the God-
world relationship,' 61 one is surprised why trinitarian theology has not really affected, 
changed or reformed the life of the Church. Are the questions posed and then answered 
by theologians engaged in trinitarian theology questions within a philosop!llcal-
• --.:" ,,,, ·/· • ' . • . ··">1 • -- __ , -
theological realm that are not correlated with modern human experience and life? Is the 
61 C. Schw<>bel, 'Introduction', in C. Schw<>bel and C. Gunton (eds.), Persons, Divine and Human 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1991), 10. 
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theological enterprise still a one-way street, where the theologian, out of his 
philosophical reflections, offers the ordinary Christian his or her advice and 
knowledge?62 
If there lies any truth in these observations, even just a little, then this would entail 
that the realms of theological enterprise and the basic experiences of Christians are not 
properly linked. There is an un-bridged gap between philosophical theology and grass 
root theology, between the academic sphere and human life. The consequence of such a 
gap is necessarily the subordination of basic human experience to systematic theology, 
and thus a subordination of faith-grounded experience to doctrine and philosophical 
investigation. One starts to wonder whether theology is really a function of faith and of 
human life, given in order to understand our relatedness to God and the human other, or 
whether it is rather a function of the Church with its agreed doctrines. This leads to 
some more fundamental questions. 
1.3.2 Inadequate correlation between Church and faith 
Wilfried Harle starts the exposition of his Dogmatik with the definition: 'Theology is a 
function of faith. Christian theology therefore is a function of the Christian faith. ' 63 This 
statement, which might seem rather simple and for some people maybe too self-evident 
even to mention, can help shed light on some of the contemporary problems within 
trinitarian theology, problems which are grounded in the presupposition of a 
theologian's work. In saying this I have particularly in mind Karl Barth's dictum for his 
Church Dogmatics: 'Dogmatics is a theological discipline. But theology is a function of 
the Church. ' 64 This definition is not opposed to the one Harle uses but, nevertheless, it 
is not identical with the former. The term Church implies the social community of 
believers and, moreover, since we live in a divided Christianity with many 
denominations, the term Church becomes even more problematic in the sense that it is 
easily equated with one's own Church. But the necessity for doing theology does not 
arise in the first place out of the emergence of a particular community. The reality of 
faith in a person's life is the primary cause for doing theology, because it is God's own 
62 For an account of th~ iqlpo~9e of !~Hgious language and experience and how they relate to ~ 
theological discourse, Jeff Astley, Exploring God-talk: Using Language in Religion (London: Darton, 
Longman and Todd, 2004). 
63 Wilfried Hllrle, Dogmatik (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1995), 10. [My translation.] 
64 Church Dogmatics, Ill, 3. See also Barth's ambiguous reference to science in his Dogmatics in Outline 
(SCM Press, 2001), 1-6. 
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claim on this person's life in which theological reflection is based. The presupposition 
''theology as a function of the Church" immediately entails ecclesiology and therefore 
tends to give the group of believers the primary place in the reflection of faith. Of 
course, we always find ourselves standing within the community of believers; there is 
no point outside of an already existing community of believers and thus there is no 
isolated and independent "I". But there is a difference between saying "I am 
indissolubly embedded in relations" and assuming that "communion is primary to 
person". The latter easily deprives persons of their ultimate uniqueness and God-given 
particularity. Therefore, to state that theology is a function of faith highlights the 
essential insight that all theological reflection must ultimately be faithful to God rather 
than depending on doctrines and being faithful to the Church. 65 The community of 
believers has to be aware and take seriously the fact that God's reality in each person's 
life is the starting point for doing theology in its most fundamental meaning.66 Truth, 
although we cannot do without social structures, does not ultimately and necessarily 
depend upon majorities. 
This is important to notice because throughout the Church's history, theology was 
and still is in danger of becoming and being mainly a vehicle of the Church, which is 
probably most obvious in Catholic or Orthodox tradition, but I would argue that this is 
the case for many Protestant churches also in following Barth's definition of theology as 
a function of the Church. When theology becomes subordinate to ecclesiology, or to put 
it in words more appropriate with trinitarian language, when person becomes 
subordinate to community, it dilutes its critical strength and is in danger of forgetting its 
primary task of reflecting Christian faith and life in order to assist the Christian on his 
or her journey with God. When loosing the sensibility of this distinction, how can the 
Church remain an ecclesia semper reformanda? An ontology of communion transferred 
to the Church, as the Body of Christ, easily becomes a means of obscuring power and 
authority. To this problem I will turn in the next section. 
65 .-" -···· '~;,~ ........ -.--- ,>,;.-;:=- ······>·;-,F-;-::0._;~,;-_·.··,. . - .-.~.,-. "· . ·-· -~ - ' .,. '" . -... 
Cf. Geoffrey Wainwnght, Doxology: The Praise of God in Worship, Doctrine, and Life (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1980), 1-4. 
66 
'Theologie aber ist eine Aufgabe aller Christen. Ich glaube an ein allgemeines Theologentum aller 
GUiubigen, ihrem allgemeinen Priestertum entsprechend': Moltmann, Die Quel/e des Lebens. Der Heilige 
Geist und die Theologie des Lebens (Glltersloh: Kaiser, 1997), 9. 
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1.3.3 Ecclesiological captivity 
These assumptions seem to find some support from observations drawn from 
contemporary trinitarian theological discourse. Let us go back to LaCugna's statement. 
The remark that the doctrine of the Trinity is ultimately a practical doctrine is obviously 
a first hint why radical consequences have not yet been drawn, because for most 
theologians the doctrine itself- as delivered by the Fathers with all their philosophical 
presuppositions, their engagement in substance metaphysics, the dualism of body and 
soul or the sharp distinction of the finite and the infinite - is the starting point and centre 
of investigation. But one may question whether, after the philosophical and 
anthropological turn to relationality,67 this is still a reasonable starting point for 
developing a new understanding of the triune being of God? This attempt may lead to a 
new understanding of tradition but does it lead to a reformation of theology and thus to 
challenging implications for human life? 
Although so much is said about the fact that Greek philosophy prevailed over 
theology in shaping many of our Christian doctrines, and that a strict Christian 
monotheism subdued the notion of God's 'being-in-communion' and in virtue of that 
had devastating consequences for Church and society, one is really puzzled that this 
whole discussion of the Trinity and its implications for Christian life seems to be only a 
topic on the academic agenda for theologians concerned with Christian doctrine. Even 
more perplexing is the fact that though most of the concepts are based on God as a 
being-in-communion, on the notion of perichoresis and therefore on personhood and 
relationship as two main categories for the perception of God and for an analogy for 
human life in the image of God, most theologians have no problem in integrating their 
newly perceived views into the existing mainline ecclesiology of their denomination.68 
Are our theological investigations subdued to the prevailing doctrines and powers 
within the church? 
Let us briefly look back at the beginnings of Christianity. A first pointer toward 
ecclesiological captivity can already be found within the developments of the early 
Church. As far as I can see, although the Fathers engaged very deeply in shaping the 
doctrine of the Trinity, they obviously had no problems in juxtaposing the doctrine of 
67 For a discussion of the turn to relationality see below Chapter Three. 
68 Leonardo Boff, Trinity and Society (Burns and Oates: Search Press, 1988); John Zizioulas, Being as 
Communion (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1985); William Hill, The Three-Personed God, 
(Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1982). 
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the Trinity and the emperor made so by God's grace. Here we can observe that the 
elaboration of the doctrine of the Trinity did not really necessitate salient implications 
for ecclesiology and Christian life. This is not surprising considering the fact that the 
growing Church - organizing, structuring and creating its life and practices in 
confrontation with Jewish groups and in opposition to heretics - developed and shaped 
its ecclesiology long before the doctrine of the Trinity was a proper matter of concern. 
Moreover, ecclesiological convictions and the structuring of ecclesial sociality initially 
were derived from Scripture, which obviously contains many monarchical and 
hierarchical images and some detailed household codes. 
By contrast and as a relatively late development, the teaching about the Trinity, 
deeply embedded in apologetic disputes, emerged out of doctrinal and philosophical 
concerns as a means of safeguarding the divinity of Jesus and an appropriate 
understanding of salvation. Trinitarian language functioned as a tool for the doctrinal 
explication of the doctrine of God trying to make sense of the Christian confession of 
Jesus as Lord and Saviour. Thus the shaping of ecclesial communion and the trinitarian 
doctrine of God did not necessarily correlate with one another. This initial 
disconnectedness was further supported through the emphasis in St. Augustine's 
theology in which the formula una substantia - Ires personae was central precisely 
because talk about God as the one substance became the prevailing approach in the 
enterprise of developing a doctrine of God.69 The notion of God's perichoretic being 
and his communitarian nature did not gain sufficient weight capable of influencing and 
challenging other realms of theology. Miroslav Volf thus states in his study on the 
matter quite plainly and soberly that one should not overestimate the influence of 
trinitarian thought on political or ecclesiological realities.70 It appears to be the case that 
the view of a preceding ecclesiological givenness (prior to all doctrinal development), in 
the body of Christ, with already existing beliefs was seen as the main foundation and 
starting point for any theological enterprise. 
69 See lacugna, God/orils, lot; Moltm~~in,·Trinitat, 32. 
70 
'One should not, however, overestimate the influence of trinitarian thinking on political and ecclesial 
reality. Thus, for example, the bishops of the fifth century apparently sensed no contradiction between an 
affmnation of trinitarian faith and the sacralization of the emperor': After Our Likeness: The Church as 
the Image of the Trinity (Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1998), 194. 
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What shall be made of contemporary asswnptions, for example, when John 
Zizioulas puts his Orthodox conviction first before he even starts his theological 
investigations?71 
The Church is not simply an institution. She is a "mode of existence," a way of being. 
The mystery of the Church, even in its institutional dimension, is deeply bound to the 
being of man, to the being of the world and to the very being of God. In virtue of this 
bond, so characteristic of patristic thought, ecclesiology assumes marked importance, not 
only for all aspects of theology, but also the existential needs of man in every age.72 
And what about the Catholic conviction stated by Vatican ll in the decree on 
ecumenism that only through the Roman Catholic Church has one full access to 
salvation?73 
In saying this, my point is to argue that we cannot easily and in an immediate way 
deduce political or ecclesiological concepts from the doctrine of the Trinity, just 
because the notion of "communion" seems to be a central one. Of course - and 
Moltmann at this point is surely too superficial in his opinion when he says, that a unity 
model entails oppressive dominance structures 74 - the notion of community does not 
automatically answer the question of power and authority, because, as David Brown 
rightly observes, a community of persons, for instance three-man juntas, can also be 
oppressive and act in a manner not distinct at all from a monarch or if one wants to put 
it more negatively, from a dictator.75 But if our understanding of God is and always 
must be the foundation for doctrinal development and thus the starting point for 
elaborating an ecclesiology or other implications for our comprehension of hwnan life 
and reality, does this not imply a change of priority or at least the search for a more 
appropriate balance between the doctrine of God and ecclesiological convictions? My 
conclusion then is that the development of the doctrine of the Trinity and its current 
revitalization has not necessarily entailed a revision or a re-thinking of basic 
ecclesiological assumptions and other realms ofhuman social life. 
71 Volf (After Our Likeness, chapter 5) and Gunton (Promise, 60) criticise Zizioulas for being incoherent 
in his ecclesiological inferences. 
: ~~!'!Kf!~,£f!'!!l!1}1!!/9f!._ •. _I_~,:,£fd~: fox, Gl!rl9~J;f!!!l!!!~!Jion, ~19. 
'Denn nur dirrch die katholische Kirche Christi, die das allgemeine Hilfsmittel des Heils ist, kann man 
Zutritt zu der ganzen Ftllle der Heilsmittel haben': K. Rahner und H. Vorgrimler, Kleines 
Konzilslwmpendium. Siimtliche Texte des Zweiten Vatikanums (Freiburg: Herder, 1996), 233. 
74 Moltmann, Trinitiit, 208-17. 
75 David Brown, The Divine Trinity (London: Duckworth, 1985), 308. 
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1.3.4 Metaphysical captivity 
lbis leads to another observation. Contemporary trinitarian theology seems to be still a 
captive of metaphysics. lbis is not to deny that philosophical, sophisticated and 
intelligible reflection is important for doing theology - far from it. But there is a 
difference between reflecting our understanding of God and human personhood and 
communion in the light of human thought, knowledge, and culture and, as it still seems 
to be in contemporary trinitarian theology, in the light of Greek and medieval 
philosophical systems and presuppositions. Thus the starting point for many theologians 
still is a doctrinal exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity, a historical survey of Greek 
and Hebrew thought, or a modem concept of theism and atheism. The questions asked 
are mainly questions from tradition or from philosophical discourse and thus 
theologians still feel urged to reconcile the philosophical question of the One and the 
Many in search for the Absolute. As a result, the main basis for the exposition of the 
concept of personhood in trinitarian thought still adheres to a large extent to a dialogue 
with substance metaphysics. Modem trinitarian theology, it seems to me, engages in 
highly sophisticated, philosophical discussions in which the ongoing discourse is again 
and overall a battle on philosophical grounds and presuppositions as it tries to untangle 
the web of a hybrid deity. 76 That ongoing attempt at finding the best philosophical 
framework for understanding the Trinity as such, even as persons-in-communion, easily 
reduces to a search for the absolute and consequently for authority. Zizioulas, for 
example, ultimately substitutes an ontology of being based on the notion of substance 
with an ontology of communion based on the concept of person. Despite all his salient 
work in enhancing our apprehension of God as personal, as a being-in-communion 
rather than as an absolute substance, he uses his ontology of communion as a new 
absolute for God's being. lbis serves him not just as an analogy between God and the 
Church, but also as a prop for the authority of ecclesial communion. Here the observer 
cannot fail to notice that it is rather the unquestioned assumption of the divine givenness 
of the existent ecclesial communion which determines his discourse on the doctrine of 
the Trinity. Consequently Zizioulas' trinitarian insights do not at all critique the 
ecclesial being but rather explain and justify things the way they are. The reader is left 
with the enigma how one c~ elabol1l!e an o~tology ()f communion, ~d. a concept of 
perichoresis, of persons in mutual relationship, without mentioning the notion of power 
76 Cf. Hill, The Three-Personed-God; Boff, Trinity and Society; Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ 
(London: SCM Press, 1983). 
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and authority, and consequently not alluding to deep seated problems within the Church 
itself, as for example male dominance and the supremacy of clergy. 
At this point it is worthwhile noticing that the traditional notion of "mystery" still 
plays an important role in trinitarian theology. To speak of the mystery of God is correct 
in so far as it is applied to the notion of God's ineffability, that God and the conception 
of the Trinity ultimately always transcends our understanding and goes beyond our 
knowledge. But if the concept of mystery is used in a derived sense, for instance, in the 
mystery of faith or the mystery of the Church, it is easily assumed that God's absolute 
essence, in one way or another, lives on in the believer or in the community of the 
Church as something that we possess. Very often pneumatology is the justification for 
confusing God as Spirit with we are in the Spirit, and the mystery of God as Spirit 
suddenly becomes the mystery of us having the Spirit, with the ecclesiological 
consequence of a substantial equation between Christ and the body of the church.77 
Consequently one has to be very careful that all this does not become an obfuscating 
concept and thus a means of keeping the status quo, and so ultimately a vehicle of 
power and authority in the hands of the powers that be. 
1.3.5 The neglect of biblical experience 
A further weakness seems to be a lack of proper integration of biblical experience. It is 
fascinating to observe that biblical texts to a large degree only function as a proof for 
the necessity of the doctrine of the Trinity as 'biblical'. William Hill in his The Three-
Personed God starts his investigation with a biblical survey in order to show that the 
Trinity is already 'present' in the Bible, what he calls the ''New Testament Matrix of the 
Trinity". But once this is said and the doctrine of the Trinity subsequently endorsed as 
"biblical", the Bible thereafter does not play an important role any more. In a similar 
way this is true of Robert Jenson's work The Triune Identity where he begins with a 
biblical investigation of the name of God. He then concludes: "'Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit" is appropriate to name the gospel's God because the phrase immediately 
summarizes the primal Christian interpretation of God.' 78 After that, the following 
discourse is based on traditional doctrinal and philosophical grounds. Scripture appears 
77 Cf. Zizioulas' position: 'All s~p~ti~n .betwee~ Christology and eccle~iol~jzy vanishes in the Spirit .... 
So we can say without risk of exaggeration that Christ exists only pneumatologically, whether in His 
distinct personal particularity or in His capacity as the body of the Church and the recapitulation of all 
things': Being as Communion, Ill. 
78 The Triune Identity (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), 18. 
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to be a mere jumping board or launching pad to ground the discourse in biblical 
revelation, but subsequently trinitarian reflection is dominated by metaphysics and the 
search for ontologies. 
In his book Act and Being Colin Gunton speaks very challengingly of the pitfalls 
of theological tradition that neglects revelation as the source of our knowability of God. 
In this work, mainly concerned with the divine attributes, he claims that the Christian 
doctrine of God's names, perfections and characteristics was built, in the first instance, 
on Greek philosophical presuppositions about God's being. Although he insists quite 
strongly, and I would fully agree with him, that in Christian theology 'the Old 
Testament was effectively displaced by Greek philosophy as the theological basis of the 
doctrine of God, certainly so far as the doctrine of the divine attributes is concerned,' 79 
he does not aim for a "biblical way" of integrating the Old Testament into his 
enterprise. Even though he claims the inherent problem of the doctrine of God lies in 
the divine attributes, which is, quoting Schwobel, 'the antinomy between the 
conceptions of the divine attributes in philosophical theology and discourse about divine 
action in Christian faith, ' 80 he is not able to integrate Hebrew thought. He criticises the 
tradition. Yet while he makes some good proposals for how we can speak about and use 
God's attributes in a more adequate way, he still sticks to the traditional discourse in 
that he discusses the attributes found in tradition. This is because the fundamental 
statement that 'God's being is known in and through his action, his triune act, ' 81 is, 
throughout our theological language, always seen through the lenses of the doctrines of 
creation, redemption and consummation. In other words: When we talk about God's 
actions, we talk about abstract theological conceptions but not about the stories we find 
in Scripture. 
However, when Hebrews talk about divine actions, they tell stories. They talk 
from the depths of human experience; they open up their souls, because their 'God-
walk' is shaping their 'God-talk. ' 82 There seems to be a gap, which we do not face 
seriously enough, because we still tend to overrule biblical-story-language with 
philosophical-logical-language, or because we assume that our theological doctrines 
when we speak of creation, redemption and consummation are identical with God's 
79 Act and Being~· Towards a Theology ofthe Divine Attributes (London: SCM Press, 2002), 3. 
80 Ibia., 21-2: ·. ' 
81 Ibid., 113. 
82 The double expression "God-walk and God-talk" I owe to Frederick Herzog which I came across 
through the reading of Theology from the Belly of the Whale: A Frederick Herzog Reader, ed. Joerg 
Rieger (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 1999). 
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action in his revelation. Over and over again we come across the assertion that "God's 
being is known in and through his action." But if revelation history is the primary 
source of our understanding of God, where is the promised encounter with biblical 
theology? It seems to me that modem trinitarian theology engages in highly 
sophisticated, philosophical discussions in which the ongoing discourse is again and 
overall a battle on philosophical grounds and presuppositions.83 Furthermore, though far 
from insisting that we should negate the importance of philosophical language, it is 
questionable why abstract language should be treated as more adequate, more truthful, 
and more appropriate than the narrative language by which people express their 
theological experience. The above-mentioned antinomy between philosophical theology 
and discourse about divine action in Christian faith seems always be dissolved in favour 
of the former. 
1.3.6 The neglect of anthropology 
Earlier on, we observed that a metaphysical captivity still rules in theology. The search 
for systems and ontologies appears as a stumbling block for concrete implications 
because human life does not revolve around theories about essence, substance or 
ontologies of community and personhood, but around the notion of life, with all its 
struggle for surviving, overcoming fear, and striving for meaning. Although the 
conception of God as being-in-communion offers various fields of interpretation and 
analogies for human life, the discourse still is to a large degree a purely philosophical 
one. 84 One reason for this can be found in a false dichotomy between theology and 
anthropology, an observation which finds support in Douglas Davies' recent comment, 
that systematic theologians 'are reluctant to admit anthropological notions into their 
83 Cf. Alan Torrance, Persons in Communion: An Essay on Trinitarian Description and Human 
Participation (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1996). Torrance exhaustively examines the manner in which 
language functions in the context of trinitarian descriptions without, although engaging with Wittgenstein, 
paying proper attention to the "Lebensformen", that is human experience and life as it is lived. 
Consequently be invokes a doxological model and speaks of semantic participation in the Trinity. 
84 Cf. Steven Holmes, 'Trinitarian Missiology: Towards a Theology of God as Missionary', International 
Journal of Systematic Theology 8 (2006), 72-90. Holmes has developed an interesting trinitarian 
missiology based on the doctrine of the divine missions, which allows him to say that God is properly 
described as missionary. 'Purposeful, self-sacrificial acts of loving concern flowing from the Father 
~<;>~ -~~ ~~IJ ~~1, §P..l!:i! ts>.til.e W,2rl~tG.QclJt~ g:~l!.t~d are fundamental-images of who God-is,Arom all 
eternity' (p.88). But what then should a missionary church look like in the image of God? His answer is: 
'Just as purposeful, cruciform, self-sacrificial sending is intrinsic to God's own life, being sent in a 
cruciform, purposeful, self-sacrificial way must be intrinsic to the church being the church' (p.89). These 
implications are surely important as theological statements but they still remain very abstract and are in 
need of a more concrete and relevant completion. 
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studies, and have tended to have philosophy as their dialogue-partner. ' 85 These two 
terms still wait for reconciliation. I wonder if this dichotomy is closely connected with 
the treatment of theology as a function of the Church rather than of faith. The Church 
seems to be the warrant for theology, while "faith", understood as the subjective 
understanding of a single person's belief, is closely connected with anthropology. 
Certainly, it seems that many theologians are suspicious of anthropology, which is one 
reason why the integration of human experience seems to be hardly possible, an 
integration which is overdue in trinitarian theolo~. 
This dichotomy between theology and anthropology seems to be based on another 
ambiguity and ambivalence, namely freedom and necessity and in a Barthian manner, a 
sharp distinction between Creator and creature, between God and human. It is very 
illuminating to study the reactions of some theologians to Pannenberg's work, where 
Pannenberg is branded as being an 'anthropologist' while the other side feels urged to 
safeguard 'theology', putting on the role of the defender of God's aseity and freedom. 
One feels inclined to parallel this discussion to the book of Job. John Thompson, for 
example, in a critique of Pannenberg's theology,86 is not able to sense the 
embeddedness of human beings in history and creatureliness in a way that all our God-
talk is provisional and we have to distinguish this condition from the doxological creed 
that Christ is the truth. It is interesting how he reacts to Pannenberg's struggle, for 
instance, with religious dialogue: 'There may be "truths" and "lights" in the world that 
God uses to make himself known especially in other religions than the Christian. But 
such truths and lights are to be measured by the one truth and light of God in Jesus 
Christ rather than being seen as contributory phases necessarily leading to its fullness. ' 87 
I will not go into detail, but what one can sense here, is a certain type of fear, due to a 
confusion of two distinct things. It is one thing to confess and say that Christ is God-
Son and thus ultimate truth and fullness. But it is something else to say, that we are able 
to measure the truths of other people. Of course we have to, if we take dialogue 
seriously, but always as an open process, where the other could contribute an insight, 
which enhances our understanding of God and Christ. All we have is limited 
knowledge; even the words of Jesus are embedded in the human condition and depend 
on human interpretation. Thus, to acknowledge that non-Christians can contribute to my 
knowledge of God and thus help to understand God more fully is not in contradiction 
85 Anthropology and Theology (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 2. 
86 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Volume I (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991). 
87 John Thompson, Modern Trinitarian Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 138. 
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with the fullness of Christ. A similar objection we fmd in one of Christoph Schwobel's 
essays, when he concludes, that 'the relationship of theological anthropology to non-
theological anthropologies should not so much be seen in terms of a possible 
(theological) synthesis, but in terms of a dialogue.' 88 And he comments in a footnote 
that this indicates his 'criticism of Pannenberg's attempt to provide a foundation for 
Christian anthropology in general anthropological studies. ' 89 Again, one is surprised 
how Schwobel is able to separate these two realms so clearly, if he wants to draw 
conclusions that are reasonable for human reason and knowledge not just within the 
realm ofthe Church. Certainly, we must distinguish the two realms because we cannot 
subsume the non-theological anthropologist under the Christian roof. While theology 
assumes that God exists and underlies religious experience, anthropology tends to 
assume that God does not exist and thus simply studies the reported experiences of 
people. 90 But the relational interdependency forbids us to put one theoretically over the 
other, as if concepts from a non-theological anthropologist would automatically be 
opposed to theological concepts. If statements about the human condition are true, they 
ultimately have to be true for theologians and anthropologists. Of course, and 
Pannenberg himself is conscious of this peril, one has to be careful not to be occupied 
just with reported human experience, neglecting God's unconditioned work through the 
Holy Spirit. But this in no way weakens Pannenberg's argument, that, if theology does 
not want to deceive itself, it must engage from the very start in reflections on the 
fundamental significance of anthropology for modem thought and the perception of 
human and religious experience if it wants to confer relevance and universal validity 
upon theological claims concerning the human condition.91 
Anthropology might seem to threaten God-talk as proper God-talk, as if there 
could be such a thing as pure theology at all. This assumption somehow, however, 
obscures the fundamental insight that all God-talk is 'anthropological theology'. This is 
not to say that theology is dissolved in human anthropology, as if there would be such a 
thing as human anthropology isolated from theological anthropology and vice versa, but 
it is to argue that there is for us no point where we can step outside of our human 
createdness. When revelation is understood as God's dialogue with human beings, his 
88 C. Schwobel, 'H~ Being as RelatiQnal ~~blg', in C. Schwobel and C. Gunton (eels.), Persons, 
Divine and Human (Editibuigh: T. & T. Clark, 1991), 145. 
89 Ibid., footnote 7. 
90 Davies, Anthropology and Theology, 1. 
91 Pannenberg, Anthropologie in theologischer Perspektive (GOttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983), 
15-6. 
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presence in my life and in the world, then I live and think automatically under this 
condition. My experiences and my knowledge are conditioned by faith. This means, I 
acknowledge the reality of God and his presence in the world and I acknowledge that 
God communicates with human beings in whatsoever way is appropriate. I 
acknowledge that there are words and knowledge which are not just human words, but 
which we know and can only know because God reveals himself. At the same time, 
faith, and subsequently all revealed knowledge, is inescapably embedded in created 
time and space. Knowledge of God, expressions of divine attributes, and all speech 
about God depends on the human condition. Consequently, although I believe that 
God's Word is not identical with human words and knowledge, it is always expressed 
through human words, which depend on historicity, culture, language, and 
interpretation. There is no way that I can draw a sharp demarcation line between God's 
Word and human words, experience, and knowledge about God. At this point it is 
essential to mention Pannenberg's fundamental insight, that even an appeal to 
inspiration as distinct from revelation, as some theologians wish to do92, first, does not 
decide the truth of such experienced inspiration as divine, and second, is always 
automatically followed and conveyed by interpretation, which is mediated by the 
context of experience.93 Everything human people utter theologically falls under the 
verdict of created limitedness and therefore remains provisional, but simultaneously this 
God-talk, as a response to God's speaking to us, is always meaningful, because it 
emerges out of our God-walk. The relationship between revelation and human language 
thus must be conceived as interpretation, but at the same time we can say that the 
interpretation of revelation by language is steered by revelation through faith.94 Thus 
while theologians like Thompson do seem to have a clear and sharp picture of what 
Christian revelation concretely means and entails, they succumb to "revelation 
positivism", which we already find in Barth, and are therefore not able to appreciate 
anthropology as God's gift and not as a threat.95 It is here that we envisage the necessity 
of giving the doctrine of incarnation a higher priority in order to overcome a false 
92 E.g. W. Abraham, The Divine Inspiration of Holy Scripture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
93 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 1:234. 
94 Cf. E. JOnge1, Gott als Geheimnis der Welt (TUbingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 334-57. 
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s A further example is Paul Molnar's Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity 
(~R~: ]. & I· }~1~~.2QQ~)d~tPJ!!!!• J!L~a!9~~e ,~th ~!fl B~ an(_l cont~mP9~WY tijJritarj@D 
theology, wants to develop an immanent doctrine of the Trinity that clarifies divine and human freedom 
and avoids agnosticism, monism and dualism. He launches a massive neo-Barthian attack against 
contemporary trinitarian theologians accusing them of not allowing the Word of God revealed to dictate 
the meaning of theological categories rather than experience. In my view, his understanding of revelation 
and experience is not tenable. 
33 
opposition between theology and anthropology, which is one reason why trinitarian 
theology has not yet properly appreciated and consequently integrated biblical stories 
and anthropological insights for describing the relational being of God. 
1.4 CONCLUSION 
We have looked at contemporary trinitarian theology from two perspectives, first, 
through the prism of theology and, second, through the prism of Church and human 
experience. From both angles we came across similar blindspots and weaknesses that 
find their common link in the neglect of human experience. Drawing all those threads 
together, let me briefly summarize. 
First, while speaking of personhood and communion, we have noticed that the 
notions of power and authority were neglected. At this point there is further need for 
discussion if we want to draw conclusions from a communitarian or perichoretic 
understanding of God for Christian life; otherwise a concept of a social Trinity or of an 
ontology of communion is most likely to become either a vehicle for one's personal 
perception of an ideal community or a means of obfuscation in favour of the powers that 
be. 
Second, in relation to the doctrine of revelation, a false dichotomy between 
theology and anthropology was noted, which inhibited a more fruitful discourse with 
human experience and insights from the human sciences. Anthropology here is 
understood in a wide and open sense, indicating all areas of research that contribute to 
our understanding of what it means to be human - usually carried out by studying the 
reported experience of people without assuming a theological framework. Especially 
when using the concepts of communion and personhood for God's being as Trinity, it 
becomes quite obvious that the demarcation line between theology and anthropology is 
not as clear as some would wish it to be. Most concepts of human personhood are based 
on anthropological studies. If we fail to appreciate anthropology as an integral part of 
doing theology, we will always tend to amalgamate and subsequently confuse our 
intentions and opinions with God-talk. It should also be noted that this dialectic and 
interpenetration of anthropology and theology already hugely shaped the Church 
Fathers' theology. Not only is it the cru;e that their personal e~peqence of salvation in 
the context of a pagan society and their experience of love and fellowship within their 
Christian communities played a vital part in shaping theology, but also that their 
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particular anthropological insights gave their theologies a distinct form. Brian Horne's 
essay on the correlation of Augustine's Confessions and his De Trinitate is very 
illuminating in pointing this out. The Confessions, pondering on the significance of 
human memory and digging into the psychological conditions of being human, he 
argues, build a backbone for Augustine's theology, and especially for his doctrine of the 
Trinity. Thus he concludes: 'Decades later, when he came to expound the doctrine of 
the Trinity the source of his analogies was the anthropology (more precisely the 
psychology) ofthis tenth book ofthe Confessions.'96 This, then, is a good illustration of 
how human experience and knowledge of the human sciences influence and mould 
theological interpretation and formulations. 97 
Third, theological approaches to God-talk that are mainly engaged in a dialogue 
with philosophical concepts of being miss a link to human experience. People do not 
experience "being" or "substance"; they rather experience life in all its fragmentation, 
exposed to fear and suffering and the ambiguity of freedom and dependency. People 
search for meaning in their lives and how they can cope with the human condition. This 
search does not so much build upon concepts of being and nature, but rather on 
concepts of life, meaning, fear and particularity. If trinitarian theology wants to draw 
implications for human life it must engage with this search, pick up the right questions 
in a dialogue with church ministry and the human sciences and overcome a sometimes 
obscuring religious positivism (maybe under the notion of mystery or revelation), which 
always implies an objective starting point from above. Theology is always in danger of 
forgetting its roots. It has to be a function of the Christian faith rather than of doctrinal 
expositions and take into account the narratives of religious experience within the 
Christian community. Theology, therefore, has to assist in reflecting and understanding 
the correlation between Christian story telling and possible contributions toward a 
doctrine of God. Theology must not lock itself up in ivory towers but has to seek again 
and again the dialogue with religious narratives as an original way of God-talk, as an 
expression of faith-grounded experience, which is manifest in Scripture before all 
doctrinal regulations and in the believer who is in a fundamental sense a theologian. 
96 Brian L. }-lome, ·~c:rsons as C"onfessi()Q: A\!gyst.me o(Hippo', in C. SchwObel and C. Gunton (eds.), 
Persons, Divine and Human (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1991), 71. 
97 Cf. Edmund Hill's introduction to Augustine's The Trinity: 'Augustine had a greedy mind, a voracious 
intellectual appetite, and what he fed it on was the whole range of his experience, his whole sensual, 
emotional, rational, and energetic life. This is the field in which he is looking for God': Saint Augustine, 
The Trinity (New York: New City Press, 1991 ), 20-1. 
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Fourth, we noted that biblical material more or less functioned as supporting 
arguments for the justification of the doctrine of the Trinity and the vindication of the 
Creeds. This is not to suggest that this approach is wrong, but to argue that this should 
not be the only one. If Scripture is the basic means of God's grace, then it certainly has 
more to offer in respect of trinitarian God-talk than merely endorsing the propriety of 
once formulated doctrines. If we are aware of what Gunton states in agreement with 
Karl Barth, that 
in the incarnation God demonstrates his freedom "to become unlike Himself and yet to 
remain the same", and it is this revelation of himself which ought to be the source of any 
conclusion we draw about what he is in eternity. That is the order of knowing: We know 
God from and in his acts. We know who God is from what he does/8 
then trinitarian theology has to overcome a one-sided understanding of revelation. If 
revelation is identified with Christology and subsequent doctrinal formulations, it 
aggravates the integration ofthe wider biblical experience (that is the stories ofthe Old 
and New Testament) in a more appropriate way and in virtue of that the intensification 
oftrinitarian theology's fecundity. 
Fifth and last, we have observed that ecclesiology and a certain kind of doctrinal 
pre-understanding seems to be the prevalent measure and base for doing trinitarian 
theology. Due to this, the current discourse within trinitarian theology grounds itself to a 
large degree on traditional presuppositions by putting the delivered doctrine of the 
Trinity with its doctrinal formulations at the centre of attention. Subsequently, 
reforming theology is seen as a linear process, where new theological development is 
elaborated in accordance with traditional formulations and arguments. 
All this, of course, is closely related to a theologian's understanding of doctrine. 
We might therefore mention the fact that many of the above problems also ground in a 
certain understanding of doctrinal development in correlation with the concept of 
revelation. To put it succinctly, those who believe all doctrinal development 
acknowledged and accredited and sanctioned by the Church not only to be wholly true 
and without an element of error in it, but also to be an unchangeable necessary 
process,99 will certainly not agree with my argumentation. But from my point of view, 
looking at the historical developments within Scripture itself and within doctrinal 
development, and conceiving the relationship between revelation and human language 
as interpretation, though ,in a particular,way,steered··by revelation through faith, I cannot 
98 Act and Being, 97. 
99 For a critique, Maurice Wiles, The Making of Christian Doctrine (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1967). 
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but assess Scripture and doctrinal development as an interaction of God's Spirit with 
fallible human beings. This does not at all negate the understanding of Scripture and of 
doctrines as means of God's grace and as a necessary process for a particular time under 
particular circumstances, but it does rule out the possible talk of doctrinal development 
as infallible and as an unchangeable necessary process. Too much was involved in these 
processes and too many historical reasons shaped the way of doctrinal development to 
justify the assertion that for the early Church continuity meant building on 
unchangeable formulations or doctrines. With Maurice Wiles we should rather assume: 
True continuity with the age of the Fathers is to be sought not so much in the repetition of 
their doctrinal conclusions or even in the building of them, but rather in the continuation 
of their doctrinal aims. Their doctrinal affirmations were based upon an appeal to the 
record of Scripture, the activity of worship, and the experience of salvation. Should not 
true development be seen in the continuation of the attempt to do justice to those three 
strands of Christian life in the contemporary world?100 
Trinitarian theology and our understanding of the Trinity, therefore, cannot merely build 
upon the foundations of Chalcedon, trying to reinterpret old formulations. If continuity 
is at least partly found in "doctrinal aims", as Wiles put it, in repeating the work of the 
early Church within our modem framework, then we have to engage much more with 
modem experience of salvation, read Scripture and doctrines in new ways, looking for 
more suitable language frameworks and intelligible human experience and thus opening 
up new possibilities for trinitarian God-talk. 
In conclusion then, the survey of this chapter has identified some inconsistencies 
within contemporary trinitarian theology, highlighting the need for a fresh approach. 
This conclusion is justified by the observation that trinitarian theology fails to a large 
degree to draw sufficiently practical implications for human life because of its 
metaphysical and ecclesiological captivity and its subsequent neglect of general human 
experience and religious experience as expressed in the biblical narratives. However if 
trinitarian discourse fails to integrate the language of human life within it and if the 
Trinity cannot be spoken of in connection with the problems ofhuman sociality, then, it 
seems to me that LaCugna's conviction is incapable of delivering on its promise that 
'[t]he doctrine of the Trinity is ultimately a practical doctrine with radical consequences 
for Christian life.' 101 Any social doctrine of the Trinity emphasizing God's being as a 
being-in-communion that departs from or neglects human experience is in danger of 
beconiihg orie-sidoo and of losfug tlie link to hwium life as it is actually lived. How then 
100 The Making of Christian Doctrine, 173. 
101 God for Us, 1. 
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must a new approach be structured and pursued if trinitarian theology as academic 
discourse is not to lose its connection with experience and human life? To answer this 
question is the main objective of the next chapter. 
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2 
RETRIEVING HUMAN EXPERIENCE 
FOR A TRINITARIAN HERMENEUTICS 
2.1llNTRODUCT:U:ON: 
AN INTERSTITIAL METHODOLOGY 
Before giving a brief outline of the different parts some preliminary comments in 
relation to the notion of human experience seem to be requisite, in order to clarify the 
underlying methodology and structure. Let me begin by drawing attention to the title of 
this chapter. In choosing the phrase "retrieving human experience for a trinitarian 
hermeneutics" my aim is to establish what I would like to call an interstitial 
methodology. "Interstitial" is used here because trinitarian theology is in need of 
recognising its "in-between place" due to an essential dialectic between experience and 
revelation which underlies its discourse. In this regard two things have to be pointed 
out. First, it is vital to address the question of how trinitarian theology can and must be 
done on the basis that all human knowledge and hence linguistic discourse somehow 
depends on human experience. This emphasis refers to the fmdings from Chapter One 
that a one-sided doctrinal and conceptual starting point that neglects a proper 
investigation of the role human experience plays within theological discourse was found 
to be unhelpful. From this perspective, the stress on experience tries to hint at both the 
inappropriateness of indulging in revelatory positivism for theological discourse and the 
disputability of prioritising the concept over general experience as it is expressed, for 
instance, in stories. Second, it has to be conceded that Christian theology finds itself 
already set within a certain kind of trinitarian framework before all questioning and 
reasoning. This rules out any experiential positivism which seeks to ground theology on 
a universal and foundationalist notion of experience. This dialectic, however, must not 
be conceived in oppositional categories. Experience and revelation seem to mutually 
interrelate with and depend upon one another. The proper place for any theological 
investigation as linguistic discourse, therefore, is rather somewhere "in-between". 
Trinitarian theology's abode then displays a kind of interstice, a place where experience 
and revelation can,.be distinguished, .. conceptually but not clearly separated on 
experiential or epistemological grounds. They belong together in such a complex way 
that I cannot simply start at one point and work my way in a linear fashion down or up 
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to the other. What does this imply for the purpose of this chapter? Let me briefly spell 
out some corollaries. 
Without abandoning the importance of the notion of revelation, human experience 
must be considered as the platform on which all human knowledge, including discourse 
about God, takes place. Theological discourse is linguistic and hence embedded in 
human experience. If one ventures to claim that trinitarian discourse about God has 
implications for human life, then this can only be done responsibly if one starts with an 
investigation of the concepts of experience and language and how they function within 
the human condition. Only subsequently can the concepts of experience and revelation 
be distinguished on linguistic grounds without confusion. Admittedly this relationship is 
a difficult and complex one. Retrieving human experience for theological discourse is 
not an easy task. Not only is experience itself anything but a simple and uncontested 
concept, but it also indicates continuing dispute especially in connection with the notion 
of revelation. 1 This underlines the need to face this problem head on. Given the context 
of Wittgenstein's account of language and its influence on theology, it becomes 
imperative, on the one hand, to develop an understanding of experience in relation to 
language and the notion of truth and, on the other hand, given the theological context of 
postliberal proposals with their objection against pre-linguistic experience and their full 
endorsement of a certain kind of cultural-linguistic approach to theology, the crucial 
task emerges of elaborating a viable notion of revelation that is not doomed to complete 
silence. For this reason the obligatory task is to give an account of both how theological 
discourse depends on human experience as the basic condition for all human knowledge 
and how human experience as not alien to God and his revelatory action is yet able to 
express and convey knowledge about God. In order to pursue such an investigation it is 
indispensable to focus not only on the interdependence and interconnectedness between 
the notions of experience, language, and truth but also on the relationship between 
revelation and experience. However, since theology undoubtedly is linguistic discourse, 
any notion of revelation can only be expressed and made intelligible on linguistic 
grounds. In this sense the concept of experience is primary and hence the elaboration of 
a new trinitarian hermeneutics must take its point of departure on the side of human 
experience. 
1 C. SchwHbel rightly summarizes that the concepts of "revelation" and "experience" are often used to 
identify two dominant fashion trends in theology, in which the theology of revelation and the theology of 
experience are seen as alternatives and mutually exclusive models: God: Action and Revelation (Kampen: 
Kok Pharos, 1992), 83-6. 
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This must simultaneously be seen in the light of a second considemtion. In 
contmst to the concept of experience, the notion of revelation includes from a 
theological perspective the conviction that certain beliefs cannot be conceived as being 
merely derived from experience because their contents are held to be true at least to 
some extent as something that has been revealed to human beings by God. This means 
that theology can only be done from an open "in-between" place where the problem of 
identifying the relationship between experience and revelation is not yet solved. 
Concerned with God-talk theologians have no way of leaving this complex and 
unresolved dialectical structure. Especially in trinitarian discourse they find themselves 
personally and communally already and always in an "in-between" situation, practicing 
a belief (worshipping God in Jesus through the Spirit) that is, on the one hand, clearly 
embedded in experience and linguistic terms and, on the other hand, experienced as not 
self-produced and transcending the human condition. Anticipating an essential point of 
the later discussion, it is helpful to note the crucial insight that one can only build an 
argument if there is something to build on. This means that there is no starting point for 
any argument unless one presupposes something or initially holds a belief which 
appears to be true. Only then can one start to test and, if need be, correct a belief or a 
theological statement. Theologically speaking, human beings cannot prove the belief in 
the Trinity but mther have to presuppose it as something given within the condition of 
human experience in order to test it from the perspective of human experience.2 
Looking back to the New Testament and the Fathers it was precisely in connection to 
life as it is lived and to human experience as it is expressed in the manifold stories of 
different people throughout the history of Ismel and early Christianity that the belief in 
a trinitarian God was soon considered as the overall framework of God-talk. As Dietrich 
Ritschl rightly points out: 'That is the case because Christian reflection on God had as 
its theme from the beginning the God of Ismel, the coming, suffering and dying of Jesus 
and the work of the Holy Spirit. ' 3 God was worshiped in a community of believers 
made up of Jews and Gentiles. This worship was experienced as a (not self-created) 
participation in the Father by the Son in the Spirit. This then highlights both that 
trinitarian discourse never was merely human discourse for its own sake (pointing to the 
notion of revelation as something given) and that it had to serve and be in agreement 
with the commlJllities' and one's own experi(!llCe of salvation within the conditions of 
2 See below sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. 
3 The Logic of Theology (London: SCM Press, 1986}, 144. Cf. G. O'Collins, The Tripersonal God, 1-82; 
Roger Olson and Christopher Hall, The Trinity (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2002), I-ll. 
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human life (pointing to human experience as the platform on which this belief could be 
reasonably held and made intelligible). 
In conclusion, what an interstitial methodology attempts to provide is space for an 
open and creative encounter between the concepts of experience and revelation. It seeks 
to be· dynamic and open, to move on and between both levels of discourse, and hence to 
inhabit the interstice. To adhere to such an interstitial attitude of theological 
investigation then means, first, with respect to the concept of experience, to be aware of 
both the fact that human experience is the sole ground for doing theology and that this 
embeddedness does not necessarily rule out the possibility of divine revelation 
occurring within this condition. Secondly, in regard of the concept of revelation, an 
interstitial attitude is also aware of both the possibility that divine revelation might 
meaningfully indicate something beyond the realm of human experience and the 
impossibility of revelation occurring unless it occurs within the realm of human 
experience. This leads to the following structure. 
In the first part of this chapter the main concern lies with the concept of 
experience and its interrelationship with the concepts of language and truth. My 
intention is, firstly, to establish a general account of human experience (2.2.1 ), then, 
secondly, to clarify its relationship with the concept of language (2.2.2), thirdly, to 
examine this understanding in relation to metaphorical language and the notion of truth 
(2.2.3) and, fmally, to propose a conclusive summary of how human experience and 
language function within the human condition (2.2.4). The second part aims at an 
elaboration of some essential features of the concept of revelation. I will pursue this aim 
with an interstitial attitude: firstly, slowly moving from experience to revelation (2.3.1 ), 
elucidating how the concept of experience aspires after the notion of revelation and 
then, secondly, developing a concept of revelation more directly as interpreted activity 
(2.3.2) and by doing so showing how a) revelation is in need of the concept of 
experience and b) that it is precisely a trinitarian framework that sustains this amicable 
relationship as the most appropriate one. This discussion will be concluded by an 
account of how experience, revelation and the Trinity can be conceived as inseparably 
hanging together (2.3.3). Drawing all the threads together in the fmal part (2.4), my 
intention will be to outline some essential aspects for a trinitarian hermeneutics. It is my 
overall conviction that if theology starts .to. appreciate the notions of (a) God not 
violating the human condition, (b) God exposing himself to this condition and (c) God 
giving his creation as the very possibility and ground for human knowledge and 
43 
revelatory experience, then there is no need to draw false demarcation lines between 
revelation and human experience, as well as between theology and anthropology. 
Although both realms have to be distinguished, leaving space for revelation to occur, 
trinitarian discourse must be pursued as an interstitial theology. If this interstitiality and 
theology's dependence on human experience is not approved, trinitarian discourse about 
God as being-in-communion will most likely fail to depict and appreciate a fuller and 
richer understanding of its truth. 
2.2 EXPERIENCE, LANGUAGE, AND TRUTH 
2.2.1 Experience and human reality 
2.2.1.1 Theological integrity 
In his essay on 'Theological Integrity'4 Rowan Williams reminds us that theological 
discourse is there to test the truthfulness of our language and the fidelity and openness 
to what it says it is about. It is 'the attempt to make sure that we are still speaking of 
God in our narratives.' But, and he rightly insists on this point, theological discourse 
'does not do this by trying to test the ''truth" of this or that religious utterance according 
to some canon of supposedly neutral accuracy. ' 5 When I now turn to a discussion of the 
concepts of human experience, language, and truth it is worthwhile to keep this advice 
in mind. In our pluralist and postfoundationalist context there is no way to return to a 
foundationalist position by appeal to some inner experiences or any other direct access 
to states of affairs in virtue of which our theological sentences can be judged true. 6 At 
the same time, however, since Christians believe in God as the source, sustainer, and 
consummator of our humanness and morality, one cannot simply do away with the 
notion of truth and indulge in a world of private taste. If there is a common hope for 
human beings and if there is a common humanness that reflects somehow God's 
4 On Christian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 3-15. 
5 Ibid., 14. 
6 For a discussion of the epistemic inappropriateness of any claim of interiority: Bruce Marshall, Trinity 
and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000}, chapters 3 and 4. Cf. Nicholas Lash, Easter 
~'},.Q!,t!_{r}tJ,rY,.:,Bf!fle_c_~!9c1J _o~ .flw~.'!:!'-~l?e_~i~l!f!!oSmAdb_~_/S!JJl'w.lel}ge. of Goc/.(London:. SCM Press, 1988). 
Lash, although charitably engaging with Schleiermacher, Newman, Buber, and Raimer, holds firm to the 
conviction that there is no such thing as raw or pure experience. In my opinion, however, Lash proposes a 
rather unhelpful distinction between "description" and ''reference" arguing that Christian speech about 
God is 'more a matter of ensuring correct reference than it is of attempting appropriate description' (p. 
258). How can language be merely referential without also wanting to be appropriately descriptive? 
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purposes for this world, then any rejection of foundationalism should not too easily 
endorse the trends of non-realism or postliberalism. 7 The abandonment of objectivity in 
the name of particularity and contentions about the incommensurability of different 
contexts and cultures not only tend to jettison the notion of truth but also the basis for 
any reasonable communication between human beings. Any attempt towards 
reconciliation and peace on these terms in a world that is haunted by an accelerating 
process of globalisation despite a multi-cultural context would simply be doomed to 
failure. Regarding this one should keep in mind, as Marshall has persuasively shown 
with reference to analytic philosophy of language, 8 that any suggestion of radical 
incommensurability on the basis of cultural-linguistic practice negates its own 
presuppositions. The claim of incommensurability between two competing languages or 
cultures presupposes that human beings are in fact capable of comparing and thus 
understanding the other cultural-linguistic system. However, in order to understand the 
other context human beings are in need of a common reality, be it a belief or the 
possibility of experience, which transcends each particular context. Saying this is not to 
suggest that one is actually able fully to disclose this ground and base human 
knowledge on a foundation of general experience. Such an option is not viable. 
Nonetheless the possibility of meaningful communication and human interaction does 
emphasise, against any claims of radical particularity and incommensurability, that for 
meaningful communication and human interaction to be operative some points of 
common reference are indispensable.9 If there is one created world, rather than many 
different worlds, which all human beings inhabit and refer to, then this points to the 
necessity of giving an account of how this world can be thought of as one and not many. 
In other words: 'If there is one God, the acts of that God should, prima facie, be 
consistent; the community established by the divine action should have some unifying 
points of reference; and reflective speech of that community should in some way 
articulate the divine consistency, or, at the very least, be able to deal with and contain 
what seems to make for fragmentation.' 10 Anybody who talks about fragmentation, or in 
a cultural-linguistic manner about plurality, particularity or incommensurability, should 
be aware of the fact that speech about fragmentation only is meaningful if there exists 
7 For brief discussioJ? ~f the inadeq\U!.(:Y of th,~olog~~J non-realism and the limitations of Lindbeckian 
postlibeialism: Paul Muriay, Reason, Truth and Theology in Pragmatist Perspective (Leuven: Peeters, 
2004), 10-6. 
8 Trinity and Truth, 141-79. 
9 See also Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty- Ober Gewissheit (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975). 
10 Williams, On Christian Theology, 21. 
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some kind of holistic concept or at least an imagination of what wider picture these 
fragments actually are fragments of. Fragments without a notion of the whole become 
wholes themselves, that is isolated and self-sufficient realities. But then human beings 
would not live in one world any more but in many. Hence I wonder if the emergence of 
Lindbeckian postliberalism with its whole-hearted advocacy of a cultural-linguistic 
model, in opposition to experiential models, is really helpful in respect to theological 
integrity and the complexity of life. In order to highlight the need for a rather different 
and more balanced account of the concepts of experience and language let me now turn 
to Lindbeck's influential work The Nature of Doctrine. 11 
2.2.1.2 Contra Lindbeck: Experience as a basic form of living in one world 
Lindbeck attempts to re-describe the relation between cultural-linguistic contexts and 
experience. While trying to safeguard what is distinctive about the Christian voice 
within a pluralistic context, Lindbeck fails to satisfY, precisely in respect of the 
relationship between language and experience and how this refers to a reasonable notion 
of truth. Lindbeck not only seems to presuppose a sharp demarcation between 
experience and language but also favours the latter as the one that determines the 
former. 12 Surprisingly he does not engage in a thorough investigation of the relation 
between language and experience as such, but rather takes the concept of "inner 
experience" as it is employed by theologians such as Rahner and Lonergan as the 
normative meaning. These theologians, according to Lindbeck, understand experience 
ultimately as pre-linguistic, as an experience that, 'while conscious, may be unknown 
on the level of self-conscious reflection.' 13 This experience is present in all human 
beings and therefore forms the basic factor, an a priori condition, for the formation of a 
religion. What Lindbeck wants to stress is that theologians who support such an 
experiential-expressive model assume that there is a general primordial religious 
experience of ultimate concern (Paul Tillich) or of the holy as a mysterium fascinans et 
tremendum (Rudolf Otto) which precedes the cultural-linguistic embeddedness of 
11 The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (London: SPCK, 1984). Hereafter 
(NoD]. 
12 
.A s~ar te:f!~~nEY~'?an be QQ.~ne4 jJ} H.~ Frei,. Typ(]S of Christian Theology (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1992). Frey obviously influenced Lindbeck's proposal by drawing a 
rather sharp demarcation between "Christian self-description" and "external description." Cf. Gerard 
Loughlin, Telling God's Story: Bible, Church and Narrative Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 38. 
13 NoD, 31. 
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human beings.14 In taking up and countering this model, Lindbeck adheres without 
questioning to the same and somewhat misleading opposition between "inner 
experience" and "external religion", the latter indicating a concrete belief in its cultural 
and linguistic forms and structures. While Lindbeck rightly asserts that religions and all 
theological discourse are cultural-linguistically structured, he is reluctant to reconceive 
the notion of experience in a different way from the representatives of the experiential-
expressive model. This negligence results in seeing religions 'as comprehensive 
interpretive schemes, usually embodied in myths or narratives and heavily ritualised, 
which structure human experience and understanding of self and world.' 15 This suggests 
that religion has to be viewed as a cultural and linguistic framework that shapes the life 
and thought of this community. Experience is subordinated and therefore secondary to 
the language framework of a given community. Lindbeck reverses the relation between 
"inner" and "outer" and conceives of inner experiences as derived from the external 
features of a religion. 'Thus the linguistic-cultural model is part of an outlook that 
stresses the degree to which human experience is shaped, moulded, and in a sense 
constituted by cultural and linguistic forms.' 16 
The crucial point is that Lindbeck is prepared to admit that language is a 
precondition for the possibility of experience, but, due to his misleading equation of the 
complexity of human experience with inner pre-linguistic experience, he is not willing 
to simultaneously say that experiencing the world might also be a precondition for the 
possibility of saying something at all. The cultural-linguistic formation of a given 
community gains a kind of quasi-transcendental status 17 while the very possibility of 
saying something at all due to human beings' experiencing the world does not come to 
the fore. 'In short,' he concludes, 'it is necessary to have the means for expressing an 
experience in order to have it, and the richer our expressive or linguistic system, the 
more subtle, varied, and differentiated can be our experience.' 18 Experience is reduced 
to an act of intelligible communication. Without language there is no experience. But 
since language depends entirely on the cultural-linguistic framework Lindbeck further 
asserts that in the same way there is no private experience. He supports his argument 
with Wittgenstein's insight that private languages are logically impossible. While this is 
certainly true in respect to language, it does not follow that experience can either be 
14 NoD, 31-2. 
15 NoD, 32. 
16 NoD,34. 
11 NoD, 36. 
18 NoD, 37. 
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equated with or subordinated to language. If the concept of experience is viewed in the 
light of the human condition in which nobody ever shares my particular point of view 
(the other remaining other) and in which my being in the world exhibits a relational 
interaction between perception and action, between matter and mind, then reference to 
experience also indicates that human beings live in the world as embodied entities, 
which is more then purely linguistic. 19 At this point Lindbeck reads Wittgenstein rather 
one-sidedly. 
Our experiencing of the world, although utterly amalgamated with language, 
expresses more than conscious language games. Experience displays a complex 
embeddedness of human beings in the world as parts of this world, which are all, in one 
way or another, connected with each other. This complexity is the givenness that 
Wittgenstein names Lebensformen. When Wittgenstein talks about Sprachspiele he 
rather supports a holistic view. The whole of language and all the acts and doings of life 
are included in his vision.20 He is quite clear about the fact that the word Sprachspiel 
should underline that the speaking of a language is part of an action, of a form of life. 21 
These Lebensformen are the reason why the meaning of language can never be settled 
ultimately. The meaning of words depends on the usage of the words within a language 
and this usage again depends on the Lebensformen.22 This includes the notion that 
language is not always capable of expressing what we experience. Consider the 
following example that Wittgenstein provides. 
Compare: knowing and saying: 
how many metres high is Mont-Blanc -
how is the word "game" used -
what is the sound of a clarinet. 
Anybody who is surprised that one could know something but not express it, probably 
has in mind an example of the first kind but definitely not of the third kind.23 
Wittgenstein's contention is that language is like a labyrinth of paths24 and that one 
main reason of philosophical ailments is a one-sided diet, that one nourishes oneself 
only with one kind of examples and perspectives.25 Hence Wittgenstein's notion of 
Lebensformen suggests that, since the Lebensformen exhibit the complexity of what 
19 For a detailed discussion of what it means to be human: Chapter Three. 
20 
'Ich werde auch das Ganze: der Sprache und der Tlltigkeiten, mit denen sie verwoben ist, das 
,Sprachspiel" nennen': Philosophische Untersuchungen, I, 7, in Ludwig Wittgenstein, W er/causgabe Band 
1 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984), 225-580. Hereafter: [PU]. 
21 PU, I, 23. _ 
22 PU, I, 43. 
23 PU, I, 78. [My translation.] 
24 PU, I, 203: 'Die Sprache ist ein Labyrinth von Wegen. Du kommst von einer Seite und kennst dich aus; 
du kommst von einer anderen zur selben Stelle, und kennst dich nicht mehr aus.' 
25 PU, I, 593. 
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human beings in relation with one another and their environment experience (erleben), 
the concept of experience cannot be reduced to an account of language. Furthermore, it 
should be noted that Wittgenstein's notion of Lebensformen is established against the 
love of the self of philosophical solipsism and against a notion of self-experience that 
claims to be capable (without depending on the other) of depicting the reality of being. 
It is the being-in-the-world and being-part-of-the-world that human beings all share, as 
Fergus Kerr observes, 'the only a priori in Wittgenstein's philosophical vision of 
human life: our Lebensformen. ' 26 All this rather points to a balanced relation between 
human experience and language, which cannot be disentangled. If Wittgenstein 
maintains that there is no inner experience that does not have conceptual links with 
other people's experience, then this again is a confirmation of our Lebensformen which 
human beings share rather than a subordination of experience to language. 
For Wittgenstein, it is our bodiliness that founds our being able, in principle, to learn any 
natural language on earth. In contrast to the metaphysical conception of the self, where 
our bodies supposedly get between us and prevent a meeting of minds, Wittgenstein 
reminds us of the obvious fact that the foundation of mutual understanding is the human 
body, with its manifold responsiveness and expressiveness.27 
Considering this insight, it is rather the notion of "experiencing the world" as (matter-
mind) bodies that make the learning of language possible as well as giving Wittgenstein 
the ground for asserting that there is no private language at all. If the concept of 
experience is conceived on the grounds of our bodily being and living in the world, 
which depends on the biological act of perception and movement, then the concept of 
experience must display a basic form of living in the world in distinction from the 
concept of language. On a Lindbeckian account, however, one cannot appreciate the 
givenness of both experience and language as entirely bound up with one another 
without subordinating one to the other. 
What are the consequences? In proposmg a postliberal theology Lindbeck 
envisages the Christian religion as one cultural-linguistically shaped community 
drawing a distinction between "intratextual" and "extratextual", the latter referring to 
the understanding of religion as propositional and the former to his own cultural-
linguistic approach.28 Due to the fact that Lindbeck abandons the notion of foundation 
for theology altogether he concludes: 
26 Theology after Wittgenstein (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), I 05. 
27 Ibid., 109. 
28 NoD, 114. 
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Thus the proper way to determine what "God" signifies, for example, is by examining 
how the word operates within a religion and thereby shapes reality and experience rather 
than by frrst establishing its propositional or experiential meaning and reinterpreting or 
reformulating its use accordingly. It is in this sense that theological description in the 
cultural-linguistic mode is intrasemiotic and intratextual.29 
This leads him to assert that in order to expound and to understand the belief of a 
particular religion one has to speak its language. Theology is entirely intratextual. 'It is 
the text, so to speak, which absorbs the world, rather than the world the text. ' 30 On a 
larger scale this means that human knowledge and theology not only remain utterly 
particular and therefore exclude any notion of universals but also that to 'the degree that 
religions are like languages and cultures, they can no more be taught by means of 
translation than can Chinese or French.'31 The result is that '[t]he grammar of religion, 
like that of language, cannot be explicated or learned by analysis of experience, but only 
by practice. . . . In short, religions, like languages, can be understood only in their own 
terms, not by transposing them into an alien speech. ' 32 
This conclusion is rather odd since Lindbeck himself draws on Wittgenstein 
saying that there is no private language. However, if the differences between cultural-
linguistic communities become insurmountable, 'so that translation of concepts 
becomes impossible, then we are no longer in one world. ' 33 Furthermore it can be 
argued that with this assumption Lindbeck draws a sharp demarcation between 
Christian tradition with its own cultural-linguistic framework and the modern 
secularised culture. Paul Murray has rightly suggested in a discussion of Lindbeck's 
proposal that 'within an ecclesiological perspective appropriately shaped by the doctrine 
of creation and eschatology respectively there is an important sense in which the Church 
is not fundamentally "other" than the world. Rather, the Church precisely is the world 
explicitly before God. ' 34 In view of this, David Brown emphasizes the ambiguity that 
postliberal theologies, on the one hand, appear to say 'that all that matters is 
membership of the Christian community;' on the other hand, however, they suggest 
'that we cannot do otherwise than acknowledge our membership of the wider culture 
and academic community.' But is the situation not 'immeasurably more complicated? 
Not only are we all members of a number of different intellectual communities, some 
29 NoD, 114. 
30 NoD, 118. 
31 NoD, 129. 
32 NoD, 129. 
33 Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein, 105. 
34 Reason, Truth and Theology, 15. 
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coextensive with church membership and others not, but also there exists considerable 
pluralism in the Church, and indeed even within ourselves. ' 35 
One is surprised how Lindbeck is able to hold together both the conviction of 
postliberal antifoundationalism and the endeavour of fmding ways for communicating 
an incommensurable belief (the Christian religion) to non-Christians. The postliberal 
answer for dealing with the question of mission and the communication of religious 
belief, Lindbeck suggests, resembles ancient catechesis. 'Instead of redescribing the 
faith in new concepts, it seeks to teach the language and practice of the religion to 
potential adherents. ' 36 At this point Lindbeck is quite inconsistent. One might ask him 
how a potential adherent who does not speak the Christian language and who was 
brought up, for instance, in an utterly non-Christian and non-Western culture and 
environment is ever able to understand this language. Since this person is utterly 
dependent upon his native non-Christian language and has no possibility to translate the 
alien Christian language into his own, there seems to be no way that he can learn the 
new language. If, however, Lindbeck suggests that this person can learn and 
meaningfully understand the Christian language because he lives with the Christian 
community and takes part in their rituals and practices, then, this will only be possible if 
he can assume that what he experiences in this alien community is at least in part 
somehow commensurable with and therefore translatable into his own native 
language.37 A concept of learning through participation and progressive understanding 
of belief through practice precisely depends on a concept of experience which is not 
subordinated to language but rather helps to connect particular contexts. 38 It is 
interesting to see how Lindbeck suddenly shifts his emphasis from language to practice. 
35 Discipleship and Imagination: Christian Tradition and Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
355. 
36 NoD, 132. 
37 For another perspective on the interpretation of language and the possibility of translation: Marshall, 
Trinity and Truth. Taking up Davidson's analytic philosophy of language, Marshall highlights the 
interconnectedness between truth, belief, and meaning for every act of interpretation and the 
understanding of a foreign language. If Davidson is right, Marshall argues, then 'interpretation will have 
to hold for truth while testing for meaning' (p. 93). Davidson calls this the "principle of charity." This 
approach suggests that understanding the meaning of a sentence, and therefore any successful 
interpretation, depends on 'applying the "principle of charity" across the board, that is, to all actual and 
possible utterances of a group of speakers, and thus to their language as a whole. The "principle of 
charity" applies a holistic constraint to interpretation' (p. 94). From this perspective any radical notion of 
incommensurability, which Lindbeck seems to have in mind, is untenable because it makes no sense. 'In 
org,~r t,9 ~>: ~~~, 1:\!~."'l?eli~f~ ,Qt~()!!!er cqmmYJ;I!ty"'b.e,l~mg,to a worldview, which is for, us alien or foreign, < 
we have to know what their beliefs are - we have to understand them. Beliefs we cannot comprehend are 
obviously beliefs we cannot classify as either foreign or domestic' (p. 161). 
38 With respect to the Christian context: Murray, Reason, Truth and Theology, 16. 'In line with the fleshly 
materiality of orthodox Christian faith in the incarnation the tradition is always shaped in part at least by 
the broader social, cultural and linguistic contexts in which it is enacted.' 
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He asserts, 'intelligibility comes from skill, not theory, and credibility comes from good 
performance, not adherence to independently formulated criteria. ' 39 Reasonableness in 
theology has something of an aesthetic character. This conclusion poses again the basic 
question of how we know and recognize a good performance and how we agree on good 
art or on true aesthetics without some common points of reference. It is precisely on the 
grounds of his own cultural-linguistic proposal that Lindbeck fails to show how the 
postliberal model of doing theology 'does not reduce the choice between different 
frameworks to whim and chance.'40 Moreover, any attempt to draw a clear demarcation 
line between Christianity and its texts and other religions or cultural-linguistic 
communities displays an oversimplification of the complexity of human and hence 
cultural interaction and cross fertilisation. Christian tradition and the development of 
doctrines display not only a picture of diversity but also a process that expresses a 
continuing dialogue with foreign claims. Many of these processes have resulted in the 
assimilation of initially foreign imaginations or narratives and thus exhibit the Christian 
tradition's capability of renewal and its imaginative and integrative power.41 Precisely 
on a linguistic account, the claim of Wittgenstein would be that language does not 
merely hover on the surface of things but, because language is not rationally invented 
by human beings,42 actually tells us something about the reality of our Lebensformen. 
The fact that the search for reality and truth always leads us to human life as it is lived 
suggests that one must think of reality 'as consisting precisely in the kind of 
multifaceted complex of contextually specific interrelationships and interactions that 
comes to articulation, albeit partially, in language. '43 This coming to articulation, in 
tum, depends on experiencing ( erfahren, erleben) the world that makes cross-cultural 
communication in one and the same world possible. 
2.2.1.3 Experience as the determination of reality 
Having argued that postliberalism fails to address the concept of experience in an 
appropriate way, I now would like to turn to Christoph Schwobel's account of 
39 NoD, 131. 
40 NoD, 130. 
41 
'Forc'a profotiild study of the deveiopment of Christian Tradition: David Brown, Tradition and 
Imagination: Revelation and Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
42 
'Language neither grew on human beings like hair nor did they sit down and invent it. Language is not 
the product of thought or will': Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein, 114. 
43 Murray, Reason, Truth and Theology, 73. 
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experience.44 His approach is a helpful one because he engages not only thoroughly 
with the concept of experience but also does so with the intention of overcoming a 
somewhat unfruitful dichotomy between the concepts of experience and revelation. 
Although I will not take up the discussion of revelation until the next part of this chapter 
it is vital to keep this horizon already in mind. In theology both the concepts of 
revelation and experience played and still play a crucial role. While theologies centred 
on revelation stress the notion of God's freedom and tend to anchor the notion of truth 
in a divine act of communication independent of human manipulation, theologies 
centred on experience tend to emphasise modernity's notion that all human knowledge, 
hence also theological knowledge, is inescapably fused with human experience 
dependent on historical-cultural-linguistic frameworks. Consequently, even if there is 
such a thing as truth or objectivity, the door of direct access is locked. Regarding this 
dilemma Schwobel's account of experience can function as a step forward in the right 
direction. 
The task which seems to follow from these observations of the problematical character of 
a theology of revelation which excludes the concept of experience and of a theology of 
experience in which the concept of revelation has no place, consists in considering 
whether the alternative of seeing either revelation or experience as the foundational 
concept of theology is, in fact, justified. Are there possibilities of relating revelation and 
experience in such a way that we can avoid the risk we have indicated and can conceive 
ofboth concepts as signifYing complementary aspects of a single phenomenon?45 
Given this task Schwobel sets out to overcome reductionist conceptions of experience 
that equate experience with a process of perception. He argues that if experience is 
identified with perception alone 'the understanding of reality is reduced to the 
exposition of a mechanism of stimulus and response. ' 46 A person x, it is usually 
assumed, experiences y and in 'a basic process of perception a certain bundle of sensory 
stimuli which affect our sensory apparatus is isolated and becomes the object of our 
perceptual attention in the context of our "holistic" bodily indwelling of our 
environment. ' 47 This process of perception is not only purely individual but also 
44 God: Action and Revelation (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1992). Hereafter [God]. 
45 God, 86. Schw6bel's emphasis on "aspects of a single phenomenon" is crucial here because - given, 
for instance, Tillich's method of correlation in his Systematic Theology, Volume 1 (London: Nisbet & 
Co., 1953) - theologians might engage in a friendly way with human experience but still understand 
revelation as something totally distinct and ultimately detached from experience and human knowledge. 
Scbl!'i~nnacher)s ll19N" tl~lpful h~re. Gnutted,,!h_at \'V.e. do .. not share. his idealistic .assumptions, his 
understanding of revelation in connection with the pious self-consciousness emphasises an amicable 
encounter between revelation and experience; hence they are not conceived as opposites or as mutually 
excluding one another: Der Christliche G/aube (1830/31), esp. §§ 10, 13. 
46 God, Ill. 
47 God, 104. 
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presupposes that human perception takes place linearly in a way that, firstly, we are 
passively affected by stimuli and, secondly, react actively by directing our attention to a 
particular object.48 This view presupposes a simple subject-object distinction, neglecting 
the fact that a human individual not only is a subject of perception but at the same time 
an object of another experiencing subject. Moreover, since on this reductionist account 
all perception is individual, the notion of objectivity tends ultimately to be abandoned 
altogether because, it is assumed, we have no access to it. Such a narrow and one-sided 
perspective, Schwobel contends, could never function as an organizing concept for all 
human knowledge because it is not able to deal with the complexity of normal 
experience. An appropriate account of experience has to deal with the relational aspects 
of life and both the mutuality of the concepts of subject and object and the 
interconnectedness between reality as it is and as human beings perceive it. 
Hence Schwobel begins with the following basic formula that a human person 
experiences something as something: 'A experiences x as y . .49 With this formula he 
indicates that the normal situation of experience not only consists of isolating something 
as an object of perception but also of interpretation. The term y therefore expresses the 
interpretation of x. Human experience is always amalgamated with language and a 
particular framework of interpretation. Signification and interpretation, or in other 
words, semiotics and semantics go hand in hand with any act of experience. This is why 
any object x, isolated by the experiencing subject from its wider environment, is always 
experienced as y. However, being embedded in a framework does not mean that x loses 
its objective reality altogether. Hence Schwobel extends the formula in the following 
way: 'A experiences x as y by integrating x through the predication as y into the 
interpretative framework 1.'50 With this formula he maintains the importance of the 
concepts of the subject, the object (and the notion of truth) and its interconnectedness 
within a common linguistic framework of interpretation. This formula displays the 
crucial role of the interpretative framework. Although it is always historically concrete 
and shaped by cultural, social and scientific presuppositions, the interpretative 
framework provides a common ground of some kind of objective reality. Every 
individual experience does not remain completely individualistic because it cannot 
escape the processes of signification and interpretation, which in tum depend on this 
common framework. If experiences ultimately co11tribute or prepare the ground for 
48 For a critique oflinear causality within the process ofhuman perception: Chapter Three, section 3.4.3 
49 God, 105. 
50 God, 105. 
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knowledge about our common reality they can only do so in connection with the 
interpretative framework. This framework 'provides with its predicates and structuring 
models for our experience the conditions for the interpretation of reality and, with that, 
the conditions for our active organisation or reality.' 51 Schwobel's interpretative 
framework appears to function in a similar way as Wittgenstein's Lebensformen. 
Because everybody participates in it, depends on it, and contributes to it, this framework 
makes sense and can only be labelled meaningful if it de facto reflects and lives within a 
common reality. 
All this points towards both an overlap and a crucial distinction between 
experience and reality. Human experience remains in a sense individual because it will 
always be mine. Nobody will ever share my distinctive perspective. However, my 
experience can only be called individual because it exhibits a fragment of a larger piece. 
Despite its particularity it is a part of the broader picture and lives within a wider 
framework of which it mirrors something. Experience and reality go hand in hand. 
Otherwise all talk about human life and the human world would indeed be non-real, a 
deceptive imagination, and everybody would be isolated in his or her own world. 52 This 
does not mean that experience can be equated with reality. Individual experience in 
order to say something true about the common reality is in need of the interpretative 
framework. It will most likely reach beyond its particularity into the realm of truth if it 
becomes meaningful for the wider community, if it becomes itself a part of the 
interpretative framework. Looking from this perspective, human experience must be 
depicted as an "active and constructive process" while simultaneously maintaining that 
it is not arbitrary but depends on a common reality. Living in one world is an essential 
premise for the possibility of experiencing and interpreting the world in which we live. 
Having highlighted these basic conditions of experience from a rather 
observational perspective in the form of A experiences x as y, Schwobel extends his 
concept as we have seen. One must also inquire after the role of the subject of 
experience. Such an inquirJ will necessarily result in the acknowledgment of an 
understanding of subjects of experience as conscious human beings capable of choice, 
interpretation, and self-perception. Experiencing not only means the perception of an 
object and its predication within an interpretative framework but also includes the self-
51 God, 106. 
52 This highlights the crucial point made earlier that any radical claim of non-realism contradicts itself 
because it presupposes a certain kind of meaningful understanding of the "other worlds". To judge an 
experience as non-realistic or as deceptive imagination is only possible on the ground of a common idea 
of reality. 
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experiencing of a subject within the process of experience. 'It is therefore inevitable to 
assume that reflexive self-experience can accompany all acts of the synthesis of 
experience. ' 53 Hence the initial formula has to be extended in this way: '(A experiences) 
A experiences x as y, insofar as x is integrated into the interpretative framework I by 
. . "t ,54 mterpretmg z as y. 
With this formula Schwobel suggests that self-experience not only is an inherent 
part of any act of experience but also that ultimately the interpretative framework 'exists 
only in the form of personal appropriation.' 55 Ifthis is acknowledged then the relational 
character and the interdependence between different subjects of experience can be 
expressed. 1bis leads to a more complex conceptualisation of human experience, for it 
can now be asserted a) that human experience of the world and of each other as a 
cultural-linguistic event depends inescapably on the mutual experience of each other 
and b) that the interpretative framework does not exist as a neutral entity on its own but 
only exists as social communication and interaction. 56 The concept of human experience 
is therefore based on the fundamental reciprocal experience of A experiences B which 
simultaneously depends on B experiences A. Behind both persons A and B stands the 
full formula mentioned above. Both persons have to acknowledge the other as a self-
experiencing subject of experience. 1bis expresses a 'constitutive mutuality and 
reciprocity of personal relations'57 indicating a dialectical structure of all human 
experience. Both A and B contribute to the interpretative framework and consequently 
to the interpretation of reality, while not having created it. Both depend on this given 
reality for their own self-experience; they cannot disconnect from it, while being able to 
freely participate in and respond to it. 
Hence, there is more to human experience than the notion of subjectivity. Human 
beings who live in one world and participate in the interpretation of reality through 
experience find themselves placed between both dialectical structures of freedom and 
dependence and particularity and universality. 1bis implies that the notion of personal 
freedom is only conceivable against the background of this discussion. Schwobel 
concludes: 'The condition for the possibility of self-experience appears in the personal 
experience of freedom as something that is given in, with and under all acts of 
experience, but not as constituted by the subject of reflection.' 1bis entails 'that for all 
53 God, 107. 
54 God, 107. 
55 God, 107. 
56 God, 107-8. 
57 God, 109. 
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subjects of experience there is a difference between what is constituted for the 
experiencing subject and what is constituted by the experiencing subject. ' 58 This 
statement confirms the earlier crucial distinction between experience and reality and 
expounds it a little further. Given the premise that human beings live in one world and 
that human communication and interaction in fact is real and not a ghostly and fake 
non-sense activity, Schwobel is able to contend that reality can de facto be experienced 
by actively reflecting subjects of experience without equating the one with the other. 
This discloses a "fundamental openness of reality" towards human experience. Reality 
and human experience must not be disconnected and viewed as alien and exclusive 
entities. Although human experience remains fragmental, it has the capacity of truth. 
This conceptualisation allows Schwobel to distinguish between two levels. One 
level refers to reality as beyond human experience. It is the level of reality that is 
constituted for the experiencing subject as the condition of the possibility of human 
experience. This reality that is a given, and from a theological perspective indicates the 
doctrine of creation, is not objectively accessible for human beings since human beings 
are part of this reality. The other level also refers in a certain sense to this given reality 
but not from an observational outsider view but rather from an insider perspective. It 
expresses reality as being subjectively accessible by human beings from within. This 
reality is constituted by the experiencing subjects59 from within the given reality as an 
active and creative process of experiencing the world. This permits the view of seeing 
the interpretative activity of experiencing subjects itself as being part of this reality. 
Reality in this sense then can be understood 'as the sum of possible experience which is 
in its different layers open for the acts of signification' and interpretation. 60 Both levels 
of reality can be distinguished conceptually but at the same time viewed as overlapping. 
In a nutshell, Schwobel arrives 'at the interpretation of the concept of experience where 
experience is understood as the determination of reality as an object of experience and 
certainty, by interpreting and organizing subjects on the basis of the disclosedness of 
reality for the signifying acts of self-experiencing subjects of perception and 
interpretation. ' 61 
By taking a closer look at this summarizing statement it will be possible to depict 
both strength and weakness of Schwobel's proposal. The strength of his conceptuali-
58 God, 109. Cf. Levinas' notion of"otherwise than being", Chapter Three, section 3.4.4. 
59 God, 110. 
60 God, Ill. 
61 God, 111. 
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sation is the overcoming of a one-sided Lindbeckian postliberalism, in which the notion 
of experience was subordinated to language and dissolved into a particular cultural 
framework. Reality and truth consequently were utterly relegated to the realm of 
particularity. Schwobel's account moves a step forward. It shows how reality can 
intelligibly be spoken of as both God-given (and therefore universal) and accessible for 
human interpretation within the process of experience. This approach has the strength of 
holding both sides together. Firstly, it can be acknowledged that human experience and 
knowledge is particular and subjective and therefore never total or absolute. The notion 
of truth remains partial and is always embedded in a process of dialogue and reciprocal 
human interaction. Particularity, however, since human beings are a real part of reality 
itself, does not contradict the notion of truth and human beings' possibility of 
expressing it. Secondly, it can also be maintained that the process of human experience 
and interaction is only possible on the ground of a given reality, which reaches beyond 
the particular and therefore guarantees meaningful interpretation and intelligible 
knowledge of the world. Partial and subjective human interpretations of truth therefore 
stand always in relation to universal truth. God-given reality is not objectively 
accessible for us but it displays the condition for human beings' capacity of 
meaningfully experiencing and interpreting the world at all. A Christian account of truth 
about God and the world, therefore, cannot retreat from the task of looking beyond its 
own intra-textual or intra-cultural context. It is precisely at this point, as I will argue 
later, that the concept of revelation need not be opposed to the concept of experience. If 
God reveals godself at all, then revelation must not contradict but rather has to be 
sought within the active and creative process of experience. 
The weakness of Schwobel's account, on the other hand, lies in his one-sided 
adherence to a structural formula that presses the notion of experience into a clear-cut 
system. Although Schwobel wants to escape empiricism with its simple subject-object 
distinction and its equation of experience with perception, he partly fails to do so. His 
own reflections are a huge improvement but still adhere to the same distinctions. 
Proposing the basic formula '(A experiences) A experiences x as y, insofar as x is 
integrated into the interpretative framework I by interpreting it as y', Schwobel 
obviously differentiates between many levels of human life's complexity but still views 
experience maip)y within th~ ftcup~Y{9Jk of a "se.lf-experiencing I" per~eiving "another 
self-experiencing I" or an object of the created world. Not surprisingly he speaks of 
experience as the determination of reality as an object of experience. With this 
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definition Schwobel tends to suggest that we are somehow dealing with clear-cut 
entities or objects, that is a particular object x, which can be clearly isolated from its 
wider context, and a comprehensive y, which provides us with an intelligible 
interpretation. But is that not too simplistic?62 Does not such an approach still 
presuppose an observational perspective like in the natural sciences where one observes 
from the outside how things relate and function? Is human life not more complex? Does 
not human experience once we enter the realm of emotional and sensual experience 
burst any structural formula? If the concept of experience indicates an active and 
creative process of interpretation, then Schwobel's formula meets its limitations. Once I 
think about experiencing life as it is lived, for example, a particular event where I meet 
people and experience different affections and emotions, I will realize that it is not 
helpful at all to express such an event in the formula of 'A experiences this birthday 
party as deeply satisfying.' What does "party" really signify and what does "deeply 
satisfying" really mean? Given Wittgenstein's notion of "Sprachspiele" and its 
embeddedness in the "Lebensformen", do we not rather have to assume a more complex 
interwovenness of x, y, and an interpretative framework in real life? What about human 
memory that has to be conceived as in a state of flux rather than a storage room of fixed 
data? What about the experience of events that reach beyond any adequate description? 
Life is more complex than his formula tends to suggest. The question of how humans 
are able to figure out what interpretations of their experiences are more real or true than 
others in order to gain a better knowledge of the common reality as it is actually given 
to us by God is still in need for clarification. It cannot simply be answered by applying 
this altogether too simplistic formula to our experiences. While approving whole-
heartedly of his claim that reality is accessible for experiencing human subjects, the 
crucial question of how discourse about truth and reality can be pursued, without 
recourse to an objective foundation, must now be addressed. Since discourse is always 
linguistic it has to be shown how language relates to experience and participates in 
experience's possibility of expressing truth. 
62 Cf. Chapter Three, section 3.4.3. There I argue from a biological perspective that human beings as 
living beings are far more interconnected with the environment and their perception of it than empiricism 
and physics seem to be aware of. 
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2.2.2 Re-conceiving experience and language 
2.2.2.1 Experience: A way ofbeing in the world 
What I am now attempting to do is to develop a balanced account of the concepts of 
experience and language and how they are capable, although partially, to express truth 
about God and the world. Since all reflection and discourse cannot operate without 
language my aim in the following subsections will be to focus on the fact that human 
experience and therefore all conscious perception of the world and all experience of 
God is inescapably linked with language. At this point it might be noted, given the 
weakness ofSchwobel's structural formula, that I do not intend to give a clear definition 
of experience. Rather my premise is to fmd out what experience might mean in due 
course as I go along. For the time being I simply take experience not so much as a noun 
but rather as a verb. This has to do with my own native German Lebensform. The 
German language uses the terms 'Erlebnis' and 'Erfahrung'. These nouns are 
abstractions and generalisations of the verbs 'erleben' and 'erfahren'. Their roots 
'Ieben' and 'fahren' are expressions of movement, doing, and happening. Experience 
has something to do with living life as it is, perceiving the environment and acting 
within it as well as encountering people. 63 Experience entails the whole human being, 
body and mind, and the environment in which they live. Humans depend on experience 
in order to develop knowledge of the world. Simultaneously it can be maintained that 
already gained knowledge, and hence some kind of beliefs that are held true, will affect 
and influence future experiences. This is a complex matter. Experience signifies a way 
of being in the world as conscious human beings that cannot be totally grasped or 
defmed by a single concept. 64 Therefore I prefer to keep the concept open and to 
develop some understanding of it in connection with the concept of language. 
To pursue this aim I simply assert that the complexity of life finds one expression 
in the mutual dependency between experience and language. In other words, they form 
two sides of the same coin called human life. The relation between experience and 
language must be conceived as a dialectical structure. On the one hand, experience, 
indicating human beings' awareness and perception of being alive and being-in-the-
world which underlies all human knowledge and reflection, exhibits the precondition 
63 This is also true for the English term "experience" if it is seen in the light of its Latin root experiens I 
experior. 
64 Cf. Astley, Exploring God-talk, 15-8. 
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for the possibility of language. But at the same time, on the other hand, it has to be 
claimed that without language the possibility of bringing those experiences to the 
surface of life and to the surface of the consciousness of being would be missing. 
Without language there would be no experience as a meaningful and therefore true 
interpretation of being. Experience seems to aspire after speech, it wants to become 
conscious and expressed. Experience is in need of a voice to gain meaning. The notion 
of meaning implies interpretation and points to the necessity of signification and 
identification as a condition for language to be operative. Language appears to be 
conceptual and although actual life-experience tends to transcend language and to 
exceed the means of conceptual expression, it nevertheless depends upon signification 
and therefore conceptualisation. The notions of experience and language (including 
conceptualisation) form a complex and close relationship. My intention therefore for the 
following discussion will be to shed some light on this complexity in order to clarify the 
relation between the notions of experience, language, and truth and to describe its 
theological relevance. 
2.2.2.2 The sameness and otherness structure of experience 
To be human means to have body and soul. This essential relational structure between 
matter and mind, as the condition and givenness of our human existence, already 
indicates an irreducible connection between some kind of objectivity and subjectivity in 
which one cannot be thought of without the other. Experience is certainly rooted in this 
relational structure. Experiencing as a function of the interplay between body and mind 
is from the very beginning an act of consciousness that expresses a process of reflection 
by relating one thing to another. The nature of such consciousness cannot exist without 
signification and identification. Experience always embraces meaning. Language is 
unavoidable. The very fact that a particular individual is not identical with another 
individual, that is to say, that the other person always remains the other without 
becoming me, and that human beings find themselves in a way set against a world as 
something that can be experienced, entails the distinction of sameness and otherness 
which can be expressed in categories such as subjectivity and objectivity, I and Thou, I 
and the world. But this very di~tiilctiop. )1~ a precondition of experience within the 
human mind indicates a certain kind of e~periential conceptual captivity. Experience 
can only be subjective if there is something which can be experienced as other and 
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which is indeed different from the individual I. The self-experiencing subject can only 
experience itself as such because it is always embedded in relations (such as the other 
and I, here and there, now and then, body and mind), which are in turn indications of 
conceptuality. 
From a theological perspective one could also say that the distinction between 
creator and creation displays the fact that there is already a giver and a receiver before 
all experience. There is a relation before all experience. There is a distinction and 
consequently the need for interpretation (to gain meaning) before all experience. There 
is already a concept, a structure of meaning before all experience. But also from a 
purely anthropological perspective, there is already the other and the surrounding world 
as a relational structure for being-in-the-world before all experience. A relational 
structure as a meaningful givenness for self-experiencing subjects entails concepts of 
signification, identification, and distinction in order to make sense of all that. 
This relational structure exhibits, as I would now like to suggest, a fundamental 
dialectic between sameness and otherness. If there is a relation at all it can only be if the 
other is really other and distinct from me. This otherness carries with it the notion of 
totality taking into account that the other cannot be reduced to the same. Otherness 
cannot be annihilated; it always stays in force. A relation would cease to be a real 
relation if otherness could be dissolved into sameness. However this otherness can only 
be a meaningful otherness for a self-experiencing subject if the subject is able to make 
sense of it, that is to say, understands the other as other in distinction to oneself. This is 
a crucial point for this also entails the notion of sameness as a constitutive part of the 
structure of experience. As a self-experiencing subject I can only make sense of 
something or someone in relating this other something or someone to my experience of 
being-in-the-world. If there is a relation at all, then there must be a connection between 
the other and myself. Otherness becomes only visible and factual and consequently 
meaningful in terms of sameness. Otherwise there would be no understanding of being 
and of human life as relational, there would be no comprehension and communication. 
Sameness is indispensable for a relation to make sense and to receive meaning. A 
relation would cease to be a relationship if there were no connection at all. 
In view of this it must be assumed that human experience is rooted in an 
irreducible relational strt.~.cture of otbeml!.ss and sameness. Otherness and sameness 
form the two focal points of human experience's ellipse, simultaneously they exclude 
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and include each other, remain strangers and friends.65 If knowledge of being-in-the-
world is possible at all (and this knowledge I want to call truth in the sense of a true 
interpretation of human life and the world) and is gained through experience, then this 
truth can only come to expression in language as an inherent part of experience's 
sameness-essence. Language is experience's voice in its attempt at expressing otherness 
in meaningful words of signification and identification. From this point of view 
language can be conceived as an inherent part of experience's sameness-essence in 
distinction to experience's otherness-essence, which remains unspeakable and beyond 
all expression. Although experience is never fully expressible through language, 
language is capable of bringing some parts of experience to speech and therefore to 
illuminate and formulate truth about being. This is precisely the strength of language 
(beside its weakness of reductionism) to make sense of a given, relational reality 
through a process of relating otherness to sameness, which otherwise would remain 
silent, inconceivable, void, and meaningless. 
2.2.2.3 The paradoxical character of experience 
In view of these reflections we should now speak of the paradoxical character of 
experience's sameness and otherness structure, which shows that human life as it is 
lived cannot be reduced to a tidy concept. On the one hand, self-experiencing subjects 
are always distinct from one another in a fundamental and irreducible sense. Experience 
as the basis for reflection, interpretation, and knowledge of our reality of being-in-the-
world cannot be utterly reduced to language because language is rooted in the 
sameness-essence of the relational givenness of the world and therefore violates the 
otherness-essence. 'My experience,' as Paul Ricoeur points out, 'cannot be directly 
become your experience. An event belonging to one stream of consciousness cannot be 
transferred as such into another stream of consciousness. '66 Experience as an act of 
consciousness always transcends language and therefore concepts. On the other hand, 
self-experiencing subjects who are ultimately not capable of experiencing the other's 
self-experiencing of the world have to relate these otherness-experiences to each other 
65 It is a merit of ph~nomeQological research to show that individual life determines itself through self-
diffeiendation from 'the environment and at the same remaining tied to it. Being and keeping alive 
upholds a dialectic between distinction and assimilation, between otherness and sameness: Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (Tnbingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1965), 238. 
66 Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth: The Texas Christian 
University Press, 1976), 16. 
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and presuppose a certain kind of sameness. This relation is a real possibility because 
experience is grounded in the givenness of the world, which is the same for the other 
and myself. Otherwise there would be no relating and hence no conscious experience. 
This means that due to experience's continuous transfer and transformation into 
language human beings cannot but make sense of the experienced world by employing 
concepts. In correlation with the notion of truth, expressing a meaningful and at least in 
part true interpretation of reality, it can be claimed that concepts (due to language's 
intention of giving experience a voice) disclose and limit reality at the same time. 
Jacques Derrida's notion of "obliqueness" appears to be helpful at this point to exhibit 
the concept's dialectic character, pointing to both the disclosure and deflection of 
truth.67 However the main issue at stake seems to be the appreciation of experience's 
inescapable link and interwovenness with the notions of language and the concept as 
inherent parts of its own essence. 
In order to strengthen this proposal I would like to add a further consideration. 
Language as the means of bringing experience to speech, as an act of describing, 
narrating, reflecting, comprehending, and communicating and consequently as an act of 
interpreting and understanding the world and the human condition within a given world 
and community of human beings, is inherently conceptual. From a linguistic 
perspective, comprehension and communication depend upon both semiotics 
(signification and identification) and semantics (meaningful relation between the signs) 
as an interpretative framework in order to make sense of our experiences. This means 
that language (in all its forms of signifying and. relating sounds, words, objects, 
emotions, gestures, etc.) is essential for being conscious. Language and experience need 
each other. As a result this relationship also displays the paradoxical character. It can be 
portrayed as an inseparable interconnectedness between experience, indicating a "prior 
to language" (a kind of pre-language or pre-conceptual experience due to the otherness-
structure of the world's givenness), and language, indicating a "prior to experience" (a 
kind of pre-experience signification due to the relational givenness of the world and its 
sameness structure). In other words, if both experience and language are based on the 
ground of human consciousness, then, on the one hand, the possibility of language 
67 For a disc~sion of "obliqueness", .[)e_rrida, On the Nam~ (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 
3-31. Cf. James Smith, Speech and Theology: Language and the Logic of Incarnation (London: 
Routledge, 2002), 92: 'The oblique strategy, which indicates both a pointing and a deflection, is a 
disclosure without full disclosure, an expression without divulgence, a speaking without seizing. So the 
oblique strategy of formal indication is a non-objectifYing employment of concepts which enables one to 
point to the incommensurable.' 
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(expressing something meaningful at all) depends utterly on experience. On the other 
hand, without a reference system, that is to say without language as a concept of 
identification and signification, which renders it possible that the world in which we 
live becomes meaningful at all, there would be no experience. 
2.2.2.4 The dialectic between conceptual and metaphorical language 
Given the argument so far, I sense a somewhat one-sided approach and false dichotomy 
within philosophical and theological discourse when the initial problem of the 
relationship between experience and language is formalized in the following way: 'If 
the very topic of philosophy is experience, and if we appreciate that experience is 
pretheoretical, then how will it be possible to theoretically describe this pretheoretical 
experience?'68 Such formalization neglects the fundamental relational structure and 
givenness of the world as noted above and presupposes a dichotomy between 
conceptual language and experience, theoria and praxis, language and truth.69 
Maintaining the paradoxical character of experience due to its sameness and otherness 
structure it must be asked: Can there be factive experience without language and, due to 
the fact that language is inherently conceptual, without a notion of the concept? How 
can I experience something without at least already being aware and conscious of this 
something? How can I experience something meaningful without having a basic 
concept of correlating this something to me and to my world? Does not experience in 
order to be meaningful need language and the concept? And on the other side, how can I 
conceptualise without being inescapably embedded in factual life experience as the 
"what" and focus of my reflection? How can I experience life without any reference 
system, that is to say, some kind of meaningful knowledge ofthe world and human life? 
It is precisely at this point that one can see how representatives of a postliberal, a non-
realistic or a prelinguistic-experiential account of reality and truth fail to do justice to 
the complexity of human life because they draw a misleading and one-sided distinction 
between experience and language. 
68 Smith, Speech and Theology, 4. 
69 Smith notes that Heidegger grappled with this question of how we can do justice to the 
incommensurability of factual life experience: 'While the concept traffics on the high road ofuniversality, 
factical life experience is lowly and singular; while the concept is abstract and schematic, "life" is 
concrete, rich, and dynamic; while the concept is detached and aloof, factical life is engaged and 
involved; while the concept is a product of theoria, experience is a matter of praxis': Ibid., 78. 
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To be clear, to name something and to articulate experience means always to 
restrict it in the way described above within the dialectical framework of otherness and 
sameness. Therefore it has to be maintained that language limits being and that the 
factual and concrete experience in its fullness and completion can never be totally 
grasped. Experience goes beyond language because experience includes otherness and 
sameness, while language lives within the sphere of sameness. Nonetheless, to say that 
experience transcends language is not the same as to assert that experience and language 
are incommensurable. It is my contention that it is misleading to speak of pre-
theoretical experience in opposition to language and the conceptual. Instead one should 
rather favour a relational approach within the image of an ellipse with two focal points. 
Following this image I suggest that the understanding of human experience should be 
anchored in the dialectic structure of otherness and sameness as its essence. Human 
experience then can be visualized as an ellipse with otherness and sameness as its focal 
points. Language and concepts circle around the focal point of sameness, while the 
notions of transcendence and incommensurability circle around the focal point of 
otherness. This image must not be viewed as a static picture but rather as a dynamic 
process in which the sphere of language (in its continuous process of signification and 
conceptualisation in order to make sense of the world and to gain knowledge of the 
world) is able to expand into the sphere of incommensurability. If one now visualizes 
that both spheres overlap and connect to a certain degree without being dissolved into 
one another but remaining intact in their distinctiveness, then this would suggest that the 
realm of language is dynamic and movable. Consequently, language that is more 
attentive and sensitive to the otherness-essence of experience will more likely be 
capable of expressing human experience in a fuller and more meaningful way. This 
image then points towards language as most meaningful and true to human experience 
and its transcendence-character when it includes or at least tries to deal with 
experience's otherness. 
Regarding this the question must be faced of which language is the most 
appropriate for expressing human experience. When experience is brought to speech 
there is a spectrum of language forms which range from metaphor to proposition. While 
metaphorical language, stories and images tend to open meaning, conceptual language 
tends to limit meaning an.d reduce the playful multiplicity of images to a system. 70 
70 Paul Fiddes, 'Story and Possibility: Reflections on the Last Scenes of the Fourth Gospel and 
Shakespeare's The Tempest', in G. Sauter and J. Barton (eds.), Revelation and Story: Narrative Theology 
and the Centrality of Story (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 47. 
66 
However, there is no playful multiplicity and opening up of meaning unless there is also 
a concept and the attempt at clarifying speech and interpretation. But the opposite is 
valid as well: there can be no process of conceptual understanding of reality unless there 
is open space towards new meaning through the creativity of metaphoricallanguage.71 
The appropriate answer to the question of how to express truth and of how to express 
knowledge gained through experience, therefore, has to be sought in a creative 
interaction between metaphorical and conceptual language. 72 This again seems to be a 
relational process. While metaphorical language opens up space within the realm of 
otherness, giving conceptual language the opportunity to expand its understanding of 
human experience, conceptual language in turn clarifies the horizon of this new 
understanding (implying a kind of reductionism), giving metaphorical language the 
opportunity to create new playful constructions and new space on the ground of new 
understanding. To pursue the argument further it now has to be shown that experience's 
dialectic structure of sameness and otherness extends into the realm of language. I 
therefore turn to Paul Ricoeur and Eberhard JOngel as my dialogue partners. In the 
following discussion, the dialectic of conceptual and metaphorical language emerges as 
the ground for language's possibility of both expressing truth about the human reality 
and opening up space for God talk. 73 
2.2.3 Metaphorical truth 
2.2.3.1 The in-exhaustiveness ofmetaphoricallanguage 
Ricoeur's approach to language in his Interpretation Theory74 is a relational one. He 
grounds his theory in an understanding of language as discourse, which indicates the 
fundamental embeddedness of language within human communication. But 
communication is not about codes and messages but rather exhibits, be it the "inner 
communication" of reflection and interpretation within one's own consciousness and 
71 Many philosophers treat metaphorical language as an irreducible and irreplaceable form of language 
that can give a real insight into reality. Cf. Astley, Exploring God-talk, 36-40. 
12 For a similar point with regard to the relationship between language as biblical narrative and 
conceptually complex theology: Ritschl, The Logic of Theology, 14-27. Cf. also Janet Martin Soskice, in 
Rupert Shortt, God's Advocates: Christian Thinkers in Conversation (London: Darton, Longman and 
Todd;2005)oesp:"29·34, . , ~ .. ~ 
73 This implication rests on subsection 2.2.1.3 where I argued that God's creation as a given reality, which 
is open towards human experience, indicates the possibility of gaining knowledge about God and the 
world that can be held true. 
74 Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth: The Texas Christian 
University Press, 1976). Hereafter: [11]. 
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thinking or the outer communication with other people, an event which depends on an 
irreducible relation between semiotics and semantics. For this reason Ricoeur departs 
from the structural model (prioritising semiotics and the superiority of the sign) which 
sees language as a code 'on the basis of which a particular speaker produces parole as a 
particular message.' 75 He criticises the structural approach as creating its own world 
considering language as a self-sufficient system. It loses its essential ground and is 
disconnected from its reference system, namely human life, in which language always 
indicates mediation between minds and things. 76 Regarding this he holds that language 
as discourse has to distinguish between semiotics and semantics but must not rip them 
apart. Language as discourse and as meaningful communication always generates 
sentences. But a 'sentence is a whole irreducible to the sum of its parts. It is made up of 
words, but it is not a derivative function of its words. A sentence is made up of signs, 
but is not itself a sign.' 77 
This fundamental basis of human language is the very reason why language as 
discourse has to be described as an event. Messages seen as merely signs or paroles 
have a temporal existence, they vanish. But ''the said as such" with an ontological 
significance rather lies in a meaning that exists through the relations of signs within the 
semantic structure. It is the intertwining of noun and verb that exhibits this fundamental 
event and discloses the propositional content of the said as such. This interplay between 
noun and verb signifies the two essential functions of discourse as event and 
consequently also the premises for meaning: identification and predication. Hence 
Ricoeur holds that '[i]f all discourse is actualised as an event, all discourse is 
understood as meaning.' 78 
Taking this basic trait of language as discourse for granted Ricoeur highlights the 
fact that, if we remind ourselves that an important aspect of discourse is its address-
character, it is precisely the dialectic of event and meaning which urges us to distinguish 
between the utterer's meaning and utterance meaning. Here lies the centre of the 
problem of interpretation. Once an utterance is spoken it gains its own life although it 
emerged from a speaker with a particular intention. But once the utterer has uttered his 
words the 'mental meaning can be found nowhere else than in discourse itself' and 
75 IT, 3. 
76 If, 6. 
77 IT, 1. 
78 IT, 12. 
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therefore 'the utterer's meaning has its mark in the utterance meaning.'79 Ricoeur nicely 
describes these two dimensions with the following words. 
My experience cannot directly become your experience. An event belonging to one 
stream of consciousness cannot be transferred as such into another stream of 
consciousness. Yet, nevertheless, something passes from me to you. Something is 
transferred from one sphere of life to another. This something is not the experience as 
experienced, but its meaning. Here is the miracle. The experience as experienced, as 
lived, remains private, but its sense, its meaning, becomes public. Communication in this 
way is the overcoming of the radical non-communicability of the lived experience as 
lived.80 
This statement highlights that language as discourse always contains a subjective and an 
objective side, namely the utterer's meaning and the utterance meaning. However, this 
dialectic is not all that can be said. It rather has to be pointed out that discourse in its 
objective sphere says something and says something about something. Ricoeur calls this 
the sense (the "what" of discourse) and the reference (the "about what" of discourse).81 
With this distinction he emphasises the essential and indispensable significance that 
language relates to the world, to actuality, and thus can claim to say something about 
the reality of the world as it is. The realm oflanguage makes the realm of experience (as 
the basic condition for human perception and knowledge of the world) accessible and 
that is why language in its relation to the world says something about the ontological 
condition of our being in the world. Because language is essentially referential it is 
essentially meaningful and therefore capable of bringing to speech what life and reality 
is all about. 
Proceeding from this understanding of language Ricoeur rejects the traditional 
concept of metaphor, which defines a metaphor as an ornament of speech. On the 
traditional account metaphor is understood as a phenomenon of denomination and not 
of predication. This means that a metaphor, because it does not represent a semantic 
innovation, does not say anything new about reality. Ricoeur argues that a metaphor as 
a figure of speech, which depends on the dialectical event of identification and 
interpretation, belongs to the realm of discourse. Metaphor, therefore, must be 
understood as a phenomenon of predication. Hence it is wrong to subordinate metaphor 
to the realm of semiotics in order to assert that a metaphor only 'represents the 
extension of the meaning of a name through deviation from the literal meaning of 
19 IT, 13. 
80 IT, 16. 
81 IT, 19. 
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words. ' 82 One should not, as Ricoeur points out, even speak of 'the metaphorical use of 
a word, but rather of the metaphorical utterance. The metaphor is the result of the 
tension between two terms in a metaphorical utterance. ' 83 This tension emerges out of 
the connection between two terms that, if understood in a literal sense, would contradict 
or oppose each other. With reference to the lexical meaning of words one has to say that 
a metaphorical utterance only starts to make sense if one engages in a kind of 
interpretative work. A literal interpretation would be nonsensical, but through the 
process of transformation the metaphorical twist starts to make sense and expands the 
meaning of reality. This implies the assertion that 'a metaphor does not exist in itself, 
but in and through an interpretation. ' 84 As a result of this reflection Ricoeur maintains 
that metaphorical language is innovative and creative and does tell us something new 
about reality. He summarizes as follows: 
In this sense, a metaphor is an instantaneous creation, a semantic innovation which has no 
status in already established language and which already exists because of the attribution 
of an unusual or unexpected predicate. Metaphor therefore is more like the resolution of 
an enigma than a simple association based on resemblance; it is constituted by the 
resolution of a semantic dissonance.85 
Finally, this reflection of metaphorical language leads to another implication. Real 
metaphors that signify a creative innovation are ultimately not translatable. Surely, it 
may be said, one can fmd a paraphrase as an attempt of interpreting and clarifying the 
meaning of a particular metaphorical utterance. However, precisely because a metaphor 
represents a unique dialectical tension of words, paraphrases and interpretations can 
never exhaust the innovative meaning of it. If I follow Ricoeur's understanding of 
metaphorical language and correlate it with my image of experience as an ellipse with 
the two focal points of otherness and sameness, then I have got an example of how 
language is capable of expanding into the sphere of otherness without objectifying it, 
hence resisting the danger of reducing the other totally to the same. It seems that both 
human experience and conceptual language can fmd fruitful soil on metaphorical 
grounds. While the concept's need for clarification can fmd new possibilities of 
expression within a metaphorical language, experience's need for coming to speech and 
at the same time not wanting to be fully disclosed can fmd enough open space to 
breathe. This in-exhaustiveness (indicating a respect for the otherness-essence of 
82 IT, 49. 
83 IT, 50. 
84 IT, 50. 
ss IT, 52. 
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experience) as well as the actual possibility for innovative conceptual language 
(pointing towards new horizons of meaning and knowledge) within metaphorical 
language already indicate the importance of Ricoeur' s understanding of language for 
theological discourse. 
2.2.3.2 Metaphor and theological truth 
It is Eberhard Jtingel' s conviction that a theological theory of language has to take into 
account the essential and indispensable concept of revelation as the very possibility for 
human beings to experience and to bring their experience to speech. 86 Experience 
depends on the givenness of the creation as something which is constituted by God for 
the self-experiencing subject. This is even more relevant for the realms of theology and 
faith in which people try to express something which ultimately reaches beyond the 
actual of human experience. To say something about God is always to say something 
more than one actually can perceive, comprehend, and explain within our world. From a 
theological perspective 'actuality is not the sum ofbeing,' 87 actuality only represents the 
givenness of the creation insofar it is open to the experience of human subjects. But the 
givenness of the creation as actuality, which is constituted for the subject of experience 
by God, is at the same time always amalgamated with a confused actual state of affairs 
which is constituted by self-experiencing subjects who in turn simultaneously are also 
the objects of experience. This is why Jtingel can claim at the very start that religious 
language because it presupposes revelation 'necessarily accords to actuality more than 
an actual state of affairs can show itself at any particular time, more, indeed, than it is 
capable of showing for itself at any particular time. . . . religious language can only be 
true religious language when it goes beyond actuality without talking round it. ' 88 The 
always confused actual state of affairs of human experience and reality therefore is not 
entitled to express the fullness of actuality in the sense of what is constituted for the 
self -experiencing subject. Regarding this, JUngel emphasises the fact that the possibility 
of expressing truth about actuality as that which is given and constituted for human 
beings depends precisely on a given, a donum, as a potentia aliena which brings light 
into the confused states of affairs. 89 
86 Eberhard JUnge I, 'Metaphorical Truth', in Theological Essays I (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1989), 16-71. 
Hereafter: [MT]. 
87 MT, 16. 
88 MT, 16. 
89 MT, 17. 
71 
On these grounds Jungel connects metaphor, as a process which is fundamental to 
language, with the notion of truth. To do this he follows Ricoeur and departs from the 
traditional understanding of metaphor, which depends to a large degree on Aristotle's 
definition that ' [ m ]etaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something 
else. ' 90 This view assumes that 'the existence of metaphor is dependent upon the fact 
that there are non-metaphorical words'91 and 'that things are normally signified by the 
ordinary word in common usage. ' 92 The result of this view is that, although metaphors 
are important and language seems to love them, when it comes to the point where truth 
is at stake, language can also do otherwise.93 This Aristotelian view subordinates 
semantics to semiotics and metaphorical language becomes an ornament of speech. But 
this understanding of metaphor, Jiingel argues, is incorrect. He points out that not only 
within the realm of statements but also within the realm of language as address we 
always come across the necessity of having to shape metaphors in hermeneutical 
emergencies. New things which we experience and new situations which we have to 
face often lack a verbum proprium and therefore are in need of metaphorical 
signification. Jiingel summarizes: 
A necessary metaphor of this kind is the remedy in a hermeneutical emergency, in a 
situation in which normal language use does not represent a particular state of affairs by a 
verbum proprium, so that (at ftrst) an "ordinary word" for that state of affairs is lacking. 
In such cases the verbum proprium is, as we saw, replaced by a metaphor formed by 
analogy. The post-Aristotelian tradition calls this necessary metaphor Ka:'tliXPT)OLc; 
(abusio, catachresis), thereby expressing both that the usage was derivative and that the 
derivative usage was the normal one. This metaphorical catachresis is enough to call into 
question the entire traditional theory ofmetaphor.94 
With reference to these hermeneutical emergencies Jiingel supports the assumption that 
there are cases in which metaphors function as the essence of language because no 
verbum proprium is available. Hence he is able to contend that 'we need to recognize 
~E'ta:<j>opa itself as the event of truth. ' 95 It is in this context that one can observe that 
Jiingel construes his account of metaphorical truth on christological foundations. What 
he has in mind, when he speaks of the essence of language, is God's self-revelation in 
Jesus Christ. ME'ta:<j>opa as the event of truth is only a true statement if it is equated with 
the one event in which God lets himself be discovered, an event for which there was 
90 MT, 35, footnote 42. 
91 MT, 32~3. 
92 MT,35. 
93 MT, 47. 
94 MT, 47. 
95 MT, 53. 
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initially no verbum proprium available. In this event, that is the incarnation, being lets 
itself be discovered and in this process enters into correlation with what has already 
been discovered. This process of discovery has to be conceived as something that stands 
over against human beings who experience themselves as discoverers. It is precisely 
through this necessary process of creating metaphorical language in order to express 
states of affairs which cannot be satisfactorily signified and described by already 
existing words or phrases that we gain new meaning and a new perspective on our 
reality. Hence J\ingel insists on the passivity of this truth for the human discoverer. 
Truth is an event in which being lets itself be discovered.96 Even negative theology in 
its attempt to avoid defining God constrains itself to non-metaphorical language and 
consequently speaks of God in favour of semiotics, adhering to a structuralist 
assumption which regards language as a code. J\ingel reminds us of the fact 'that a 
metaphorical statement has a new information-value over against a non-metaphorical 
sentence with the same intention. ' 97 In other words, ' [ m ]etaphors expand the horizon of 
being by going beyond fixation upon actuality with that which is possible, in this way 
intensifying the being of that which is.'98 However, metaphorical language in its 
capacity to go beyond what is known within the restrictions of the confused actuality of 
self-experiencing subjects is the most appropriate language for God-talk only as long as 
it is bound up with the incarnation. 
The incarnation, consequently, is also Jililgel's answer to the problem that not all 
metaphorical language necessarily is speech of God or truly revealing something about 
God. Theology is in need of a reference system, in need of a revelation which manifests 
itself in history within the human condition. The life of Jesus Christ, God within the 
human condition fully embracing it, becomes the meeting point between divine being 
and human being, between the incommensurability of human language for God-talk and 
its very possibility as appropriate and meaningful. This is the reason why all 
metaphorical language as an expression of being-addressed-by-God fmds its root in the 
event of God himself becoming human. If the language of faith, and as a consequence 
theological utterances, do not want to take the name of God in vain, then their use of 
96 MT, 56. However this passive formulation of "lets itself be discovered" in connection with truth 
remains vague. In respect to the concept of revelation it is rather ambiguous. Cf. below part 2.3. 
97 MT,62. 
98 MT, 68. 
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metaphorical language needs to be in continuous correlation with the event in which 
God addressed humanity in the most direct and concrete way.99 Jiingel argues: 
Thus the event in which we are addressed in God's name is decisive for the proper 
formation of theological metaphors. That event is the event in which God once and for all 
carne to the world and came to speech as the one who addresses us: the event of the life, 
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the event of the justification of sinners. In this 
event free choice of theological metaphors has both its ground and its limits. 100 
At this point, however, one starts to wonder whether Jiingel does not too quickly reduce 
the complex event of God revealing himself in the life and death of Jesus (which is a 
narrative) to a particular concept, namely the incarnation. Moreover, what is the role of 
Old Testament language, obviously articulated before the incarnation took place? Given 
Jiingel's indebtedness to Ricoeur with his stress on language as discourse and the in-
exhaustiveness of metaphorical language the problem appears to be more complex than 
Jiingel wants to concede. Although I do agree with him on the centrality of the 
incarnation as an argument against God's refusal of speech, 101 I do not concur with his 
one-sided dissolution of metaphorical truth into the Christ event for true speech about 
God. From a trinitarian perspective one might also want to ask where the Holy Spirit 
comes into the equation. This problem is not addressed. 
The Incarnation is God's refusal to avoid speaking, and so the Incarnation functions as a 
paradigm for the operation of theological language which both "does justice" to God's 
transcendence and infmity, but at the same time makes it possible to "speak." In other 
words, it is the Incarnation that provides an account which affirms both transcendence 
and immanent appearance - both alterity and identity - without reducing the one to the 
other.102 
But what exactly does "incarnation" stand for? Which signification and interpretation of 
the Christ event should gain priority for the limitation of theological language about 
God? Given my account of experience and language, there is no single and 
straightforward answer to this question. What is the meaning of Jesus' life, death, and 
resurrection? Surely a Lutheran theologian will answer this question differently to a 
Roman Catholic, and Jiingel leaves no doubt that for him it is the doctrine of 
justification that provides the theological reference point. However, he does not give 
any reason as to why this should be so. Is he favouring the limitation of theological 
99 In this incamational context, biblical language as profoundly metaphorical and as deeply grounded in 
and correlated with the Christ-event also gains fundamental significance for JOngel. 
100 MT, 64. c 
101 Cf. Smith, Speech and Theology, 126: 'God's incamational appearance is precisely a condescension to 
the condition of finite, created perceivers. How could he appear otherwise? The Incarnation signals a 
connection with transcendence which does not violate or reduce such transcendence, but neither does it 
leave it in a realm of utter alterity without appearance.' 
102 Ibid., 154. 
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language by doctrine rather than being inclined to open up new theological meaning by 
metaphorical language? The in-exhaustiveness of metaphorical language seems to be 
subordinated to a particular understanding of the incarnation. This displays not only a 
one-sidedness but, from a trinitarian perspective, leaves the question unanswered 
whether or not the Holy Spirit might initiate metaphorical utterances stemming from 
human experience which, although certainly not in contradiction to the Christ event, 
would expand our understanding of God's being from a different perspective. 
In conclusion then, on the one hand, I wholeheartedly agree with Jililgel's 
emphasis on the importance of the incarnation for theological discourse. On the other 
hand, however, one has to reach beyond Jililgel's account of metaphorical truth as a 
mere function of christology. The metaphorical process, embedded in the condition of 
experience and language, must not be conceived merely as a passive "letting itself be 
disclosed" but rather as a given possibility of the human condition to which God 
accommodates himself.103 Otherwise we are again left with an account oftruth in which 
revelation and experience are considered as opposed to one another. Jiingel, at this 
point, neglects a proper investigation into the relationship between experience and 
revelation. To this problem I will turn in the next part of this chapter. For the time being 
I must end on a preliminary conclusion. Metaphorical in-exhaustiveness in connection 
with the incarnation as a framework for theological language a) should manifest itself as 
a creative and open interaction of human experience with the whole range of Jesus 
narratives and testimonies rather than merely with christological concepts and b) must 
be sought for within a trinitarian framework that acknowledges God's presence in the 
Holy Spirit throughout the ages. 
2.2.4 Conclusion 
In this part I have tried to shed some light on the correlation between language, 
experience and truth from philosophical, linguistic, and theological perspectives. 
Investigating the relational dependency between experience and language in its pre-
experiential and pre-linguistic condition of a given and relational reality it became 
imperative to ground human experience in the dialectic structure of otherness and 
s.ameness. As a res~t I conclud~d that language is an inherent p@]t of experience and 
therefore cannot be opposed to experience as incommensurable. An appropriate attempt 
103 See below part 2.3. 
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of articulating truth, therefore, will most likely emerge out of a creative interaction 
between metaphorical and conceptuallanguage.104 The graph below might function as a 
summary. 
I the other 
my experience .... t-----l .... the other's exp. 
only mine (incommensurability) only his/hers 
OTHERNESS 
SAMENESS 
I communicate meaningfUlly with the other 
I and the other 
live in the one and same created reality 
(presupposes commensurability) 
METAPHORICAL CONCEPTIJAL 
LANGUAGE/ LANGUAGE 
NARRATIVE - signifies and 
- transcends exacts language 
conceptual - narrows down 
signification meaning 
- moves into the -clarifies 
realm of otherness ~ understanding 
- reaches beyond by reducing 
actuality "otherness" 
- opens up new experiences to 
meaning "sameness" 
language 
'----------------------------- .. ·-··r··--·-----------------------------' 
LANGUAGE AS DISCOURSE 
- participates in the common reality 
- connects "otherness" experiences 
- words of signification as communal product 
- means of meaningful communication 
Graph 1: Experience 's sameness and otherness structure and its relation to language 
Given this structure and interconnectedness between experience and language, as well 
as the premise that human beings actually do live in one world as our common point of 
reference rather than many, truth must be sought within this complexity. That is to say, 
concern for truth must be a concern for the articulation of reality which displays a 
richness that cannot be grasped by one concept or style. The dependence of conscious 
human beings on the dialectical structure of experience and language does therefore not 
discar4 th~-notion oLtruth"but rather,highlights the problem .with language that it does 
not block 'all access to reality, but that it always falls short of a finally adequate 
104 Schleiennacher's discussion of the correlation between poetic-narrative language and dogmatic 
sentences is also very suggestive in this respect: Der christliche Glaube (1830131 ), §§ 16-18. 
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account.' 105 Theological integrity, to refer to the opening section of my discussion, and 
the search for true and meaningful interpretations of reality needs to admit that there is 
no such thing as a normative style or language. As Williams rightly emphasizes: 'The 
theologian needs to affirm theologically the propriety of different styles, and to maintain 
exchange and mutual critique between them.' 106 However, the search for truthful 
articulations of reality must also include non-theological styles of discourse. Jilngel and 
Schwobel argued from a theological perspective that experience depends on the 
g1venness of the creation as something which is constituted by God for the self-
experiencing subject and that in theology and faith people try to express something 
which ultimately reaches beyond the actual of human experience. If this distinction has 
some validity, it implies the necessity for theological discourse to integrate without 
restriction the articulation of reality as human beings experience it. Hence, theological 
discourse about the doctrine of God as human speech, if it wants to be more sound and 
meaningful, has to integrate more thoroughly conversations with different fields of the 
human sciences as being part of the quest for true interpretation of our common reality. 
Otherwise it runs the risk of misleading one-sidedness with the consequence of not 
being able to give an appropriate account (despite all fragmentation) of how human 
beings still live in one world and God-given reality, which they all inhabit. 
2.3 EXPERIENCE, INCARNATION, AND REVELATION 
2.3.1 From experience to revelation 
2.3 .1.1 The otherness-sameness-structure as a key to speech about revelation 
After having investigated the concept of human experience in relation to the concept of 
language I now would like to spin this thread a little further and extend it more 
specifically into the realm of God-talk and the possibility of speech about revelation. 
Assuming this interstitial attitude, the heading "from experience to revelation" must not 
be misunderstood as indicating experiential foundationalism. As noted earlier, the 
intention now is to search on the platform of human experience for traces of revelation 
which do not violate the human condition but still allow for a reasonable and 
'"'-
meaningful interpretation of experience in terms of revelation without confusing the one 
105 Murray, Reason, Truth and Theology, 74. 
106 On Christian Theology, 9. 
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with the other. To begin with, therefore, it is essential to bear in mind that the concept 
of experience led to a crucial distinction between two levels of reality. First, there is the 
level of reality that is constituted for the experiencing subject as the condition of the 
possibility for human experience. Second, there is the level of reality as being 
subjectively accessible by human beings from within, and as being part of, this given 
reality. Due to reality's fundamental openness towards human experience, this entails 
the fact that both levels are somehow connected and should not be seen as mutually 
exclusive. Given this distinction theological discourse when it appeals to revelation can 
be described as the attempt of reaching beyond the second level and of saying 
something about the ground of reality and consequently about the telos of the human 
condition and the created world in relation to God. This reaching beyond, that is 
genuine theological discourse, however, can only be ventured as human discourse if 
God somehow breaks through and enters the level of human experience. To speak of 
revelation includes the aspect of learning something from God about the first level of 
reality which human beings cannot objectively know by themselves. It is at this point 
that not only the indispensable role of the notion of revelation but also its proper context 
emerges for theology. Looking from the perspective of the previous part the notion of 
revelation should not and cannot be established as a warrant for objective truth. It 
therefore must be explicated in mutual dialogue with an account of human experience in 
its recognition of the reality of God as the ground of human reality. Christian theology 
when it speaks of God's presence in the world and subsequently of the possibility of 
knowing something about the transcendent God and his reality usually refers to Jesus 
Christ and the Holy Spirit. However, when the Bible speaks of God revealing godself in 
various ways in history through the prophets, through the Son, or through the Holy 
Spirit,107 this process of discerning what God actually reveals to human beings is deeply 
embedded in the conditions of human life. Truth about God and the relation between 
God and the world is found in the midst of human life as it is lived and theological 
discourse emerges mainly out of the primary experiences of charismatic leaders, 
prophets and Jesus' followers. Looking at the New Testament as a whole one can 
observe complex processes of different discourses and theological arguments used in 
order to discern the significance and truth about Jesus, 108 as well as the struggle not to 
107 John 14; Romans 8; Hebrew 1.1-2. 
108 Paul's first letter to the Corinthians might suffice as an example of diversity in the Christian 
community and its struggle to explicate the Gospel of Christ. 
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confuse the workings of the Holy Spirit with human spirits.109 This analysis supports the 
fact that God's presence among his people in Jesus and through the Holy Spirit must be 
understood in a way that connects the concepts of experience and revelation. 
Consequently this approach seeks to focus on experience's hospitality towards 
revelatio~ claiming that experience and revelation are not hostile to or exclusive of one 
another.110 
On the theological canvas, given reality's openness to experience and therefore a 
certain kind of overlap between God's objective reality and our human subjective 
perception of created reality, the otherness-sameness-structure of experience now 
emerges as a possible intersection between the two levels of reality. In regard to the 
possibility of divine revelation and human speech about God, it can be argued that the 
creative process of human experience fused with the inexhaustiveness of metaphorical 
language opens up space for God's otherness to appear within the realm of human 
sameness. In other words, the appearance of God's otherness within the confmements of 
human language renders possible theological discourse as meaningful and true 
interpretation of God's being. At the same time, however, it can and must also be 
maintained that this appearance within the sameness structure does not dissolve God's 
otherness into sameness. With regard to the human sphere and the given reality human 
beings inhabit, it was argued earlier that the sameness-essence of experience signifies 
the common reality of human being. In the case of relating the levels of divine and 
human being within the sameness-essence of experience, however, the notion of grace 
takes over. Theologically speaking, God remains the other and in this way is not a direct 
object of human investigation and observation. But because human reality is open 
towards God as the source of this reality, human experience and its embeddedness in 
language is not disconnected from God's reality. This connection has to be depicted as a 
connection sustained by grace and not as one of being. Otherwise it would be suggested 
that the created world is somehow an emanation of God's being and that therefore the 
appearance of God's otherness within human sameness grounds on the foundation of a 
common reality of being. What I suggest here is the view that because God willed in his 
freedom to create finite reality and to render possible the human condition as it is, the 
109 1 John 4.1. 
110
,IfChristian theology ventures .to make claims abouuhe .universal validity of its central beliefs, then it 
has to show how they can be thought of as grounding in God's reality while at the same time not 
neglecting the indispensable function of human experience for all knowledge. Lash emphasises in a 
similar way theology's task 'to take with sufficient seriousness the function of human experience in the 
process of revelation, while at the time safeguarding the God-given nature of that revelation': Change in 
Focus: A Study of Doctrinal Change and Continuity (London: Sheed and Ward, 1981), 13. 
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only way to make sense of experience's meaningful participation in this given reality 
and its receptive possibility for divine revelation (and therefore its capability of reaching 
beyond subjectivity, particularity, and non-realism) is by way of contending that human 
experience de facto is capable of hosting God's appearances. This renders possible talk 
about revelation without confusing it with the concept of experience. Furthermore, it 
implies the possibility of theological discourse about both God's otherness appearing 
within the limits of the human condition and meaningful (and in this sense true) speech 
about God. 
In order to give this claim some more substantial and "experiential" support it 
should be noticed that experience's hospitality towards the notion of revelation already 
displays a crucial aspect within Israel's God-talk in the Old Testament. The authors of 
the Old Testament are not really interested in conceptual language or in a clear-cut 
enterprise of attempting to define the ways in which God shows himself. It is rather the 
case that scriptural testimony not only refuses to provide a general term for 
"revelation"111 but also urges theologians to speak of a plurality of concepts of 
revelation. 112 This refusal makes perfectly sense in the light of the previous discussion 
because the actual event of experiencing a divine encounter, or of having an experience 
of God's otherness within the human condition, can only be linguistically expressed 
within the sameness structure in order to gain meaning at all. Hence the Old Testament 
tends to narrate experiences, interpret reality through worship, and deliver "revealed 
truths" through the cultural-linguistic sameness structure of its time. People try to 
describe how God acts in their lives and how God reveals himself within the realm of 
human experience. The Old Testament therefore talks about Yahweh's word as an event 
in which human beings with their lives, acts, and thoughts form an integral part. Divine 
words are happenings. Theological truth, for Israel, is disclosed within experience and 
through interpretation. 113 Theological truth takes time to express and consequently 
includes the notions of development and process. Let me briefly mention one example, 
namely Israel's developing understanding of the concept of God itself. Initially 
expressed in a more open way, leaving room for the belief in the existence of other gods 
111 Cf. Claus Westennann, Theo/ogie des A/ten Testaments in Grundzugen {G6ttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Rup~~bt, .197.8),~:l9. .· . ~ .. ·· . ~ _ ~"". ;,.·~~ ,__ , _ . · -t~ 
112 Cf. James D. G. Dunn. 'Biblical Concepts of Revelation', in Paul Avis (ed.), Divine Revelation 
(London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1997), 1-22. According to Dunn we can speak of revelation in 
nature, in history, in the moral consciousness, in wisdom, through inspiration and prophecy, through 
visions and dreams, and of course in Jesus Christ. 
113 Cf. Chapter Four, part 4.1. 
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beside Yahweh, the concept of God was finally uttered in more monotheistic terms, 114 
thereby expressing a universal and hence a more meaningful understanding of God's 
being. 
This process is quite illuminating and illustrates both a vital aspect of experience's 
capacity for relating to theological truth within its sameness-otherness-structure and 
God's capacity to steer this process through the Spirit. Israel's process of coming to 
emphasise a monotheistic concept of God115 highlights experience's possibility of 
reaching beyond the self-constituted reality of self-experiencing subjects. God's 
otherness and his reality as experienced by Israel through the centuries pushed - after 
the destruction of Jerusalem and the temple - beyond the framework of cultural-
linguistic sameness, that is the unquestioned belief in the existence of many gods. 116 
Israel's creative process of experience in its recognition of God's reality as the ground 
for their existence pushed beyond the limits of human reality and self-created 
interpretation. Israel's embeddedness in the Babylonian cultural linguistic framework of 
that time as well as the common belief in the existence of different gods would rather 
suggest a different outcome of Israel's interpretation of its doctrine of God. However, in 
the light of Jerusalem's destruction and the exile experience, the actual development of 
Israel's doctrine of God resulting in the belief "Yahweh alone" exhibits a real novelty. 
This novelty opens up space for a pneurnatological interpretation of revelation. Counter-
intuitively Israel began to insist, although Nebuchadnezzar destroyed the temple - the 
most obvious sign of God's presence in Israel-, that there is only one God alone and 
that this God is called Yahweh. God made himself known to Israel as the only God, who 
is other and transcends the reality of the world, in the midst of all "sameness-
objections", namely that God had obviously lost against the Babylonian gods and 
therefore should rather be seen as inferior to them. Belief in God alone as the only God 
at this moment in Israel's history (including a disillusioned view of human guilt) 
indicates that Israel's process of experience was capable of leaving space open for 
God's otherness, an otherness that, when seeking expression, could not be simply 
derived from the sameness features within the human condition. Believing in Yahweh 
gained a new quality and a true and meaningful expression of God-talk was born. 
114 E.g. Genesis or Psalms 82; 86; 97 in contrast to Isaiah 44.6; 45.5. 
115 For. an account of the development. of,monotheism.,in.,the. Old Testament: H.D. Preu6, Theologie des 
A/ten Testaments, Band I (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1991), 124-32. 
116 Preu8 concludes that Israel's development towards monotheism ultimately cannot be derived from 
other religions or cultural influences: Theologie des A/ten Testaments, 1:131. Cf. W.H. Schmidt, 
Alttestamentlicher Glaube in seiner Geschichte (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1990), 84. 
Schmidt discusses monolatristic tendencies in relation to the first commandment. 
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Theology from then on had to speak of the one and only God of Israel, creator of the 
world who, despite all particular experiences of suffering and despair, is and remains 
God with us. This example emphasises that experience itself is not hostile to the notion 
of revelation but rather provides the ground for expressing this development towards 
monotheism in meaningful terms without recourse to some canon of neutral accuracy. 
In this context it rather should be maintained that God revealing himself as the one and 
only God during the time of Second Isaiah finds a meaningful interpretation neither if 
one postulates that Israel merely developed this belief (alone or dependent on other 
influences) nor if one tries to safeguard God's freedom (independent of human 
interpretation) by recourse to some objectively revealed word. The notion of revelation, 
despite its indispensability, bursts any attempt of conceptual tidiness117 and cautiously 
117 Regarding this one should be very cautious conceiving revelation too straightforwardly in terms of 
speech or communication. The problem of conceiving revelation as divine speech or divine self-
communication in Jesus Christ is that we cannot escape the ambiguous analogy drawn from human 
communication. The problem one has to face is that what is valid for human communication cannot be 
transferred straightforwardly to religious experience because there is no objective possibility of 
identifYing the divine sender of a received message within human experience. For a critique of the divine 
speech model see Pannenberg who holds that every religious experience, even when correlated with a 
concept of inspiration, cannot determine its own truth content and that every 'interpretation is always 
mediated by the context of the experience': Systematic Theology, I :234. 
Also some modem proposals that employ a concept of inspiration are not convincing because they seem 
to transfer the problem to a intermediary concept of inspiration, which then has to deal with the same 
epistemological problems. See especially W. Abraham who roots his concept of inspiration in a concept 
of what it is for one agent to inspire another: The Divine Inspiration of Holy Scripture, esp. 63. With this 
model he does not overcome the in-congruency within the communication analogy. Similar problems 
occur in Frances Young's attempt in The Art of Performance: Towards a Theology of Holy Scripture 
(London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1990). Cf. also W. Klaiber and M. Marquardt, Gelebte Gnade. 
Grundrij:J einer Theologie der Evangelisch-methodistischen Kirche (Suttgart: Christliches Verlagshaus, 
1993), 19-52. 
Furthermore, one could argue that even within the realm of human communication the situation is much 
more complex than the communication model suggests. For human communication to be operative it 
always has to take place within a particular context (presupposing common experience and a relationship) 
and in a specific code (namely an intelligible language). This means that already for human 
communication we have to say that the communication of a particular content can only be conceived as a 
complex relational event in which the dimensions of language, common experience, and the surrounding 
world build integral parts of any revealing event. Even within human communication (where we know the 
sender of a message) there is no such thing as an objective message in the strict sense which would reveal 
objective truth from outside to us. For an illuminating discussion: Charles Davis, 'Revelation and Critical 
Theory', in Paul Avis (ed.), Divine Revelation (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1997), 87-99. 
Surprisingly it is still quite common in German protestant theology to construe revelation in analogy to 
human communication. Schw6bel, although he is aware of the problems, straightforwardly claims: 'The 
concept of revelation depicts revelation as the act of divine self-communication in which the triune God 
communicates himself through the medium of created reality as the ground and the author of creation, 
reconciliation and salvation of created being' (God, 86). Then he construes the formula 'A discloses in 
the situation B the content C for the recipient D with the result E' (God, 87). For a similar example: W. 
Hlirle, Dogmatilc, 88. These proposals limit too soon the complex notion of revelation to the Christ-event 
anc:l therefore fail to address the problem ofthe.function.ofhuman.experience. In· order to showthat.,God 
still speaks to human beings today, Schw6bel is urged to construe "faith" (as the result of revelation) as 
an ontological category. This is rather ambiguous because faith suddenly advances to the realm of 
epistemic priority, which does not solve the problem of deciding which beliefs or statements to hold true. 
As Marshall points out, 'the collapse of foundationalism surely does not mean that we may believe 
whatever we like, nor does it mean that we may choose our epistemic priorities at will': Trinity and Truth, 
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shows itself pneumatologically within the sameness-otherness-structure of human 
• 118 
expenence. 
In conclusion then, one might say that the otherness-sameness-structure of human 
experience displays the vehicle of the possibility to encounter God's reality in the 
human world. It is not only human experience's condition of living within this dialectic 
structure of sameness and otherness but also its conscious capacity of relating otherness 
to sameness, singularity to universality, or strangeness to familiarity that God talk 
becomes possible at all. It is precisely this structure of human experience which allows 
theology both to speak of real and meaningful experiences of divine encounter through 
the Holy Spirit (and consequently of revelation) and to take seriously the possibility of 
expressing such experiences in meaningful linguistic terms. 
2.3.1.2 The divine other as the human other 
The general line of this argument must now be extended and connected with and 
supported by an incamational hermeneutics. Here a similar inseparable interaction 
between experience and revelation can be detected within the development of 
christology. Christianity's central belief in the divinity of the man Jesus 119 supports the 
conviction that human experience is capable of relating divine and created reality within 
the limitations of creaturely existence. Analogically, as argued above with regard to 
145. For a similar ambiguous notion where it is not clear which role faith plays in connection with human 
experience: E. JOngel, Gott als Geheimnis der Welt, 334-51. He contends that, on the one hand, the 
relationship between revelation and human speech has to be conceived as interpretation, but on the other, 
we simultaneously have to say that this process of interpretation is steered by disclosed knowledge 
through faith. 
There is no revelation without experience. Consequently, when dealing with the notion of revelation one 
should be quite cautious because it does not signifY a clear and indisputable concept but rather has to be 
seen in the light of the theologian's search for God's presence and involvement in the created world. As 
John Milbank notes: 'Revelation is not in any sense a layer added to reason .... It is lodged in all the 
complex networks of human practices, and its boundaries are as messy as those of the Church itselr: 
Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon (London: Routledge, 2003), 122. 
118 D. Brown also envisages an amicable encounter between the concepts of revelation and human 
experience when he concludes: 'As with it seems to me all religious experience it is a matter of God 
carrying the individual further along a path which he has already indicated some willingness to pursue. In 
other words, revelation must be treated like the question of grace in general, as demanding synergism, the 
full cooperation of both parties. In a word, without a free response, God wishes no revelation': The Divine 
Trinity, 14. 
119 This move within my interstitial methodology attempts to clarifY the concepts of experience and 
revelation in a mutual dialogue. Especially on the background of subsection 2.2.1.2 it must be contended 
for epis!emic. r~asons~ that Jto,rational argument whatsoever would·be,possible if we were to abandon all 
beliefs held true. Cf. Marshall, Trinity and Truth, 144: 'It seems impossible that we could doubt all our 
beliefs at once, or even be prepared to doubt them all.' And with reference to Wittgenstein he continues: 
'doubt is logically possible only against a background ofbeliefs held true, since doubt (or preparedness to 
doubt) requires reasons for doubting (or being prepared to), and giving reasons requires appeal to beliefs 
held true (that is, not doubted).' 
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monotheism, it can be conceded that the belief in Jesus as the Son of God evolved out 
of God's appearance within experience's structure of sameness and otherness. Looking 
from this perspective the reported experiences of Jesus' life, death, and resurrection 
within the New Testament exhibit an overlap of divine and human reality. Given the 
context of Jewish monotheism it was rather counter-intuitive for the early Christian 
communities to insist that, although they prayed to the Father and to the Son, they 
nevertheless were monotheists.120 To make sense of such a claim human experience's 
dialectic structure appears to be indispensable. In regard to the reported experiences of 
the New Testament, encountering Jesus was a matter of familiarity and strangeness, of 
sameness and simultaneously of complete otherness. Despite so many "sameness 
objections" that Jesus was quite like them, merely the son of Joseph, and obviously a 
human being like everybody else, the notion of total otherness could not be 
abandoned. 121 The cultural-linguistic sameness-essence of first century Palestine would 
have rather suggested going down the line of Celsus, one of the first critics of 
Christianity. He argued: 'If these men worshipped no other God but one, perhaps they 
would have a valid argument against others. But in fact they worship to an extravagant 
degree this man who appeared recently, and yet think it is not inconsistent with 
monotheism if they also worship his servant.' 122 In comparison with the Old Testament 
example this displays an immense intensification of the dialectic of sameness and 
otherness and its openness to revelation. Early Christian theology spoke of Jesus' 
divinity, despite all particular sameness experiences of encountering Jesus as a human 
being, without abandoning belief in monotheism.123 The result was the development of 
the doctrine of the incarnation with its confession to Jesus as true God and true human 
being, maintaining precisely a structure of otherness and sameness. This emphasises 
that human experience is not hostile to the notion of revelation but rather provides a 
fruitful ground for interpreting this development towards the doctrine of the incarnation 
in meaningful terms without recourse to some canon of neutral accuracy. The belief in 
Jesus as the Son of God (and hence the total divine other) fmds a meaningful 
interpretation by saying that God's otherness as the true source of all reality entered 
12
° Cf. Martin Soskice, in Rupert Shortt, God's Advocates, 39. "' 
121 Luke 4.22; 5.21; Matthew 11.3-5; 17 .1-8; Jesus' Eyw EL!.LL statements in John's Gospel. 
122 Contra Ce/sum VIII.12, quoted in Frances Young, The Making of the Creeds (London: SCM Press, 
2002), 33. 
123 Cf. Lany Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Grand Rapids: Wm. 
B. Eerdmans, 2003), 27-78. 
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experience's sameness essence of first century Jews through Jesus who related to them 
as the human other without being reduced to the sameness-essence ofhuman reality. 124 
A particular case in point to support this conviction can be seen in the significance 
of the resurrection of Jesus as the starting point for New Testament proclamation and 
theology}25 For the present purpose it shall suffice to highlight the fact that the belief in 
Jesus' divinity as the risen Lord was prompted and brought about by experiences of the 
risen Jesus, the stories of the empty tomb, and to some degree by a commonly held 
belief within late Second Temple Judaism in the resurrection of the dead as an 
eschatological act of God.126 However, these expenences and theological 
presuppositions, despite their ground preparing significance, are not enough to account 
for the belief in Jesus' resurrection and subsequently his divinity. This is simply so 
because there were different and more probable options within the sameness-structure 
of experience which would have fitted much easier. As Dunn notes, first, 'there were 
other categories which one would expect to have appealed to the disciples' and, second, 
'resurrection had a limited reference, that is, to what was expected to take place at the 
end of time, prior to final judgement.' 127 This rather indicates the inseparable dialectical 
structure between experience and revelation. On the one hand, Jesus' burial and the 
empty tomb as an event in history128 and the experiences of Jesus as the risen one were 
necessary for revelation to take place in respect of Jesus' divinity. On the other hand, 
these circumstances alone cannot reasonably account for the belief in Jesus as the risen 
one}29 Rather it has to be asserted that within the process of human experience 'it is the 
unexpectedness of the interpretation put upon the resurrection appearances which is so 
striking . . . Appearances of Jesus which impacted on the witnesses as resurrection 
124 The here proposed concept of experience is especially helpful once we connect the incarnation with 
accounts of atonement that must hold together particularity and universality. Cf. Vernon White, 
Atonement and Incarnation: An Essay in Universalism and Particularity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991). 
125 
'Jesu Auferweckung von den Toten hat zentrale Bedeutung filr die urchristliche VerkUndigung und 
Theologie. Sie ist der Ansatzpunkt filr die Rezeption der vorijsterlichen Geschichte und Botschaft Jesu, 
und sie ist die Grund1age filr die gesamte nacMsterliche Tradition, worauf aile Einzelthemen bezogen 
sind': Ferdinand Hahn, Theo/ogie des Neuen Testaments, Band 1 (TUbingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 128. 
126 Hahn, Theo/ogie, 1:128-31; J.D.G. Dunn, Jesus Remembered (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 
2003), 821-79 . 
. 
121 Je$'!l8Rememb.ered, 866. . .. ~ 
128 
'Thus general historical considerations already show that the proclamation of the news of Jesus' 
resurrection in Jerusalem, which had established the Christian community, is hardly understandable 
except under the assumption that Jesus' tomb was empty': Pannenberg, Jesus: God and Man (London: 
SCM Press, 2002), 99. 
129 For an account why psychological explanations ultimately fail: Pannenberg, Jesus, 88-94. 
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appearances did not confirm to any known or current paradigm.' 130 Hence it can be said 
that the experiences of the risen Jesus by human beings in human modes of perception 
(most likely including visual and auditory elements) created a new reality. Resurrection 
received a new meaning and the disciples were able to augment their understanding of 
God, penetrating a little further into the realm of God's otherness. 131 Again, God 
revealing himself in the experiences of the risen Jesus finds a meaningful interpretation 
neither if one postulates that the disciples merely developed this belief (dependent on 
tradition or psychological processes) nor if one tries to safeguard God's freedom 
(independent of human interpretation) by recourse to some objectively revealed word 
proclaiming Jesus as the divine Lord. 132 
However, this appearance of God within the human condition does not equate 
divine being and human reality. It is essential at this point to recall that the concept of 
human experience maintains the notion of total otherness alongside the necessity for 
sameness. The sameness-essence of human experience had to be upheld in order to 
contend that human beings actually are able to communicate meaningfully. It was 
argued in connection with postliberalism and non-realism that any radical account of 
incommensurability would lock human beings up in different worlds. Nevertheless, the 
human other remains other in an irreducible way. This also suggests that already on the 
human canvas one has to speak of the sameness-essence as an expression which is 
linked to the concept of grace rather than being. The indispensability of the sameness-
essence of human experience must be maintained but cannot be proved. The possibility 
of sameness - and therefore of a moderate but meaningful commensurability among 
human beings and different contexts - can be understood as grounding on God's grace, 
which sustains created reality as it is constituted for self-experiencing subjects. Jesus, 
therefore, shared human life with us on the grounds of experience's sameness-essence, 
enabling us to see God's otherness meaningfully through the eyes of human reality 
without being reduced to it. To coin the phrase "from experience to revelation" in this 
context then is a way of saying that through the process of first century Jews 
130 Dunn, Jesus Remembered, 874-5. Similar Paonenberg, Jesus, 92: 'The Easter appearances are not to be 
explained from the Easter faith of the disciples; rather, conversely, the Easter faith of the disciples is to be 
explained from the appearances.' Cf. also N.T. Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God (London: 
SPCK, 1996), 111. 
131 Cf. Peter Stuhlmacher, Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments, Band 1 (G6ttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 1997), 168: ·~" ng!!.~~~en~liche _ Auferstehungszeugnis vollzieht gegenUoef -der 
a1ttestiilitentlicli~fiillijtfdisclien- Tradition einen kUhnen Schritt ... Dieses Bekenntnis der neutestarnent-
lichen Zeugen ist analogielos.' 
132 Helpful is Hurtado's discussion of religious experience and religious innovation in the New 
Testament: How on Earth Did Jesus Become a God? Historical Questions about Earliest Devotion to 
Jesus (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2005), 179-204. 
86 
experiencing Jesus God entered the sameness-essence ofhumanity and thus opened up a 
possibility for us to partly understand how and who God is in relation to humanity. 
Jesus' contemporaries <111141111--_,111-~ Jesus 
their experiences <111141111--_,lliJo~ Jesus' exp. 
only theirs 
111111 • 
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experience the same created reality 
- Jesus addresses his contemporaries 
meaningfully 
Graph 2: Experience, Incarnation, and Revelation 
2.3.1.3 From incarnation to experience 
The discussion so far is well on the way to exhibiting the proposed interstitial 
methodology which moves between experience and revelation in order to meaningfully 
interpret both. Taking now the doctrine of the incarnation more directly as a starting 
point this section attempts to give the argument some more imaginative strength from 
working the other way round, presupposing a belief as revealed and testing it against the 
concept of experience. For this purpose I would like to draw attention to some 
contemporary theologians arguing in favour of the Hegelian tradition. Touching briefly 
on this tradition I intend to sketch how the dialectical structure of otherness and 
sameness proposed here can also be detected in this tradition. This highlights the 
significance of the incarnation for theology as a connecting link between divine and 
-hummfteality. To begiliWiili''lt is"i~peratl~e-t(;;;~;lliH~-g~l's di~;in~~i~~,·c~~~~~tion to 
an incarnational hermeneutics because he clearly emphasised the problems for theology 
if it construes the doctrine of God in strict oppositional terms viewing divine and human 
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reality as exclusive and hostile to one another. Such strict polarization, he claimed, is 
not appropriate and not in agreement with the doctrine of the incarnation. 
'The son of God is also son of man; the divine in a particular shape appears as a man. The 
connection of infmite and fmite is of course a "holy mystery", because this connection is 
life itself. Reflective thinking, which partitions life, can distinguish it into infmite and 
finite, and then it is only the restriction, the finite regarded by itself, which affords the 
concept of man as opposed to the divine. But outside reflective thinking, and in truth, 
there is no such restriction.' 133 
Besides Hegel's aspiration after a total and all encompassing philosophical system, 
which led him to a speculative christology in which Christ in the end was sublated in his 
system of the absolute spirit,134 he rightly observed that 'ifthe Infinite and the fmite are 
thought of in a way that they are merely opposed to each other, then the Infinite is 
determined by the finite. The lnfmite is limited by the fmite if it is defmed simply as 
that which is not finite.' 135 In other words, Hegel showed that the categorical distinction 
between God und human, between the lnfmite and the fmite, logically limited God's 
infinitude because it puts him in the restricted realm of 'not being finite' and 'other than 
human'. For Hegel, God had to be the one who is both finite and infinite. In virtue of 
that striking argument divine life and human life in the light of the humanity of Christ 
cannot be easily separated and opposed to each other because God's act of becoming a 
particular man in history is not something alien to his being, but it is in accordance with 
his being. 'In brief, according to Hegel, the true God is the one who is both finite and 
infinite, both God and man in unity.' 136 
Hans Kling, taking up Hegel's line of thought, developed some helpful 
prolegomena to an incarnational christology. Kling argues that if one takes the 
incarnation seriously, then it has to be contended that God de facto experienced human 
life. In connection with the suffering of Christ he says that 'God suffers in his Son - not 
intrinsically, but de facto; not simply as God in himself, but in the flesh. But he himself 
suffers in the Son, and the suffering in the flesh is his suffering.' 137 God freely willed to 
do so and in doing so embraced human experience in the life of Jesus. As a result, and 
without neglecting or playing down Hegel's compelling considerations that it is 
impossible to restrict God to the realm of "not-being-fmite", the stt:ong conviction 
133 G.W.F. Hegel, quoted in Hans Knng, The Incarnation of God (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1987), 111-
2. 
134 See 'Begriff des Geistes', m G.W.F. H~gel, Werke. 10, Enzyklopadie der philosophischen 
Wissenschaften III (Fraflkfurt: Suhrkarnp, 1981 ), 17-3 7. 
m F. LeRon Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology: After the Philosophical Turn to Relationality 
(Grand Rapids: B. Eerdmans, 2003), 24-5. 
136 KOng, The Incarnation of God, 434. 
137 Ibid., 446. 
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should be maintained that in the incarnation of Jesus Christ God remains godself and 
thus includes his own antithesis, the experience of nothingness and meaninglessness of 
human life within the realm of finitude. 138 
In a similar way, devising an epistemology of the theology of the cross, Jtirgen 
Moltmann takes up these consequences and comes to the conclusion that without 
revelation in the opposite, the contradictions between divine and human despite their 
connectedness within Paul's doctrine of justification cannot be brought into 
correlation.139 The cross of Jesus reveals God's deity. Thus he contends: 'It is the 
dialectical knowledge of God in his opposite which first brings heaven down to the 
earth of those who are abandoned by God, and opens heaven to the godless.' 140 The 
living Christian God is a God who includes the human condition. His incarnation does 
not indicate a deficiency in God's nature nor does it express a process of perfection 
within the divinity. 'In the genesis and kenosis involved in becoming man God neither 
loses nor gains himself, but rather confirms and reveals himself as the one who is.' 141 
Consequently the being (das Sein) of Jesus and his humanity can be expressed as an 
event of God's self-correspondence or self-appropriateness. 142 
In line with these interpretations of the doctrine of the incarnation it is sound to 
maintain that, if God is truly the human other in the man Jesus, the experiences of first 
century Jews, who encountered Jesus and expressed their experiences in language, 
contain the actual possibility of revealing truth about God and the reality of our human 
condition. If God not only chose to become human but in doing so addressed human 
beings in Jesus on the ground of creaturely finitude without violating the concept of 
experience, then, experience itself becomes the fundamental base for theological 
reflection and the ground for theological truth. It is precisely with reference to this 
incamational understanding of God that one should 'neither look down on images and 
138 Brown highlights this dialectic in connection with John's Gospel: 'It is only by reading that Gospel as 
descriptive of something other than Jesus' humanity (either his divinity or our relation with that divinity) 
that we are really able to come to terms with its message. It was thus essential that Jesus should speak of 
things other than himself so long as he remained in this world. Paradoxically, God had to reveal himself 
by being other than God, just as Jesus had to speak of a kingdom of which he was not the king, for it to 
become plain that it was indeed his kingdom that was being revealed': Tradition and Imagination, 319. 
139 See especially his section on 'Revelation in Contradiction and Dialectical Knowledge': The Crucified 
God, 25-8. 
140 The Crucified 6oii;28. 
141 Kllng, The Incarnation of God, 456. 
142 Cf. Jllngel who employs the phrase 'Das Sein Jesu Christi als Ereignis der Selbstentsprechung Gottes': 
Das Evange/ium von der Rechtfertigung des Gottlosen a/s Zentrum des christlichen Glaubens {TUbingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 66. 
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symbols out of intellectual snobbery nor renounce concepts and ideas under the 
influence of agnosticism or mysticism.' 143 
The truth of the belief in the incarnation emerged out of the process of human 
experience to which God accommodated himself in the Spirit. 144 This process, 
continuously relating otherness to sameness, ultimately pushed beyond the common 
framework of human possibilities of intelligible interpretation and intuitive 
reasoning. 145 In conclusion, the doctrine of the incarnation has a two-fold significance. 
First, God himself assumes the human condition and therefore reveals to human beings 
that the otherness of finite existence can be meaningfully understood as forming a part 
of the divine life. Experience and language with its complexity of linguistic concepts as 
well as the multi-layered-ness of images, symbols and metaphors are not alien to his 
nature. '[I]f God wanted to identify completely with the human condition, he had to 
accept such characteristic human limitations, at least in so far as they came to 
expression in the humanity of Jesus.' 146 Secondly, the human condition, despite all its 
dependence on the concept of experience and the limitedness (including fallibility) of 
knowledge, becomes the actual possibility of theological knowledge. 
This move "from incarnation to experience" then hints at some further 
implications. In connection with the discussion of the concept of experience I conceded 
that on epistemological grounds religious experience is in principle not separable from 
general human experience as a first hand or superior experience in order to gain 
knowledge of the reality of the world. Taking this into consideration I now want to 
propose an interpenetration and a mutual dependency of theology and anthropology or 
respectively of faith (or as some would say spiritual or religious knowledge) and mere 
human knowledge, embedded in the conditions of experience. There is no sharp 
demarcation line that could be drawn in order to exclude one aspect or the other. Human 
understanding of life and the reality of the world and subsequently our attempts to 
143 Ktlng, The Incarnation of God, 464. 
144 John 14.26; 16.13; Romans 8.11.14; I Corinthians 12.3-11. 
145 When Stuhlmacher speaks about the Easter confession as a daring and bold (wagemutig) interpretation 
of experiences and observed facts (Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments, I: 169), then this displays a 
good circumscription of the here proposed sameness-otherness-structure of human experience. 
Furthermore, looking at the New Testament, Paul's reports about his experience of the risen Christ (I 
Corinthians 9.1; 2 Corinthians 4.5-6; Galatians 1.12) can also be interpreted in this dialectic way. 
Stuhlmacher summarizes: 'Es ging also um einen von auften her an Paulus herangetragenen 
Erleuchtungs- und Erkenntnisvorgang~· Der gekr~j~e, (:ly:~tw er.schien Paulus als"· Trager ·der 
Herrlichkeit Gottes' (1':'173). In terms ofthe eariler discUssion about language and truth, this is a good 
example of how metaphorical language is capable of pressing beyond itself in relating sameness to 
otherness and in such a way prepares the ground for God's revelation occurring within the realm of 
e~rience. 
1 Brown, Tradition and Imagination, 278. 
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conceive God as the all-encompassing reality is neither opposed to theology nor is it 
subordinated to theology. Rather it is the "always already there" point of our theological 
reflection, just in the same way as faith is the "always already there" point of our 
anthropological reflection. There is no theology without self-understanding; there is no 
elaboration of the doctrine of God without embeddedness in human experience with its 
anthropological assumptions and presuppositions of personhood, communion and the 
relationality of life. 
An incarnational theology, which looks at the testimony of Jesus' life in the 
Gospels and the many stories of how Jesus encountered people and dealt with his 
contemporaries, acknowledges that the question of how and who God is and the 
question of what it means to be human is mediated by the experience of human life. The 
concept of religious experience within Jesus' day and age mainly depended on gradual 
perception through creative telling and retelling of experienced events and encounters 
with Jesus. These experiences with Jesus are to a large degree expressed in stories and 
narratives which in turn pay tribute to the variety and complexity of life. Hence an 
incarnational theology and the recorded testimony of how unconventional and always 
anew Jesus encountered people, can remind us of the fact that ordinary life is rather 
unsystematic and often confused. 'Life lived is not as life documented, and, though 
some systematizing is justified, as scholars seek order and intelligibility amidst 
complexity, it is unwise to impose an artificial order on human experience.' 147 Is it not 
precisely this complexity of life in which Jesus engages and talks about God's nearness 
and love that the doctrine of the incarnation not only makes sense to Christians but 
becomes the foundation of any relevant doctrine of God? The Bible speaks of the living 
God, the God who liberates the people of Israel, who is actively involved in the human 
search for justice and abundant life.148 According to the Gospel of John, Jesus not only 
calls himself the bread of life but equates himself with life: "I am the life." Jesus wants 
people to receive full life, to realise their humanness, and to become whole and 
complete.149 In order to make a real impact and to influence peoples' lives Jesus had to 
make their issues his issues and take part in their contextual interpretation of experience 
as the ground for all reality. 150 This then also indicates that Jesus' being-in-relation with 
147 Davies, Anthropology and Theology, 20. 
148 Cf. Chapter Four, part 4.2. 
149 Cf. Chapter Four, part 4.3. 
15
° Cf. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 69: '[E]s ist nicht mOglich, das GOttliche anders als vom 
Sinnlichen aus zu erkennen... Es ist mOglich, vom Sinnlichen aus zum GOttlichen hinaufgefilhrt zu 
werden.' 
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his contemporaries does not only display a social reality of human life but, from a 
theological perspective, also points to an essential trait of divine life. In regard to the 
concept of revelation this also implies the importance of retelling or rereading biblical 
narratives in order to understand afresh, and hopefully anew in a revelatory sense, some 
truths of how and who God is in Jesus Christ. 
However, it must not be forgotten that the relationship between God's and created 
reality is a relationship of grace rather than being. It is here where the notion of the 
Spirit emerged as indispensable for Christian theology. In using the phrase of "God 
accommodating himself to the framework of human experience" I now and then 
deliberately alluded to this circumstance. Hence I argued in connection with the 
examples of monotheism and the incarnation that an account of revelation within the 
framework of human experience is in need of pneumatology. In order to keep up a 
balanced view between revelation and experience without confusing the one with the 
other it is essential to claim that it is God-the-Spirit who accommodates himself to the 
thought framework of the dialectical sameness-otherness structure and brings about the 
possibility of real God encounters and revelatory experiences that reach beyond the 
human sameness structure. As a result of this discussion the claim of experience's 
hospitality towards revelation can be asserted. This aflirms theology's indispensable 
task of including the different realms of human experience into its discourse and 
listening to their possible truth-contents before drawing fmal conclusions. 
2.3.2 Revelation re-visited 
2.3.2.1 Interpreted activity 
The remaining task is now to give an account of how revelation or the presence of God 
in the world and our lives can be understood without violating two main conditions: 
firstly, that all human discourse and knowledge is inescapably bound up with human 
experience and language and, secondly, that retreat to an objective canon of supposedly 
neutral accuracy is not a viable option. 151 If my previous discussion "from experience to 
151 lfrevelationand experiencearesee11 as oppo~ed~d hostile to each other, misleading inconsistencies 
incapable of holding together divine and human freedom will be the result. It is this complex and 
ambiguous relationship between revelation and experience which causes so much controversy within 
theological debates. On the one hand, if a theory of God's action is overemphasised without an 
appropriate link to the concept of experience one will unavoidably end up with a tendency towards 
revelatory positivism (i.e. direct verbal inspiration), which will most likely interpret revelation as some 
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revelation" bears some truth, then it seems obligatory to conceive of revelation as some 
kind of "interpreted activity"152 or interactive dialogue between God and human beings 
attempting to make sense of divine otherness within experience's sameness essence. 
It is commonplace nowadays to acknowledge that divine revelation can only 
intelligibly be spoken of if its content is received by human beings. Revelation as such 
can only take place if the process of human experience is constitutively involved in it. 
Schwobel, for example, who describes revelation as a disclosure event, formulates: 'The 
disclosure event is directed, asymmetrical and irreflexive, but without the reception of 
God's self-communication one could not talk about revelation.' 153 The notion of 
revelation, therefore, indicates a complex event or process that takes place between God 
and human beings in which God discloses truth without violating the human condition. 
This interactive process becomes even more complex if one looks through the prism of 
the incarnation. Having addressed the significance of the incarnation in the previous 
section as a process of first century Jews experiencing Jesus, I mainly viewed the 
incarnation as having occurred within history and at a particular time. It now becomes 
indispensable to focus also on its significance beyond a particular time. This means that 
the central belief in Christ as the self-revelation of God confronts us with the difficult 
question of how this foundational story of Christ's life, death and resurrection at a 
particular place and time in history is and remains a possibility of revelation to occur. 
This obviously also entails the significance of the Bible as the testimony of this Christ-
event, which is neither a sealed-off past occurrence nor can it simply be relegated to the 
realm of scripture. The Christ-event as a revelatory event is only accessible for us today 
within an open process of scriptural understanding and a development of tradition. In 
this context then theological discourse as the attempt to bring to speech what God 
reveals to human beings participates in a certain kind of hermeneutical spiral. This 
spiral not only depends on mutual human communication and interaction on the basis of 
kind of guaranteed divine speech with the emphasis on a doctrine of sola scriptura. For a critique of the 
misleading principle of sola scriptura: Frances Young, The Art of Performance: Towards a Theology of 
Holy Scripture, esp. 61-2. On the other hand, if the concept of experience is overstated as the ground for 
doing theology at all, one will probably stress the possibility of natural theology and end up with a 
tendency towards metaphysical discourse or an experiential positivism, which in tum will most likely lead 
to the neglect of a concept of revelation all together because a new sola experientia in line with the 
modem empirical sciences will be thought of as verifying all theological truth. On the equally 
unsatisfactory solutions of either "scripture alope", "tradition alone", or "today alone": Lash, Change in 
Focus;esp:~69~n. · · · · · 
152 Lash, Change in Focus, 12: 'Revelation is thus "interpreted activity". That is, certain events are 
understood to be a ''word of God" to man. Each of the three terms in that definition are of equal 
importance: God, certain events in human history, the interpretation of those events by human minds.' 
m God, 92; see also Lash, Change in Focus, 13; Harle, Dogmatik, 88. 
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the process of experience but also, if it is to express divine revelation, is in need of a 
pneumatological foundation. To figure out what God speaks to us in Jesus Christ and 
through the Spirit not only points to theological concepts but also to worship and acts. 
'Human beings,' as Nicholas Lash asserts, 'express themselves not only in what they 
say, but also in what they do: in gesture, habit, social structure, forms of worship, and so 
on.' 154 Any simple account of revelation must be avoided. A theological account of 
revelation has to consider how the basic process of experience is intertwined with 
claims about truth and speech about God. 
2.3.2.2 Revelation as learning about learning 
Given the complexity of the discussion so far revelation obviously does not lend itself 
to conceptual tidiness. The learning of a language, the interpretation of events of 
experience, and the interconnection of both must somehow play a role in any account of 
revelation. Rowan Williams, in his essay "Trinity and Revelation,"155 takes up this line 
of thought and provides a helpful description of revelation as learning about learning. 
'Theology, in short,' he claims, 'is perennially liable to be seduced by the prospect of 
bypassing the question of how it learns its own language.' 156 This statement points 
towards a similar process which I defined in line with Schwobel as the process of 
experience. The phrase "learning about learning" then includes the complex 
interconnectedness between experience and language as well as the openness of this 
process towards new insights and new meaning about the human condition in relation to 
God. Revelation cannot express fixed propositions or feelings or certainties; it rather has 
to parallel the notion of faith, which signifies a "healing or live-giving project". 
Although Williams uses a different terminology, my account of experience as openness 
towards truth due to its otherness and sameness structure appears to have some 
parallels. 'Learning about learning,' he claims, 'is learning how we develop meaningful 
constructs out of historical process and decision: in other words, it is (or can be) equally 
a learning about doing.' 151 With reference to Ricoeur's idea of revelation, Williams 
argues that the process of learning opens up new questions rather than merely answering 
old ones. New horizons of meaning are opened up and new insights and new images can 
IS4 Change in Focus, 60. 
155 On Christian Theology, 131-47. 
156 Ibid., 131. 
157 Ibid., 132. 
94 
emerge, helping us to enhance meaning and understanding of our lives. Hence it is vital 
to stress that revelation is 'to do with what is generative in our experience - events or 
transactions in our language that break existing frames of reference and initiate new 
possibilities of life.' 158 The breaking of existing frames is not always a painless or linear 
matter of discourse. It rather indicates complexity, trial and error, and a continuing and 
partly controversial dialogue within the community of believers. This image of a 
generative process even evokes the notions of pain and suffering because it 
simultaneously implies the loss of something valued or even treasured. New meanings, 
especially when it comes to the notion of revelatory truth (expressing something new 
which ultimately grounds in divine action rather than human experience), can hardly 
always build upon old insights in an additive way. If new interpretations and meanings 
emerge in a way that they indicate a reaching beyond the existing thought framework of 
a community, old ones might not only be viewed as old but may be seen in a far 
stronger sense as wrong or at least misleading and harmful.159 It is here that even the 
notion of heresy cannot per se be excluded from this process of learning. 160 The search 
for and the acknowledgement of truth within a community of believers therefore 
exhibits a complex and non-linear structure. Williams concludes with reference to 
R.L.Hart: 
"Revelation" embraces (a) that which incites the hermeneutical spiral and also (b) this 
"that which" taken into human understanding, the movement of the hermeneutical spiral 
itself - or, ... , "revelation" includes, necessarily, "learning about learning". Any 
theology of revelation is committed to attending to event and interpretation together, to 
the generative point and to the debate generated. And, if this is a correct analysis, the 
model of revelation as a straightforward "lifting of the veil" by divine agency has to be 
treated with caution.161 
Williams goes on to connect these insights with a trinitarian grammar, firstly, with the 
significance of Jesus Christ. In and through Jesus the early Christian community of 
believers found itself relating to God as Father in close intimacy and trust and took 
158 Ibid., 134. 
159 One might think, for instance, of the Arian controversy and the development of the trinitarian doctrine 
of God. 
160 See also Brown, Discipleship and Imagination, 291. He argues 'that both within the Bible and beyond 
more often than not truth has emerged through lively disagreement, and not simply by fonnal acceptance 
of an existing deposit or simple deduction from it. The ability to envisage alternative scenarios has thus 
always been in~~l !.'! the ,~~alt:hy dev~!opment of the tradition. Unilinear theories of development must 
therefore --be abandoned, and the search for consensus within conflict be taken with much more 
seriousness, whether we are thinking of later Church history or even the Bible itself.' Cf. Lash, Focus in 
Change, 62. He descn"bes this unlinear process of generative experience with the terms of revolution and 
evolution. 
161 On Christian Theology, 135. 
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cognizance of itself as open to all with a global vision.162 The story of Jesus became the 
new generative power and quality of life because it reached beyond the particularity of a 
cult, a group, or a nation. The generative power of the resurrection, transcending all 
local and temporal limitations, generated a new understanding of being human in 
relation to God the Abba-Father whom Jesus proclaimed. 'Putting the point another 
way: the Christian community has a focus for its identity in Jesus, yet the "limits" set by 
Jesus are as wide as the human race itself. The Christian "community" is potentially the 
whole world: Jesus offers new possibilities for the form of human life as such, not 
merely for a particular group to find an identity.' 163 This entails that despite the 
universality of the Christ-event it remains a particular one in human history. Hence the 
revelatory character of Jesus cannot be applied by human beings to their own temporal 
and cultural-linguistic framework in an absolute way. From this it follows that the 
revelatory character of Jesus' life, death, and resurrection displays an "initiation of 
debate at an unprecedentedly comprehensive level" (Williams) rather than a lifting of a 
veil. Revelation and therefore the attempt to spell out how and who God is in relation to 
human beings expresses a hermeneutical spiral. Because life continues, contexts change, 
human experience progresses, the foundational story of Jesus has to be re-conceived 
again and again. However, if this learning about learning through the ages and this 
hermeneutical spiral, which tries to relate to God's given reality in Jesus, wants to reach 
beyond mere human knowing, it is in need of pneumatology as an expression of God 
sustaining and steering this learning. 
This leads Williams to the notion of the spirit as indispensable for any account of 
revelation. Human imagination, interpretation, and the acting out of Jesus' life, death 
and resurrection in worship and within theological discourse will only bear a revelatory 
character if generative power is also ascribed to the whole process. Only if we are able 
to say that the community's learning and re-learning, the interpretation of itself by 
means of Jesus through the ages, is part of God's generative power, only then can we 
properly speak of revelation. 164 lbis underlines from a different angle the same insight 
as expressed earlier that without conscious reception one cannot speak intelligibly of 
revelation or a disclosure event. It is precisely here where the notion of the spirit in 
connection with the notion of grace is indispensable. The central scriptural notions of 
the fellowship of the Holy Spirit and the. indwelling of God within his people supports 
162 Ibid., 137. 
163 Ibid., 137-8. 
164 Ibid., 140-1. 
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the fact that any real and truthful interpretation of the generative power of the Christ-
event cannot be reduced to mere human act. God the Spirit's generative power which is 
responsible for the revelatory possibility of the church's "learning about learning" and 
which sustains the hermeneutical spiral 'is not reducible to a human recollecting of 
Jesus; it is rather the process of continuing participation in the foundational event- the 
forming of Christ in the corporate and individual life ofbelievers.' 165 
To push the implications a little further, we can now assume that it is precisely 
through the concept of human experience in its process of relating sameness to 
otherness that it can intelligibly be said that God reveals himself. With respect to the 
incarnation it can be argued that God encounters human beings in the human person 
Jesus and does so by simultaneously accommodating himself in the Spirit to the 
framework of experience and thus renders possible without violating the human 
condition the disclosure of truth. This can be depicted as a process of grace highlighting 
the fact that this process of meaningfully reaching beyond mere human reality 
ultimately is an act of God's grace rather than self-produced by human experience. In 
virtue of this it can be contended that the concept of experience supports the view that 
revelation has to be conceived in a trinitarian manner - through Jesus Christ and the 
Spirit together - and that the structure of revelation can be understood as a 
hermeneutical spiral. 166 Revelation must not be confused with absolute knowledge. 
Linking Williams' thought with Schwobel' s distinction between the two levels of 
reality, it is possible to view the Christ-event as God's trinitarian reality which is given 
to human beings in history and is therefore open to the experience of human subjects. 
This reality is not objectively accessible for human beings as absolute knowledge or as 
some kind of foundationalist neutral source of accuracy. But due to the overlap of 
objective reality and the subjective experience of this reality by human beings, as well 
as the indwelling of God the Spirit in this process, it is not only possible but imperative 
to say that revelation indeed does takes place. 
Looking through the prism of the first half of this chapter, the complexity of the 
present concern can also be stated in the following way. The universal truth of God's 
intended reality of creation as well as God's own reality in the kenosis of Jesus Christ is 
only subjectively and individually accessible for human beings as a meaningful 
interpretation of reality because it occurred in hist9ry within time and a particular 
cultural-linguistic framework. A timeless truth would in fact cease to be relevant for 
165 Ibid., 141. 
166 Ibid., 142. 
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human beings for it would bypass the process of experience. No reasonable and thus 
meaningful interpretation of this transcendent reality would be possible. This entails 
that the notion of truth for self-experiencing individuals subject to failure and distortion 
always remains one of fragmentation. However, this does not entail abandonment ofthe 
notion of truth, and it does not discard the possibility of revelation. This contention, in 
Williams' words, might be summarized as follows: 
The claims of our foundational story to universal relevance and significance mean that it 
must constantly be shown to be "at home" with all the varying enterprises of giving 
meaning to the human condition. Thus the "hermeneutical spiral" never reaches a plateau. 
For the event of Christ to be authentically revelatory, it must be capable of both "fitting" 
and "extending" any human circumstance. 167 
The two terms "fitting" and "extending" highlight the fact that in order for revelation to 
occur as a new and God-given insight into reality it cannot completely burst the 
framework of human experience and language. Otherwise it would be meaningless. 
However, I am not so sure whether the phrase "never reaches a plateau" is a helpful one. 
Although Williams probably understands it as opposed to foundationalist claims it can 
also easily suggest that neither the "generative power of the Christ-story" nor the 
"learning about learning through the ages" within the community of believers provide 
us with some kind of meaningful and truly tentative plateaus. Be it as it may, most 
importantly it is essential to emphasize that for revelation to occur or for truth to be 
found it must be at home with all the varying enterprises of giving meaning to the 
human condition. 168 
2.3.2.3 Revelation in need of a trinitarian framework 
What I have suggested so far is that what God reveals about godself and the human 
condition is always mediated by human experience. From a phenomenological 
perspective it can even be said that revelation is interpreted experience whose relevance 
is asserted and, should the occasion arise, is recognized and accepted. 169 This 
emphasizes the dialectic between the individual process of experience and its 
167 Ibid., 142. 
168 Some theologians emphasise that theology would succumb to self-deception if it would neglect its 
creaturely embeddedness and its historical and cultural conditioning. See KUng, The Incarnation of God, 
I; Pannenberg, Anthropo!qgi~.Jr'<th~z{~~~<;/r!r fl!r,.~pf!lgiv,e, 15-6. Helpful cis also Caroline SchrMer's 
assessmeiitof'the 'ihtetrelationship betWeen story, doctrine and revelation in her article 'The Productive 
Vagueness of an Untranslatable Relationship', in G. Sauter and J. Barton (eds.), Revelation and Story 
(Aidershot: Ashgate, 2000), 175-87. 
169 Hans-Martin Barth, Dogmatik. Evangelischer Glaube im Kontext der Weltreligionen (GOtersloh: Chr. 
Kaiser I GOtersloher Verlagshaus, 2001), 155. 
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interpretation of a single subject and the communal framework of beliefs, interpretations 
and language games. 170 
What part do they play within this account of revelation and how do they mutually 
depend upon one another? Since there is no such thing as private language and since 
interpretation always depends on a common interpretative framework, individual 
experience cannot be disconnected from the wider community. However, the individual 
experience of self-experiencing subjects cannot be reduced to the interpretative 
framework. This is why one still has to speak of self-experience and subjective 
experience. Neither the individual nor the group can be dissolved in the other. If, 
especially within the biblical and Christian tradition, people talk about personal God-
encounters and revelatory experiences (for example within the prophetic tradition) they 
obviously include the notion of some sort of new received insight, which neither can be 
derived from the interpretative framework nor from the individual experience as a 
human act. 
Having this in mind, how then do individual experiences and communal beliefs 
interconnect? On the one hand, looking through the lens of particularity, a revelatory 
experience is a subjective experience under the circumstances of a specific situation of 
an individual. On the other hand, however, to call a belief or a proposition a revealed 
truth, signifying at least in proximity God's will, such a belief must leave the realm of 
subjectivity and particularity and proceed to universal significance. A true belief or a 
revealed truth-content is something which is not only valid for an individual but for the 
whole community. Therefore, if the process of revelation, which takes its starting point 
at the level of subjective experience, shall grow towards a revealed truth-content, valid 
for the wider community of believers, then this revelatory process must include as a 
constituent part the process of drawing implications. 171 
In view of this, revelation can be conceived as a process in which God discloses 
himself. If it can be assumed that God communicates with us in whatsoever way 
without violating the human condition, then initially all one has to do is to 
'acknowledge the necessity of divine accommodation to the thought framework of the 
170 The importance of the embeddedness of human being-ness (menschliches Sein) in a community of 
people and therefore a tradition of understanding is well expressed in the notion of Wirkungsgeschichte. 
Gadamer reminds us that in all upders~ding, ifw~.~~J~~~,()(it Qr not, Wif'kungsgeschichte influences 
and"detefuiliies ilicf iliterjlretatiOnof omexpenenc;;:' Wahrheit und Methode, 284-90. 
171 Hans-Martin Barth, Dogmatik, 160-1, speaks of the unavoidability of syncretistic processes within the 
Christian confession to the revelation of God in the history of Israel and in the person of Jesus Christ. 
Statements and confessions which were articulated as revelation always underwent a process of inclusion 
and exclusion of beliefs and "materials" found in other religions and folk traditions. 
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hearer' 172 which depends on the concept of experience. In order that God can make 
himself known he has to adapt human possibilities of knowledge and perception. The 
incarnation is a case in point which can make us sensible to this divine structure of 
accommodation. It suggests that it is essential for God to assume the human condition in 
Jesus Christ and in this way to expose himself to a particular situation in history within 
a specific cultural environment and thought framework. Is it not precisely in this way 
that God takes us seriously as human beings without violating our freedom and our 
possibility to respond freely? Regarding this it seems to be conceptually sufficient for a 
concept of revelation to interpret God's accommodation to the human condition within 
the framework of a doctrine of creation (God as the creator of the possibility of 
experience and the giver of the disclosedness of created reality) pneumatologically and 
describe God's involvement as the source or the cause of certain experiences that can 
develop into true beliefs or revealed truths which transcend the realm of subjectivity and 
particularity. With such an understanding it is possible to conceive God as the source of 
a revelatory process without having to lay bare any particular words as divine speech. 
The contents of revealed truths of a believing community, consequently, can be 
understood as divine revelation mediated by human experience and the possibility of 
transcending these experiences in the awareness that God wants to make himself known 
within the human condition. 173 Such a model is also more in accord with both the 
biblical "dabar-concept", in which the response of Israel and the human being is an 
integrated part of God's word-event, and the Gospel narratives, which give testimony to 
the fact that people gained new knowledge of God through an experienced encounter 
with Jesus. 174 Finally, ifthe moral argument is taken into consideration that any concept 
of revelation should not violate human freedom but be at home with all the varying 
enterprises of giving meaning to the human condition the understanding of revelation 
must be consistent with the notion of free human response. Only if individuals can 
accept for themselves a particular belief as true will they be able to signify a message or 
an event as revealed. 175 But this in turn means: individuals have to be able to interpret 
this belief within their processes of experience as meaningful. 
172 Brown, The Divine Trinity, 51. 
173 F9ril de!icriptiotH>freyelation as divine dialogue: Brown, ibid, 70. '.[R]evelation is a process whereby 
God progressively unveils the truth about himself and his purposes to a community of believers, but 
always in such a manner that their freedom of response is respected.' 
174 Cf. Chapter Four. 
175 Cf. Brown, ibid, 74: 'As with it seems to me all religious experience it is a matter of God carrying the 
individual further along a path which he has already indicated some willingness to pursue. In other words, 
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To return full circle to the starting point of the argument it can be claimed that 
such an understanding of revelation and the appreciation of human experience as the 
location where God makes himself known is not only consistent with but rather in need 
of a trinitarian concept of God. While much of the traditional concept of revelation as 
divine speech (with its one-sided emphasis on the biblical word) reduced theological 
discourse about revelation to christology, a trinitarian understanding of God exhibits the 
importance of the doctrines of creation and of the Holy Spirit and therefore takes the 
human condition seriously. If one believes that God is still at work, that God as Spirit is 
among his people, and if one believes that God is still a being-in-becoming176 because 
his story with his creation is moving on, then God's speaking to human beings (moving 
their lives and enabling them to receive new insights) is a revelatory act mediated by the 
Spirit and embedded in human experience which can advance their understanding of his 
love and being. Hans-Martin Barth expresses this insight in the following terms: 
Revelation is being executed as the mutual collaboration of the Father, the Son, and the 
Holy Spirit: Conditions of the creation (the dependency on human possibilities of 
communication and receiving knowledge), the historical testimony of Jesus as the Christ, 
and present-day experiences through the Spirit (who has to make relevant the historical 
testimony within one's own creaturely constitution), must be effective at the same time in 
order for "revelation" to occur. 177 
This trinitarian understanding expresses the fundamental belief that the God in whom 
Christians believe as the source of revelation is also the creator, reconciler and perfecter 
of the world and human life. Hence the possibility of human experience as the capacity 
of human beings to perceive, interpret, and understand the reality of the world and 
human life, can be made intelligible more appropriately if a trinitarian framework is 
presupposed. In this sense the concept of revelation is at the same time an explication of 
the possibility of human experience. The very fact of the disclosedness of created reality 
and the possibility for human beings to experience the world has to be understood 
already as an act of God. 178 
revelation must be treated like the question of grace in general, as demanding synergism, the full 
cooperation of both parties. In a word, without a free response, God wishes no revelation.' 
176 Cf. Jtln~el! Th~ J?octrinf! ~fl'll! Trin(ty:. QQcJ/s_J!eiiJgJs in Becoming (Edinburgh: R. & R. Clark, 1976), 
108: 'Iii the death of Jesus Christ God's "Yes", which constitutes all being, exposed itself to the "No" of 
nothing. In the resurrection of Jesus Christ this "Yes" prevailed over the "No" of the nothing. And 
rrecisely with this victory it was graciously settled why there is being at all, and not rather nothing., 
77 Dogmatik, 154. [My translation.] 
178 SchwObel, God, 118. 
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2.3.3 Conclusion 
In this second part I have explicated the concept of revelation on the ground that God 
makes himself known through experience in a process which includes reflection and 
interpretation and is in need of the community of believers. If revelation is understood 
in this way then it does not specify a special realm alongside experience but rather the 
base as its possibility and as the possibility of its truth. This entails that initially there 
can be no epistemological privilege of some forms of experience over others. Human 
experience in general, as the ground for all knowledge, has to be brought into a creative 
correlation with religious experience including the experiences of the past. This process 
is executed as a communitarian theological hermeneutics and it must exhibit a mutual 
dialogue and a continuous interaction between scripture, tradition, reason and 
experience. Within such a process, where already held beliefs are valued but left open 
for God to act anew and brought into correlation with human experience, God will most 
likely be part of this process and be able to accommodate himself in the Spirit to our 
human thought framework and open up new meanings and enhance our understanding 
of him and the human reality. Theological truth and revealed understanding of 
creaturely reality and God's being will therefore most likely fmd true and appropriate 
expression within human language if our theological reflections are rooted in such a 
process.179 To put matters in a nutshell, if the concepts of revelation and experience are 
seen in this light, then the human condition as God's good creation, Jesus as the 
incarnation of God, and the Spirit as God's liberating creativity, not only enable but 
rather urge us to embrace and include human experience from the broad field of the 
human sciences into theological discourse. The graph below might function as a useful 
summary. 
179 For an illuminating discussion of the complexity of revelatory buth and the criteria which might be 
applied by the community of believers: Brown, Discipleship and Imagination, 384-406. Brown 
distinguishes between nine criteria: historical, empirical, conceptual, moral, continuity, christological, 
degree of imaginative engagement, effectiveness of analogical consbuct, and ecclesial. 
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2.4 TRINITARIAN HERMENEUTICS IN THE INTERSTICE 
On our journey towards a new account of the doctrine of the Trinity we have reached a 
first significant signpost. It suggests unmistakably that if trinitarian theology is to 
deliver on its intention to say something true about God and the human condition 
without being accused of reductionism or irrelevance, it has to engage in a more 
creative interaction with human experience as the possibility for interpreting reality and 
the nature of being as it is given by God. To anticipate any misconception this does not 
mean that a general account of human experience (in a foundationalist manner) slips 
back in again through the back door. Any objection suggesting this misses the point that 
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it is not a general account of experience that gains authority180 but rather the generative 
process of "learning about learning", the hermeneutical spiral, within the community of 
believers. It is most important to emphasize that for revelation to occur or for truth to be 
found it must be at home with all the varying enterprises of giving meaning to the 
human condition. lbis then points to a crucial corollary. If trinitarian theology wants to 
say something about how and who God is as a being-in-communion and in relation to 
the human condition without confusing otherness with sameness it is in need of an 
account of the human condition. Only then, when one attempts to give a reasonable and 
appropriate picture of what it means to be human and what human relationality entails 
can one reasonably talk about both God's "communitarian" otherness and the 
correlation between divine and human sociality. Otherwise any endeavour to draw 
practical implications for human life will most likely tend to be either utopian 
(confusing divine and human reality and thus overloading and overburdening the 
possibilities of human communion) or too one-sided (simply favouring one's own social 
agenda). Theological discourse about the social doctrine of the Trinity, therefore, must 
be at home with all three levels of human experience and uphold a creative tension 
between them and move in the interstices. 
Level A 
Experiences of the human condition 
as relational and of 
what is means to be human 
(conditions of divine creation) 
Level C 
Experiences of the Spirit 
who renders possible God 
encounters through the ages 
(conditions of the Soirit) 
Graph 4: Trinitarian hermeneutics in the interstice 
Level B 
Experiences of Jesus 
who interacted with human beings 
and lived relationships 
(conditions of divine incarnation) 
180 Such an account could not be developed. Any objector should be reminded of the crucial claim that 
there is no pre-linguistic experience as such and that it is misleading to speak of pre-theoretical 
experience in opposition to language and the concept. 
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While level A highlights the necessity of including an account of the human condition 
as relational and social, levels B and C draw attention to the importance of the Gospel 
narratives in particular but also of the Bible as a whole and of the tradition. Especially 
discourse on level A will help us to say in what way certain concepts apply to the 
human condition and in what ways they simultaneously might also be meaningful 
descriptions of the triune God. In order to determine, for instance, in which way 
experiences of Jesus or of the Spirit might reveal true and meaningful interpretations of 
the social Trinity we need to be able to explain both their divine otherness and their 
human sameness. Talk about the Trinity as a divine communion that is different from 
human communion (maintaining God's otherness) but at the same time similar to and 
reflected in the human condition, therefore, will only be theologically meaningful (and 
in this way hopefully suggestive and helpful for drawing out practical implications) if 
trinitarian discourse is developed as an interstitial theology. Otherwise any discourse 
about God's social being will remain in metaphysical captivity without any adequate 
link to human live as it is lived, and thus again effectively stress God's 
incomprehensibility in such a way that it easily becomes meaningless. 
Following the conclusions of this chapter the remaining discussion of this thesis 
will be pursued in the following ordering. In Chapter Three my aim will be to address 
experiences of the human condition (level A) and to give an account of what it means to 
be human. This will lead to a description of human relationality and sociality. Chapter 
Four will focus on experience as it comes to speech within the biblical narratives. This 
will allow me to give an account of how and who the triune God is from the perspective 
of level B and C. Given the understanding of experience, language, and truth in this 
chapter, the outcome will be a tentative description of trinitarian trajectories. Taking up 
again the dialogue with contemporary trinitarian theology (including a conversation 
with tradition), I will be able to develop a more fully interstitial theology in Chapter 
Five. Drawing on the insights of Chapter Three and Four my aim is to propose an 
account of the Trinity in connection and in mutual dialogue with human life. Proceeding 
in this way the rationale "from experience to revelation" is applied to theological 
discourse. The outcome, it is my conviction, will be a creative re-reading of the doctrine 
of the Trinity with reference to some crucial notions of lived experience. Such a reading 
will provide better grounds for any subsequent theological discourse that wants not only 
to draw practical implications for human life but also to disclose distortions of life 
within our society and exercise some kind of social critique. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
WHAT IT IS TO BE HUMAN 
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3 
WHAT :O:T :O:S 'fO BE HUMAN 
3.1 INTRODUCTION: 
NARRATIVE AND CONCEPTUAL EXJPERIENCE 
In this chapter my main concern is to focus on some proposals from general human 
experience and the human sciences in order to display some essential traits of what it 
means to be human. Such an anthropological endeavour is an indispensable task if the 
concept of God and human experience are to be brought into a fecund correlation. 1 But 
before commencing this investigation, what I would like to do first is draw attention to 
some important preliminary explanations in order to highlight my main concerns and 
the rationale behind the ordering of the following parts of this chapter. 
To inquire into the understanding of what it is to be human can be a boundless 
enterprise. Limitation, a clear focus, and the disclosure of the starting point are 
indispensable for any reasonable contribution. Not only the huge number of different 
fields of research within the academic community demands this direction but also the 
fact of cultural and ethnic multiplicity around the world which forbids any hasty 
conclusion towards universality. To give an answer to the question of what it means to 
be human can only be understood as a contribution from a particular perspective bound 
to a specific cultural, religious, and philosophical framework. Saying this, it is not my 
intention to relativize my fmdings and underestimate their validity, but rather to state 
my own awareness of contextuality. Accordingly, my aim is not to present 
anthropological concepts around the world and compare them with each other in order 
to deduce some common characteristics which then could be described as the essentials 
of being human. Such a comparative method always entails the notion of cultural 
relativity that tends to violate 'language games' of other cultural contexts? Rather, as a 
Christian theologian living in Europe, I would like to contribute some insights from 
"western" human experience and scientific research to open up new correlations 
between the human sciences and Christian theology in this context. However, it must 
1 Interestingly theologians,,who 'address-the relationship between science and theology come to a similar 
conclusion. Because Christian theology treats the world not as opposed to God it must, 'by its very 
nature, be concerned with what can be known of creaturely reality on the basis of other disciplines': Paul 
Murray, 'Truth and Reason in Science and Theology: Points of Tension, Correlation and Compatibility', 
in C. Southgate (ed.), God, Humanity and the Cosmos (London: T. & T. Clark International, 2005), 112. 
2 Cf. D. Davies, Anthropology and Theology, 3. 
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also be remembered that despite all awareness of contextuality a strong assertion of 
incommensurability had to be rejected in Chapter Two. Therefore, what I propose at the 
end of this chapter is an account of some features of what it is to be human (albeit 
fragmented) that claims to transcend particularity and contextuality.3 
I begin then by considering that an investigation of what it means to be human, 
initially, is not so much a task for reasoning and conceptualising but rather a matter of 
observing and interpreting life and human relationships. Scientific conceptions and 
daily human experience mutually have to illuminate the fundamental traits of being 
human. The conclusions drawn by the human sciences have to be grounded in life 
experience, which usually comes to expression in narratives.4 People tell stories in order 
to communicate what they experience. This complexity I would like to call the dialectic 
between narrative and conceptual description. It suggests a twofold approach, first, to 
inquire into human personhood from a non-scientific and, secondly, from a scientific 
perspective. The term non-scientific simply indicates general human experience 
resulting from observations and conclusions drawn from outside the academic research 
community (the narratives), while the term scientific refers to concepts and frameworks 
provided by specific fields of the human sciences. 5 This obviously poses the question of 
how one can come across "general human experience" and examine it within an 
academic discourse. 
This concern leads me to the distinctive feature of the first part (3.2). The question 
at hand made me aware of the realm of literature and the importance of stories for the 
understanding of human life. It led me to the venture of integrating a survey of modern 
novels into this inquiry. Stories reflect on life in its various levels and relations. Novels 
are being read not simply because people like reading but because they express common 
experiences in which readers can reflect their own reality. Human life always transcends 
concepts and is in need of stories that give meaning to life. Human life unfolds itself in 
stories in which fiction and reality cannot be separated from one another. Moreover, 
3 To test such an account on the grounds of other cultural contexts is neither part of the scope of this 
thesis nor is it necessary since such a test could only be pursued as an inter-cultural discourse. 
4 This dialectic is also reflected in theology: Ritschl, The Logic of Theology. 'Stories can express things 
for which other idioms would be inappropriate. In particular the identity of an individual or a group can 
be articulated by stories. People are what they tell of themselves (or what is told to them) in their story 
and what they make of this story' (p. 19). At the same time one must say: 'A conceptually complex 
theology is'necessary for situations, which must be,made,clear,and-relevant over againsUhe,biblical offer 
of life. Complex family, social, political, ethical, psychological and philosophical data and problems 
cannot be explained and solved by the simple narration of biblical stories or by the recitation of central 
statements from tradition' (p.27). 
5 This reflects my discussion of the relationship between metaphorical and conceptual language: Chapter 
Two, section 2.2.3. 
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human beings always do fictionalise people in encounters because they "read" them as 
persons of this or that sort.6 Novels are thus capable of contributing insights from 
common life experience, which should not be neglected in such an investigation. This is 
valid not only because human experience can never be totally conceptualised but also 
because human thought cannot be reduced to academic reasoning that neglects the 
importance of imagination and the richness of story telling. Although this survey can 
only be a limited one, it has to be ventured. If the process of choosing books and their 
subsequent interpretation is pursued and carried out from the wider perspective of life 
experience, then such a contribution is as much justifiable as is any other from a 
psychological or philosophical perspective. Furthermore, a survey of a confined number 
of bestseller novels as the source of investigation enables me to draw conclusions and 
correlate them with findings drawn from scientific concepts. Such an attempt displays a 
novelty in theology but has to be taken seriously if one wants to draw more attention to 
human experience from outside the academic research community.7 In this part, 
therefore, my intention will be to interpret some salient features of contemporary novels 
and in doing so highlight major traits of human personhood. 
After having completed this task, my aim then will be to turn to the other end of 
the above-mentioned dialectic, namely, to conceptualised experience within academic 
discourse. In the second part (3.3), I would like to address more general reflections and 
examine the modem turn to relationality that reveals a basic conviction which underlies 
many fields of modem research. What I propose to do is to engage in a discussion 
advocating the necessity of going beyond philosophical and scientific reductionism. 
Touching the concepts of consciousness, self-system and time in correlation with the 
dialectic of matter and mind, I will draw attention to the notions of otherness, sameness, 
and particularity as well as meaning, fear, and the beyond as fundamental features of 
human relationality. 
In the third part (3.4), I will narrow the focus and examine closely three particular 
contributions from scientific research. In order to make a strong case for some essential 
characteristics of what it means to be human, these characteristics must be shown to be 
meaningful on different levels of inquiry. Given the dialectic of matter and mind and the 
complexity of human life within its environment, I will approach this task from a 
6 John Barton, 'Disclosing Human Possibilities: Revelation and Biblical Stories', in G. Sauter and J. 
Barton (eds.), Revelation and Story (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 55. 
7 For an account of the importance of novelists retelling core experiences ofthe Bible: F.W. Dillistone, 
The Novelist and the Passion Story (London: Collins, 1960). 
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psychological, biological, and philosophical perspective. All three contributions share a 
relational view, attempt to avoid reductionism, and are very rich in their suggestions. 
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that the three concepts at hand are not directly 
influenced by one another and therefore exhibit independent implications from different 
angles and points of departure. Finally, drawing all the threads together in a concluding 
part (3.5), I will be able to propose a reliable account of what it is to be human. 
3.2 INS][GHTS FROM CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE 
3.2.1 The importance of stories 
I begin then with a brief consideration of the importance of story-telling in relation to 
the experience of human life as it is lived. To be alive and to be a human person means 
to experience. Human beings experience themselves, the other and their environment in 
every moment of their lives - when they move, talk, meet people, perceive the 
environment, think and reason. Due to these experiences human beings ask who they 
are, what they are, and how they can understand themselves as human beings. Looking 
at modem literature, especially at novels, it is amazing how these stories seem to 
captivate huge numbers of people. This, in my opinion, is not accidental but due to the 
fact that the author, as a good researcher and observer of human life, describes 
experiences and reveals thoughts through which many people are able to discover and 
include their own. A good novel, in which certain characters and their interactions with 
one another are described in a profound and realistic way, affects and concerns people 
because they have either experienced similar events or because they can honestly 
imagine that, due to their own life experience, these stories exhibit real human life. John 
Barton confirms this insight in referring to Martha Nussbaum when he observes 'that 
works of fiction can disclose vital insights into the question how we should live 
precisely because there is no fixed boundary between the "fictional" characters who 
appear in stories, plays and poems and the "real" people we meet every day.' 
Accordingly 'well-drawn characters in novels or plays are almost real and so can offer 
insight to real people like ourselves. ' 8 In this way novels are capable of opening up 
essent.ial feature~ of h~an experience and thus are a vital contribution to the 
investigation of what it means to be human. 
8 John Barton, 'Disclosing Human Possibilities', op. cit., 54. 
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The following discussion, therefore, is an attempt of a theologian to integrate the 
experience and observing capacity of some modern authors in his anthropological 
conclusions. I was fascinated and captivated by some bestseller novels,9 which I have 
read over the last few years alongside my engagement with the present research topic. 
However, it was precisely this "alongside", reading books in my free time and 
immediately being drawn into the question of what it means to be human, that made me 
aware of the importance of modern literature for the understanding of anthropology. 
Furthermore, this contribution from the outside of theology and the human sciences 
secures a partly independent input to the discussion from a perspective which is largely 
neglected in contemporary theology and anthropology. 
Understandably, as a part of a bigger chapter, this task can only be accomplished 
in a very limited and concentrated way. I propose to introduce and briefly discuss four 
bestseller books from two female and two male authors. In order to contribute various 
focuses on human relationship and interaction, each novel I have chosen deals with 
different life circumstances and social backgrounds. This choice attempts to secure, at 
least to some extent, a broad enough and relevant picture of human experience. It is not 
my intention to give detailed summaries of the stories but rather, as a result of my 
personal comprehension and interpretation, to draw attention to one or two main 
features of each novel and correlate them with the question of what seems to be 
essential for successful (gelingende) and failing (miss/ingende) relationships. In doing 
so I hope to highlight some proposals which modern literature puts in front of anyone 
who is in search of the indispensable characteristics of human life. 
3.2.2 Shreve: All He Ever Wanted10 
This novel by Anita Shreve tells the story of Nicholas van Tassel, Professor of English 
Literature and Rhetoric in a college in New Hampshire about a hundred years ago. At 
the back of the book one reads the following blurb: 'It is a fire in a New Hampshire 
hotel that brings Nicholas Van Tassel and Etna Bliss together, a chance meeting that 
lights up a lifelong passion. But their life is not everything they could have imagined. 
Many years later, Nicholas recounts their courtship and their time together. And as the 
threads of the . story begin to unravel, what is revealed is a patchwork of promises, 
9 For details see bibliography 8.4. 
10 Anita Shreve, All He Ever Wanted (London: Abacus, 2003). 
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truths, secrets and lies, and a man, madly in love, for whom his wife is all he ever 
wanted ... ' 
Anita Shreve reveals in this novel in a very profound way the depths of the human 
heart. Two important realms of Nicholas' life I would briefly like to emphasise. The 
first one is his career as a college professor in which he desperately tries to become 
Dean of the college. This endeavour leads him to considerable efforts at putting himself 
in the right position. His attempt develops into a fight against a guest Professor who 
recently arrived at the College to deliver some lectures. However, as is revealed to 
Nicholas in due course, this newcomer not only intends to stay but is also favoured by 
the principal of the governing body as a candidate for the position of Dean. Anita 
Shreve beautifully discloses Nicholas' soul and gives the reader a glimpse into his heart. 
From now on Nicholas' thoughts and actions display a struggle with his own biography 
and an ultimate incapacity to come to terms with the threatening challenge of this new 
colleague. His conscious reflections seem to be determined by continual comparisons; it 
is like a fatal race in which he forgets his own uniqueness and becomes incapable of 
viewing his colleague from different perspectives. In virtue of this he ultimately 
perceives and meets his fellow Professor only in the light of his own life destiny. This 
one-sidedness darkens his sight. He puts on a behaviour-mask and consequently cannot 
see and perceive the face of his opponent properly. Masks throw shadows and distort 
encounters. Jealousy creeps up and his colleague becomes his enemy. As time passes by 
he becomes less capable of meeting him in an honest and open way. Locking himself up 
in his own thought-world impedes the appreciation of his own strengths and faculties. 
Fear of losing the race emerges as a theme, and anxiety of not being in control 
dominates parts of his life. To summarize this development one could say that Nicholas 
fails to integrate positively the other person in his own life, not as a potential threat but 
as a supportive colleague, as a unity despite diversity. 
The second realm is Nicholas' marriage with Etna Bliss. This relationship seems 
to be haunted from the very beginning. When Etna eventually agrees to marry Nicholas, 
he is overjoyed and accepts the fact that Etna does not really love him but more or less 
seeks some security. As time passes by, more and more problems are imposed on their 
partnership until fmally their relationship breaks up. Nicholas, although he agreed with 
Etna on a specific type of partnership. isJlOt ~bl~. tQ give_ ht;r enQugh f.reecl91TI to let h~r 
appreciate things in her own way which he does not always understand. He treats her 
like his property, indicating the same problem as mentioned above with his colleague: 
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the incapacity to look into her face and to realise her otherness, thereby appreciating her 
uniqueness. The experience of giving her space and not knowing what she is doing in 
her free time starts to threaten him. Being bound up with his own thoughts and 
perspectives he looses the capacity to integrate and acknowledge Etna's own 
perspectives and life experiences. Nicholas' concept of life continuously declines from 
being relational, and is increasingly centred and focused around his own ego. Once he 
cannot understand and comprehend Etna's behaviour and thoughts he appears to be 
frightened of loosing control. He is incapable of coming to terms with her uniqueness. 
But otherness, as one can obviously learn from this novel, always implies a certain kind 
of incomprehension and thus loss of control. 
To put it in more conceptual terms, Nicholas' life breaks up, becomes shattered 
and partly meaningless because of his incapacity to deal with the characteristics of 
otherness and particularity, which seem to demand the recognition of the other person's 
uniqueness and the responsibility of shaping a community (i.e., a team of colleagues or 
a marriage) where the other is at least not seen as an enemy. Where the relational 
structure of life is not appreciated, people mistrust each other, always smell danger, and 
put on masks. As a consequence encounters with other persons become partly faceless, 
dishonest and inauthentic. This then is a source of fear - a fear of not being in control, of 
not being able to comprehend entirely - which haunts Nicholas from the very beginning. 
Hence, the title of the book is paradigmatic: All he ever wanted! This results in failing 
relationships and an increasing isolation. 
3.2.3 Sparks: Message In A Bottle11 
The second novel by Nicholas Sparks tells the story of two people. One is a boatman, 
Garrett, a widower whose life is still determined by the loss of his wife. The other is a 
woman, Theresa, a divorced newspaper columnist in search of a good and exclusive 
story. "The message in a bottle" is found accidentally by Theresa at a beach and arouses 
her curiosity. The bottle contains Garrett's love letter written to his deceased wife. 
Theresa, with her journalistic instinct, sets off to find him, wanting to know the whole 
story. But life is sometimes more complicated than expected. In due course they do 
meet and slowly but surely fall . in love with one another. This new and carefully 
11 Nicholas Sparks, Message in a Bonle (London: Bantam, 1999); now also a well-known film. 
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developing partnership becomes the main focus of the story that narrates the problems 
both Garret and Theresa have to face. 
Garrett struggles with the memories of his deceased wife determining his 
behaviour towards Theresa, comparing and thus forgetting that she is different. Theresa 
is in conflict with her professional instinct, initially trying to write a story about him and 
thus reducing his unique and personal story to a journalistic pattern, which presses his 
life experience into specific modes of language and categories, so that everybody else 
might read something which ultimately is not readable. They both think in their own 
framework. But once they meet face to face indicating a concerned sight beyond the 
surface (which is not a particular moment but points to a process) and realize the 
particularity, the uniqueness of the other, they recognise that they have to change their 
behaviour towards each other. Theresa realizes that she cannot write a newspaper 
column anymore and Garrett recognizes that he cannot treat her always in comparison 
with his deceased wife. Apart from being a love story, this novel represents the 
experience that once I meet the other face to face, which means in proximity, in seeing 
the other as they are, responsibility for the other emerges. Subsequently I cannot reduce 
the other to the same, to my I think. This is valid both ways. Garrett cannot reduce her 
to his memories and Theresa is not able to reduce him to her categories. 
However, their love deepens and is more and more realized as they both meet the 
other as unique and responsibly. She gives up her story and frees herself from all the 
comments of the colleagues in her office, puts down her mask and meets him, as she is, 
vulnerable and open. He in turn gives up his attempt at pressing her into his memories 
and thus says a last and final good-bye to his deceased wife, writing his last "message in 
a bottle." This whole development and the interaction of the two main characters are 
accompanied by the notion of fear. Both are frightened to give up their framework, to 
leave their masks behind and take up responsibility for the other. But once they can 
appreciate the otherness of the other and their uniqueness, a new start becomes possible 
and the experience of mutual responsibility emerges, which makes life meaningful and 
whole. This novel shows, despite all our dependence upon being determined by our 
biography, that, when we meet somebody face to face, we are able to respond 
gratuitously, spontaneously in responsibility for the other without any demand of 
reciprocity. One of the last scenes ~s ,m()s~ jp.!figuing in this respect. Garrett, despite 
stormy weather, sails off to throw his final "good-bye-message" to his deceased wife 
into the sea. Doing this clearly indicates his newly gained responsiveness and the 
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realization of what is meant by looking into Theresa's face and taking up responsibility 
for her. Fighting the storm at the same time, he suddenly notices a wrecked boat. He 
sees the frightened faces of a family and without thinking, jumps into the sea and tries 
to rescue them. This event in which Garrett dies (sacrificing himself and dying in the 
attempt to rescue another person), suggests that offering oneself in a gratuitous response 
is meaningful in itself and reveals something of the essence of human life. 
This novel points to the experience of life as relational, but again in a way that 
makes life most meaningful and whole when the other, in his or her particularity and 
uniqueness, is not perceived as a threat to my life but as an enrichment belonging to my 
life. This notion of belonging to my life indicates respect for the other as other without 
trying to reduce the other to the same. This otherness and the appreciation of 
particularity still can be the cause of fear because the framework of understanding 
remains open to change and new unpredictable experiences. This is why the main 
characters in the novel experience a lot of ups and downs, misconceptions and 
obstacles. But, as this novel seems to suggest, in a gratuitous response, in taking up 
responsibility for the other, this uncertainty and fear can be put on a firm ground 
capable of love and respect. 
3.2.4 Harris: Chocolat12 
The third novel by Joanne Harris deals very strongly with the notions of otherness and 
particularity, or in other terms, with unity and plurality leading to conformity or the 
verdict of heresy. The main contents of the novel are well summarized in the blurb on 
the book cover: 'When an exotic stranger, Vianne Rocher, arrives in the French village 
of Lansquenet and opens a chocolate boutique directly opposite the church, Father 
Reynaud identifies her as a serious danger to his flock - especially as it is the beginning 
of Lent, the traditional season of self-denial. War is declared as the priest denounces the 
newcomer's wares as the ultimate sin. Suddenly Vianne's shop-cum-cafe means that 
there is somewhere for secrets to be whispered, grievances to be aired, dreams to be 
tested. But Vianne's plans for an Easter Chocolate Festival divide the whole community 
in a conflict that escalates into a 'Church not Chocolate' battle. As mouths water in 
anticipation, can the solemnity of the Church compar~ with the pagan passion of a 
chocolate eclair?' 
12 Joanne Harris, Chocolat (London: Black Swan, 2000); now also a major film with the interesting 
difference that the main villain is the mayor instead of the priest. 
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There are, of course, many possible perspectives and starting points to look at in 
this book, which is rich in its underlying themes. For me, a major topic of interest is the 
ongoing conflict with the problem of otherness and particularity. This is a theme that is 
essential for all parties involved, Father Reynaud, the villagers and Vianne. All of them 
have their convictions of how things are and therefore have to be. The scene of the story 
is a French village with a small, traditional community. The main focus lies, on the one 
hand, on the priest and the villagers in their attempt to come to terms with new ideas 
and changes, and on the other, on Vianne who is used to change and diversity. As a 
foreigner who has lived in many countries and experienced different traditions, she 
represents just the opposite. Very soon after Vianne's arrival it becomes obvious that 
the villagers who are now compelled to reflect and take a standpoint are not really 
happy with the way things are. Tradition seems to have an answer for everything and 
the complexity of life is subordinated to the tradition, which Father Reynaud tries to 
defend at all costs. 
From the outside everything seems to be fme and in order, but once the arguments 
start between Father Reynaud and Vianne many hidden problems are revealed. Now 
that there is a person who questions the conformity with tradition and the church rules, a 
beaten up wife turns up at Vianne's house and other moral inconsistencies appear. 
Desires emerge among the villagers which had to be suppressed hitherto. Chocolate in 
the middle of Lent, of course, is a perfect image for all kinds of desires which belong to 
our human life. However, one of the messages that is conveyed by this novel is that the 
denial of otherness and particularity, indicated and exhibited in the conformity of the 
villagers, does lead to oppressive structures, reducing plurality to uniformity. This in 
tum leads to a life without real enjoyment, a life in which I as another have to comply 
with the same. The neglect of particularity and otherness as a part of human life, be it in 
the encounter of a stranger or in a hidden desire of my soul, and its denunciation as 
dangerous turns immediately around and drowns every colourful variety of life into a 
dull one-coloured-ness. 
The consequence is, as it happens, that Father Reynaud is not only incapable of 
seeing the face of Vianne but also of other villagers. Without asking, to give one 
example, he drags out the husband who beat up his wife and tries to tum him into a 
gentleman. He does not encounter him. as a ounique person but reduces him to the same. 
He is not interested in his real problems but tries to press him back into the system. 
Consequently, when meeting others, Father Reynaud is not responding to them but 
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rather to his consciousness of how things have to be. But despite some strong aversions 
to Vianne at the beginning, things do change in due course, people get closer and even 
the priest learns his lesson at the end of the story when he cannot resist chocolates' call 
"Try me. Test me. Taste me." and fmds himself on Easter morning sitting on the floor 
of Vianne's shop, spilled chocolate around him. Slowly but surely the reader can learn 
two things. 
First, if one starts to face one's own desires, not denying them but understanding, 
integrating, dealing and living with them, things change and life becomes more whole. 
If desires are integrated in a positive and not in a confrontational way, one can learn 
from and cope with them. Secondly, if one faces the other, who is different and always a 
stranger, and starts to respect his or her particularity one will be able to approach the 
other, respond to the other and learn to live with the other as a fellow human being and 
not as an enemy. Without any judging fmger this novel reminds us of human 
relationality, not just on a sociological but also on a psychological level, trying to 
emphasise that human life is most meaningful and enjoyable when otherness and the 
other is integrated in my life without oppressing the other's particularity. Contrariwise, 
where the other is not seen face to face, not seen in particularity, power and authority 
tend to become oppressive. Where otherness cannot be appreciated, authority depends 
solely on the concept of sameness, which entails the division of human beings into 
either friend or enemy. By contrast when the other can be integrated people in a 
community are suddenly able to breathe fresh air, encounter each other respectfully and 
engage in a joyous celebration. In doing so, without being forced to give up one's own 
standpoint, persons take up responsibility for one another and subsequently reduce 
mutual fear to a minimum. Hence they can live. This is the promising end of Chocolat, 
an Easter Chocolate Festival, a joyous celebration of unity despite diversity. 
3.2.5 Kneale: English Passengers13 
This last novel takes us 150 years back into a nearly forgotten time, English colonialism 
and rule in Tasmania, the extinction of the Aborigines and the oppressive western 
christianised cultural attitude towards other traditions and religious beliefs. Matthew 
Kneal~ narrates a historic drama whi(!h is based on profound historic research that 
13 Matthew Kneale, Englische Passagiere (Stuttgart-MOnchen: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 2000). 
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succeeds in bringing together many different characters from the English and the 
Tasmanian inhabitants and sheds light on human behaviour from various angles. 
The story starts off with Captain Kewley and his crew from the Isle of Man trying 
to smuggle some cognac and tobacco from France to England but they then get caught 
by the English customs officer and are in need of money to escape the fate of prison. 
Just in time three English gentlemen arrive on the scene, desperately in need of a ship 
for an excursion to Tasmania in order to fmd the Garden of Eden. This journey turns out 
to be very adventurous and the reader is introduced to three main characters. Reverend 
Wilson, now searching for his last piece of proof, tries to verify biblical infallibility by 
his geological studies by demonstrating that the Garden of Eden lies in Tasmania. 
Doctor Potter is only interested in collecting samples of human skulls and bones for 
writing his book 'The Destiny of the Nations' in which he divides the human races into 
superior and inferior classes. Mr. Renshaw meanwhile is a botanist who wants to escape 
from his family. 
Parallel to this story, the reader learns from the perspectives of the Aborigine 
Peevay, the settlers, and different officials how the British Empire is forced to 
extinguish the Tasmanian tribes because they are not willing to accept the Christian 
faith and the western civilised way of living. The details which Matthew Kneale reveals 
in this novel are shocking and give a profound insight into human consciousness and 
how convictions tend to become oppressive and authoritarian, if based on a worldview 
entirely isolated from others. Kneale narrates in the form of personal diaries, letters and 
jotted-down notes, which give the reader a good insight into the characters of the main 
actors in the drama. Their lines of arguments are disclosed and their convictions are 
brought to light. Looking closely at every character one soon recognizes similar patterns 
of dealing with the other. It seems that everybody perceives their environment, be it the 
other person on the ship, the Tasmanian Aborigine, the English settler or the different 
cultural and religious traditions, exclusively from their own framework of thought. 
Reverend Wilson's whole worldview and his perception of persons and things are 
totally centred around his Christian faith and dogmas, leaving no room for the truth or 
reasonableness of other traditions or interpretations of events. Doctor Potter's 
perception and judgement of Reverend Wilson or of the Aborigines is wholly 
deteri?ined by his anthropolQgica! studi~s JlllcUris extreme ideas about the destinies of " 
the nations. The others are automatically put in a category of sameness, not taken 
seriously, and thus deprived of their individuality and uniqueness. And, to mention a 
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third example, the perception of Peevay, the Aborigine, depends so much on his 
biography and the experience of hatred that he is not able to make room for new 
interpretations and experiences. Here again one observes a reduction of the other to the 
same. It is very intriguing that towards the end of the story it is Captain Kewley who 
remains alive. He is an ordinary man, a one-off-smuggler decided upon in order to 
survive and earn some money. But now and again he is able to see the other. Although 
having his own ideas and frameworks of understanding, he leaves room for the others 
and lets them be as they are. Reverend Wilson ends up insane and schizophrenic and 
Doctor Potter drowns with the ship, two persons who radically subdued the other and 
the perception of events to their own framework of sameness. 
There are many other features and themes to this book, but this topic of unity and 
plurality, sameness and otherness that I just emphasised seems an important one. It 
indicates that so many of the dreadful events like the extinction of Aborigines, the 
oppressing structures of colonialism, the disparaging assessment of other cultures and 
traditions and the trait of superiority were rooted in a one-sided doctrine of unity and 
sameness and in the incapacity to appreciate otherness and particularity. Consequently 
different traditions, religious rituals and social behaviour which could not be explained 
out of one's own experience and thought framework had to be assessed either as 
dangerous and barbarian or as inferior and in need of development aid. This negative 
structure of humanness seems to suggest the following conclusion. If the other is 
perceived from the isolated perspective of the selfish ego, he is very easily reduced 
either to a threatening or an inferior object, both leading to oppressive structures and the 
incapacitation of the other. 
Closely linked with the patterns of sameness is the notion of fear. Unity and 
conformity seem to help people to see things "clear", that is to say, to give them a clear 
explanation and interpretation which keeps oneself in control. Otherness- the stranger, 
i.e. the Doctor, the Reverend, the Settler, the Aborigine, the behaviour that I do not 
understand, the tradition which seems meaningless - is a threat to my framework. 
Otherness, therefore, includes the possibility of fear, the fear of losing oneself, being 
wrong, or losing control. The interactions of the main characters in Kneale's English 
Passengers precisely reflect this fear which leads them to one-sided perceptions and 
disparaging verdicts. 
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3.2.6 Conclusion 
Having surveyed these four novels the reader now has a good picture of the complexity 
of human relationships. Two main notions can be singled out that gave all the different 
relationships and encounters their reference system: sameness and otherness or, in other 
terms, unity and plurality. Human life, the search for meaning, the endeavour for 
meaningful relationships and the sometimes-everyday struggle for survival appear 
always to be correlated with the notions of sameness and otherness. The novels thus 
advocate the following conclusions. On the one hand, human beings experience an 
inescapable embeddedness in relational structures in which the other is and always 
remains particular and incomprehensible, and on the other, human beings experience a 
dependence upon a certain level of sameness, that is to say, on agreed frameworks 
which tell them (without the need of a continuous reshuffle) what is reliable and 
reasonable. This aporia, which is never resolved and remains a continuous battle in 
one's consciousness, entails the experience of fear. Fear, therefore, emerges as the 
counterpart of the sameness-otherness structure of human life. Fear of not being in 
control, of having to reshuffle one's convictions and change one's life, or of admitting 
to being wrong seemed to underlie many of the convictions, dialogues, and arguments 
in the above-presented books. The stories point to this problem and seem to suggest that 
it is of great importance that if human beings want to live on this earth in peace and 
mutual understanding they must focus on the notions of sameness, otherness and fear. 
Hence concepts of power and authority have to correlate precisely with these fmdings. 
A human understanding of power and authority has to prepare the ground for the 
possibility of dealing with the sameness-otherness dialectic and of minimizing the 
experience of fear in order to increase a respectful celebration of life. Where fear is 
partly overcome in the attempt to integrate the other or the stranger in one's own life 
concept, relationships begin to be less tight and fearful and more caring and 
understanding. Then, mutual understanding despite incomprehensibility and mutual 
respect and fairness despite disparity of views seem to be the most profound and 
promising possibility of human communitarian existence. This then might be called a 
reconciled fully human existence. 
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3.3 THE TURN TO RELAT1lONALITY 
3.3.1 Beyond reductionism 
The complexity and relationality of human life with its inherent notions of otherness 
and sameness is of course part of a larger picture. In the human sciences relationality 
has become a key concept for understanding the human person as a very complex being. 
So what I want to do now is examine the scientific turn to relationality and look for 
some clues that will advance our understanding of this complexity of human life as 
relational. The fundamental experience of everyday life is that one cannot inquire after 
the understanding of being and look upon oneself without always being surrounded by 
others, that one is deeply embedded in social structures and cultural settings which form 
one's self-understanding and that human freedom as self-determination always is a 
limited freedom, depending on the decisions others have already made. Furthermore, the 
significance of bodily existence and the interdependency between body and soul cannot 
be disregarded, which raises the scientific question about the relation between matter 
and mind and its subsequent consequences for a concept of personhood. But, and this is 
vital to note, these experiences of being in relation with others and with one's own body 
do not necessarily determine the concept of personhood as long as relations are 
conceived as accidents, that is to say, as a secondary structure subordinated to being. 
This assumption, held by many scientists and philosophers up to the twentieth century, 
led to the conclusion that the essence of being can be understood from the self and this 
resulted in an equation of subjectivity and being. The concepts of personhood and 
subjectivity could be derived from the vantage point of the self and its reasoning 
regarded as the primary entity opposed to the other and the world. 
The modem turn to relationality challenged this view, posing the following 
questions: Am I wholly myself without the other? Is the other as a subject a mere person 
opposite who only concerns me as an object or is he in a certain way substantially 
necessary for me? Is consciousness and self-understanding possible without body and 
subsequently the other? And what about our environment and the evolutionary process? 
Does not the fact that we as human beings are biologically embedded in a world 
represent more than just a subject-object relation? Moreover, if relations belong to the 
essence of being, then the other is a part of myself and relations are not mere accidents. 
A relational view therefore suggests that being human means being relational and thus 
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essentially bound up with the other as a primary condition for any concept of 
subjectivity or human personhood. 
Interestingly, this emphasis on relationality is also supported by the natural 
sciences. For instance particle physics with its assumption of energy fields is to a large 
degree all about relations, about interpenetrating and mutually binding energy fields. F. 
L. Shults, referring to the scientists Prigogine and Stengers, argues that 'most physicists 
agree that units and relations are distinct but interdependent: "for an interaction to be 
real, the 'nature' of the related things must derive from these relations, while at the 
same time the relations must derive from the 'nature' of the things".' 14 Following this 
development it was inevitable that there followed criticism of substance metaphysics 
(that subordinated relations to substance) and of the deterministic and mechanistic 
views of the early modem sciences (that emphasised a linear cause-effect principle). 
Clear distinctions between assumed opposites or orders of priority such as substance 
and relation, body and mind, subject and object became less evident and were seen in a 
new light that acknowledges an indispensable interdependency which does not permit a 
subordination of one to the other. 
A case in point, indicating the necessity of such a relational view, is the problem 
of consciousness which stands in the centre of the scientific body and soul debate. The 
concept of consciousness, which plays an essential role for any understanding of 
personhood, exhibits the dialectic between body and soul, matter dependent brain 
functions and consciousness dependent psychological states. There are some extreme 
positions on each side of the body-soul debate, believing either in the omni-competence 
of science or in the metaphysical principle of an immortal soul. Ideological one-
sidedness leads, on the one hand, Peter Atkins, a lecturer in Physical Chemistry who 
believes in the omni-competence of science, to talk about "purposeless people" 
declaring that human persons are 'creatures of chance, nothing more than fragments of 
highly organized matter.' 15 On the other hand, Richard Swinburne, former Professor of 
the Philosophy of the Christian Religion at Oxford, tries to proof from his theistic 
perspective not only that the soul is an immaterial thing but also that 'the conscious life 
of thought, sensation, and purpose which belongs to a man belongs to him because it 
14 F. LeRon Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology: After the Philosophical Turn to Relationality 
(Grand Rapids: B. Eerdmans, 2003), 18. For an account of relational logic and the Trinity: Hennann 
Deuser, 'Trinitat und Relation', Marburger Jahrbuch for Theo/ogie 10 (1998), 95-128. 
15 Peter Atkins, 'Purposeless People', in A. Peacocke and G. Gillett (eds.), Persons and Personality 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 13. 
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belongs to his soul.' 16 These extreme convictions are misleading because they neglect 
human experience in which the relation of matter and mind, body and soul cannot be 
dissolved in favour of the one for the other. Both positions neglect the problem of 
incomparability and ignore the limits of their respective field of expertise. 17 Regarding 
the problem of human consciousness, while the concept of meaning or purpose cannot 
be dealt with by physical concepts, the mechanisms of brain functions cannot be 
explained by metaphysics. Furthermore, they confuse three different approaches and 
levels of interest concerning human personhood, which, following David Wiggins, can 
be called (a) persons as objects of biological inquiry, (b) persons as subjects of 
consciousness, and (c) persons as the locus ofvalue. 18 
To acknowledge this dialectic and aporetic structure of being-ness leads to a 
relational view which claims 'that human consciousness (or mind) cannot be explained 
either by completely reducing it to brain functions (monism) or by separating it 
substantially from the body (dualism). The former cannot account for subjectivity, and 
the latter cannot elucidate the interaction between body and mind.' 19 Rather it is the 
case that one cannot be conceived without the other. It seems to be the relation between 
matter and mind, distinct and yet inseparably combined, which forms the ground for 
consciousness and personhood. Contemporary scientific research, thus, highlights 
different levels of relationality and claims that our consciousness is a complexity of 
biophysiological, sociocultural, intra-psychic and even transpersonal aspects which 
suggest that 'because so many factors interrelate to create consciousness, 
interconnectiveness is a property fundamental to consciousness. ' 20 
At the same time this relationality and interconnectiveness can only be conceived 
as an aporia. Matter and mind deny each other the possibility of explaining and 
conceptualising the other by their own terms and suggest that a holistic view is needed 
of what it means to be a human person. The so-called scientific working hypothesis of 
simplicity then seems to be nothing more than a dishonest intellectual battle to secure 
one's own conviction. It exhibits the suppression of fear in not being able to come to 
16 Richard Swinburne, 'The Structure of the Soul', in A. Peacocke and G. Gi1lett (eds.), Persons and 
Personality, 33. 
17 For a survey of the current debate between psychology and theology in relation to brain and 
consciousness: Fraser Watts, 'Psychology and Theology', in C. Southgate (ed.), God, Humanity and the 
Cosmos, 193-209. For a balanced dialogue between modem physics and theology: David Wilkinson, 
God, Time and Stephen Hawk,fr'K ~!'A~9: :Mol!~h Books, 200 1). 
18 David Wiggins, 'Tiie Person· as Object of Science, as Subject of Experience, and as Locus of Value', in 
A. Peacocke and G. Gillett (eds.), Persons and Personality, 56, 67. 
19 Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology, 182. 
20 John Boghosian Arden, Science, Theology and Consciousness: The Search for Unity (Westport: 
Praeger Publishers, 1998), 11. 
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terms with an unsolvable aporia. Reductionism seems always to be a frantic endeavour 
for keeping control, excluding from the very start the possibility of a significant 
contribution from "the other side", and to that degree violating human experience?1 It 
might be noted that the ceaseless human experience of fear, which came to the fore in 
the previous part (thoughtfully and vividly described by modern novels), seems to 
connect with a deeper level that anchors precisely in this aporia, which indicates being's 
refusal to be grasped and explained by solely one concept or another. However, what 
must be pointed out, if matter and mind are so deeply interwoven with one another, is 
that this being bound together cannot be confined to the self centred consciousness of a 
subject. My body as matter-dependent is also determined by my surrounding matter, the 
other and the world. Consequently human consciousness cannot be seen as a mere 
opposite of the other and the world. A relational view, taking this interwoven-ness 
seriously, has to take the other and the world into account for the understanding of 
personhood. 
3.3.2 Egocentricity and exocentricity 
In order to broaden the perspective on relationality I now would like to draw attention to 
some developments within the fields of philosophy and psychology and outline some 
general implications for a concept of personhood and self-consciousness. John 
Macmurray was one who, from a philosophical viewpoint, tried to overcome a false 
subject-object dualism in arguing for the primacy of relational being. The self is at the 
same time subject and object and due to this fact concepts of personhood and self-
understanding can never be isolated from others.11 Martin Buber, with his philosophical 
personalism, was another driving force in the first half of the twentieth century who 
stressed very strongly the relatedness of the I to the Thou in order to become an I. 'The 
primary word 1-Thou establishes the world of relation. ' 23 With this presupposition he 
was able to prompt the philosophical discussion towards the notion of meeting as real 
21 Note that even Arden's relational approach in his Science, Theology and Consciousness tends to 
become reductionist. His attempt to reconcile the sciences with theology from an evolutionary perspective 
neglects from the very start the possibility of a "beyond being" and results in a spiritual pantheism. 
Despite his agreement with the concepts of "relativity" and the "incompleteness theorem" he compares 
and interprets all experience from the scientific concept of evolutionary process. Claiming a new 
paradigm shift and criticising reductionism, h~ ~ssJf ~C()IJ!~§ a reductionist in not acknowledging the 
conceptual difference of philosopliical discotirSe · or religious experience (indicating a beyond 
ghenomenology) and his physical-psychological method. 
See John Aves, 'Persons in Relation: John Macmurray', in C. Schw6bel and C. Gunton (eds.), Persons, 
Divine and Human (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1991), 120-37. 
23 Martin Buber, I and Thou (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1994}, 18. 
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living. Consequently Buber defmes: 'In the beginning is relation - as category of being, 
readiness, grasping from, mould for the soul; it is the a priori of relation, the inborn 
Thou. '24 And in virtue of that he concludes that 'through the Thou a man becomes I. '25 
There is now wide agreement amongst scholars that 'instead of autonomous subjects 
that stand over against the natural world and other subjects, today human self-
consciousness is understood as always and already embedded in relations between self, 
other and world. ' 26 This implies that the other as particular and distinct from me is an 
integral part of the self, suggesting that one cannot think of being without integrating 
the notion of otherness. Taking relationality seriously therefore seems to allow for a 
more holistic view of what it means to be human including the notions of otherness and 
particularity. 
Another way of looking at the present concern is through the lens of psychology 
which strongly supports and deepens this understanding of relationality. Especially 
developmental psychology stresses the fact that the whole process of developing one's 
identity and self-understanding as a person depends essentially on external social 
circumstances. Developmental analyses distinguish between different steps and levels 
within the process ofthe formation of identity from childhood to adulthood.27 However, 
in a number of psychological schools and concepts one still faces the remnants of 
Freud's deterministic and mechanistic view. Freud saw in his depth-psychoanalytical 
method, dependent on the early modem sciences, the person as an apparatus. A person 
is determined by his unconsciousness, in which the "drives" and the "Id-instance" play 
the main role and therefore have to be made conscious in therapy. In this concept the I is 
mainly driven by the /d. Freud, obviously coming from the side of the natural sciences, 
mainly saw a person from the perspective of his biological functions.Z8 This supported 
in the first half of the twentieth century the dualism of body and soul, mind and matter. 
Either a person was seen more in abstract categories in his biological functions (body 
and matter) or from his inner spiritual aspects as a subject with feeling and values (mind 
and soul).Z9 Nowadays sharp dualistic views belong largely to the past and it seems to 
be acknowledged that a human being as a person has to be conceived in more holistic 
24 Ibid., 43. 
25 Ibid., 44. 
26 Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology, 31. 
27 For a pr~f()~~ .. ~t:qgy of dl:(v~~opmental p)'lychology: Rolf Oerter and Leo Montada, Entwicklungs-
~sj;chologie (MUnchen: Psychologie Verlags Union, 1987). 
8 For a study of Freud's psychoanalysis: Jtlrgen Kriz, Grundkonzepte der Psychotherapie (MUnchen: 
Psychologie Verlags Union, 1989), 29-49. 
29 For a survey of modem psychological schools: Dieter Wyss, Die tiefenpsychologischen Schulen von 
den Anfangen his zur Gegenwart (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972). 
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views. 'Today personality as a whole is seen as the basis for understanding the parts. 
The whole person registers itself in particular behaviors ... The sciences still allow for a 
weak sense of duality, i.e., a distinction between biological and material events, but not 
for dualism, in the sense of two separate substances. ' 30 
To come to terms with this inner-personal dialectic of matter and mind and the 
problem of unity in diversity modem concepts of the self appear to be helpful. That a 
human person can understand himself is due to the fact that he is able to relate to 
himself. In virtue of that fact it is necessary to distinguish between self and ego. But this 
distinction has to be perceived under the principle of inseparable interrelatedness. A 
person is able to relate to himself and his surrounding world precisely through the 
relatedness of the ego and the self. Through this relation a person is able to act, think 
and know, and therefore is. Pannenberg tries to describe this dialectic as follows: 
Personality is then defined as the presence of the self in the ego. When this viewpoint is 
adopted, it is possible to surmount the oppositions between the "absolute" concept of 
person, which is limited to the individual that exists for itself, and the "rational" concept, 
which looks rather to the conditioning of the ego by the Thou and by society. The 
premise here is the idea of the self, which, on the one hand, is mediated through the 
dialogically structured social sphere and therefore shows itself to be constituted by the 
symbiotic exocentricity of the individual, and with which, on the other hand, the ego 
knows itself to be identical in the for-itself of its self-consciousness.31 
This statement, dealing with a reasonable distinction between the notion of the ego and 
the self and its interrelationship and interdependency, provides a good example of the 
importance of the concept of relationality and the integration of otherness into the 
understanding of human personhood. Symbiotic exocentricity (symbiotische 
Exzentrizitiit) of the self is a suitable term to depict precisely such an indispensable 
togetherness of the Thou and the "outer" world with the ego in its for-itself 
(Fiirsichsein). While ego signifies a person's irreducible essence of "for-itself' which 
nobody can ever share, the self signifies simultaneously this person's essential 
interwoven-ness with its outer world without which there would be no egocentric "for-
itself' at all. This concept of the self allows for a balance between determinism and 
freedom and also between particularity or uniqueness and otherness. Consequently, 
'[i]nstead of autonomous subjects that stand over against the natural world and other 
subjects, today human self-consciousness is understood as always and already 
30 Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology, 180. 
31 Anthropology in Theological Perspective (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1985), 236-7. 
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embedded in relations between self, other and world. ' 32 This leads to the conclusion that 
a concept of personhood must include the notion of otherness, which integrates the 
other and the environment as a necessary condition for developing self-consciousness. 
To be whole and to be a human person in the sense of finding oneself and being oneself 
then can be described as a becoming oneself through meeting otherness. This becoming 
oneself expresses the organisation of persons' self-systems through continuous 
connection and interrelationship with their consciousnesses, which displays the 
interrelating factors of biophysiological, sociocultural and psychological aspects. 
' [S]elf-systems are differentially aware and sensitive not only to their own subjective 
experiences but to the environment and to others. Consciousness is not a static 
structure.'33 This openness and interconnectiveness of the human consciousness 
underlines the aspect of wholeness through otherness. However, this also points to a 
major aporia. Otherness would not be otherness if it is reduced to the sameness of what 
subjects know due to their Fiirsichsein. A tension remains which cannot be resolved. 
At this point an important implication can be drawn in connection with the 
experience of fear. Because otherness always lingers in human beings' consciousnesses 
as a part of their self-system it continuously challenges persons and thus can be seen as 
a major factor for the experience of fear. The tension between sameness and otherness, 
or in Pannenberg's words between egocentricity and exocentricity, has to be kept in a 
healthy balance, otherwise one will fearfully fall off to one or the other side of the 
divide, leading to a distorted or diminished realization of human life. When Fritz 
Riemann in his depth-psychological analysis describes fear as something that 
accompanies us from birth to death and that fear signifies a basic condition of human 
life, this then supports the present argument.34 According to Riemann the human self 
finds itself placed in-between four demands, 1. th.e demand for uniqueness and self-love 
(individuation), 11. the demand for opening oneself to the world and the other (altruism), 
Ill. the demand for duration (safety and security), and IV. the demand for development 
(change).35 While 1. and 111. depict the importance of sameness within the self-system in 
order to maintain one's own particularity and the duration of a particular condition 
(Filrsichsein), 11. and IV. emphasise the indispensability of otherness in order to avoid 
" Sh11hs, Reforming Theological Anthropology, 31. Cf. Robert Jenson, Systematic Theology, Volume 2 
{Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 63-8. 
,, Boghosian Arden, Science. Theology and Consciousness, 35. 
-" Gnmdformen der Angst. Eine llefenpsycho/ogische Srudie (MUnchen·Basel: B. Reinhardt Verlag, 
1994). 
" Ibid., 13-5. 
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isolation and bondage and a finality that contradicts the openness and incompleteness of 
the human condition (Exzentrizitiit). In view of this Riemann depicts four basic forms of 
fear which exhibit the human condition from a depth-psychological perspective: the fear 
of giving oneself, the fear of becoming oneself, the fear of change, and the fear of 
necessity and fmality. 36 This then reflects not only in a profound way the relational 
structure of the human self-system which revolves around the poles of sameness and 
otherness, but also provides an explanation for the experiences of fear within human 
beings' struggles for successful relationships as encountered in the previous part of this 
chapter. 
3.3.3 Time and consciousness 
To expand the argument a little further I now want to connect the reflections with some 
considerations on time as another condition for being human. As conscious beings 
human beings perceive themselves and their environment always in correlation with 
time. Time as a continuous process, as something that makes it possible to distinguish 
between past, present, and future, is a necessary condition for human consciousnesses 
and self-systems to be operative. It is due to the factor of time that human beings are 
able to perceive themselves as being born, being young or old. This function of time, 
which enables human beings to experience that they are not static but dynamic and 
alive, that they develop, change, are happy, suffer and die, is one of the main factors 
through which they are able to relate to the world and to themselves as described earlier. 
Time is necessary for human self-understanding and consequently is constitutive for 
being a person. 37 
However, the notion of time also reveals an ambiguity. It is the contradiction of 
subjective human experience, on the one hand, to perceive oneself as a unity and 
36 Ibid., 15. 
37 In employing the concept of time as distinct from space I disagree with the stasis theory of time. This 
proposal from modem physics contradicts human experience and relegates the debate about human 
consciousness, mind, and soul to an inferior place. Time as past, present, and future then is merely a 
psychological phenomenon but ultimately not as real as the actual physical space-like nature of time. This 
is not convincing because modem physics seems to neglect the vital fact that in order to investigate into 
living things one has to take part in life. A stasis theory of time as an interpretation of the special theory 
of relativity (presupposing an objective view from the outside of life lllld h~~ty) i!JlP9~~d OIJ hllg:tan 
, _. _ ·- _ · ",j:' e·: . · '\\--~·-';··~ -._. ,.-. -' • ;. "-"<'> = --.,...;. · · .'• <¥' ,, • ...,~~.·--~-, - • -~ -~·~ • ·>- • ,_,,. """'_, ~- ,-.- '!'~.~-• - • 
life as it is lived ana experienced 6y self-experiencing subjects of a given reality violates Its own premises 
as an observational science from within this same reality. The stasis theory itself as a conscious construct 
of the mind is also part of a merely psychological phenomenon which denies us access to knowledge that 
reaches beyond human experience. For a brief survey of the time-space problem: Lawrence Osborn, 
'Theology and the New Physics', in C. Southgate (ed.), God, Humanity and the Cosmos, esp. 123-8. Cf. 
below section 3.4.2. 
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simultaneously, on the other, as not being able to perceive oneself as such a unity.38 
Persons perceive themselves as psychic-physic unities, as being distinguished from 
others and being able to relate to oneself, move, feel, know and think. Persons seems to 
know themselves but at the same time experience the fact that they do not really know 
themselves. Persons sometimes are alarmed by unexpected self behaviour, by not 
knowing their own future or by the experience of dependence or being influenced by 
others which seems to contradict the assumption that the self-system always is itself, 
possesses itself. 
This ambivalent experience can be made intelligible from the perspective of time. 
Although the presence, the here and now, is the most certain of time because it always 
is, it is at the same time always gone. Presence can never be grasped, it simply is, but it 
is never a being there in a way that I have it. 39 But precisely because of this condition of 
time human beings are able to look at themselves and at their world. Because the 'being 
there' of their presence always already has slipped out of their hands, they can relate to 
themselves, conceive themselves, and thus learn, develop, act and react. The 
consequence is that to be consciously under the circumstances of time means to always 
be in relation with one 's past and therefore not be able to perceive oneself as complete 
and whole in the presence of the being there. This leaves the presence of the being there 
open, it cannot be grasped by consciousness.40 The self-system as it is studied in the 
human sciences, therefore, opens up space for transcendence and the beyond being.41 As 
a human being, as long as I shall live, I am always "on the move". The notion of time, 
therefore, appears to be intrinsically transcendent. An understanding of the fullness of 
human reality and of the meaning of human existence cannot easily be detached from 
this beyond structure and an appropriate notion of transcendence. 42 
38 Walter Schulz, 'Differente Bestimmungen der Subjektivitlit in der Tradition', in Prlifendes Denken. 
Essays zur Wiederbelebung der Philosophie (TUbingen: Klopfer und Meyer, 2002), 109. 
39 Ibid., 97-113. 
4
° For a similar point, below section 3.4.3. 
41 Thus one is not surprised that precisely this philosophical aspect of time is omitted by reductionists 
(e.g. Peter Atkins and John Boghosian Arden) in their search for unity as mentioned above. 
42 It is interesting to realize how Arden confuses two levels of discourse. He explains the development of 
human consciousness as the result of the evolutionary process, which makes good sense as long as he 
remains on the conceptual level of physics or the interconnection of mind and matter from a 
psychological viewpoint. But then suddenly he comes up with concepts of meaning and introduces ethical 
terms depicting spirituality as the energetic unity between individuals and biosphere, which represent love 
and compassion for the other. Consequently" love ·and 'compassiorf are not only the 'outc"'cllne of the 
evolutionary process but also are more important and show higher organized levels of consciousness than 
other notions. It is bewildering that suddenly the processes of change within the evolutionary process 
(leap into higher states of organizations of matter and fields of information) take on meaning, are loving, 
caring, compassionate or selfish. At this point one can observe how his own biography and western 
christianised values creep into his concept without being introduced and without noticing the confusion of 
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This condition might help us to understand more profoundly that human beings as 
relational beings aspire after meaning and hope and ultimately can find this only when 
they transcend their experience. This is because, as long as they live in the present and 
are consciously concerned with the past, they never wholly possess themselves. From 
this perspective it also becomes intelligible why human beings are existentially and 
ultimately more concerned with questions like "What will the future bring?", "What 
comes after death?" or "How can my life become meaningful and whole?" than they are 
with questions dealing with the past. With the latter, they are concerned in so far as they 
want to gain new insights and knowledge from past problems for the solution of future 
issues. Thus the study of the past and the analysis of already occurred problems are a 
tool for coping with the not-being-able-to possess-oneself, and in such a way live and 
hope for a better future. But precisely because of this exposure to time, every day that 
passes adds new insights, but new insights and knowledge, as much as they help to 
solve some problems, simultaneously add new open questions and unsolved problems. 
Life, therefore, always leads us into new, unfamiliar and unknown experiences. The 
experiences of fear, as observed in the various life stories, then make sense as a 
continuous companion on a journey that is essentially incomplete and open.43 
3.3.4 Summary 
With these reflections on consciousness, self-system and time I have attempted to 
underline and support the case for relationality. Concepts equating subjectivity and 
being or adhering to the positivism of philosophical idealism, which put the I over the 
Thou and assume the autonomous subject, had to be questioned and rejected. It is now 
possible to assert that the emphasis on relationality helps to overcome reductionism, 
which either stresses a one-sided monism (leading to the subordination of consciousness 
to matter or object to subject) or dualism (favouring a strict opposition). In conclusion 
then, these findings move us in the direction of a holistic view of human personhood in 
which the notions of otherness and sameness (inherent in the dialectic of body and soul 
or subject and object) as well as the notions of meaning and the beyond (inherent in the 
dialectic of time and consciousness) are held together- including the notion of fear-
metaphysics and the natural sciences. The question why love should be better than hate or compassion 
better than killing cannot be addressed by the evolutionary process. See esp. chapter 8 in his Science, 
Theology and Consciousness. 
43 Cf. Riemann, Grundformen der Angst, 199-212. See also above section 3.3.2. 
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and only together can they build the ground for an understanding of what it means to be 
human. Out of these reflections on relationality the following preliminary implications 
can be drawn: being human means being on the move, never possessing oneself and as a 
conscious person being inescapably in relation with one's own self, the other and the 
environment. However, looking on the other side of the coin, this being on the move and 
this being in relation is precisely what renders it possible that a human being thinks, 
perceives and knows and therefore is a human person. Hence, to be a conscious person 
entangled in this dialectic and exposed to the aporia of matter and mind, reality and 
possibility, also means to strive for meaning, to be opened up towards a beyond, and in 
this way longing for hope and a fulfilled life. 
3.4 INSIGHTS FROM SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 
In order to reach a point from where I will be able to make a strong case for some 
essential and hence universal characteristics of what it means to be human, the rather 
broad picture of the first two parts has to be tested and conveyed against the scrutinizing 
gaze of some profound, subtle and comprehensive concepts of scientific research. What 
I propose to do now is to engage in a conversation with psychological, biological and 
philosophical research in order to secure at least to some extent a comprehensive and 
differentiated conceptualisation. If the findings from the previous two parts reflect some 
truth of what it means to be human then surely a closer look into the physiological-
psychological realm of humanness as well as some phenomenological and metaphysical 
reflections will not completely contradict these findings. Rather they will help to get rid 
of some incidental features and sharpen the focus on what really matters. 
To pursue this task I will examine three scientific contributions which are all 
relational from the very outset in attempting to overcome one-sided reductionist 
accounts of the past. The first focuses on Viktor Frankl's concept of Logotherapy. This 
investigation aims at an understanding of personhood from a psychological perspective 
and emphasises the notions of meaning and responsibility in connection with a 
transcendent concept of the human conscience. The second contribution engages with 
Viktor von Weizsacker's medical anthropology. There I shift the focus from psychology 
to biol~gy. Weizsack~r's resear~h e~ami11e;;. the l,lllity of movement and .. perception in 
each biological act which displays a paradigm for the inseparability of matter and mind 
and thus contributes a strong case against any reductionist approach. This will lead to 
some crucial insights into the concepts of relationality and otherness in relation to the 
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human experience of crisis and fear. The third contribution then turns to philosophy and 
highlights some features of Emmanuel Levinas' thought. My intention will be to exhibit 
Levinas' distinctive understanding of the "beyond being" that provides some substantial 
arguments for the importance of the concepts of transcendence, otherness and 
responsiveness. 
3.4.1 Frankl: Meaning and responsibility 
3.4.1.1 The will to meaning 
Viktor E. Frankl, the founder of Logotherapy, the "Dritten Wiener Richtung der 
Psychoanalyse," intends to re-humanize anthropological research by surmounting an 
absolute determinism, insisting on the assumption that the human dimension goes 
beyond the biological and psychological dimension. Therefore Logotherapy and its 
underlying perception of humanness display an important contribution toward the 
search for an appropriate concept of what it means to be human. It is amazing that this 
concept has been ignored in theological anthropology and never really taken into 
consideration. Contemporary practical theologians concerned with pastoral care have 
rightly lamented this fact and are re-discovering the significance of this concept. W. 
Kurz argues that Frankl's Logotherapy is a happy discovery for practical theology and 
especially for the theory of pastoral care because theology has an immediate affinity to 
the category which is at the centre ofLogotherapy: meaning.44 
Frankl aims at the overcoming of the one-sidedness of both traditional 
psychoanalysis and behaviourism, as both advocate a form of reductionism. While 
psychoanalysis, as represented in the Freudian schools, sees a human mainly as 'a being 
whose basic concern is to satisfy drives and gratify instincts,' behaviourism understands 
the human reality 'merely as the outcome of conditioning process or conditioned 
reflex. ' 45 Of course there is no doubt about the importance of each school within their 
own dimension, but for an appropriate description of what it means to be human, 
without neglecting the essential dialectic of body and mind, one has to go beyond these 
44 W. Kurz, in Holger Eschmann, Theologie der See/sorge. Grundlagen, Konkretionen, Perspektiven 
(Neukirchen-VIuyn: Neukirchener, 2000), 113. 
45 Viktor Frankl, The Unheard Cry for Meaning: Psychotherapy and Humanism (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1979), 17. Hereafter: [Unheard Cry]. 
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concepts, beyond the assumption of detenninism.46 Otherwise the human person is 
being deprived ofhis humanness.47 One of Frankl's favourite stories, which I would like 
to quote here in full, illuminates this concern. 
In a favorite story of mine, a rabbi was consulted by two parishioners. One contended that 
the other's cat had stolen and eaten five pounds of butter, which the other denied. "Bring 
me the cat," the rabbi ordered. They brought him the cat. ''Now bring me scales." They 
brought him scales. "How many pounds of butter did you say the cat has eaten?" he 
asked. "Five pounds, rabbi," was the answer. Thereupon the rabbi put the cat on the 
scales and it weighed exactly five pounds. ''Now I have the butter," the rabbi said, "but 
where is the cat?" This is what happens when eventually the reductionists rediscover in 
man all the conditioned reflexes, conditioning processes, innate releasing mechanism and 
whatever else they have been seeking. ''Now we have it," they say, like the rabbi, "but 
where is man?'"'8 
For Frankl reductionism is the nihilism of today because it treats a human being mainly 
as a thing among others and does not leave enough space for meaning, freedom and 
responsibility, which are, according to Frankl's own experience and research, main 
characteristics of human personhood. He is compelled to move beyond determinism not 
mainly out of philosophical reflections but because of his therapeutic experience and the 
integration of his own personal life experiences and his deep concern for dignified 
human life despite all suffering. "The will to meaning", which becomes one of his basic 
notions, forces itself onto him.49 One major and very credible prop of his argument is 
the experience of the unheard cry for meaning, which is initially based on his own 
encounter with suffering and death. 
Nobody needs to remind me of the fact of human determinism- after all I am a specialist 
of neurology and psychiatry and as such I know all about the human bio-psychological 
46 Frankl is clear about the fact that human beings are determined to a large degree by their biological, 
psychological and sociological conditions. They are not free from these conditions, hence they are not 
free from but they are free towards something. Human beings are free to take a stand and to respond to 
these conditions: Frankl, A.'rztliche Seelsorge. Grundlagen der Logotherapie und Existenzanalyse (Wien: 
Deuticke, 2005), 51. 
47 Frankl quotes the American sociologist W.I. Thompson: 'Humans are not objects that exist as chairs or 
tables; they live, and if they find that their lives are reduced to the mere existence of chairs and tables, 
they commit suicide': A.'rztliche Seelsorge, 48. 
48 Unheard Cry, 56. 
49 Most convincing is Frankl's own documentation of life in the concentration camps, in which he 
attempts to describe and then psychologically analyse the different phases of camp life the inmates had to 
go through. He fmishes his phenomenological documentation as follows: 'Life in concentration camps 
undoubtedly opened up a view into an abyss of extreme depth of the human nature. Should it surprise us 
that in these depths again we find mere humanness? Humanness as that what it is - a blend of good and 
evil! The schism, which penetrates all humaneness and separates between good and evil, reaches to the 
depths of the depths and is even disclosed at the ground of this abyss, which the concentration camp 
exnibits: We may 'have had· the"oppoffiffiit)'t<i'Becom"i:~·~accjuiiilrted with-the human being m a wa)7 tb.atno 
other generation had before us. What is a human being? He is the being [Wesen] that always decides what 
it is. He is the being that invented the gas chamber, but at the same time he is the being that went into the 
gas chamber with heads held high and a prayer on the lips': ... trotzdem Ja zum Leben sagen. Ein 
Psychologe erlebt das Konzentrationslager (Mtlnchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2000), 139. [My 
translation.] 
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conditionedness. However I am not only a specialist of two disciplines but also a survivor 
of four camps, concentration camps, and therefore I know about the freedom of human 
beings who are capable of reaching beyond their conditions and are able to face worst 
conditions and situations and to battle against them by virtue of- what I am used to call -
the defiant power of the Spirit [die Trotzmacht des Geistes].50 
lbroughout his work as a doctor and a psychotherapist Frankl observed that human 
persons ultimately do not strive after material happiness, power, or sex but after a 
meaningful existence, after a meaningful life. 51 This search for meaning gains 
importance beyond the determining factors of life (the biological and psychological 
dimension), indicating 'a distinctive characteristic of being human. ' 52 Frankl calls this 
characteristic ''the will to meaning" and describes it not only as a true manifestation of 
man's humanness, but also as a reliable criterion of mental health. 53 It safeguards the 
conviction that to be human is more than being a product of genetic givenness and the 
amalgamation of drives and conditioning processes. This will to meaning has "survival 
value" and is always a pointer to self-transcendence, which means 'the primordial 
anthropological fact that being human is being always directed, and pointing, to 
something or someone else other than oneself: to a meaning to fulfil or another human 
being to encounter, a cause to serve or a person to love. ' 54 
3.4.1.2 From meaning to responsibility 
In v1ew of this Frankl translates "Logos" as meaning and defines logotherapy as 
''therapy through meaning", which is somewhat different from the traditional 
understanding of psychotherapy as "meaning through therapy". Human Being 
(menschliches Sein), Frankl argues, always transcends itself and points to meaning. 
Because life is meaningful every single person is related in his or her particular situation 
to his or her special meaning. At this point it is important to note that Frankl 
distinguishes between two levels of meaning. First, there is a concrete meaning of a 
concrete situation in life which a human person can perceive and realize. Second, there 
is the transcending significance of meaning, which Frankl calls the "super-meaning" 
( Obersinn ), a notion that is based on the concept of conscience, which will be explained 
50 .. Arztliche See/sorge. 51. [My translation.] 
51 Elisabeth Lukas, Rendevoia mit dem Leben. Eriitutig.ungenftir die Zukunft (Milnchen: K6sei-Verlag, 
2000}, 7. Cf. Frankl's interesting observation that due to life conditions and under-nourishment in the 
concentration camps the sexual urge was absent: ... trotzdem Ja zum Leben sagen, 57-8. 
52 Unheard Cry, 29. 
53 Ibid., 34. 
54 Ibid., 35. 
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later on. With this latter notion he emphasises that there is a meaning that transcends 
every human understanding, a meaning that lies beyond human knowability. It is 
precisely the existence of this Obersinn which makes it possible that concrete meaning 
can be found in all circumstances, even in suffering. Frankl finds confirmation for this 
assumption by looking at extreme experiences of suffering where we are no longer able 
to alter a situation but where we are still capable of finding meaning and are challenged 
to change ourselves. 
It is true that if there was anything to uphold man in such an extreme situation as 
Auschwitz and Dachau, it was the awareness that life has a meaning to be fulfilled, albeit 
in the future. But meaning and purpose were only a necessary condition of survival, not a 
sufficient condition. Millions had to die in spite of their vision of meaning and purpose. 
Their belief could not save their lives, but it did enable them to meet death with heads 
held high .... Uncounted examples of such heroism and martyrdom bear witness to the 
uniquely human potential to find, and fulfil, meaning even 'in extremis ' and 'in ultimis ' -
in an extreme life situation such as Auschwitz and even in the face of one's death in a gas 
chamber. May from unimaginable suffering spring forth a growing awareness of life's 
unconditional meaningfulness. 55 
To support his argument Frankl draws attention to the fact that, studying reasons for 
suicide, it does not matter whether a person is poor or rich, in a state of basic survival or 
in a situation of socio-economic abundance. If there is no meaning, persons are inclined 
to take their lives independently of their well-being. 
It had been overlooked or forgotten that if a person has found the meaning sought for, he 
is prepared to suffer, to offer sacrifices, even, if need be, to give his life for the sake of it. 
Contrariwise, ifthere is no meaning he is inclined to take his life, and he is prepared to do 
so even if all his needs, to all appearances, have been satisfied. 56 
A survey of suicide attempts in the midst of welfare states highlights exactly this 
correlation. Even in situations where the socio-economic conditions are satisfying and 
the struggle for survival has disappeared, a new struggle emerges, which one could 
express with the question: Survival for what?57 
These observations result in the conviction that each situation in life is unique 
with a unique meaning. To avoid any misconception, this concept of meaning has 
nothing to do with the notions of fate, destiny or a belief in a divine determined plan. 
Rather it indicates the possibility of a human being to find and attribute a concrete 
35 Ibid., 34-5. 
56 Ibid~. 20. 
57 Frankl vigorously attempts to unmask the dangers of nihilism and reductionism. Two statements are 
very illuminating: 'Nihilism unmasks itself not by talking about nothingness but rather by its phrase 
"nothing than".' 'Reductionism I could define as a pseudoscientific procedure by which specific human 
phenomena are reduced to sub-human phenomena or deduced from them. In this way reductionism could 
be defmed as sub-humanism': A"rztliche See/sorge, 47. [My translation.] 
135 
meaning to a particular situation in life. For Frankl, life is never lacking a meaning and 
to this meaning, which is always open and never determined in advance, a human being 
can respond, make his own choice and confront this situation with a unique response. 
However, this in tum is only a real possibility if there is a beyond the mere facts of 
biological and psychological determinism. Therefore, Frankl speaks of "freedom in 
spite of determinism" and leaves the concept of the human being open. One must not 
conceive of it as a closed system. Otherwise, again, one would be left alone with causes 
and effects represented by conditioned reflexes and drives and instincts. This view is 
strongly supported by Frankl's professional encounter with criminals, who, 'at least 
once the judgement has been past, do not wish to be regarded as mere victims of 
psychodynamic mechanisms or conditioning process .... To explain his guilt away by 
looking at him as the victim of circumstances also means taking away his human 
dignity. I would say that it is a prerogative of man to become guilty. To be sure, it also 
is his responsibility to overcome guilt. ' 58 If this freedom in spite of determinism is 
denied, being is reduced to a thing and being human is de-humanized. Frankl 
summarizes his findings as follows: 
We departed from determinism as a limitation of freedom and have arrived at humanism 
as an expansion of freedom. Freedom is part of the story and half of the truth. Being free 
is but the negative aspect of the whole phenomenon whose positive aspect is being 
responsible. Freedom may degenerate into mere arbitrariness unless it is lived in terms of 
responsibleness. 59 
The relatedness of every human being to meaning makes their responses real responses 
- in spite of many acts and attitudes which can be explained by drives or conditioned 
processes - and thus responsibility a genuine characteristic of being human. The 
following graph by Elisabeth Lukas60 illustrates some basic features and shows how it is 
a vital characteristic of human beings to respond to meaning in every concrete life 
situation. 
58 Unheard Cry, 51. 
59 Ibid., 60. 
60 Rendevouz mit dem Leben, 13. [My translation.] 
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Graph 5: Logotherapy 's concept of meaning 
3.4.1.3 Conscience and self-distance 
possibilities 
of meaning 
in the future 
The will to meaning and the characteristic of responsibleness are further developed and 
explored within the concept of conscience representing the spiritual dimension of 
human beings through which they are capable of self-distance and self-transcendence.61 
The freedom of human will consists of' being free from driven by an Id' and 'being free 
to be responsible ' and thus having a conscience. 62 The experience of conscience where 
people are facing their faculty of self-distance and self-relation as a place within 
themselves, being able to argue and judge themselves, can be understood as the 
possibility of being responsible. But human conscience can only be such a possibility if 
it is the place where human beings transcend their I and thus perceive their existence 
from outside themselves. Therefore the dialogue that is proceeding within a human 
conscience about one's self-understanding has to be a real dialogue and not just talk 
with oneself. If the concept of human conscience were not an open concept, then all 
distinctions between ego and self or between I and Id would ultimately be a non-
distinction. Frankl claims that the concept of conscience is only intelligible as a 
transcending concept and that we have to perceive the human being from his 
61 Eschmann, Theologie der See/sorge, 96. 
62 Frankl, Der unbewu]Jte Gott. Psychotherapie und Religion (MOnchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 
1988), 39. 
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creatureliness and his relation to a meaningful transcendence. 63 This leads him to the 
revision of the distinction between body and psyche by adding a spiritual dimension. Up 
to his time psychoanalysis transformed the traditional notion of the soul into the 
"psyche" as the locus for our drives, instincts, perceptions, memories and so on. But this 
mere substitution of soul with psyche made it impossible to integrate the experience of 
self-transcendence and the notion of freedom as expressions that move beyond 
determinism. For this reason, Frankl supplements and completes the concept with the 
notion of "spirit". The following diagram64 illustrates the amendment which integrates 
the spiritual dimension as a characteristic of being human. 
OLD 
DISTINCTION: 
BODY 
visible, 
material 
(concretion) 
SOUL 
invisible, 
immaterial 
(abstraction) 
transformation I \ supplementation 
through psychology ~hrough logotherapy 
NEW 
DISTINCTION: 
CONSEQUENCE: 
CONSCIENCE & RESPONSIBILITY 
{IN AGREEMENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE) 
PSYCHE 
not free 
(destiny) 
Graph 6: Logotherapy 's distinction between psyche and spirit 
SPIRIT 
free 
(freedom) 
Self-distance 
Self-transcendence 
This concept helps to conceive the notion of responsibility in a way appropriate to 
human experience. For Frankl, the human conscience is the place where the spiritual 
dimension can be experienced. It functions as a sense organ, or better, as an organ for 
meaning. Human being (mensch/iches Sein) points outside itself, it points to meaning. 
He understands human being profoundly·as'resi>onsible being (Verantwortlichsein) and 
63 Ibid., 40-1. 
64 Adaptation from Lukas, Rendevouz mit dem Leben, 155. 
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thus Logotherapy as an analysis towards being responsible. 65 Every responsibility of 
being there (Daseinsverantwortung) is a responsibility "ad personam" and "ad 
situationem".66 In comparison and as a clear distinction from Freud and his followers he 
emphasizes that what becomes conscious within Logotherapy is not an "Id" or a 
"drive", but my I. In other words, the ego faces itself and becomes conscious of itself; it 
finds the way back and finds itself.67 Frankl does not at all deny either the factors that 
limit our freedom or the embeddedness of a human person in a special situation, which 
determines the ego to a certain degree in a particular way. But despite all determinism, 
in which a person is always tangled up, the ego remains responsible. Through the 
transcending concept of conscience and the existence of ultimate meaning (at the level 
of Vbersinn) human persons are capable of finding concrete meaning for their own lives 
and as a result are also responsible for it. This responsiveness to meaning manifests 
itself on three levels of experience. 
In this context Frankl speaks about different values. Three categories of values 
can be distinguished which show that human beings are capable of both fmding 
meaning in every life situation and responding to it. There are creative values 
(schopferische Werle), experiential values (Erlebniswerte), and attitude or belief values 
(Einstellungswerte ). While creative values display the possibility of finding meaning in 
work and creative action and experiential values point to the fact that meaning and 
fulfilment can be found in the .beauty of the natural world, in social interactions, or in 
the arts, values of attitude point to the vital insight that human beings even in utter 
despair and where they cannot change their destiny are still capable of responding to 
such a situation by taking up a certain attitude or belief. 68 If all three levels are kept 
together, then human life, Frankl concludes, 'can never become meaningless: the life of 
human beings maintain their meaning even "in ultimis" - therefore as long as they 
breathe, as long as they are conscious, they remain responsible in the light of these 
values - even if they are only values of attitude or belief. ' 69 
Frankl's concept of conscience supports the experience that human persons are to 
a certain degree always free due to their capacity for self-distance and thus are able to 
engage in a proper dialogue with life and its meaning. To express this trait of being 
65 Der unbewujJte Gott, 12. 
66 1bid., 13. 
67 Ibid., 14. 
68 For example attitudes like bravery in situations of suffering or dignity and self-respect in situations of 
failure, destruction or death. 
69 Jirzt/iche See/sorge, 93. [My translation.] 
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human Frankl also sometimes speaks of the unconscious God, which he circumscribes 
as an existent transcendent meaning for every person. Human persons are not totally 
determined either by their genes or by their biographies but remain free and thus can 
find meaning in their lives. They are responsible and always capable of starting anew 
and being open for changes. 70 The notions of meaning and responsibility orient the 
human person toward an always open future, toward hope. Persons are not only what 
they have become through their past but they are also what they still can become. 
In conclusion then, according to Frankl and the contemporary representatives of 
Logotherapy,71 true humanness transcends the biological and psychological dimensions. 
This is based on the experience of the will to meaning which indicates the possibility of 
responding to life in each new situation. Three constitutive characteristics, therefore, 
form an inseparable unity, meaning, responsibility, and transcendence. The balance 
between them must be maintained. As a consequence human relationality has to be 
conceived of as the relation and interdependency between biological and psychological 
facts and the beyond. Otherwise every concept of being human would ultimately lead to 
absolute determinism which is a form of nihilism, negating the basic experience that life 
'is a life-long question-and-answer period' and that '[r]esponding to life means being 
responsible for our lives.' 72 
3.4.2 Weizsicker: The theory of Gestaltkreis 
3.4.2.1 The significance of the subject 
'To inquire into living things one has to take part in life. Physics is only objective, the 
biologist is also subjective. Dead things are alien to each other, living beings are, even 
in hostility, social.'73 With this statement one can already breathe Viktor von 
Weizsacker's conviction that the human sciences are rooted in life and cannot abstract 
from it. Weizsacker's whole attention as a medical doctor and a psychotherapist in the 
70 Eschmann, Theo/ogie der Seelsorge, II4. 
71 Frankl comments that since his concept was introduced in I949, 'it has been empirically corroborated 
and validated by several authors, using tests and statistics. The Purpose-in-Life (PIL) Test devised by 
J~Tl!~J ~' C:IUJlll!~ugll an~I J.e.of1a.rd T.)v1aholik, and Elisabeth S. Lukas's Logo-Test have been 
...,, . ·-~·-- ... .-... ,., o='->·-·""1""'-' -·-· - ,, ..-.;><1.·. -" > , • --~ ._,_,_ ·~~..,r. ,. ·'-f.Jl;.--·:1>..· :--· ·• 7 •"'"-r---.-"' .,._ --~..r-,- v< -•·,·. •. · ... -t,.··- -•: _ -.'-
administered to thousands of subjects, and the computeriZed data leave no doubt tliaftlie will to meaning 
is real': Unheard Cry, 31. 
72 Unheard Cry, II 0. 
73 Viktor v. Weizsllcker, Der Gestaltkreis. Theorie der Einheit von Wahrnehmen und Bewegen, 
Gesammelte Schriften 4 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, I997), 295. Hereafter: [Gestaltkreis]. All 
following English quotations in this section from German sources are my own translation. 
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middle of the twentieth century was drawn to the concept of person in order to explore 
the development of illnesses and malfunctions of human persons that led him to the 
profound biological concept of GESTALTKREIS.74 It is his conviction that unless we 
integrate the notion of the subject into our scientific research the concept of being 
human will be one-sided and out of balance. There is no subject-independent 
objectivism in natural processes. The scientist and observer is always a co-player in the 
complex process of discerning and understanding natural phenomena. 75 It has to be 
taken into consideration that all human acts as biological acts are unities of perception 
and movement, disclosing a deep psycho-physical dynamic. Interested in medical 
anthropology, Weizsacker integrates the notion ofthe subject into biology and links the 
psychological moment of being human with the physical moment of his anatomical-
physiological research. Illnesses, for instance, cannot merely be seen as somatic or 
psychological malfunctions presupposing the Cartesian distinction between res cogitans 
and res extensa due to which the human being is divided into two objective realms soul 
and body. Illnesses are meaningful events and therefore are always also expressions of 
biographical crises.76 In other words, the strength of Weizsacker's work is that his 
research includes vast numbers of physical, physiological, and psychological 
experiments and studies which are brought into correlation with his experience and 
encounter with patients as a medical doctor. This leads him to the notion of encounter 
(Begegnung, Umgang) as the basic category for understanding every biological act. 
Thus his theory ofGESTALTKREIS unites biological, medical and philosophical questions 
and thus is a very profound contribution towards an understanding of what it means to 
be human. 
3.4.2.2 The biological act: perception and movement 
To be a living being, from a biological perspective, means to move and perceive at the 
same time in every moment of life. We cannot do anything without feeling and 
74 There is no exact translation for the notion ofGESTALTKREIS. As a guideline I suggest 'circle of form, 
appearance and shape'. 
7 Cf. Walter Schindler, 'Anthropologische Medizin - heute? Anmerkungen zur unzeitgemlillen Aktualit!it 
Viktor von Weizsllckers', in Zur AktualiUit Viktor von Weizsiickers (hereafter: [ZA VW]), Beitrage zur 
Medizinischen Anthropologie, Band 1 (WUrzburg: Verlag KOnigshausen & Neum!lJl, 2003), 19-3?. 
Schindler also refers to Weizsllcker's indebtedriess to Niels Bohr'nnterpretation ofQuaniU:ffi theory: 'liD 
Bereich atomarer Prozesse zeigt sich, daB die Ortsmessung eines Teilchens nicht zugleich eine scharfe 
Impulsmessung erlaubt. Wenn also exklusiv gilt, daB entweder eine genaue Orts- oder ein scharfe 
Impulsmessung m6glich ist, dann ist die Objektbestirnmung, also die Objektivitllt der Beobachtung, von 
der Wahl des experirnentierenden Beobachters abhangig' (p.25). 
76 Schindler, • Anthropologische Medizin- heute?', ZA VW, 21-4. 
141 
perce1vmg and we cannot feel and perceive without carrymg out a motorial act. 
Whatever we do, even if we 'do nothing', we are moving because, from a physiological 
perspective, movement (Bewegung) is taking place ~ we are employing muscles or other 
organs: a physical performance is being realized. At the same time movement is 
inseparably linked with perception (Wahrnehmung), which cannot merely be described 
as a function of the sense organs but is also a function of our mind transcending a purely 
physical explanation. Whatever we do, see, or observe - and even if we are blind or 
deaf, our senses "see and feel" - we perceive ourselves and our environment with our 
mind, which displays the psychological moment of being human. In opposition to a 
purely physical and physiological approach to the biological act, Weizsacker shows that 
perception and movement are inseparably connected with each other. The biological 
dynamic cannot be properly explained with the theories of physical forces, 
physiological stimuli or impulses and psychological drives, which ground on the law of 
cause and effect. Rather an explanation of the biological act is in need of a holistic view, 
integrating physiological and psychological research, not forgetting that the study of the 
biological act always compels the medical doctor not to deny the subjective aspect of 
every investigation. 
An examination of biological acts, like gomg, standing or seeing, shows that 
human beings are connected with their environment through certain relations which 
become manifest in the two notions of perception and movement. To get a first idea of 
what Weizsacker means, it is helpful to look at one of his examples in which he 
describes the event of a person observing a butterfly.77 When we look at a person who 
observes a butterfly we may assume first of all that the picture of the butterfly glides 
over his retina. It follows a movement of the eyes in the direction the butterfly is taking, 
which is accompanied by movements of the head, the body and maybe by some steps. 
The aim and the success of this manifold employment of the muscles is always the 
same: it enables a continuous image of the butterfly on the retina. The movements (the 
physiological event) enable the observer to perceive psychologically. In virtue of this 
the observer remains in contact with the object. The coherence is only upheld precisely 
under this condition of movement. But at the same time, the psychological perception of 
the butterfly, out of many other options which can be perceived at this moment in the 
environment, forms the necessary condition for -the particular employment of the 
muscles, which was mentioned above. The whole event of seeing the butterfly, is one 
77 Gestaltkreis, 110. 
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act and only made possible through perceiving and moving as a physiological-
psychological dynamic. Perception and movement mutually interpenetrate each other so 
that one can say: 
Through moving I let a
7
rrception appear, or, through perceiving something a movement 
becomes present to me. 
3.4.2.3 Conditions of perception 
Having drawn attention to this interdependence of perception and movement in every 
biological act, I would now like to highlight separately, first, some conditions of human 
perception and, secondly, some of human movement. To start off with the butterfly 
example can help because it emphasises that human perception, which is always a 
perception of something particular, does not take place in a laboratory but within the 
environment. The person who observed the butterfly could also have chosen something 
else to look at or pay attention to. But she limits herselfto seeing the butterfly, which in 
turn determines her movement. This entails two consequences. First, it means that it is 
vital for a specific perception to take place that persons place themselves within the 
environment at a particular moment and focus on a particular object. Second, it follows 
that the concrete perception depends precisely on this placing oneself within the 
environment. 79 This can be easily shown by referring to two trains that stop at a station 
on neighbouring tracks. Sitting in one of the trains it is possible to perceive one's own 
or the other train starting to move depending on one's present inner order or perception 
of objects. The perception of the environment (trains, compartment, assessment of time, 
etc.) and how I relate to them and which particularities I contemplate, determine which 
of the trains I see moving. 
At this point Weizsacker makes a distinction between the physical-mathematical 
and the biological integration of space and time. While the former has a constant and 
unmoveable reference system of space within time, the latter is always changing. 
Physics tries to integrate everything in a firm system and look at things from the 
outside, treating them as mere objects. 80 But biological integration is only possible for a 
78 Weizsacker, quoted in Wyss, Die tiefenpsychologischen Schulen von den Anfangen bis zur Gegenwart, 
306: 'lndem ich mich bewege, ~tasse ich eine W8htitehfuiuig erscheinen, · oder, indem ich et\\las 
wahrnehme, wird mir eine Bewegung gegenwartig.' 
79 Gestaltkreis, 112. 
80 At this point Weizsacker is not making statements about relativity-theory and cosmology. His criticism 
is directed against the natural-scientific presuppositions within medicine, i.e., against an assumed 
objectivism and the principle of deterministic causality, which is often even maintained when medicine 
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short period until its reference system alters. The reference system of a biological 
performance of perception is continuously being changed and replaced.81 A subject 
always places itself anew within its environment. A new movement entails another 
perception of the environment (the reference system of space and time) and a new 
perception entails new movements and physiological behaviour in order to adjust to this 
new framework. The correlation between perception and object is not settled or 
arranged a priori. It always has to be reaffirmed in every moment of life. For example, a 
seen square is not necessarily related to a square object; or a square object is not 
automatically seen and perceived as a square. 82 
This leads to a further characteristic, namely the predicative essence of perception. 
Perceiving means that one never sees "ein Ding an sich", but always sees something in 
particular and never the whole. Perception always chooses between objective 
possibilities and thus creates its own limited environment. Regarding this it can be 
maintained that perception is a continuous and repetitive process of perceiving 
particularities. I see a house (in the garden), but then the windows (of the house in the 
garden), then the pane (of the window of the house in the garden), etc. Perception is 
always experiencing so that one can always ask the question: What did I experience? 
And not, what is right or wrong. Human perception always goes on, never stops, 
happens as an event and does not know the firm anchor of physical objects in space and 
time.83 
Closely linked to this observation is the characteristic of what Weizsacker calls 
the Antilogik. To explain this term he employs the following example.84 If one looks 
down the railway tracks the observer will see a convergence although the gauge appears 
at every point the same. The mathematical law of parallelism is abrogated in the act of 
seeing. However, nobody would say that he sees an objective decline of the gauge and 
nobody would deny that he sees a convergence. We see the tracks in relation to us as 
near and distant and the perception of this depth effect includes the impression of 
allows some space for psychological explanations. Weizsllcker argues: 'Wilhrend in der Voraussetzung 
der Physik der Gegenstand auch unabhllngig vom lch existieren wUrde, ist der Gegenstand der Biologie 
tlberhaupt nur denkbar, wenn wir mit ibm ein Handgemenge eingehen; seine unabhllngige Existenz ist 
nicht voraussetzbar': Gestaltkreis, 295. Cf. Schindler, 'Anthropologische Medizin - heute?', ZA VW, 21: 
'Diese Ontologie der klassischen Naturwissenschaft leitet die Medizin auch, insofem sie Seelisches im 
Krankheitsgeschehen· bertlckSichtigt; sie redet daiili· von psychogeiien Krilrikheitefl. Schon die ·oiagnose 
.. psychogene Angina" interpretiert die Krankheit gemlill dem Schema der Kausalitllt.' 
8 Gestaltkreis, 112. 
82 Gestaltkreis, 220. 
83 Gestaltkreis, 202-4. 
84 Gestaltkreis, 227-8. 
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parallelism although the image of convergence is still there. This fact Weizsacker calls 
the Anti/ogik within the act of perception. 85 
Weizsacker concludes that perception is not a subjective final product but has to 
be understood as an act in becoming and a happening encounter (geschehende 
Begegnung) between an I and its environment. 86 Human beings perceive things 
necessarily in a way in which they have to appear under a present condition. Perceptions 
are appearances of real things through real organs. Therefore perceptions cannot be 
understood either as organic or as inorganic but must be seen as a unique encounter 
between the I and the environment, constantly fused and combined with movement. 
This act is a process in which every step is followed by a new one which cannot be 
predicted in advance. 
3.4.2.4 Conditions of movement 
The theory of GESTALTKREIS, which will be explained in the next section, uses the 
notion of 'circle' especially to oppose the classical law of cause and effect, which 
assumes that there is, in physiological terms, first a stimulus which then is followed by 
an effect, for example, the movement of a particular muscle. In this case the reference to 
time and to the one-after-the-other is an important condition for speaking of causality. 
But if one explores the conditions of movement of human beings in correlation with 
space and time, one has to draw different conclusions. Weizsacker employs an everyday 
example. 87 When I cross a busy street while a lorry is coming closer, I determine my 
speed not due to some actual sense-stimuli which reach my eye, but due to the 
anticipation of the lorry which approaches me at a certain speed. The stimulus, which 
has to prevent me from choosing a certain walking speed, would be the anticipated 
collision which is not yet given. The anticipation which determines my walking speed, 
thus, refers to the future and not to the past. This fact Weizsacker calls the anticipation 
of the effect. 
85 W eizsacker1 s choice of the term ,,Antilogik" is not the best: It' must not be confused with"formal logic. 
"Antilogik" in connection with living beings alludes to basic paradoxes in human life, which means in our 
perception there are opposed counterparts (experiences) which both are valid in their affirmation and in 
their negation. 
86 Gestalt/ere is, 219. 
87 Gestaltkreis, 255. 
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A similar observation can be made if circular motions of human beings are 
investigated, 88 for example, the drawing of a circle with a finger in the air. The shape of 
such a circle will be determined by a person's particular anticipation of the circular 
form. Here one is confronted with the correlation between shape and time. What 
biology finds is that similar shapes have to be realized in the same time and this 
similarity cannot be deduced from a mechanic construction of the movement but only 
from an anticipation of the effect in every part of the whole movement. This observation 
exhibits an essential difference between physics and biology. While the construction of 
the rotation of the planets is the result of a constant interrelation of forces, within the 
organic movement the circular shape is the precondition for a particular construction of 
forces in a certain period of time. This entails the important and indispensable insight 
that organic movement is proleptic movement, depending on the anticipation of the 
movement, which in turn is a function of perception. Only the actual execution decides 
the concrete form of the movement. 89 Organic movement, therefore, is not merely a 
succession of cause and effect, but includes a decision.90 
3.4.2.5 Gestaltkreis 
According to these studies Weizsacker's theory of GESTALTKREIS is an attempt to give 
all these observations due stress and to underline human relationality. The symbol of the 
circle stresses mainly three points. First, the unity and inseparable interdependence of 
perception and movement in every single biological act, second, the openness of this 
process - it is the continuous flow of life in which all persons have to find themselves in 
every event anew - and, third, the unity of the I and its environment despite its 
difference. Although every human being stands opposite its environment, it is also part 
of it and only due to an encounter between the I and its environment that perception and 
movement is being realized. In view of this the notion of GESTALTKREIS defmes the 
unity of the subject with its environment, which it creates constantly by moving and 
perceiving.91 
88 Gestaltkreis, 258. 
89 Gestaltkreis, 274. 
90 Gestaltkreis, 264. 
91 Weizsacker, quoted in Wyss, Die tiefenpsychologischen Schulen, 306. 
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To avoid any misunderstanding, Weizsacker is clear about the fact that the image of the 
GESTALTKREIS is not a new scientific methodology. What he wants to highlight is that 
the relation between matter and mind, movement and perception, I and environment is 
not strictly causal and deterministic. The relationship between body and soul or between 
two subjects must not be seen as a connection between two separate entities. It rather 
illuminates the character of mutual representation and substitution.92 Within the realm 
of medical anthropology body and soul cannot simply be presupposed as two basic 
substances. Body and soul are not a tight unity but rather they inseparably live with, 
deal with, and encounter one another.93 This then points to a mutual hiddenness or 
concealment between body and soul (movement and perception) within our scientific 
processes. If one focuses on the somatic dimension, the psychological dimension slides 
into the background and is hidden from the methods of physiological investigation and 
vice versa. In this sense there is a certain kind of methodological indeterminism, which, 
for Weizsacker, is not the abandonment of scientific research and explanation but 
highlights the importance of the human sciences taking seriously the notion of the 
subject. In the GEST AL TKREIS the notion of the subject is therefore inseparably 
connected with the notion of the world. Self-being (Selbstsein) and self-movement 
92 Schindler, 'Anthropologische Medizin- heute?', ZA VW, 26-8. 
93
, Meclithilde"'KUteffieyer·lias' higliligl1ted''llilt'relevance"·of Weizslicker's insights ih relation to the 
phenomenon of pain, which, she argues, shakes every theory of causality. Every pain is psycho-somatic 
and exhibits an amalgamation of nerve sensation and psychological perception leading sometimes to 
paradox phenomena such as the absence of pain despite severe bodily damage or the experience of pain 
where "nothing is wrong" with the patient: 'Arztlicher Umgang mit Schmerzen und Schmerzkranken. 
Schmerz im Rahmen einer subjektiven Neurologie', ZA VW. 55-74. 
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(Selbstbewegung) is a being in togetherness and exists within a context of motion 
between living beings in a common world.94 This dialectic shows, for instance when 
someone is ill, that there are certainly rules (physical and psychological insights and 
theories), which help to recognize states of affairs and to predict certain future 
developments, but that at the same time subsequent moves and countermoves cannot be 
clearly determined in advance.95 
The relevance of this theory can be illuminated by an analogy with a game of 
chess.96 A player of chess is an observer and a theorist. He knows the rules but he 
cannot explain the moves of his opponent by these rules. Rather it is important that he 
presumes and anticipates possible moves and then awaits the execution. Did he know 
the moves, there would not be a game at all. The realization of the game depends 
precisely on compliance with the rules and upon the freedom of the move, that is to say, 
the correlation of supposition and observation and not upon the correlation of cause and 
effect reflecting a particular law. Exactly under the condition of this indefiniteness of 
the opponent's move does a game of chess exist. It is this indefiniteness which is the 
real condition of this event. 
What can be learnt from this analogy? Perception is concrete perception. In the 
event of perceiving an objective possibility is being realized. Organic movement is 
anticipated movement. Only the execution itself decides upon the concretion. In terms 
of the GESTALTKREIS, every act of perceiving and moving is carried out under the 
condition of such productive encounter between an I and its environment.97 This then is 
also the condition for the generation of real events, for the being of concrete and actual 
life.98 
94 Reiner Wiehl summarizes WeizsHcker's notion of subjectivity: 'Subjektivitlit bedeutet nicht nur 
Selbstbeziehung eines lebendigen lndividuums und Selbstbewegung in dieser Selbstbeziehung; auch nicht 
nur Selbstsein und Selbstbewegung in der Beziehung auf anderes und in dem Bewegungszusammenhang 
mit anderem. Subjektivitlit bedeutet Ober dies beides hinaus: Selbstsein und Selbstbewegung im 
Zusammensein und im Bewegungszusammenhang mit anderem in einer gemeinsamen Welt; und 
Verhalten zu dieser Welt im Verbalten zu sich und zu anderen. Hier ist der Subjektbegriff mit dem 
Weltbegriff verbunden': 'Form und Gestalt im ,Gestaltkreis". Zur philosophischen Begriffssprache in 
Viktor von Weizsackers Medizinischer Anthropologie', ZA VW, 171. 
95 Hans Stoffels also refers to the proximity of Weizsacker's Gestaltkreis to UexkOII's notion of 
Situationskreis. 'Eine Situation ist weder durch die Eigenschaften des Subjekts noch durch die objektiven 
Gegebenheiten allein defmiert, sondern nur dadurch, wie gut oder wie schlecht beide zueinander passen 
und sich zu einem raumzeitlichen Gebilde ergllnzen, zu einer belebten BOhne, die Lebens- und 
Oberlebenschancen bietet': 'Situationskreis und Situationstherapie. Oberlegungen zu einem integrativen 
Konzept von Psychothernpie'; ZA VW, 94. · 
96 Gesta/tkreis, 273. 
97 Gesta/tkreis, 274. 
98 For an illuminating discussion of the significance of Weizsllcker's work in relation to modern neuro-
science and brain research: Peter Henningsen, 'Kognitive Neurowissenschaft als "Umgangslehre." Ein 
aktuelles Erklllrungsmodell filr die Medizin?', ZA VW, 103-25. 
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From this perspective the notion of balance emerges and becomes important as a 
term of identity, namely the biological identity of a living being in his environment. The 
notion of biological balance indicates the mutual relation between an organic unity and 
its environment.99 To give an example, one might look at the maintenance of our body 
balance. As long as our perception of the environment and the correlating movement 
and vice versa build a unity, we will keep our body balance. Our biological identity is 
correct and makes sense. But once we lose this unity, for example through a false 
perception of the height of a step or a hole in the street, our movement will 
simultaneously correlate to this perception and we will fall. The biological balance, our 
identity in correlation with the environment, is lost for a tiny moment. 
The consequence of this concept is that the so called object of an investigation or 
experiment is not an object or thing which merely faces the subject but that the object 
itself is a subject which enters into a relation with another subject. The unity of 
perception and movement discloses in the biological act itself, the aspects of freedom 
and determinism, decision and necessity. Life therefore is always original, acts can be 
similar but they are never the same. Life is social because human beings are embedded 
in their environment and the perception and movement of others influence and 
detennine their lives. The theory of GESTALTKREIS thus expresses the fact that every 
biological act, which can be called the basic event of being alive, is not intelligible and 
would not at all be possible without the environment and the other. Weizsacker shows 
that not the I but the We and thus the being in relation (Begegnung - Umgang) is the 
ultimate foundation for human life. Herewith his biological endeavour points into the 
same direction as the philosophical personalism of Buber. 100 However, this being-in-
relation as the ground for our lives is not itself an object of scientific investigation but 
rather points to a transcendent dimension of human life. Being alive and living within 
an inseparable connection and interdependence between both body and soul on the 
individual level and I and environment on the social level corresponds to a basic 
characteristic of being human, namely 'that we are in a dependence with all living 
creatures, whose ground itself cannot become an object of human knowledge.' 101 
99 Gestaltkreis, 290-1. 
100 Wyss, Die tiefenpsychologischen Schulen, 308. 
101 Weizsacker, quoted in Schindler, 'Anthropologische Medizin - heute?', ZA VW, 29. 
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3 .4.2.6 'Antilogisch' and 'pathisch' existence 
Weizsacker's theory of GESTALTKREIS allows him to introduce other notions drawn 
from life-experience in order to form his concept of person. The basic experience 
underlying his concept and the main focus on the subject is from the perspective of the 
human experience of illness as a crisis.102 This approach follows from his emphasis on 
every biological act as crisis, that a living being has to keep up his biological balance 
and find its identity in relation with the environment. Although most of the time this 
does not become a problem for a person, from a biological viewpoint every biological 
act can be seen as an adjustment to new perceptions and movements. To that degree 
human persons always have to find their identity and therefore are exposed to crises. If 
this balance cannot be found for a certain period of time, one can also psychologically 
properly speak of a crisis: a person is divided, cannot be perceived as a unity. But 
persons who are able to endure, struggle through and in the end overcome a crisis, 
facing the questions of meaning and nothingness, existence and non-existence, 
experience a deep change in themselves and gain meaning and life - a new identity is 
found. However, a subject does not entirely possess itself; rather it constantly has to 
acquire itself, has to suffer crises and insofar to re-acquire itself as something always 
new. According to this view a subject consists of the following two moments: i) the 
GESTALTKREIS, which is not understandable without the subject as constituted by the 
unity of movement and perception, and ii) the crisis. Only through the crisis, which 
threatens the identity of the subject and questions all unity and freedom, when endured 
and overcome, the subject remains one and finds itself again and again.103 At this point 
Weizsacker contributes a philosophical notion to the discussion. Over and above the 
notions of space, time, number and causality, he tries to conceive a person within the 
categories of ANTILOGISCH, PATHISCH and UMGANG. The first two are especially novel 
and need attention because with them he deliberately wants to enhance the 
understanding of being human. 
102 For a medical anthropology, which obviously is very suggestive for any theological concept of 
pastoral care, these insights have vital significance for W eizs:tcker overcomes the reductive and false 
dicliotomy betWeen' ··11ealtliy'''and~''ill';. Illiiess''(cir crisis) thenis riof a defect of oeiifg"niiliian(as"if lliete 
is such a thing as a defmable healthy or correct psycho-somatic human condition) but rather a way of 
being human (eine Weise des Menschseins). For some illuminating practical examples from hospital 
experience emphasising the importance of Weizsacker's medical anthropology: Dieter Janz, 
'Anthropologische Erfahrungen in der Klinik', ZAVW, 41-53. 
103 Wyss, Die tiefenpsychologischen Schulen, 310. 
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With the notion of ANTILOGISCH, which he had already used as a characteristic of 
human movement and perception, 104 he now defines the paradox within human life-
experience which no metaphysics can solve. A typical ANTILOGISCH example would be 
that human beings can say that they are becoming and simultaneously that they are 
vanishing. Events like birth and death are ANTILOGISCH events. 105 ANTILOGISCH 
statements within the realm of human experience are not contradictory in a way they are 
within formal logic, but they are paradoxical, they are valid in their affirmation and in 
their negation. With this term Weizsacker not only wants to emphasize that different 
forms and expressions within the realm of "living things" in their general terminological 
descriptions conflict with one another but also that already the ordering of their relation 
to each other exhibits a basic problem.106 Living experience cannot be pressed into the 
corset of unchangeable forms. Living experience always reaches beyond the perception 
of forms. Consequently, statements, experiences, or notions that seem in the first place 
as opposed to each other, can be conceived as belonging together, as ANTILOGISCH 
within the framework of GESTALTKREIS, in which opposed notions or experiences both 
are true, and only together build the unity of human life. 
A further consequence of this approach is the second category, which he calls DAS 
P A THISCHE. Here, Weizsacker argues that it is not ontology or metaphysics that 
determine life but passion because within the framework of GEST AL TKREIS a person is 
basically bound to his situation which always contains the possibility of the 
ANTILOGISCH dynamic. Only in the reality of this dialectic, of joy and despair, of 
happiness and guilt a person experiences life. The notion 'ontic' merely defines pure 
being, i.e., that someone or something just is. But ifthat what is is a unity of movement 
and perception, and if being precisely means finding oneself through crises and the 
constantly flowing process of self-understanding and gaining identity, then the 
ontological category is insufficient. To be alive means to have a PATHISCH existence 
because a living subject is embedded in a context in which it acts and behaves in a 
world relating to the world. Subjectivity, therefore, is always subject to change in direct 
relation to the other and its environment. Subjectivity exhibits always a kind of 
104 Weizsllcker uses also the term "revolving door principle" (Prinzip der Drehtiir), which means that 
movement and perception are related in mutual hiddenness. When I· am concentrating on· my perception 
my movement remains concealed from me and when I am focusing on my movement my perception 
remains concealed from me: Gestaltkreis, 124-5. See also above p.143: 'Through moving I let a 
perception appear, or, through perceiving something a movement becomes present to me.' 
105 Wyss, Die tiefenpsycho/ogischen Schulen, 312. 
106 Reiner Wiehl, 'Form und Gestalt im Gestaltkreis', ZA VW, 184-5. 
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interstitial subjectivity. 101 Human beings are always in the midst ofthe GESTALTKREIS 
which means that they cannot clearly excavate the exact location of their subjectivity 
neither in regard to their organism nor with respect to their living experience as a 
continuing process. 108 The notion ofPATHISCH subjectivity, therefore, describes both the 
in-betweenness of the human condition as crisis (highlighting that a person necessarily 
endures life, joy and suffering, and consequently is) and the openness of this condition 
within the fundamental interplay between determinism and freedom. 
This ANTILOGISCH and PATHISCH existence is constitutive for the GESTALTKREIS. 
If human life is seen in terms of this, then life can never be possessed in its fullness, 
rather it has to be walked through and a person has to be on the move and endure its 
paradoxes and crises. 
The Gestaltkreis is essentially • an instruction for experiencing the living world. One 
cannot possess the Gestaltkreis in its integrity ( ... ), rather one has to move through it and 
suffer its contrasts in a continuous process of losing-sight-of as well as losing-the-effect in 
order to gain something new. This condition can also be depicted in the following way, 
that we must ceaselessly transcend our possession, the presence and lose it in order to 
possess - but we can never totally possess because we always lose. The biological act 
therefore is transcendent. 109 
Here then, similar to Viktor Frankl's notion of meaning, the concept of GESTALTKREIS 
as the framework for human relationality and self-understanding points to a completion 
yet to come. But in this connection what is most vital to notice is that the concept of 
GEST AL TKREIS due to the mutual interpenetration and interdependence of persons with 
persons and of persons with their environment entails decision and hence a concept of 
responsibility, which plays a key role in Weizsacker's relation with his clients. It does 
matter how one decides and how one wills to perceive oneself, the environment and 
their mutual relation. Hence the concept of personhood can be depicted as a concept of 
integrated otherness, because otherness, either as another human person or another 
creature or the natural environment, through the framework of GESTALTKREIS, is 
always, though distinct, a part of myself. Through the constant interaction and ongoing 
interpenetration of my moving and perceiving with the moving and perceiving of the 
107 This phrase is not found in Weizsllcker. It is used in connection with postcolonial thinkers describing 
the modem cultural condition as one of interstitiality, emphasizing that there is no purity to cultural 
identity and that we rather dwell at boundaries. Hence identity and subjectivity are without clear 
boundaries. We are not capable of totally defming what a subject is, where it starts and where it ends. I 
owe this. refer~nce to an unpublished,paper fm: ·the·-AAR 2004:· Michael Nausner, 'Boundary as 
Negotiation.' Cf. Michael Nausner, 'Der geMfuete Raum. Theologische Reflexionen Uber 
zwischenmenschliche Vergebung', Theologieftir die Praxis 31 (2005), I 14-26. 
108 Reiner Wiehl, 'Form und Gestalt im Gesta1tkreis', ZA VW, 191. 
109 Weizsllcker, quoted in Peter Achilles, 'Anthropologische Medizin and humanistische Psychologie', 
ZAVW. 149. 
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other, I am. This integrated otherness reveals and supports the notion of crisis as a 
constitutive trait of being human and helps to explain the vital human experiences of 
longing for wholeness and searching for meaning as states of being in which the I finds 
its identity and hence can be itself. 
Finally, to reach beyond Weizsacker, if this description of the biological act as 
transcendent is correct, then it is directly correlated to the notion of fear as a basic trait 
of the human condition underlined earlier in this chapter. 11° From a psychological 
perspective one could say that fear is a crucial part of human life and lives within the 
GEST AL TKREIS, more precisely, is the sister of the notion of crisis. The psychological 
phenomenon of fear then discloses the state of crises in which human beings find 
themselves in and indicates if they are able to keep up an appropriate balance between 
perception and movement, I and environment within an ANTILOGISCH and PATHISCH 
living experience. 111 When Fritz Riemann describes fear as something that accompanies 
us from birth to death and that fear signifies a basic condition of human life, this can be 
seen to illuminate Weizsacker's notion of crisis from a psychological perspective. 
Riemann's four demands, 112 which exhibit the nourishing-ground of human fear and 
which every human being must learn to hold in balance, mirror Weizsacker's 
ANTILOGISCH and PATHISCH description of the existence of human life. From a 
psychological perspective then, Weizsacker's GESTALTKREIS with its inherent notion of 
crisis finds confirmation in Riemann's conceptualisation of human existence as a kind 
of interstitial identity, placed in-between the four demands for individuation, altruism, 
security, and change. 
3.4.3 Levinas: The-One-for-the-Other 
3.4.3.1 Beyond Heidegger 
The strength of Levinas' philosophical contribution to our modem understanding of 
being and the conception of what it means to be human is his stress on the ethical. 
Philosophy, that is his conviction, begins with the meeting of the other and with 
responsibility. 'It is the other who is first, and there the question of my sovereign 
110 See above sections 3.2.2- 3.2.6 and 3.3.2. 
111 For a discussion of fear with reference to Weizslicker: Hinderik Emrich, 'Die existentielle Situation 
Angst. Herausforderung fllr die Medizinische Anthropologie als integrative Wissenschaft', ZA VW, 75-88. 
112 See above section 3.3.2. Cf. Riemann, Grundformen der Angst, 13-5. 
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consciousness is no longer the first question.' 113 With this emphasis Levinas' thought is 
deeply embedded in relationality and highlights the fact that there is no consciousness 
of the ego without the other who is not the same. There is a structure before all 
questioning, a structure which cannot be deduced from ontology, a structure which 
precedes the thematizing gaze of the ego's I think. He therefore criticises idealism and 
realism, which, in their dialectic method proceeding by question and answer around the 
I think, reduce the other to the same. But for Levinas subjectivity is not a modality of 
essence and cannot be reduced to the known, to the consciousness and to 
intentionality. 114 This is the reason why he had to depart from Husser! and Heidegger, 
his teachers in phenomenology. Before turning to a more detailed elaboration of 
Levinas' thought, it is therefore helpful to recall some main arguments of his discussion 
with Heidegger. 
In Heidegger "to be" is perceived under the aspect of the fact that beings are. 
"The being" (das Seiende) is we ourselves and the being-ness (das Sein) of the being 
(des Seienden) is always mine. Consequently "to be" is the source of mineness 
(Jemeinigkeit). In Sein und Zeit he writes: 
Das Sein, darum es diesem Seienden in seinem Sein geht, ist je meines ... Das Ansprechen 
von Dasein muB gemaB dem Charakter der Jemeinigkeit dieses Seienden stets das 
Personalpronomen mitsagen: "ich bin", "du bist". 115 
Being determined by Jemeinigkeit is an assumption which Levinas has to reject because 
Heidegger's phenomenological studies, despite his profound existential analysis, reduce 
the other to the same. Levinas criticises the fact that Heidegger empties the distinction 
between subject and being of its meaning. 116 As a consequence notions like 
transcendence and the other are deprived of a deeper meaning. Due to the definition 
that being is determined by Jemeinigkeit, these notions are drawn into the intentional 
consciousness of the subject's Dasein, which is always a Being-in-the-world, a Dasein-
with-Others and a Being-towards-the-end. Thus, the character of the encounter with the 
other is determined by the Jemeinigkeit of the Dasein. Although the Being-in-the-world 
of the I is always a Being-with the other, the other does not determine the authenticity, 
the Eigentlichkeit of being, the I's Jemeinigkeit. The Other as manifest in the Being-
113 E. Levinas, Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other (London: The Athlone Press, 1998), 112. 
114 E. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (The Hague: Martinus NijhoffPublishers, 1981), 
17.. . 
11 ~ Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Ttlbingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2001), 42. ET: J. Macquarrie and 
E. Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), 67-8: 'That Being which is an issue for this entity in its 
very Being, is in each case mine ... Because Dasein has in each case mineness (Jemeinigkeit), one must 
always us a personal pronoun when one addresses it: "I am", ''you are".' 
116 Otherwise than Being, 17. 
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with-Others is a mode of Being-in-the-world, but not as an indispensable character or 
mode of the essence of Eigentlichkeit.117 In other words, Heidegger's remarks on the 
other, especially his notion of Fiir-sorge (charitable concern), the "to-be-for-the-other", 
which is well treated in his existential analysis, remains a characteristic of the formal 
structure of the Being-with and not of the Eigent/ichkeit. The other is only important as 
another being whose Dasein is also characterized by his or her Jemeinigkeit. The other 
becomes the same. This is the consequence of subordinating the relations between 
beings to the structures of being. Heidegger's Miteinandersein, although resting on the 
ontological relation, is grounded on the assumption that 'to relate to beings qua beings 
means to let beings be, to understand them as independent of the perception that 
discovers and grasps them.' 118 
It is here that one observes an inconsistency, which Levinas so emphatically 
emphasises. To understand the other being as independent and to let him be in his or her 
Jemeinigkeit presupposes a pre-understanding of the structure of being and assumes that 
what I am and what Eigentlichkeit means can be derived prior to the relation to the other 
being. This is a moment of egoism, where the consciousness of an I identical in its I 
think embraces all otherness and presupposes that there is a presence of the I think to 
the ego. This "being-present" is equivalent with being. 119 Consequently, otherness, the 
other or other things, can be grasped because they are always "zuhanden", they are 
present, leading Heidegger to the conclusion: 'Zuhandenheit ist die ontologisch-
kategoriale Bestimmung von Seiendem, wie es "an sich" ist.' 120 Here, otherness is 
conceived and synchronized in presence with the I think. Due to this temporal modality 
the other or other things appear for the I think as they are and thus represent being's 
essence. Levinas' critique is clear and intelligible. This understanding of alterity 'has 
been taken up by thought of the identical as one's own and, in so doing, of reducing 
one's other to the same. The other becomes the Fs very own in knowledge, which 
secures the marvel of immanence.' 121 
Furthermore, Heidegger's Sein-zum-Tode (Being-towards-the-end), interpreted 
from the perspective of his Being-in-the-world, shapes the thought that '[m]it dem Tod 
steht sich das Dasein selbst in seinem eigensten Seinkonnen bevor ... So sich 
117 Sein und Zeit, 53, 118-25. 
118 Entre Nous, 6. Cf. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 118. 
119 1bid., 160. 
120 Sein und Zeit, 71. 'Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are "in themselves" are 
defined ontologico-categorially': ET, 101. 
121 Entre Nous, 161. 
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bevorstehend sind in ibm alle Beziige zu anderem Dasein gelost.' 122 lbis shows, as 
Levinas argues, '[a]n authenticity of the most proper being-able-to-be and a dissolution 
of all-relations with the other!' 123 Here, it seems clear that Heidegger's concept of 
Eigentlichkeit as the ontological foundation of being is ultimately entirely independent 
of relations to the other. His approach has reduced phenomenology to ontology and 
subordinated metaphysical exploration to ontological absolutes. Thus it is impossible 
for a beyond being to take on meaning. Everything rests on the Dasein as Being-in-the-
world, understood from the perspective of the intentional I think. For Levinas, this 
expresses a neglect of human relationality as a pre-condition for any philosophical 
investigation and a one-sidedness of the understanding of subjectivity which cannot be 
reduced to ontology and to the knowable of human consciousness. 
3.4.3.2 Beyond being 
This short discussion of Levinas' reaction to Heidegger has revealed his concern to go 
beyond reductionism. Levinas' philosophy is concerned with the reality of life as 
always being relational. There is no I without a Thou and thus no philosophy apart from 
this relation. There is no philosophical question without facing the other. The "what?" 
and "who?" can only be uttered because of a structure "before the questioning", which 
means that the possibility of response is already given before any cognitive subjectivity 
is possible.124 To philosophise about being has to take this structure into consideration 
and therefore distinguish between being and subjectivity. Otherwise the known 
expresses the unity of being in the I think. But the experience of relationality, 
representing a structure of being "before the questioning" of any inquiry, entails the 
notion that the concept of being cannot be reduced to ontology conceived by the I think 
or deduced from the I am. Rather this relational structure in which the other is already 
always there signifies a beyond subjectivity, or an otherwise than being. lbis needs 
further consideration. 
To understand being is to exist. 125 lbis short statement emphasises the fact that 
being is a noun and a verb at the same time. It indicates the ambiguity of being, on the 
one hand, its mode of designation as a noun, and on the other, its beyond designation as 
122 Sein und Zeit, 250. 'With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being ... 
When it stands before itself in this way, all its relations to any other Dasein have been undone': ET, 294. 
123 Entre Nous, 214. 
124 Otherwise than Being, 26. 
125 Entre Nous, 3. 
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a verb which goes beyond the said indicating that in the saying being cannot be reduced 
to the said because it has always already slipped away. To inquire after being is only 
possible because we are, and to inquire means to ask the what-question. The 
phenomenological inquiry with its what-question is therefore at the beginning of all 
thought. However this questioning is only possible because of the appearances of being. 
But appearances understood as being's 'modes of being' are embedded in the 
thematizing gaze of the I think, they are always already correlated with a theme, a said. 
This is why appearances already dissimulate being in its very disclosure. 126 This fact 
indicates for Levinas that there 'is a problem preliminary to the question "who" and 
"what?'" and that ' [ t ]he search for truth has to draw being out of appearances.' 127 
In order to do so, he introduces a distinction between presence and the present 
which correlates with the saying and the said. Phenomenological inquiry as a conscious 
act investigates into appearances that are always already in the past; they are always 
already in the mode of being recognized and of being thematized. Present for us, 
therefore, is always something or someone that has appeared. Once the appearing has 
appeared for us, it is grasped by the subjective self and consequently is already and 
always a said, indicating the designation of this something or someone. But the 
appearing as such (which includes afor another because appearing is only meaningful if 
there is another, hence implying a relational structure) precedes the object that has 
appeared. In view of this, if one understands the appearing as the manifestation of being 
and thus as the primary event, then it has to be said that 'the very primacy of the 
primary is in the presence of the present.' 128 The present object as a present object in 
our conscious perception is not identical with the presence of the relational structure of 
the appearing, a presence that is the pre-condition for all ontological investigation. 
There is always an already there, the before questioning in the present which the I am 
tries to conceive with cognitive inquiry. 
Phenomenological inquiry depends upon consciousness, language, sensation, and 
expression. But these human characteristics and tools of conceiving and understanding 
being are always correlated with a theme, that means with a present represented as a 
said. Consciousness depends on the what-question because it always relates to the past 
and consequently objectifies the other or other things. But, for example, if human 
capacities of sensation or sensibility are considered, they are not reducible to the clarity 
126 Otherwise than Being, 24. 
127 Ibid., 24. 
128 Ibid., 24. 
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and definiteness of an idea derived out of the said. 129 For instance sensational 
experiences such as being gently touched by a lover or being stabbed by someone are 
not simply reducible to the ideas of happiness, enjoyment, vulnerability or suffering. 
Sensation and perception of the I am, which are basic to every knowing, not only 
always display a fragment of the whole in every moment of perception and are never 
complete, but also depend upon the environment and the other. 130 It is precisely this 
relational structure which indicates again a "something" prior to being's essence as 
conceived by the I am. 
All this leads Levinas to the conclusion that in the process of knowing we 
experience the passing from images and thus realize that all knowing is symbolic. In the 
said we experience particularity and thus fragmentation but never totality. Every "access 
to Being" out of knowing, consciousness, sensation - a language which already 
indicates a problematic exteriority as if one could look at being's essence from the 
outside - 'is already borrowed from thematization, consciousness of ... , the self 
sufficient correlation of the saying to the said.' m But this equation of the saying with 
the said, of the appearing with the appearance, signifies the re-presentation of a present 
in the I think and discloses the ontological structure of signification but not the whole 
reality of being. This then is a pointer beyond ontological signification of being because 
the said as the foundation for signification never discloses the presence of the present; it 
is always secondary. The following graph attempts to illuminate this structure. 
BEYOND BEING BEING AS PERCEIVED BY PHENOMENOLOGY 
I 
t}Unt-------------- ',fllwavs already thematized 
saying ···-··············-··F-""'........=.-------'-+ said 
Graph 8: Being and its Beyond 
129 Ibid., 63. 
130 See also above Weizsllcker's theory ofGestaltkreis. 
131 Otherwise than Being, 68. 
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Following this argument it can be contended that transcendence exhibits an important 
character of being. If human understanding of being includes the otherwise and beyond 
of the ontological signification of being, then its transcendent character must be 
acknowledged in its ontological as well as in its metaphysical meaning. 
If transcendence has meaning, it can only signify the fact that the event of being, the esse, 
the essence, passes over to what is other than being .... Transcendence is passing over to 
being's other, otherwise than being. Not to be otherwise, but otherwise than being. And 
not to not-be; passing over is not here equivalent to dying. Being and not-being illuminate 
one another, and unfold a speculative dialectic which is determination of being. 
Being's essence dominates not-being itself. 132 
To put it in a nutshell, being is not identical with the construction of a cognitive subject, 
it does not derive from cognition. 'The "birth" of being in the questioning where the 
cognitive subject stands would thus refer to a before the questioning, to the anarchy of 
responsibility, as it were on this side of all birth.' 133 This leads back to the start: There is 
no I without a Thou and thus no philosophy apart from this relation. There is no 
philosophical question without facing the other, and the "what?" and "who?" can only 
be uttered because of a structure "before the questioning", which means that the 
possibility of response is already given before any cognitive subjectivity is possible. At 
this point one might also think ofWittgenstein's insight that there is no private language 
and that language (as being inseparably fused with experience) must be learned. His 
notions of Sprachspiele and Lebensformen underline the fact that language is not always 
capable of expressing what we experience. 134 Language, then, as a conscious act of 
signification, representing the said, depends on certain forms of life which are already 
given. 135 This given structure, which Levinas calls the otherwise than being, correlates 
with the notion of the saying without the said indicating the beyond modality of 
subjectivity. This modality of being emerges out of the-one-for-the-other structure and 
is found in the notion of responsibility. 
132 Ibid., 3. 
133 Ibid., 26. 
134 See above Chapter Two, subsection 2.2.1.2. 
135 Cf. Schwnbel's account of reality as both a given (and therefore preceding all human language games) 
and open and accessible for human interpretation within the process of experience: Chapter Two, 
subsection 2.2.1.3. 
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3.4 .3 .3 Responsibility: The-One-for-the-Other 
Levinas adds a new argument to his discussion by looking at the interdependence of 
bodily existence and human sensibility. Sensibility as a character of a living being is 
inseparably linked with the state of embodiment or corporeality. 
Incarnation is not a transcendental operation of a subject that is situated in the midst of 
the world it represents to itself; the sensible experience of the body is already and from 
the start incarnate. The sensible- maternity, vulnerability, apprehension- binds the node 
of incarnation into a plot larger than the apperception of self. In this plot I am bound to 
others before being tied to my body. 136 
This means that sensibility, as being tied to one's own body which in turn is already tied 
to another body, grounds on the structure of one-for-the-other. From conception to birth, 
from childhood to adulthood, a human being is from the very beginning tied to another -
body to body, body to soul, and soul to soul. The world into which a child is born is 
already communal and it is this communion which is the ground for perceiving, 
learning, and living. Moreover, if from a psychological perspective subjectivity and the 
self mainly emerge out of separation from the other (initially the mother to which a 
child is tied) through a process of individuation (balancing out proximity and distance), 
then in this sense there is no enjoyment, no suffering, no vulnerability without the other. 
There is no sensibility without contact. This is why the subject cannot be described 
solely on the basis of the thematizing gaze and the aiming thought of the I think, which 
Levinas calls intentionality. The always already being there of the other precedes the I 
think, precedes ontology. Thus beings one-for-the-other signifies 'before showing itself 
as a said in the system of synchronism, the linguistic system.' 137 
"beyond being" 
before all questioning 
= being's "One-for-the-Other " 
= being's presence filled with 
responsibility 
Graph 9: Being's "One-for-the-Other" structure 
136 Otherwise than Being, 76. 
137 Ibid., 77. 
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Another aspect can be added from the perspective of time. Time passes and 
temporalization, time as the temporal modality of being's being-present, therefore, is 
always a loss of time. To be in time means to be consciously in the past. The said never 
coincides with the saying and is always a re-presentation of the present. The I think in 
its process of knowing never really is with itself in a way that one could speak of a 
having itself. The self is never for itself, it is always with the past that grows and is 
never the same. 'In Self-consciousness there is no longer a presence of self to self, but 
senescence.' 138 This senescence signifies the diachrony of time pointing to lost time that 
does not return and disclosing a disjunction of identity. The so much wanted for-oneself 
of identity, where the subject possesses itself, understands itself in the I think, never is 
for itself because the diachrony of time never allows the same to rejoin the same. But 
once there is the other, once there is a relation or sociality, being's presence is filled, not 
with the other (because the perception of the other, or the commitment for the other 
would already be a function of the self, a re-presentation of a present object) but with 
responsibility. 'The subject as one discernible from the other, as an entity, is a pure 
abstraction if it is separated from this assignation.' 139 Responsibility, the one-for-the-
other structure, the possibility of response, is older than any commitment, older than 
any question. Responsibility is always there, not as a present "something" which comes 
and goes and thus again would represent a said, but as being's other, the infinite, which 
lies beyond being's essence. 
The freedom of another could never begin in my freedom, that is, abode in the same 
present, be contemporary, be representable to me. The responsibility for the other cannot 
have begun in my commitment, in my decision. The unlimited responsibility in which I 
find myself comes from the hither side of my freedom, from a "prior to every memory," 
an "ulterior to every accomplishment," from the non-present par excellence, the non-
original, the anarchical, prior to or beyond essence. The responsibility for the other is the 
locus in which is situated the null-site of subjectivity, where the privilege of the question 
"Where?" no longer holds. 140 
It can now be affirmed that Levinas' notion of responsibility as an attempt to define 
being's other highlights the importance that the other is other than the I. This in turn 
emphasises the fact that the I think cannot disclose the totality of being's essence 
because it reduces the other to the same. 141 The aporia of this otherness, which in a 
138 Ibid., 52. 
139 Ibid., 52. 
140 Ibid., 10. 
141 This is a clear distinction from Heidegger who in his notion of "man" dissolves the other in the 
category of "die anderen". The otherness of the other, looked upon from the perspective of the subject's 
Jemeinigkeit, is reduced to the same. Heidegger suggests that the other is not a particular other; 
contrariwise every other can represent the others. 'Jeder ist der Andere und Keiner er selbst. Das Man, 
161 
pure ontological attempt to define being's essence always leads to reductionism, can 
only be resolved in responsibility for the other. The other as being different precisely 
urges the I to respond and to answer gratuitously. The inquiry after being, thus, has to 
include more than any phenomenological description of the I think can provide us with, 
which cannot help but reduce all otherness to sameness-structures in its process of 
understanding. It is precisely in encountering the other's face that the I recognizes a 
glimpse of being's otherwise, a structure which goes beyond immanence. It is this for-
the-other older than consciousness of, which goes beyond and thus 
precedes, in its obedience, all grasping, and remains prior to the intentionality of the /-
subject in its being-in-the-world, which presents itself and gives itself a synthesized and 
synchronous world. The for-the-other arises in the I as a commandment understood by 
the I in its very obedience, as if obedience were its very accession to hearing the 
prescription, as if the I obe?'ed before having heard, as if the intrigue of alterity were 
woven prior to knowledge. 14 
This being's otherwise, the for-the-other of being, which is prior to all commitment, is 
most profoundly articulated in being's responsiveness. The "to be oneself', despite the 
aporia of sameness and otherness, can be found in responsibility as being's structure 
before all questioning. Responsibility, then, is the proximity of the same and the other, a 
one-for-the-other structure, a prior to any "being-in-the-world." In other words, 
'[p]roximity, difference which is non-indifference, is responsibility. It is a response 
without a question, the immediacy of peace that is incumbent on me.' 143 But to avoid 
any misconception it has to be stressed that this understanding of being's responsibility 
in proximity has nothing to do with an altruistic inclination that is rooted in the said of 
our consciousness. Rather it is this responsibleness before all responsibility which 
enables us to respond, to see the other as belonging to me, and to be a living being in 
responsibility for the freedom of the other. Thus it can paradoxically be claimed, that 'it 
is qua alienus - foreigner and other - that man is not alienated,' 144 but in the most 
meaningful way with himself. 
mit dem sich die Frage nach dem Wer des alltliglichen Daseins beantwortet, ist das Niemand, dem alles 
Dasein im Untereimm,qersem !li~h je sch()ll ausg~Jiefert hat.?, The conclusion is that this ''to the same 
reduce(f' otherness'; Is ,an orlgiflal part of the Dasein: 'Das Man ist ein Existential und gehort a/s 
urspriingliches Phanomen zur positiven Verfassung des Daseins': Sein und Zeit, 128-9. 
142 Entre Nous, 166. 
143 Otherwise than Being, 139. 
144 1bid., 59. 
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3.5 WHAT I'f :U:S TO BE HUMAN 
In this final part I want to draw together what seem to me the most important features of 
the discussion. My intention is to draw converging observations together and make a 
final proposal towards an answer to the question of what it means to be human. For this 
proposal I would like to introduce the image of a "spinning coin" in order to help the 
reader understand the complex and relational structure of human personhood. The 
converging thoughts throughout this chapter lead to the following proposal which 
describe the basic traits of human personhood as a coin as well as the spinning of it, 
expressing the dynamic of human existence. While the coin refers to the fmdings from 
the matter-mind dialectic, the relational interconnectivenss of personhood's being, the 
"spinning" dimension attempts to express that human life is not static but dynamic. Life 
is being experienced and this experiencing includes the relation to the beyond structure 
of human life. "Spinning" also indicates the "being pulled outwards", expressing a 
beyond relation, a more than what the coin is able to describe. This image of the coin 
and its spinning aspect can function as a framework for the following discussion. What I 
propose to do now, therefore, is, first, to introduce and explain four characteristics of the 
essence of what it is to be human (the coin dimension), second, to reflect on the 
"spinning dimension" and thereby connect the basic characteristics with the dynamic of 
human life and then, third, summarize the discussion with a concise description of what 
it is to be human. 
3.5.1 Four essential characteristics 
1. Integrated Otherness. The first characteristic signifies the basic relational structure of 
personhood's essence. This structure is most profoundly described as the 
interconnectiveness and interdependence of otherness and sameness building together 
an indispensable unity. They form a GESTALTKREIS in which one notion cannot be 
conceived without the other. Thus persons are unique by virtue of their own particular 
perception, their own subjective development of consciousness which nobody will ever 
share. Simultaneously persons are only truly themselves by virtue of being connected 
and interwoven with the other and the environment. This basic structural.characteristic-1 
call integrated otherness. It simply is before all questioning, before all experiencing, 
and before all conceptualising. Human persons, so to speak, are saturated with it. In this 
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sense they are integrated otherness and will live accordingly if they acknowledge 
precisely this sameness-otherness structure as the basic foundation of their human 
essence, which cannot be without the particular other and the environment. 
2. Reconciling Particularity. At the same time, however, human beings' integrated 
otherness reveals another creative tension, which leads to the second characteristic. One 
might say that my particularity and the particularity of the other clash within the 
structure of integrated otherness. Because personhood's being is integrated otherness, 
and hence expresses a state of crisis (Weizsacker), it is always in need of gaining itself 
(re-conciliare) anew in order to retain its human identity. A balanced human identity, 
however, as being one with oneself, will most likely be found within a reconciling 
process of constantly integrating the particularity of the other into one's own perception 
of human beingness. This characteristic I call reconciling particularity. The term 
reconciling is used here in distinction to the term reconciled to underline the open 
character of all human being and that, despite the essential necessity of the balanced and 
reconciled state of existence between otherness and sameness, all found and re-gained 
biological and psychological balance remains open. If the particularity of the other must 
be respected and appreciated as being part of myself (without being reduced to the 
same), then this fact exhibits being towards reconciliation expressing human beings' in-
between (sameness-otherness) place. On the "spinning coin" dimension, this points 
towards the importance of human communion enacted within the two poles of 
assimilation (reducing the other to the same) and exclusion (reducing the other to the 
total other and hence not letting the other being part of the same). In a nutshell, because 
human identity cannot be realized without the other, human being's integrated 
otherness must also be conceived as reconciling particularity in order to uphold a 
balanced human existence. Otherwise human beings deny and distort the relational 
structure of the human condition. 
3. Responsiveness. A balanced human existence, or a reconciling process, however, will 
only be possible if human beings are truly and mutually responsive. This is the third 
characteristic. Human beings are communicating beings. As such they have the capacity 
for experiencing, i~terpreting and organizing the world that they inhabit. 
Responsiveness then signifies human beings' integrated otherness and reconciling 
particularity as a one-for-the-other structure (Levinas). Human community exists as a 
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togetherness in which one cannot but respond to the other. It portrays a mutual being-
there-for-the-other. In Weizsacker's terms I could also add that it is the notion of 
decision inherent in the relational one-for-the-other structure, which is imperative for 
every crisis (the instability and the regaining of balance within each biological act). 
Hence one can also say that responsiveness, in order to gain and maintain a balanced 
identity, means a decision for the other. A human person is already responsive before 
experiencing life. A human person is already turned toward the other before making a 
decision. On the "spinning coin" dimension this turns into responsibility for the other. 
4. Angst-structure. The relational essence of personhood is always in becoming, never 
tota]]y resolved. This implies personhood's openness and becoming-ness. Looking from 
this angle I am able to distinguish three levels of openness: a) relationality's 
indefiniteness in each organic act caned crisis (biological level), b) the uncertainty of 
not-having-oneself within the consciousness-time relation (philosophical level) and c) 
the constitutive element of otherness within my self-system (psychological level). This 
structure highlights the fourth characteristic that I want to call "Angst-structure." A 
human person is Angst-structured before experiencing life. In other words, 
personhood's relationality is inhabited by an Angst-structure which expresses and 
combines the notions of identity crisis, openness or becoming and integrated otherness. 
The experience of fear as a conscious and concrete reality then is a consequence of this 
structure within the "spinning dimension" of human life. Due to this human "Angst-
structure" the notion of fear becomes intelligible on many levels and includes all human 
aspects, be it a Kierkegaardian notion of existential fear, a Heideggerian notion of fear 
as a fundamental way of being-in-the-world, or a depth-psychological notion of fear as 
something that accompanies us from birth to death because of the various demands of 
life. 145 The responsiveness- and the Angst-structure, therefore, indicate a before or 
beyond consciousness, while responsibility and fear belong to the realm of the dynamic 
of human life, the conscious experience of the "spinning." 
145 For a helpful account of the notion of fear, Kirsten Huxel, 'Das Phlinomen Angst. Eine Studie zur 
theologischen Anthropologie', Neue Zeitschrifl fur Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, 47 
(2005), 33-57. 
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Interstitial Identity: 
Sameness - Otherness 
Assimilation -
Exclusion 
Experience of 
Responsibility 
Experience of 
Fear 
Responsible for 
Reconciling Existence 
Graph 10: The four characteristics and the spinning dimension of the human coin 
3.5.2 The spinning dimension 
To elucidate the relation between the coin and its spinning dimension let me briefly 
refer to one of Weizsacker' s insights. Weizsacker holds that the outcome of a decision 
(i.e., how we realize a particular movement) cannot be predicted; only when we execute 
it will we see what form it takes. This insight depended on the fact that the execution of 
an action is determined by perception. Human action (or movement) is always proleptic 
action; it depends on the anticipation of the action which in turn is a ftmction of 
perception. From this it follows that our perception of personhood (i.e., of what we 
assume the essence of being or the nature of being human is) determines to a large 
degree the outcome of our actions. This underlines the dependency of human decision-
making and responsibility on our anticipated conscious framework of humanness. In 
other words, the execution of a human act, the execution of responsibility and the 
subsequent outcome of a decision within human relationships and encounters, depend 
precisely on the proleptic perceptions (the anticipation of an encounter) of the persons 
involved. This means that the "spinning coin" dimension as the enactment of human life 
is inseparably linked with the four characteristics as the givenness of the human 
condition. Reconciled human existence, then, depends precisely on the perception of 
human beings' essence as integrated otherness and reconciling particularity. 
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Looking upon the subject matter from the perspective of life experience (as being 
consciously involved in the dynamics of life with its manifold relations and encounters), 
being human means to be responsible for one's own life, the lives of others and the 
environment. This responsibility will be carried out and pursued humanly if consciously 
grounded on the perception of personhood's relationality as displayed above. 
Responsibility then has to be described as the task of finding one's own identity by 
minimizing fear, or in other words, by looking into the other's face, responding 
gratuitously because we belong to each other, and thus take up mutual responsibility. In 
doing so, human beings aspire after surmounting the somewhat difficult and threatening 
experiences of otherness and the unknown future, which always remain a trigger of fear. 
However, as a possible consequence hoped for, the essential tasks of responsibility and 
of coming to terms with fear will lead to a concrete experience of human reconciliation 
when a balance between otherness and sameness is found, be it within myself, within 
the realm of relationships with others or within my perception of being part of the 
creation. Hence, one can also circumscribe responsibility as the duty of being 
responsible for reconciling existence. 
Finally, one crucial point has to be addressed. As I have mentioned at the 
beginning of this part of the chapter, the spinning of the coin as an image for the 
dynamic of human personhood also includes the experience of being pulled outwards. 
So far I have described the essence of personhood as integrated otherness and 
reconciling particularity (correlating with the essential experiences of sameness and 
otherness as well as assimilation and exclusion), responsiveness (correlating with the 
essential experience of responsibility), and Angst-structured (correlating with the 
essential experience of fear). But the "spinning coin" analogy also draws attention to the 
notions of ultimate meaning (Frankl), the beyond or the openness of being human. 
These notions indicate the human experience of transcendence. Ultimate meaning as I 
have already noted in some parts of the discussion can only be attested from a beyond 
point of finite time, a beyond the matter-mind relation, a beyond being as the object of 
phenomenological and scientific investigation. If reconciling particularity can tum into 
a balanced state of acceptance, respect and integration, if responsiveness can tum into 
responsibility, if the Angst-structure can be overcome, and if all that can lead to a 
reconciled experience of human existence in a concrete situation, then ultimate meaning 
and the reality of ultimate reconciliation has to be a real possibility. This observation 
already points towards theology and the next two chapters in which my intention will be 
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to address religious experience and elaborate a relational concept of God. However, 
what can be said from the anthropological perspective is that the relational structure of 
human personhood's essence leaves space open and thus indicates a relational structure 
beyond the immanent matter-mind aporia. The "spinning human coin" is in its lively 
and dynamic being-ness pulled towards a beyond itself. This trait of being human is the 
real possibility of finding meaning and reconciliation which human beings long for. To 
conclude, let me now present the following concise description of what it means to be a 
human person. 
3.5.3 Conclusion 
To be a human person means to be relational in a way that indicates the essence of 
integrated otherness and reconciling particularity. To be a human person means to be 
Angst-structured and responsive in a one-for-otherness structure including the 
characteristics of "for-the-other" and "for-the-environment" (pointing towards an 
economic-ecological aspect of being). To be human means to be in becoming and open 
towards an ultimate meaning, which indicates the possibility for ethical decision-
making not to be reduced to pure relativism. This human essence forms the ground for 
taking up responsibility for one's own life, the life of others and the world. This 
responsibility and its resulting decisions (human acts) depend on the proleptic 
acknowledgement precisely of this relationality as integrated otherness and reconciling 
particularity. The experience of fear, the level of flourishing or failing human 
relationships and interactions with the environment, will reveal if human beings succeed 
or not. Hence it can be affirmed, to be a human person means both to be responsible for 
reducingfear as thefoundationfor reconciliation and to be responsible for a reconciled 
"social- or oikos-system" as the foundation for human existence. With the term oikos-
system I simply want to allude to the Greek word "oikos" (house, home or family) and 
signifY the whole earth as being's finite home. Thereby is represented an ecological and 
economic system which human beings are part of. Where human being's relationality is 
acknowledged and appreciated reconciled existence becomes a real possibility of human 
life. 
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4 
HUMAN EXPERIENCE, THE BIBLE, AND THE TRINITY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION: 
FROM TITLES TO ENCOUNTERS 
Having completed an investigation of what it means to be human, it is now time to tum 
to religious language about God. What I intend to do in this chapter is to apply the 
trinitarian hermeneutics in the interstice to the realm of biblical experience. I will do 
this by treating biblical experience as human experience that wants to be open towards 
ultimate meaning, towards God and his presence in the world. 1 Experience that comes 
to speech within biblical stories wants to say something about God in relation to 
humanity. It is aware of and open towards the possibility of divine revelation occurring 
within the human condition, that is within life lived. Consequently, approaching biblical 
interpretation through the lens of human experience demands a shift from titles to 
encounters. This shift is unavoidable for at least two reasons; one is biblical in nature 
and the other experiential. 
Firstly, the Bible tells primarily stories. Experiences of God are embedded m 
narratives and therefore cannot be easily captured by concepts or titles. God rather 
shows himself in the midst of events and personal encounters? Doctrinal theologians3 as 
well as biblical scholars4 who put enormous stress on the understanding of certain terms 
1 Cf. Chapter Two, parts 2.3 and 2.4. 
2 In the Old Testament the word dabar represents the reality of God in the world. The noun carries the 
event character of the verb and thus signifies not only a particular content but also embraces the notion of 
affair or event. Cf. John Goldingay, Old Testament Theology, Volume One (Downers Grove: lnterVarsity 
Press, 2003), 31; G. Gerleman, 'dabar - Wort', in E. Jenni and C. Westermann (eds.), Theologisches 
Handworterbuch zum A/ten Testament, Band 1 (Giltersloh: GUtersloher Verlagshaus, 1994), 433-43; 
Claus Westermann, Theologie des A/ten Testaments in Grundziigen (G6ttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1978), 1 I. 
3 Cf. Chapter One, section 1.3.5: William Hill in his The Three-Personed God approaches the biblical 
material by investigating the concepts of Yahweh, Father, Ruach, Son of God, and Logos. Robert Jenson 
in his The Triune Identity tries to prove that the notions of Father, Son and Holy Spirit express the proper 
name of God, while Walter Kasper deals quite substantially in his The God of Jesus Christ with the 
ambiguous concept of God as the almighty Father. Colin Gunton who is aware of the fact that especially 
Old Testament material is utterly neglected engages in his Act and Being in a long discussion of 
traditional divine attributes, failing to integrate biblical experience in a new and more creative way. 
4 Martin Karrer examines how within Christology the main driving force for elaborating an understandiJ1g 
of Jesus Christ were and still are to a large extent the christologiCal'titles or key w5rds and conceptS of 
Jesus' proclamation: Jesus Christus im Neuen Testament (G6ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), 
13-22. For Eduard Lohse New Testament texts become a vehicle of the interpretation of the kerygma, a 
particular content and understanding of Jesus' life, death and resurrection. What follows is an approach in 
which certain conceptions within Jesus' proclamation, like Kingdom of God or Mercy of God form the 
structure to which the narratives have to contribute an answer: GrundrifJ der neutestamentlichen 
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such as Father, Son, Spirit, Word or Wisdom, usually examine the biblical evidence 
from a conceptual point of view, thereby largely neglecting the significance of 
narratives. Admittedly, this is one way of approaching the issue. However, it should not 
be the only one. Biblical experiences are embedded in narratives and should not one-
sidedly be reduced to special word-contents.5 In regard to the Gospel tradition, for 
instance, stories would otherwise lose their openness and transcendence as remembered 
religious experience in which every human being is still able to encounter Jesus as he 
talked and debated, shared table-fellowship and healed.6 1t is vital, therefore, to maintain 
the openness of stories and their underlying experiences. 7 
Secondly, experiences of God also reflect a dialectic between oneness and 
threeness.8 There are, for instance, on the one hand, experiences of God in and through 
nature and, on the other, experiences of Jesus and of the Spirit. The first set of 
experiences might be identified as experiences of awe or ultimate dependence. Such 
experiences of divine reality are not in need of a trinitarian narrative; they are contained 
within the realm of oneness, of ultimate meaning as the truth of the one God in which 
Christians believe.9 The second set, however, might be identified as experiences of 
Theologie (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1989), esp. §§ 1-9. Despite many differences, this seems not too far 
away from Bultmann's opinion that the object of an account of Jesus is not his life and personality, but 
only his teaching and proclamation: Jesus (MUnchen I Hamburg: Siebenstem Taschenbuch Verlag, 1964), 
13. The consequence of such an approach is the tendency to subordinate and devalue the event-character 
of the narratives. For Peter Stuhlmacher the main scholarly task is to describe the content of New 
Testament proclamation and that he himself is doing this by historical analysis, reconstruction and 
systematic interpretation: Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments, Band I (Gottingen: Yandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1997), 29. Cf. also Leonhard Goppelt, Theologie des Neuen Testaments (Gottingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991 ), 94-1 0 I. It is exactly at this point where the word-content of Jesus' 
proclamation is given such a high priority that in fact the content is detached from the event character of 
Jesus' acts and words. 
5 Cf. Erhard Blum: 'Wir stoBen als neuzeitliche Leser bei der Beschreibung der biblischen Literatur 
immer wieder an unvermeidliche Grenzen. Die GrUnde liegen, so meine ich, in unseren literarischen 
Kategorien, die der spezifischen RationaliUit dieser Traditionsliteratur offenbar nicht kommensurabel 
sind': Paper given at the Durham-TUbingen symposium, Durham University, 20.09.2004. See also Paul 
Ricoeur, Essays on Biblical Interpretation (London: SPCK, 1981 ), 77; Gerhard Loughlin, Telling God's 
Story: Bible, Church and Narrative Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 179. 
6 J.D.G. Dunn, Jesus Remembered (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2003), 893. 
7 For a positive attempt to take religious experience seriously, Larry Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: 
Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2003). Old Testament 
scholars are usually more attentive to the theological significance of stories. Goldingay underlines that the 
'biblical Gospel is not a collection of timeless statements such as God is love. It is a narrative about 
things God has done': Old Testament Theology, I :31. Gerhard von Rad's insight is still valid, namely, 
that retelling remains the most legitimate form of theological discourse on the Old Testament: Theologie 
des A/ten Testaments, Band 1 (MUnchen: Kaiser, 1957), 121, 126. 
8 -~his dialectic, which also implies a dialectic'betWeen coflceptand narrative, will be discussed at length 
in the next chapter. 
9 In view of the development of Israel's belief in monotheism (cf. Chapter Two, subsection 2.3.1.1) one 
might say that it was rather this type of experience (experiences of ultimate dependence and of enduring 
and unchanging divine love despite all flux and changes in the world) that led Israel to the confession in 
Yahweh as the one and only God. Cf. Deuteronomy 6.4. 
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personal encounters which are in need of the trinitarian narrative in order to be divine 
and redemptive experiences. Jesus' earthly experiences, for example, as they show 
themselves within the Gospel tradition, are embedded in a trinitarian framework. Jesus 
talks about his Father in heaven and about the Spirit who reveals truth to human beings. 
To encounter Jesus also means to be confronted with the one whom he called Father and 
the one to whom he referred as Spirit. 10 Moreover, within the worshipping Christian 
community, God's narrative description, the Trinity is the central reality. 11 Jesus' 
communion with the Father and the Spirit must then be presupposed not only if one 
attempts to expound Jesus' narrative theology but also if one intends to engage more 
generally with an interpretation of encounters with the biblical God. 12 Given the 
interstitial method, traces of divine revelation will then most likely show themselves 
within narrated experiences of personal encounters and thereby inform our 
hermeneutical spiral. 13 
In this chapter I am now primarily concerned with this second set of experiences 
as they come to speech within biblical narratives. My aim is to give an account of how 
the triune God shows himself through biblical experience insofar as this can be deduced 
from narratives. However, given the relational structure of the human condition and my 
stress on general human experience, 1 intend to focus on inter-human encounters as a 
hermeneutical path towards trinitarian God talk. This approach will allow me to use 
stories of human relationships and fellowship as a way of disclosing something about 
the nature of divine communion. Such an endeavour then is not so much concerned, for 
example, with John's rendering of Jesus' oneness with his Father,14 but rather with 
Jesus' narrative theology that reveals something about the essence of communitarian 
life. Obviously, to look at the whole range of the biblical material is an impossible task 
within the scope of this thesis. This endeavour can only be a limited one. What I have in 
mind, therefore, is to propose a case study of Jacob and Jesus and to consider only two 
10 E.g. Matthew 11.25-27; Luke 12.8-10; John 14. 
11 Cf. M. Douglas Meeks, 'The Social Trinity and Property', in M. Volfand M. Welker (eds.), God's Life 
in Trinity (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2006), 14. 
12 N.T. Wright points out that 'it is by looking at Jesus himself that we discover who God is' and 'that we 
should expect always to be continuing in the quest for Jesus, precisely as part of, indeed perhaps as the 
sharp edge of, our exploration into God himself: The Challenge of Jesus (London: SPCK, 2001), 3. 
13 In regard to the Old Testament Goldingay concludes that direct affirmations and theological statements 
are subordinate to t~e narrativ.e in such a way that -they need ·the narrative to give them their meaning. 
Moses'- theological statement in Exodus 34.6-7, for example, receives its meaning through the story in 
Exodus 32 and 33: Old Testament Theology, I :37. Cf. Westermann, Theologie des Alten Testaments in 
Grundziigen, 21; Walther Zimmerli, Grundrifl einer alttestamentlichen Theologie (Stuttgart: 
Kohlhammer, 1989), 123. 
14 E.g. John 17; cf. also Matthew 11.25-27. 
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stories, Genesis 33.1-16 and Luke 15.11-32. Against objections that such a limitation 
puts the argument on a too weak foundation, it must be emphasised that revelatory 
significance does not depend on a comprehensive account of biblical stories. Rather it 
draws its strength from the trinitarian hermeneutics in the interstice. 15 Revelatory 
significance then does not depend on quantity but rather on a sound interpretation of 
particular experiences within the hermeneutical spiral. This means that it must be shown 
how narrated experiences reach beyond human sameness assumptions and thus are in 
need of the concept of revelation in order to gain theological significance. If this is the 
case then even one single story is able to contribute to our learning about learning and 
enhance our understanding of God. To draw such a conclusion, however, is only 
possible at the end of the process of interpretation. Hence, for the time being, this must 
suffice to justify a limited case study that wants to show how an investigation of two 
biblical stories can lead to trinitarian God-talk. Evidently, to focus on Genesis 33 and 
Luke 15 is deliberate, and I hope that the following discussion will persuade the reader 
of its reasonableness. 
Before engaging in such a process of interpretation, however, one last issue must 
be addressed, namely, the choice of one Old and one New Testament story. This choice 
is about the importance of the whole of Scripture for Christian theology. Although the 
incarnation plays the central role within a trinitarian hermeneutics, the revelatory 
significance of Scripture cannot be reduced to the Jesus narratives alone. This entails for 
the achievement of an adequate biblical interpretation that the Old Testament has to be 
taken more seriously. To avoid any misunderstanding, for a Christian theologian there is 
in a fundamental way no escape from reading the Old Testament through the prism of 
already accepted beliefs derived from the significance of God's self-revelation in Jesus 
Christ. Interpreting the Bible will always be an exercise in faith seeking understanding. 
'Rather, what is at stake is an account of the nature of God that is inseparable from the 
particularity and specificity of Israel's account of human nature in relation to God.' 16 
Consequently within a trinitarian hermeneutics no story is simply to be read on its own 
but in the context of a trinitarian faith. In reading Genesis 33 and Luke 15 together this 
faith is taken seriously. Against objections of anachronism I follow Walter Moberly's 
hermeneutical conclusions. 
15 Cf. Chapter Two, part 2.4. 
16 R.W.L. Moberly, The Bible, Theology, and Faith: A Study of Abraham and Jesus (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 232. Cf. also Robert Jenson, Systematic Theology, Volume I 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 44. 
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To read the Bible in the light of a trinitarian rule of faith ... is not a matter of imposing 
anachronism on the biblical text. Jt is not an exercise in scouring the Old Testament for 
covering or oblique references to Jesus or the Trinity ... Rather it is to contextualize the 
Bible within a continuing attempt to realize that of which it speaks and so to bring a 
certain kind of concern to bear on the reading of the text. This concern is focused in a 
particular understanding of God and humanity, which is used heuristically in reciprocal 
interchange between text and reader. 17 
Christian theology identifies the God of the Bible with the triune God of Christian 
worship who, as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, always has and will encounter human 
beings as the triune God irrespective of whether or not they are aware of it. 18 To use a 
psychological analogy, one might say that in the same way that every act we do and 
every word we utter reveals something of who we truly are, one might say that an 
encounter with God always reveals something about God's triune being since God 
cannot be but God's triune self. However, given the account of revelation as learning 
about learning in which the doctrine of the Trinity was developed in a long process over 
time, one has to be cautious about over simplistic assumptions. Truth about the triune 
God emerging from biblical stories will not necessarily show itself in descriptions of the 
Trinity as such but rather in characteristic experiences of how the triune God - as 
Israel's God and as God incarnate in Jesus Christ - acts, addresses and becomes 
involved with human beings. 19 It is thus my conviction that the understanding of 
biblical texts cannot be separated from appropriate contexts of faith and life as a 
whole.Z0 This, however, does not mean that the Bible cannot be studied from other 
• 21 perspectives. 
To conclude, in what follows I propose a trinitarian reading of Genesis 33 and 
Luke 15 using the insights from Chapter Two and Three as tools for biblical 
17 Ibid., 234. Cf. Tim Meadowcroft, 'Between Authorial Intent and Indeterminacy: The Incarnation as an 
Invitation to Human-Divine Discourse', Scottish Journal of Theology 58 (2005), 199-218. He argues that 
the hermeneutical task involves a meaningful relationship between reader and author that incorporates 
both respect and response on the part of the reader. 
18 Cf. Moberly's hermeneutical framework. First, biblical interpretation becomes inseparable from the 
question of how people live and that it cannot be detached from basic human questions of allegiance and 
priorities, of spirituality and ethics. Second, since God is not a "person" or "object" accessible to 
scientific examination, the Bible depicts God with a host of analogies, which do not make genuine 
encounter with God straightforward. Third is the presupposition of "mystery", indicating something 
whose intrinsic depth cannot be exhausted. This opens up interpretation that moves beyond the possible 
position a.fld 1Tle!.\11ing ofsuch texts within a.history of religious thought. Fourth; there is the "rule of faith" 
to guide readers so that they may discern the truth of God in Christ: The Bible, Theology. and Faith, 39-
44. 
19 Cf. Arthur Wainwright, The Trinity in the New Testament (London: SPCK, 1962), 265-7. 
2° Cf. my discussion of experience, language and truth in Chapter Two. 
21 Cf. Moberly, The Bible, Theology and Faith, 66. 
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interpretation.22 What I intend to do is to apply the interstitial method "from experience 
to revelation" to biblical experience as part of the hermeneutical spiral. The following 
discussion then is divided into three parts. While the first part (4.2) aims at a trinitarian 
interpretation of the Jacob-Esau narrative which culminates in Jacob's experience of 
God in Genesis 33, the second part (4.3) intends to expound Jesus' theology in Luke 15 
and to spell out essential trinitarian trajectories. A short final part (4.4) will draw the 
discussion to a close and briefly summarize the main achievements of this chapter. 
4.2 JACOB ENCOUNTERS ESAU 
4.2.1 Why tbe story of Jacob matters 
The story of Jacob is essential for Israel's identity as the people of God. In its canonical 
form it reflects Israel's understanding of its own history with God and its experiences as 
a nation before God. In what Jacob experienced, Israel recognized something of its own 
relationship with God.23 Jacob not only becomes the ancestor of the twelve tribes of 
Israel but also one of the main carriers of God's promises to Israel. The stories that 
surround the person of Jacob, therefore, are not merely understood by Israel as stories 
that express experiences of the past but also that speak about how God acts in the here 
and now. They incorporate experiences of later generations.24 Jacob's encounters with 
God and the promises given to him are remembered and retold and in that way function 
as an important guideline for subsequent interpretations of Israel's perception of how 
and who God is?5 Israel's experiences of God and their respective interpretations are 
directly linked with Israel's self-perception as "Jacob's family." It matters therefore 
what Israel says about God's relationship with the patriarchs. What is told about Jacob 
22 Objections from the field of biblical scholarship to pursue biblical interpretation in such a fashion as 
here proposed have to do with not giving enough attention to the complexity and the interrelation between 
the fields of historical Wissenschaft, theology, and Christian faith. Moberly rightly draws attention to a 
neglected fact. 'There is thus a nice irony in the fact that the recurrent rhetoric on the part of biblical 
scholars about freeing the Bible from ecclesiastical and dogmatic presuppositions, so that it can speak for 
itself, tends to coexist largely uncomplainingly with the preservation of that ecclesiastical and dogmatic 
construct, the Bible itself: The Bible, Theology, and Faith, 13-4. Cf. Jenson, Systemat!.f T~£q{ogy, 1:57.-
9. For a goo'L~ccQ_~JJt ofthe .interdependency.of.faith; historical truth and biblical narrative, Stephen 
Evans, The Historical Christ and the Jesus of Faith: The lncarnational Narrative as History (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996). 
23 G. v. Rad, Genesis, 26. 
24 G.v. Rad, Theologie des AT, I :171. 
25 Hosea 12; Ezekiel28.25; Psalm 47.5; Isaiah 58.14; Jeremiah 30.10. 
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is essential for the identity of Israel and its understanding of God; hence the enduring 
significance ofthis story within the Old Testament. 
Moreover, this story is extremely valuable because it has an inherent affinity 
with topics addressed in the previous chapter. The Jacob-Esau narrative not only deals 
with otherness and particularity as essential characteristics of the human condition but 
also reaches beyond the sameness structure of human experience and opens up space for 
God-talk in the final and climatic encounter between the two brothers in Genesis 33. 
Descriptions of an embrace and of a close and loving encounter between two persons 
emerge that prepare the way for God-talk. There is space for divine otherness appearing 
within the confinements of human experience. Finally, the significance of this story, as 
we will see in due course, is supported by the fact that Jesus takes up this imagery 
within his own narrative theology. Jacob's experience of God comes to stand beside 
Jesus' portrayal of his Father as someone who unconditionally embraces the other.26 
However, before this conclusion can be reached the context needs to be taken into 
consideration. In order to spell out where and in which way Genesis 33 might transcend 
human experience and say something significant about God we have to scan the 
background of Israel's experiences which are related to the Jacob-Esau narrative. This 
leads to the consideration of the fact of Israel's existence among other nations and its 
ambivalent relation to Edom throughout its history.27 To look at this relationship will 
provide us with some guidelines for an interpretative framework. 
4.2.2 Israel and Edom: Tbe experience of a conflict 
Before considering the Genesis account it is important to address the problem of 
ambivalent interpretations of human experience in relation to God-talk and the whole 
Jacob-Esau cycle. For this reason the concept of human experience and its dialectical 
structure of sameness and otherness must be recalled. Looking at the Jacob-Esau 
narrative and its wider context in the relationship between Israel and Edom one 
immediately becomes aware of the fact that conflicting interpretations struggle with one 
another. In Deuteronomy 23.8, for example, we read that Israel shall not abhor an 
Edomite for he is like a brother. One might ask then whether a Davidic expansionist 
26 Cf. Gordon Wenham, Genesis, World Biblical Commentary, Vol. 2 (Dallas: Word Books, 1994), 304. 
27 At this point I simply acknowledge the fact of Old Testament scholarship that the oldest source J 
(Jahwist) is usually dated around 950 BCE. Hence all written accounts of past experiences are partly 
determined by Israel's existence among other nations. Cf. Werner H. Schmidt, Einfiihrung in das Alte 
Testament (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1989), 40-58. 
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politics that subdues Edom and makes him a servant, accompanied by the interpretation 
that this de facto position is in line with God's will, is justified.28 Where are divine 
characteristics to be found, in the notions of exclusion and assimilation or rather in an 
act of embrace which leaves each party enough space for particularity? This is where 
the dialectic between sameness and otherness becomes important for my approach to 
biblical interpretation. With the term sameness I allude to the concept of experience as 
established in Chapter Two.29 Sameness signifies common human experiences of 
human life which determine, influence and underlie human interpretations of reality and 
can be interpreted without the need for revelation to occur. Given revelation's 
embeddedness in experience, one has to be aware of the fact that biblical experiences 
and their respective theological interpretations are not excJuded from this complex 
relationship and, therefore, will most likely mirror different and ambiguous 
interpretations of how and who God is. Thus the distinction made between sameness 
and otherness must receive utmost attention. If God as the divine other wants to reveal 
himself within the human condition, he will most likely do so by reaching beyond 
human structures of sameness. Although boundaries are fluid, it can be assumed, on the 
one hand, that sameness structures display common interpretations of reality that are 
created by self-experiencing subjects without the need for revelation to occur, while, on 
the other hand, otherness experiences rather penetrate common interpretations and 
therefore cannot easily be made intelligible merely by recourse to political, 
psychological or sociological influences.30 In other words, otherness experiences are in 
need of revelation to occur; they are more open to God's reality. However, one can 
speak adequately of otherness only if one knows, at least to some reliable degree, what 
sameness means. In view of this it is important to scan the wider context of the Jacob-
Esau narrative. 
To begin with, it is vital to recognize that the historical condition of Israel's 
experiences of God and their respective interpretations is based upon Israel's existence 
among the nations. Due to this condition one can note that the story of the patriarchs 'is 
marked essentially by the problem of the existence of Israel in its land. Israel does not 
see itself as indigenous, but regards the land into which Abraham has migrated and in 
which Israel now lives, as given by God.' 31 Consequently, the relationship of the 
28 2 Samuel8.11-14. 
29 Section 2.2.2. 
3
° Cf. my discussion of monotheism and the doctrine of the incarnation in Chapter Two, subsections 
2.3.1.1 and 2.3.1.2. 
31 Rendtorff, The Canonical Hebrew Bible, 22. 
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patriarchs to the Promised Land is interestingly ambiguous. They live in it but do not 
possess it; they live in it but as sojourners and strangers. 32 Land is understood as a gift 
rather than a possession. In principle, there is always the possibility that Yahweh can 
take the land away again. This ambiguity already hints at some of the problems inherent 
in the relationship between Israel and Edom and its ancestors Jacob and Esau. The tense 
relationship between the two brothers reflects the relations between Israel and Edom 
with which it was connected by a varied, and often hostile history.33 Israel lives beside 
Edom its southerly neighbour,34 sometimes peacefully, sometimes inimically, and the 
answer to the question where God is in all these experiences is not an easy one. 
However, this historical condition of Israel among the nations and its ambiguous 
relationship to the Promised Land already alerts us not to confuse too easily, for 
example, interpretations of political and military victory with God's will. Israel as a 
political state quite naturally had to be concerned with questions of national security 
(including possible expansion into important military territory in neighbouring 
countries) and international diplomacy (including alliances with other nations). To 
interpret experiences of military victory as God's blessing, therefore, appears to be a 
matter of sameness. In a time where national and ethnic identity and religion formed a 
closely knitted unity, it was common for peoples of the ancient world to interpret their 
well-being and their military successes (fought in the name of their gods) as the god's 
blessing. 35 Looking from this perspective one can draw the conclusion that 
interpretations that link God-talk with human victory over another nation reside on the 
level of sameness rather than otherness. This means that they do not penetrate into the 
realm of divine otherness with revelatory significance for our understanding of God.36 
One has to be reserved when Israel delights in the destruction of Ed om or when military 
victory and the suppression of Ed om, as in the case of King David's expansion politics, 
are explained as willed by God. 
What else then can be said about the relationship between Israel and Edom? 
Both nations derive their existence from their common ancestors Abraham and Isaac. 
Although God's blessing is bestowed on Jacob, who is renamed Israel, Edom is referred 
32 G. v. Rad, Theologie des AT, I: 172. See also PreuB, Theologie des AT, I: 132-45. 
33 Rendtorff, The Canonical Hebrew Bible, 26. 
34 Numbers 34.3; Joshua 15.1. 
35 Kings played a significant role in ancient religion and society as representatives and spokesmen of the 
gods. Cf. Werner H. Schmidt, A/ttestamentlicher Glaube in seiner Geschichte (Neukirchen-VIuyn: 
Neukirchener Verlag, 1990), 210-2. 
36 Despite differences in the development ofthe institution ofthe kingdom, in retrospect Israel was aware 
of the fact that with its introduction it behaved like all other peoples (I Samuel 8.5.20). Cf. Schmidt, 
Alttestament/icher Glaube in seiner Geschichte, 212-5. 
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to as Israel's brother. On the one hand, there is sameness and likeness and, on the other 
hand, there is also otherness and strangeness. In other words, the experienced 
relationship between Israel and Edom is determined by the dialectic between brother 
and stranger, neighbour and enemy. Fear of the other and mistrust often prevail. In 
Numbers 20.14-21 we read that Israel under the leadership of Moses wants to pass 
through Ed om but Edom refuses to give Israel passage through his territory. In 2 
Samuel 8.13-14 it is rather the other way round. King David defeats and subdues the 
Edomites and they become David's servants. However, once David's reign IS over, 
Edom strives for independence and several hostile conflicts with Israel are the 
consequence.37 Political and military interests, concerns for one's own nation, freedom, 
and self-determination and even revenge38 are often the driving forces behind these 
conflicts. Where is God's will and purpose in all this? The prophetic literature might 
help in this respect. Apart from King David, whose wars with Edom are not seen so 
much in the light of a neighbourly relationship between Jacob and Esau but rather from 
the perspective of David's kingdom as the fulfilment of God's promises to lsrael/9 
hostile and un-brotherly encounters between the two nations are criticized as not being 
compatible with God's will. Prophetic words against Edom40 emphasise that God's 
wrath is justified by Edom's unsocial and un-brotherly behaviour towards Israel. Pride 
and arrogance, revenge and bloodshed, are named as the main reasons for God's 
judgment upon Edom. In other words, Esau disregards his brother Jacob. 
Similar critique, however, can also be found in prophetic texts that are addressed 
to Israel and Judah. God's wrath blazes up against his own people whenever they leave 
his ways, indulge in pride and arrogance, behave unsocially or spread injustice across 
the land.41 Hence the main emphasis here is on the social level. Prophetic words uttered 
in the name of God which deal with the relationship between Edom and Israel do not 
doubt the rightful existence of Edom. Edom is Israel's neighbour and when criticism is 
raised it clearly dwells on a social level. In a nutshell, God's wrath blazes up in 
prophetic texts when relationships fail, when neighbours become enemies and when 
Edom or other nations disregard Israel's independence and its special status as God's 
people. 
37 Cf. 1 Kings ll.l4-22; 2 Kings 8.20-22; 14.7. 
38 Cf. Ezekiel 25.12-14. 
39 For a brief survey of David's significance for Israel's belief: PreuB, Theologie des AT, I :25-7. 
40 Isaiah 34; Jeremiah 49.7-22; Ezekiel25.12-14; Amos I. II; Obadiah. 
41 Isaiah 9.7-10.4; Jeremiah 9.24-25; Amos 3-5. 
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Looking through the prism of Chapter Three, Israel's relationship with Ed om 
reveals typical elements of the human condition: both struggle with particularity, 
otherness, Angst and, now and then, reconciliation.42 On the one hand, there is a clear 
boundary, Israel is God's chosen one and Edom is not This indicates particularity and 
otherness which can always tum, as the conflicts show, into excluding and threatening 
otherness leading to pride, arrogance, exclusion and war. On the other hand, however, 
Edom remains Israel's brother. There is sameness and likeness (through a common 
remembered story and the developing belief in God as creator and Lord of all nations) 
which can always lead to neighbourly, brotherly and hence reconciling relationships. 
Conflicts evidently are part of human relationships. It might be helpful here to recall 
Weizsacker's notion of crisis. Decisions are necessary and the outcome of human 
relationships cannot be decided in advance; they have to be lived out. However, in 
Weizsacker the notion of crisis was not used as a cause for hostile conflicts but rather as 
a reminder that human life always confronts us with decisions which in tum depend on 
our perception of human relationality and sociality. It is therefore essential to remember 
that to be human (in the image of God) means to be relational. Human being is directed 
towards integrated otherness and reconciling particularity and, although it is Angst-
structured, is and remains responsive in a "for-the-other" way. Hence, human 
experiences and their respective theological interpretations that deviate from this 
framework of the human condition as it is given by God and, instead of moving towards 
integrated otherness, move toward descriptions of exclusive otherness must be regarded 
as belonging to the human Angst structure (hence as interpretations of self-experiencing 
subjects who determine their own perception of reality). Admittedly, to make this 
distinction will not always be easy and straightforward. However, as a guideline, it is 
indispensable. 
In view of this analysis the following two implications can be drawn. First, 
looking through the prism of experience, interpretations of biblical experiences that 
remain within the struggle of threatening otherness, that do not penetrate the human 
Angst-structure at least to some degree and that cannot be expounded in terms of "for-
the-other" responsiveness cannot be regarded as an essential part of the hermeneutical 
circle. Secondly, paying attention to the notion of revelation, if the triune God as Father, 
Son and Spirit wants to reveal himself without violating the human condition he will 
most likely do so by opening up space within the realm of human experience that 
42 Numbers 33.37; 34.3; Deuteronomy 23.8. Israel settles next to Edom as his neighbour which hints at a 
more reconciled relationship. 
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enables us to enhance our understanding of God in relation to human relationality and 
the characteristics of integrated otherness and reconciling particularity. Interpretations 
in line with 2 Samuel 8, where David's war against and his subsequent rule over Edom 
is narrated as willed by God, and texts that pull in the direction of exclusion and un-
brotherly behaviour, have to be rejected. Given this framework, it can be shown that the 
story of Jacob's reconciliation with Esau provides us with an experience that pushes 
beyond the sameness structure of Israel's experienced relationship with Ed om and in 
that way opens up space for trinitarian God-talk. Without further ado let me now tum to 
the Genesis account. 
4.2.3 Jacob and Esau: A struggle with otherness and particularity 
The story of Jacob and Esau is a story of conflict between two brothers who represent 
opposed and different ways of character and life-style.43 The way in which the story is 
told and in which the two brothers are introduced, one as a settled shepherd and the 
other as a non-settled hunter - but also the ethnic notions, Jacob as the Father of Israel 
and Esau as the Father of the people of Edom (Genesis 25.23) - has far reaching 
implications. This story, as shown above, is also a story about rival peoples and ways of 
living, about exclusion and conflict on a national scale. It seems to be a paradigm and 
thus a reflection of so many human stories which constantly occur in the world up to 
modern times. Hence this story is of significant importance because it does not remain 
in the private sector but reaches beyond itself, asking whether Jacob's reconciliation 
with Esau should also be seen as a paradigm for national reconciliation. Looking from 
this perspective, the Jacob-Esau story boldly calls into question the propriety of all 
subsequent stories which take for granted unquestionably a relationship of conflict 
between Israel and Edom, thereby neglecting Esau's embrace with Jacob. To get to the 
centre of the story, what must be asked is the God question. Where does God appear 
and subsequently how can God be perceived? Who is the God of Jacob? This is a 
difficult question but it can be asked because, as Walter Brueggemann reminds us, 
'[t]here are no troubled dimensions of human interaction which are removed from the 
43 Parts of the interpretation in this section I owe to a Bible Study by Dr. Jorg Barthel, Old Testament 
scholar in Reutlingen I Germany. 
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coming of the Holy God. And there are no meetings with the Holy God apart from the 
realities of troubled human life. ' 44 
Jacob and Esau are described as two opposed and totally different persons. One is 
in favour of his mother, the other of his father; one is a shepherd, the other a hunter; one 
is marked as decent and respectable, the other as wild and restless. One can hardly think 
of a bigger potential for conflict: two persons who live, speak, believe, dress, and even 
eat differently. They are strange to each other and it is here that one faces an essential 
reality of our human condition: strangeness, foreignness and unfamiliarity.45 Then 
Genesis 27 narrates a story of deception. Jacob deceives Esau and is blessed by his 
father instead of Esau. What follows is a tragedy. Esau's joy and expectations of 
receiving his father's blessing are ripped apart.46 He now has to face the bitter reality 
that his own brother has crushed all his hopes. Full of hate he tries to kill Jacob who 
manages just in time to run away. The immediate result of this plot of deception is a 
broken family: two alienated brothers, a bitter father, and a lonely mother. 
Jacob and Esau reflect a reality where differences and particularities are seen as 
opposed to one another. Otherness is not interpreted in a positive way as an enrichment 
for human community but rather seen in a negative way as a threat to relationships 
where one only feels safe if one is able to subdue and subordinate the other. Jacob knew 
the weaknesses of Esau. He was sly and intelligent, while Esau was a little bit naive. 
The scene in Genesis 25 where Esau sells his first-born-rights to Jacob over a meal of 
pottage is especially illuminating. 'Here things are governed by human need (Esau) and 
human cleverness (Jacob).'47 One is hungry, naive and not particularly gifted and the 
other one intentionally takes advantage of this situation. Esau's need and hunger, 
however, must not be understood as an expression of laziness, dumbness or moral 
inferiority. It rather indicates his particular situation and circumstances and signifies his 
life situation from which he cannot escape. Weizsacker's notion of crisis, Frankl's 
description of human beings' striving for meaning and Levinas' account of the 
problems of reductionist perceptions of being without the other are all present in this 
story. In a nutshell, the narration leading up to Genesis 33 highlights a struggle with 
otherness and particularity and displays typical elements of what it means to be human. 
44 Genesis, Interpretation. A Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 
1982),210. 
45 This story 'is realistic about power and position in the family, about the practices of promise and 
deception, about wages and departures and reconciliation': Brueggeman, Genesis, 206. 
46 For an account of blessing in the Old Testament: Claus Westermann, Der Segen in der Bibel und im 
Handeln der Kirche (Mtinchen: Kaiser, 1992), esp. 56-61. 
47 Brueggemann, Genesis, 217. 
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4.2.4 Genesis 33: Towards reconciDiation 
All the dramatic incidents reach their climax in Genesis 33. Esau and Jacob finally find 
new ways of interpreting their situation and subsequently move towards reconciliation. 
Many years have passed since the plot of deception and Jacob himself has had to 
experience many ups and downs in his life. But eventually the story moves towards the 
unavoidable, the encounter between the two brothers. Esau was on his way to meet 
Jacob and this time Jacob had no chance to turn around and run away. He had to meet 
his brother face to face. He was anxious and frightened. He not only prepared gifts for 
Esau but also a speech in which he wanted to ask for forgiveness. At this stage Jacob 
comes to realize that he had to deal with his wrongdoings. This whole preparation 
appears to emerge out of feelings of guilt and of fear and trembling. Jacob dreaded to 
see Esau because he still believed that he would hate him and so he adopted desperate 
measures to win Esau over.48 Acts of loyalty and submission determined his 
preparations. Esau is addressed as lord and master, while Jacob referred to himself as 
Esau's servant. Would he receive Esau's favour?49 When the story moves on to narrate 
the actual encounter between Jacob and Esau one is taken by surprise. Jacob is 
confronted with a situation he could never have predicted. 
And Jacob lifted up his eyes and looked, and behold, Esau was coming, and four hundred 
men with him .... He himself went on before them, bowing himself to the ground seven 
times, until he came near to his brother. But Esau ran to meet, and embraced him, and fell 
on his neck and kissed him, and they wept. 5° 
After that they introduced their families and then Jacob says: 
If l have found favour in your sight, then accept my present from my hand; for truly to 
see your face is like seeing the face of God, with such favour have you received me. 51 
This is an extremely important and central statement for understanding the final 
conclusion and the reconciliation between the two brothers. Jacob says to Esau: "For 
truly to see your face is like seeing the face of God!" The face of the other becomes the 
reflection of God's face. Jacob knew what he was talking about. Earlier in Genesis 32 
when Jacob prepares himself to meet Esau, we are told about Jacob's wrestling in the 
night with a man. This wrestling turned out to be an encounter with God. Jacob fought, 
48 Cf. Wenham, Genesis, 301. 
49 Cf. Claus Westermann, Genesis, Biblischer Kommentar Altes Testament, Band 1/2 {Neukirchen-VIuyn: 
Neukirchener Verlag, 1981), 639. 
50 Genesis 33.1.3-4. All biblical quotations are taken from the Second Edition of the Revised Standard 
Version. 
51 Genesis 33.10. 
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he won and he lost; he was hurt and had to learn to live with this weakness. Jacob called 
the place "face of God" and summarized his experience: "For I have seen God face to 
face, and yet my life is preserved."52 This is a remarkable interpretation since the 
common Israelite perception was that one who sees the face of God would die. 53 
Despite his weaknesses, despite him being a deceiver, he was reconciled with God. 54 
This experience is directly reflected in his encounter with Esau. His brother who was a 
stranger and an enemy, an image and reminder of his failure and weaknesses, becomes 
again a part of his life. Through Esau's act Jacob is able to integrate his brother's 
otherness as a reflection of his own life. Therefore his life is saved; his look into Esau's 
face mirrors the face of God. Although the narrator does not confuse God and brother 
there is an overlap. 'In the holy God, there is something of the estranged brother. And in 
the forgiving brother, there is something of the blessing God. ' 55 This is a very deep 
expression of what reconciliation means and shows the significance of integrating the 
other into one's own self-understanding and concept of life. The other, the stranger, and 
even the enemy become the carrier of God's face.56 God himself appears in the other 
which emphasises not just the condition of relationality between particular persons as 
individuals but also the inter-dependency between one person and another. With regard 
to the political level mentioned earlier, this entails the reconciling look of Israel into the 
eyes of Edom. If the Jacob-Esau story is construed as a story of origin between the two 
nations, then it should have the power to function as a critique for subsequent inter-
national developments. Some other texts intuitively support this experience. In Numbers 
33.37 and 34.3 we read that Israel settles next to Edom as his neighbour and not as his 
enemy, and Deuteronomy 23.8 states: "You shall not abhor an Edomite for he is your 
brother." Here we can detect a cluster of experiences that push beyond the human 
Angst-structure of political exclusion and open up space for reconciling 
responsiveness. 57 Especially because of the many hostile encounters between the two 
52 Genesis 32.30. 
s· 
J Exodus 33.20; Judges 6.22-23. Cf. G. v. Rad, Das erste Buch Mose, 282. 
54 
'Es besteht niimlich eine geheimnisvolle Entsprechung der Begegnung der BrUder mit der niichtlichen 
Begegnung Jakobs mit Gott, sowohl hinsichtlich der t<>dlichen Bedrohung Jakobs und seiner Angst, wie 
auch hinsichtlich seines Staunens tiber die ihm widerfahrene Huld': G.v. Rad, Das erste Buch Mose, 286. 
55 Brueggemann, Genesis, 272. 
56 These experiences then might challenge the whole of our theological enterprise, as Jorg Rieger 
reJ111!rks, 'with~l)tef)Col)nJ~~ w~th the Xt!P.r(!~~l?<l l}y~~n..e!h~r~ho is ~H!I!ren!, ~ncq~t~rs w~th the divine 
Other are unlikely': Remember the Poor (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 1998), 229. 
57 This parallels Israel's experience expressed in Leviticus 19.33-34 ("Love the sojourner as yourself."). 
Israel, despite other tendencies and developments, kept this vital theological insight alive. The stranger 
and foreigner must be treated equally to the native. Cf. Erhard Gerstenberger, Leviticus, Das Alte 
Testament Deutsch (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), 255: 'Es ist ein Ruhmesblatt der 
frilhjOdischen Gemeindetheologie sondergleichen, daB sich gegen aile Abgrenzungs- und Reinheits-
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nations, which rather highlight the fact of the human Angst-structure, the experience of 
Esau's embrace with Jacob and their reconciliation as an image of looking into God's 
face has to be rediscovered. 58 
4.2.5 Trinitarian implications 
This rather literal interpretation is not all one can say. Being placed in the interstices of 
the trinitarian framework, Jacob's reconciling experience with Esau and its 
interpretation as seeing the face of God opens up space for seeing God's triune nature. 
This contention I would now like to develop a little more. The whole story shows 
characteristic human sameness features. It is mainly fear and guilt which determine 
Jacob's behaviour (Genesis 32.5,7,11,20) and which become manifest in the preparation 
of gifts, the speech to find Esau's favour and the division of the people into two camps. 
Furthermore, it is important to notice that, once the reconciling embrace with Esau is 
over, Jacob is already suspicious again and does not know whether or not he can trust 
his brother (Genesis 33.8-17).59 The Angst-structure, which was overcome for a brief 
moment, prevails again. What is extremely relevant here is that within this sameness 
structure Jacob's experience pushes beyond it for a short moment. What Jacob expected, 
and what happened so often between the two peoples of Israel and Edam, either to 
retaliate or at the very least to reorganise the relationship in terms of loyalty and 
submission within a master-servant framework, did not happen. Esau had every right to 
be angry and the best outcome Jacob could hope for was that Esau would simply accept 
his acts of submission. Maybe they would exchange some words, shake hands and then, 
having settled an old dispute, depart again and leave each other in peace. Indeed, this is 
what seems to have happened if one tries to understand the story from its conclusion 
(vv.l 0-14). There, all is back to sameness experiences. Jacob cannot let go of his fear 
tendenzen (vgl. Esra 10; Neh 13) die lntegrationsanweisungen mit der geschichtlichen Begrtindung 
durchgehalten haben.' 
58 To support this point one could also draw attention to the story of Ruth which incorporates a Moabite 
woman into Israel and thereby connects in a direct genealogical way the story of a Non-Israelite with 
King David. Cf. Gillis Gerlemann, Ruth - Das Hohelied, Biblischer Kommentar Altes Testament 
(Neukirchen-VIuyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1965), esp. 26. That this story was passed on and found a place 
in Scripture is quite suggestive considering the fact - and given the significan~e of King David as the 
anointed one of Israel - that this cminectiori certainly revealed a black spot iri bavid's family tree. This 
story also penetrates human sameness assumptions and hence conveys a strong sense of God embracing 
the other. See also Goldingay who focuses on Naomi and shows how her story is one of bereavement and 
intermarriage closely connected with the bad reputation of the Moabites: OT Theology, 1:601-3. Cf. 
Judges 10.6; Genesis 19.30-37. 
59 Cf. G.v.Rad, Das erste Buch Mose, 286. 
185 
and so urges Esau to accept his gifts of restitution as a sign of repentance and 
confession. This obviously is a human precondition for reconciliation to take place.60 
However, Esau's behaviour does not fit in with Jacob's plans. Esau is not only surprised 
about the gifts with which Jacob wants to ease his anger (33.8) but also rejoices in 
seeing Jacob, runs towards him and unconditionally hugs and kisses him. At this point it 
is quite telling that Gerhard von Rad who wonders about Esau's sudden change -
because he wanted to kill Jacob (Genesis 27.41) - is only able to remark that the 
narrator leaves this riddle open. 61 Others speak of Esau' s magnanimity and generosity62 
or simply assume that Esau's resentment has long been vanished.63 All these 
explanations are unsatisfactory. Given the importance of the blessing in the Old 
Testament and hence Esau's understandable fury, Israel's history with Edom and finally 
certain behavioural codes necessary in order to enact reconciliation - and even granted 
that Esau's bad feelings towards Jacob were somehow alleviated to a certain degree-
Esau's behaviour cannot reasonably be explained by recourse to human generosity 
which in this case rather amounts to a god-like, heroic and quite superhuman act. 
Interestingly Jacob himself was not able to trust Esau's generosity. Is it not precisely 
here where we have to talk about God's otherness breaking into human sameness 
experiences? There is no appropriate explanation for Esau's astonishingly loving and 
gratuitous behaviour merely on the grounds of what it means to be human. Esau has 
changed, yes, but so completely unexpectedly that there is no sameness answer to this 
riddle. Even Jacob, after the amazing encounter with Esau (v.4), cannot work out what it 
all means. In other words, once the embrace is over, the Angst-structure is back. What is 
expressed in Jacob's words reaches beyond his own understanding. The encounter 
between brothers, and not merely Esau as an individual human other, becomes the 
vehicle of divine revelation.64 Complete and unconditioned forgiveness, an embrace by 
the other, and a loving look into each other's face, lasting only for a few moments, 
become experiences of a most intense divine encounter. Referring back to Viktor 
Frankl, one could interpret this encounter as an experience of the inseparable unity of 
60 Westennann in his interpretation remains completely within the constraints of this sameness structure 
and therefore is not able to realize what I call "divine otherness breaking into the human condition": 
Westennann, Genesis, 639-46. 
61 Das erste Biich Mose, 286. 
62 Westennann, Genesis, 646. 
63 E.A. Speiser, Genesis, The Anchor Bible (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1964), 260. 
64 This is even more surprising because it also reaches beyond the more known experiences of divine 
encounters which manifest themselves in visions (Isaiah 6) or encounters with the angel of the Lord 
(Judges 6). 
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meaning, responsibility and transcendence.65 Jacob, looking for meaning in his life, is 
faced by the ultimate meaning ( Obersinn) in an event of gratuitous response. 
Additionally, looking through the prism of the doctrine of imago dei, it is obviously not 
the face as a part of the human body which would signify Esau as having the image (or 
the face) of God. It is rather the reconciling encounter between the two brothers which 
becomes an illustration and a realisation of divine communion.66 Within the experience 
of normal ways of greeting relatives - running, embracing, falling on the neck, 
weeping67 - however now under most unusual circumstances, God appears. God makes 
himself known within an experience that is not only in need of a narrative but also of a 
plurality of persons. There is no running and embracing without the other; there is no 
friendly look and no forgiving encounter without the other. Jacob utters "God" and sees 
himself in the arms of Esau. Jacob experiences unexpected forgiveness, in contrast to 
restitution as a precondition for reconciliation to take place, and looks into Esau's eyes 
and they weep together. Jacob says "face of God" and they fall around each other's 
necks. At this point one realizes that God-talk needs person-talk. Jacob's and Israel's 
belief in the one God manifests itself in a personal encounter. The belief in the one God 
needs the narrative to become meaningful for human life. This story, then, on a 
theological level is not about Esau's super-human generosity and how he was able to 
change so drastically but about God penetrating the human sameness structure to show 
himself. Jacob's words "for truly to see your face is like seeing the face of God" allow 
us to see the triune God in and through this experience of a personal encounter. The 
God of Jacob reveals himself through an experience of persons in communion. 
Using the language of the trinitarian framework proposed here, it can be said 
that the triune God, accommodating himself in the Spirit to the human thought 
framework, uses the human condition of two estranged brothers who succeed despite all 
odds and objections of human sameness explanations in achieving a reconciling 
embrace to reveal godself in this situation, reflecting unconditioned forgiveness and 
divine love. A portrayal of divine persons running towards and embracing one another 
and treating one another as relatives, that is to say as equal persons who long for each 
other, emerges as a meaningful and possible description of divine communion. One 
might also talk of a circle of love, persons in communion who enact unconditioned 
forgiveness which transcends the human Angst-structure and its inherent need for 
65 Cf. Chapter Three, subsection 3.4.1.3. 
66 For an account of the doctrine of imago dei and its significance, Chapter Five, part 5.4. 
67 Cf. Wenham, Genesis, 298. 
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restitution and compensation. The story of Genesis 33 renders accessible the possibility 
of God's social identity as a truthful description of divine love and so to speak 
meaningfully of a communion of divine persons who look into each other's faces and 
embrace each other. 
4.3 THE STORY OF THE PRODIGAL SON 
4.3.1 From Jacob to Jesus 
Before considering an interpretation of Jesus' narrative theology, I want to recall the 
fact that taking the incarnation seriously means that God was completely exposed to the 
human condition. This entails that Jesus' experiences were dependent on the conditions 
of human experience and therefore have to be understood as embedded in the 
particularities and thought frameworks of his time. Additionally, since the stories we 
find in the Gospel tradition are stories about the remembered Jesus, the problem 
becomes even more complex. Hence, interpreting Jesus' narrative theology is not a 
straightforward matter and too simplistic conclusions have to be avoided. However, if 
revelation takes place without God violating the human condition, then, although 
dependent upon a particular time in history, the remembered stories about Jesus do not 
lose their primary significance. They reflect common experiences of Jesus' disciples 
who participated in Jesus' own experiences.68 When I tum to Luke 15.11-32 as an 
example of Jesus' narrative theology,69 the procedure of working my way through the 
story is similar to the one in the previous part. Again, in order to say where Jesus' 
experiences reveal something about God's triune life, we have to be attentive to the 
dialectic between sameness and otherness. 
To find a suitable starting point for this endeavour we have to look at the 
conclusion of the previous part. Hence, we are confronted with the primary notion of an 
embrace as a possible metaphor for Trinity talk. If I want to advance the argument 
responsibly, it is indispensable to connect this image with memories of the remembered 
Jesus that seem to oppose it. All human images remain ambiguous and have to be 
68 Cf. Chapter Two, section 2.3~3. See also Srutllmacher: 'Jesus' person, his behaviour and his word have 
to be perceived as God's embodiment. Jesus was not merely a God sent eschatological prophet but he also 
testified the reign of God as God's parable in person': Bib/ische Theo/ogie des Neuen Testaments, 1:74. 
[My translation.] Cf. Hurtado in respect to John's Gospel: 'In GJohn Jesus not only is associated with the 
glory of God, he is the glory of God manifest': Lord Jesus Christ, 380. 
69 For an account of the significance of Jesus' parables, Hahn, Theo/ogie des Neuen Testaments, 1:63-9. 
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carefully circumscribed if we want to employ them meaningfully for Trinity talk. It 
must therefore be conceded that the image of an embrace also evokes two closely 
correlated experiences: exclusion and assimilation. People, for example, who are not 
included in an embrace might feel excluded and isolated from others, while people who 
are embraced too tight might be frightened to lose their own particularity and self-
identity. Jacob's experience did not help us in that respect. Hence I hope to discover 
some advancing insights from Luke's remembered Jesus. To begin with, I now would 
like to offer some reflections on the notion of exclusion within Jesus' own ministry. 
4.3.2 Jesus and the language of exclusion 
Luke's Gospel puts an enormous stress on Jesus' love and care for the poor, the sick, 
the sinner and the outcast. Jesus, so to speak, is remembered as someone who embraces 
people who need help and long for healing and meaning in their lives.70 Two passages 
of the Lukan Sondergut may function as a brief illustration. The first narrates an event 
where Jesus encounters the Pharisee Simon and the woman who was known as a sinner 
(Luke 7 .36-50). In this encounter Jesus opens up possibilities for change and healing. 
Facing both and speaking to both he offers new perspectives in order to break down 
harmful and excluding boundaries.71 The second passage reports how Jesus shares life 
with a tax collector in the most profound way, eating and drinking and being his guest 
(Luke 19.1-10).72 Zacchaeus experiences a transformation through Jesus' proximity and 
love. Romano Guardini, surveying the whole of the Gospel tradition, pointedly 
summarizes this "embracing" side of Jesus' ministry. 
Jesus' power of healing is so inexhaustible that he addresses the human needs which 
press near. He does not tum away; the wounds, the crippled limbs, the distorted people, 
all the pain does not frighten him. He stands firm .... The word: "come to me all of you" 
- cf. Matt II :28- he does it, even before he utters it.73 
70 In many stories Jesus heals, helps and teaches so that people may live and have access to life (cf. Luke 
4.16-21 ). He liberates people from their isolated ivory towers, opens up their eyes to widen their 
perspectives, and frees them from evil and separating bonds that they may live. Cf. Udo Schnelle, The 
Human Condition: Anthropology in the Teachings of Jesus, Paul, and John (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1996), 17-8; Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ, 277. 
71 For an exegetical discussion, Heinz SchUrmann, Das Lukasevangelium, Herder Theologischer 
~P'WTI'~JlmL.<fJ~i~.urg: l::ler,d~r, l9,Ji4),, 1 :~29~3._ Cf. J\[1!91! .S!einer and Volj(_!:r We}'Tl.!ann, who. stress 
Jesus' embracing attitude: Bibelarbeit in der Gemeinde. Jesus Begegnungen (Basel: Friedrich Reinhardt 
Verlag, 1987), 46-7, 
72 For Hahn Jesus' meals and his table fellowship with different people (disciples, sinners, teachers of the 
law) belong to one of the core pieces of Jesus ministry, enacting his proclamation ofthe coming kingdom 
of God: Theologie des Neuen Testaments, I :62-3. 
73 Der Herr. Ober Leben und Person Jesu Christi (Freiburg: Herder, 1980), 52. [My translation.] 
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However, although this emphasis is paramount, it does not represent the whole picture. 
Some parts of Luke's Gospel confront us with words of rejection and exclusion. There 
exists a puzzling dialectic in Jesus' proclamation between all-embracing and all-loving 
statements, on the one hand, and rather harsh, rejecting and excluding words, on the 
other. There is a certain kind of togetherness of embrace and what looks like exclusion. 
In Luke 6.24-26, for instance, Jesus speaks harsh words against the rich, while in 6.27-
38 he expounds in depth what it means to love one's enemy and how to embrace one's 
neighbour. Then there are challenging words on the topic of "following Jesus" which 
seem to be a matter of "in" or "out" (Luke 9.23-27.57-62). Either one follows Jesus 
wholeheartedly or else one is excluded from his company. In the former case it seems 
that one is embraced by Jesus, while in the latter it is rather the opposite. Finally, to give 
a penetrating example, in Luke I land 12 Jesus utters severe words against the Pharisees 
that lead to the following poignant statement: 
And I tell you, everyone who acknowledges me before men, the Son of man also will 
acknowledge before the angels of God; but he who denies me before men will be denied 
before the angels of God. And every one who speaks a word against the Son of man will 
be forgiven; but he who blasphemes against the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven (Luke 
12.8-1 0). 
This statement clearly shows that Jesus is also remembered as someone who used the 
language of exclusion. In this particular case this is important to note because Jesus 
construes this passage in a trinitarian way: confessing him as the Son of man before 
God the Father goes hand in hand with confessing the Holy Spirit. The passage then 
might also be interpreted as a warning not to blaspheme against experiences of the 
triune God. Hence the question might be asked whether or not this remembered speech 
of Jesus in which he alludes to his divine communion with the Father and the Holy 
Spirit ultimately hints at a communion that excludes others. 74 Disappointingly, biblical 
commentators seem to circumnavigate the problem and take the edge off it. Eduard 
Schweizer's interpretation, for instance, is determined by the topic of discipleship 
without fear. The passage is merely a warning not to deny Jesus and to confess him 
boldly without fear before the world.75 Similar is Walter Grundmann's explanation 
where he expounds these words under the heading of "Call to confident and confessing 
74 This question is also important in view of Moltmann's trinitarian account of friendship in opposition to 
lordship that appears to be void of any kind of exclusion. Cf. Chapter One, section 1.2.1. 
75 Das Evangelium nach Lukas, Das Neue Testament Deutsch (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1986), 133-5. 
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faith."76 Although both state that these words reflect a serious warning against possible 
ruin and depravity in view of the final judgement, no discussion takes place of the 
inherent problem of the meaningfulness of the language of exclusion in the midst of 
insider talk (i.e., an experience of embrace).77 Where is the triune God in all this and 
what does this rhetoric entail for God-talk? Where are Jesus' experiences determined by 
human sameness structures and where might they well penetrate into divine reality? It is 
therefore essential to offer some brief reflections on this issue. One way forward would 
be to follow the strategy of the previous part. Human sameness structures which 
influenced Jesus' earthly experiences and therefore do not easily lend themselves for 
revealing divine otherness could then be outlined in a first step. 78 What seems to be 
more helpful here, however, is to link the above dilemma directly with the basic 
condition of human relationality and thereby clarify the boundary territory for Jesus' 
theological language. 
On this ground it can be argued that if the above passage amounted to a 
statement oftotal exclusion in opposition to a total embrace (assimilation) it would also 
rob the concept of embrace of its meaning. Experiences of both exclusion and embrace 
make sense only within the human condition if relationality is presupposed. An embrace 
can only take place if there are others to embrace without my particularity being 
dissolved into nothingness and exclusion can only be experienced as isolation if others 
abandon me, however, without vanishing altogether. Within the human condition the 
parts and the whole need each other; there is no being without the other. In other words, 
there are always relations. Life is only possible as a Gestaltkreis. A notion of total 
exclusion without the other still being there is nonsense because it violates the essence 
of life. Consequently it is not meaningful to imagine a state of exclusion which is void 
of God. The same, obviously, must be said with respect to the notion of assimilation as 
the other side of the coin. Total assimilation as the counterpart of total exclusion where 
particularity vanishes altogether is not meaningful. Hence the image of an embrace as a 
loving encounter always entails some traces of exclusion (experiences of otherness -of 
being oneself) and assimilation (experiences of sameness - of losing oneself) as its two 
76 Das Evangelium nach Lukas, Theologischer Handkommentar zum Neuen Testament (Berlin: 
Evangelische V,erlags~_l]~talt., 1971 ), 25 I -5. , . _ --~ ___ _ 
77 In Luke's context these words are addressed to the followers of Jesus (Luke 12.4). Thus people who are 
"in" suddenly hear words of total exclusion. 
78 Dualistic ideologies, frameworks of master and slave or simply experiences of isolation and despair 
could be mentioned. They all convey the unavoidable experience of being excluded. Jesus then might 
have had no other choice but simply to use these patterns as examples. However, the question posed 
above where Jesus' proclamation might say something about divine reality, still would not be answered. 
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boundary poles. Consequently, the words of Jesus, if they want to remain meaningful 
for human experience, find their limit precisely at this boundary of human relationality. 
If this is taken into consideration, a guiding principle appears, namely, that 
Jesus' words and acts must be interpreted within the dialectic between exclusion and 
assimilation. This perspective opens up the possibility to understand both Jesus' loving 
and excluding words as an attempt to clarify the meaning of the language of embrace as 
an image of God's triune life.79 One focus of Jesus' ministry is to enact and describe 
divine love. But in order to do this within the human condition, Jesus needs to say what 
it is that brings us closer to this love (reflecting the divine embrace to a higher degree) 
and what leads us away from it (distorting the embrace). The notion of love itself carries 
with it a radical sense of excJusion. Insofar as divine love signifies all that which 
enables and sustains meaningful life as it is meant by God, everything that contradicts 
that love cannot be called love and hence must be excluded from any meaningful image 
of a loving embrace. 80 This points to a crucial aporia that ultimately cannot be solved 
but rather makes one aware of the fact that theology always falls short of grasping God. 
We might call this, to borrow a phrase from Weizsacker, an experience of ANTILOGJSCH 
EXISTENCE.81 Love as something distinctive can only be so if it is not dissolved into 
sameness. This means that there must be something of which it can be said that it is 
opposed to love. From this perspective it can be argued that Jesus' words sometimes 
press hard against the outer boundaries of meaningful language because life, as it is 
given to us by a loving God, is at stake. Jesus' words of exclusion express the fact that 
when people exclude each other in a way that they ignore the other's dignity and live at 
the expense of others, they de facto violate God's love. Where human life neglects its 
own precondition, namely its essence of integrated otherness and reconciling 
particularity, it amounts to destroying human sociality in the image of the triune God. 
When this happens life indeed turns into hell and experiences of exclusion prevail. In 
Luke's Gospel, Jesus' wrath is justified by the Pharisees' or other people's unsocial 
behaviour towards their fellow people. Pride and arrogance, usury and greed, exclusion 
of neighbours and hypocritical judgement are named as reasons for Jesus' excJusive 
1anguage.82 Where human beings ground their behaviour in systems of fear, in thought 
79 Hence one might say in regard to the human condition ttiat 'bearing Cod's image is not just a fact, it is 
a vocation': Wright, The Challenge of Jesus, 141. 
80 I John 4.\6.18: "God is love, and he who abides in love abides in God, and God abides in him ... There 
is no fear in love, but perfect love casts out fear." 
81 Cf. Chapter Three, subsection 3.4.2.6. 
82 E.g. Luke 11.37-54; 12.13-21; 16.14-18.19-31. 
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frameworks of threatening otherness or in ideologies of "in" and "out", denying each 
other access to the table of life, they exclude themselves from the love of God. 
Finally, Jesus' speech in Luke 12 about people who deny God's presence in the 
Son of man and in the Spirit, then, might refer to human beings who cut themselves off 
from their exocentric being and disregard their openness towards an ultimate meaning.83 
From a theological perspective, such denial amounts to abandoning the possibility of 
revelation occurring within the human condition altogether. God would be the total 
other leaving creation in complete isolation. This, obviously, mirrors an ultimate crisis 
because it contradicts the very essence of Jesus' ministry as the Son of God. Where 
people choose to go down this road, Jesus has need for the language of exclusion in 
order to say something meaningful about divine love at all. Talk about a divine loving 
embrace, consequently, might then entail the language of exclusion, however, without 
turning the language of exclusion itself into divine attributes. 
To summarize, it can be concluded that Luke's emphasis on the embracing side of 
Jesus' ministry is not contradicted by Jesus' language of exclusion. Experiences of 
embracing love, to be distinctive and to remain meaningful for human life, are in need 
of the language of exclusion in order to specify the characteristics of love, however, 
without becoming itself the focus of attention. The confession in God as love, the 
insight that human being is directed towards integrated otherness and reconciling 
particularity and Jacob's experience of God oblige us to assume that traces of revelatory 
significance within Jesus' own narrative theology are most likely to be found where the 
language of a loving embrace is deepened as an image of divine communion. Hence it 
will also be useful to look at the story in Luke 15.11-32 through the lens of the Jacob-
Esau narrative. This will allow me ultimately to see better where Jesus' descriptions are 
in agreement with my interpretation of Genesis 33 and where they reach beyond. 
4.3.3 Luke 15: The father's embrace 
To begin with, let me briefly mention some similarities between Jesus' story and 
Genesis 33. Jesus tells his story as a response to the Pharisees' protest that he has table 
fellowship with tax collectors and sinners. Hence the story deals with the themes of 
exclusion and embrace, with the struggle for identity, and with the question of how God 
interacts with human beings who are embedded in a social reality that is, on the one 
83 Luke 12.49-53 and 13.22-30. Cf. Chapter Three, section 3.4.1. 
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hand, in need of rules and regulations but is, on the other hand, also more than that. This 
is also a theme which we have already encountered in the relationship between Esau and 
Jacob, Israel and Edom. Moreover, Jesus narrates the relationship between three 
persons, a father and his two sons and their respective problems with one another. 
Again, one immediately becomes aware of the parallels with Genesis 33, be it the 
distorted relationship between Esau and Jacob or their struggle with particularity and 
otherness. 
The story in Luke 15.11-3284 begins with a rather unacceptable breach of right 
behaviour by the younger son's audacious demand for his share of property and his 
decision to depart and leave the family. With this step the younger son breaks with the 
ethos of ancient household solidarity. 85 But not only that, the younger son also excludes 
himself from the social relationships which gave him shelter and home. Moreover, if we 
consider that the characters in the story are identified by relational designations- father, 
son, brother - then 'the very identity of each character is unthinkable without the others. 
The son's breach with the family was total... His project was to un-son himself. ' 86 From 
this perspective it becomes intelligible why the father later in the story calls him lost 
and dead. 
But how does the father react? The amazing point here is that the father Jets the 
son go. He pays him out and gives him permission to leave. However, in connection 
with the son's project to un-son himself, the father acts most tellingly in a different 
manner. The father 'who lets the son depart does not let go of the relationship between 
them. The eyes that searched for and finally caught sight of the son in "the distance" 
(v.20) tell of a heart that was with the son in "the distant country" (v.13).'87 This is 
important to underline because the father never "un-fathers" himself; he never becomes 
a non-father although the son in his own reflections on his past, when he is about to 
come home, thinks of himself as a "son no longer worthy to be called a son" (vv. 19, 
21). He would rather cancel his family ties and be treated as a "non-son." But the father 
remains also the father of the "son who thinks he is a non-son," because he would not 
84 The following interpretation is indebted to Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1996), 156-65. For a more traditional interpretation in its biblical context: Eta 
Linnemann, Gleichnisse Jesu (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), 79-87. 
85 Cf. Schweizer, Evangelium nach Lukas, 164; Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 157. For a different view: 
Gerd Petzke, Das Sond_ergut des Evangeliums nach Lukas; ~zurcher Werkkommentare zur Bibel (zurich: 
Theologischer Verlag ZUrich, 1990), 138-9. 
86 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 158. Wright comments: 'For the younger son to ask for his share of the 
inheritance is almost unthinkable: it is the functional equivalent of saying to his father, "I wish you were 
dead."': Jesus and the Victory of God, 129. 
87 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 159. 
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let the "lost" and "dead" son out of his heart's embrace. Consequently when the lost son 
comes home the father runs towards him and embraces him. For the father, to be father 
without his sons is unthinkable. Volf summarizes pointedly: 
Without the father's having kept the son in his heart, the father would not have put his 
arms around the prodigal. No confession was necessary for the embrace to take place for 
the simple reason that the relationship did not rest on moral performance and therefore 
could not be destroyed by immoral acts. The son's return from "the distant country" and 
the father's refusal to let the son out of his heart sufficed.88 
The confession of wrongdoing surely plays a crucial part in the story but the order 
envisaged by the son - first "confession" and second "non-son relationship" - is not just 
simply turned around but transcended by an unconditional act of embrace. For the 
celebration to begin the son's confession was not abandoned but it followed the 
acceptance. The father surpasses the thoughts of the younger son whose expectations 
were governed by a strict logic of rules which mark the boundaries between good and 
bad, faithfulness and disloyalty. 89 If you have failed you are "out" and if you have 
dishonoured your family then there is no way back. The younger son's reflection, "treat 
me as one of your hired servants" (v.l9), highlights the fact that this was indeed his 
logic and the only way to go about things because returning home as a son amounted to 
disgracing the whole family in the eyes of everybody.90 
Interestingly, it is this logic of clear-cut exclusion or assimilation that connect the 
younger and the older brother. For all their differences, in this respect they are very 
much alike. The older brother, unlike the father, did not keep the younger brother in his 
heart. Hence he ''un-brothers" himself and when the father welcomes back the younger 
son he also "un-sons" himself. He comments on his fury about the father's behaviour 
with the words "when this son of yours came back" (v.30) implying that as long as the 
father and the younger son have a father-son relationship he has to exclude himself. Just 
as the younger son's project, the older son's is in a similar way to "1m-brother" and 
subsequently to "un-son" himself. He is enraged because basic rules have been broken, 
rules by which one is either "in" or "out". Would not most people side with the older 
brother when possessory and inheritable rights are at stake? We might want to forgive 
the younger son, but would we also put a ring on his finger and exercise an act of 
reinstatement and restitution? The father, however, never denying that the younger son 
has done wrong and that the older brother has every right to be upset, not only reaches 
88 Ibid., 159. 
89 Cf. Grundmann, Das Evangelium nach Lukas, 313. 
90 Cf. Wright, Jesus and the Victory ofGod, 129. 
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beyond the older son's logic of rule adherence but also beyond our modem sensitivities 
and interpretations of justice. Life is more complex and ambiguous than the older 
brother wants to admit. From the very outline of the story it becomes obvious that the 
identity of each person is unthinkable without the others. Despite all wrongdoings 
relationships between persons cannot be annihilated by moral misbehaviour. This is 
why the father at the end of the story wholeheartedly embraces the older son by saying, 
"Son, you are always with me, and all that is mine is yours" (v.31 ). One cannot live and 
construct rules and also his own identity in isolation. What the father is trying to tell his 
older son is that before 'any rules can apply, he is a father to his sons and his sons are 
brothers to one another.' 91 The father's secret so to speak is his loving embrace which 
keeps both sons in his heart never terminating the relationship.92 The father represents 
someone who refuses to construct his own identity in separation from his sons. This 
entails the consequence that the sons themselves, although they would have liked to, 
ultimately cannot construct their identities without the father and the other brother. Un-
brothering, un-fathering, and un-soning are no way out any more. To confess one's 
wrongdoings and to repent certainly are vital ingredients for a process of reconciliation. 
However, exclusion as a form of drawing "in-out" borderlines and as an attempt to 
annihilate indissoluble relationships is no option. The father's embrace makes it 
impossible to "un-relation" relationships. 
Relationship is prior to moral rules; moral performance may do something to the 
relationship, but relationship is not grounded in moral performance. Hence the will to 
embrace is independent of the quality of behaviour, though at the same time 
"repentance," "confession," and the "consequences of one's actions" all have their own 
proper place.93 
4.3.4 Trinitarian trajectories 
Looking through the lens of Chapter Three and the Jacob-Esau narrative we have again 
observed typical elements of the human condition: struggles with otherness, 
particularity, Angst-structure and reconciliation. Both sons' behaviour represent 
sameness experiences which we already found in Jacob. From the angle of the social 
sciences, one could call this framework the dialectic between honour and shame. 
Honour 'belongs to the male to defend both corporate honor (i.e., family, clan or 
91 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 164. 
92 Cf. Schweizer, Das Evangelium nach Lukas, 166. 
93 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 164. 
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village) and any female honor embedded in the corporate honor. .. When a male loses 
his honor, he experiences negative shame. '94 From the perspective of the two sons, this 
framework fuels the conflict between the father and his sons and between the two sons. 
The younger son, ridden with guilt and having lost his honour, approaches the father in 
a similar way than Jacob approached Esau. He knew on the grounds of what he had 
done that he had to come back as a servant. This was expected by the older son whose 
anger is understandable and one could simply say correct because his younger brother 
fitted this category of a "shameless" person who does not acknowledge the rules of 
human interaction and social boundaries.95 What I called above "un-soning" and "un-
brothering", then, are the consequences of experiences of shame and honour. They are 
also manifestations of the human Angst-structure enacted through decisions that lead to 
the exclusion of the other. The "other" brother who left the common ground of social 
rules was perceived as a threat to the community. Assimilation was expected and 
submission to the common sameness framework. Where Jesus' narration pushes beyond 
these sameness assumptions of his time is precisely in the description of the father's 
behaviour. What the two sons expected, and what had happened so often between the 
two peoples of Israel and Edom, between ethnic groups within the Roman Empire and 
within human relationships in general, either to retaliate or to organise relationships in 
terms of loyalty and submission within a framework of honour and shame, did not 
happen. The father acted completely unexpected. Most striking is the fact that the father 
not only embraces his younger but also his older son. Moreover, he assures both, 
although the younger son un-soned himself and the older brother un-brothered himself, 
that he actually never un-fathered himself. In connection with Genesis 33 this leads to 
four crucial implications. 
First, while Jacob's reconciling expenence presupposes a mutual broken 
relationship, because both Jacob and Esau un-brothered themselves, Jesus' father never 
un-fathered himself. Hence in Jesus' story, there is a shift from temporary to lasting 
embrace. While Jacob's experience of God in the event of a personal embrace seemed 
to last only for a short moment, Jesus' father embraces both sons, organises a feast and 
assures them of their lasting relationship.96 Secondly, while in Genesis 33 Jacob's 
Angst-structure takes over, in Luke 15 it is the father's love. The father attempts to 
94 Bruce Malina and Jerome Neyrey, 'Honor and Shame in Luke-Acts: Pivotal Values of the 
Mediterranean World', in Jerome Neyrey (ed.), The Social World of Luke-Acts (Peabody: Hendrickson 
Publishers, 1991), 43. 
95 Ibid., 45. 
% Cf. Petzke, Das Sondergut des Evangeliums nach Lukas, 140. 
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show his sons that relationships come first and that sameness structures, where they lead 
to exclusion that distorts relationships, must be overcome. The seriousness of this 
implication is stressed in two ways, first, by the father's statement that the younger son 
was dead and lost but now is alive again and, secondly, by the older son's refusal to 
come to the feast. What Jacob's experience left open, namely the significance of a 
lasting embrace and its implication in regard of exclusive otherness, is now taken up by 
Jesus. Thirdly, Jesus' stress on the father not un-fathering himself emphasises the need 
for language of "persons in relations." In these words there is such a strong sense and 
confidence of unbroken relationship which transcends any simple explanation. Love, as 
was said earlier, is so fragile within human sameness structures especially when 
connected with experiences of guilt, honour and shame. According to human 
frameworks, the father would have still acted lovingly if he had un-fathered himself in 
this process, then forgiven and finally welcomed his son into the family. What else can 
we expect of human relationships? However, Jesus assures his listeners of the father's 
enduring and unbroken relationship with his sons. 
This leads to the last and final implication. While Jacob's experience was still 
limited by an event between two brothers, Jesus' story takes on board the third party. 
Saying this, I deliberately allude to Levinas' account of being.97 Theologically, the point 
here then is not the story on the literal level. It is not about a father and his two sons as 
an image of the Trinity and it is not about maleness or anything like it. It is rather the 
significance of the third party. The notion of "for-the-other" becomes truly meaningful 
within the realm of human experience if there is also "another" other. If there were only 
two there would be no real decision. Jesus' Father-talk becomes meaningfully in ways 
of three persons who interact with one another. Relationships and hence embraces have 
to be worked out and balanced within a circle of persons. Only when the third party 
enters the scene can one adequately talk of responsibility because decisions have to be 
made and the notion of a communion is taken seriously. Giving one's attention to one 
particular person leads simultaneously to a letting go of another. In view of this it is 
vital to notice that the two brothers only communicate with the father but not with the 
other brother. Hence their behaviour displays an exercise of diminished relationality that 
excludes the third party. While the younger son is not concerned at all with the question 
of how his behaviour might have affected his brother's life and reputation, the older son 
deliberately cuts himself off from his brother. In contrast, the father communicates with 
97 Cf. Chapter Three, subsection 3.4.3.3. 
198 
both and reassures them of his unbroken relationship with both. The father's embrace of 
the younger son does not lead to the exclusion of the older. Both are a part of his 
embrace. At this point divinity shines through. Jesus' theology pushes beyond human 
sameness assumptions. 
With this story Jesus tells us that his Father is always in relation and never un-
fathers himself; hence he maintains a real unbroken communion throughout. Through 
this notion Jesus' closeness with his Father through the Spirit manifests itself.98 In 
Frankl's terms one might call this an experience of ultimate meaning. Jesus relates to 
the divine reality and hints at what Levinas called the beyond structure of being, the 
one-for-the-other dimension, which is before any questioning. The trinitarian 
significance of this story then lies in Jesus' social theology of the father's behaviour as a 
reflection of what it means to be God as Trinity. Jesus' understanding of divine love 
evolves around a story which hinges on four notions: lasting embrace, unbroken 
relationship, relationships come first, and the significance of the third party. From this it 
follows that the relationship between the three divine persons is unbroken; there is no 
un-fathering, no un-soning and no un-spiriting. This understanding of communion is 
opposed to exclusion that disregards the relational structure of life, not because moral 
wrongdoings do not matter, but because relationships come first. This embrace is lasting 
and expresses mutual love. It portrays both the particularity of each divine person, 
hence includes the notion of otherness, and the complete togetherness and mutual 
integration of one another. 
In terms of a human story this embrace can be characterised as a caring for the 
other, taking the other seriously, respecting the other, wanting to be with the other and 
being there for the other without letting go of the relationship between them. In view of 
Jacob's experience, we might add the portrayal of persons running towards and 
embracing one another and treating one another as relatives, that is to say as equal 
persons who long for each other. If this is equally valid for the Son and the Spirit then 
this mutual love and communion can be described as a oneness of integrated otherness 
and reconciled particularity as the ground of being. This amounts to visualising the 
Trinity as a circle of persons in love, persons in communion who enact unconditioned 
98 See also the wider background of the Gospel tradition where Jesus is remembered as having an intimate 
relationship with God whom· he called Father: Matthew~6~9; 11.25-30; Luke 10.21-22; 11.2;· Mark 12.1-
12; 14.36. Cf. Gerald O'Collins, The Tripersonal God, 42-6; Dunn, Jesus Remembered, 724. In view of 
the Holy Spirit one might also point to Acts (1.8; 2; 8.26-40; I 0) where Luke narrates the impact of 
continuing experiences of the Spirit which vindicate the convictions about Jesus' redemptive death and 
resurrection for all humankind. But one might also include John 14-16 where the Spirit is portrayed as the 
advocate, spokesman, and agent of Jesus. Cf. Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ, 396-402. 
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forgiveness. This implies that there is no Angst-structure, no alienation, no assimilation 
and no exclusion in God. Divine responsibility includes the third party. As the ground 
of being, the Trinity displays a communion which reflects a perfected one-for-the-other 
relationship. 
Evidently, the last few descriptions do not apply to human relationships. Human 
embraces do not last, relationships are broken, people un-relation themselves and they 
neglect the importance of the third party. Hence Trinity talk is always accompanied by 
incomprehensibility. To visualize the Trinity as a loving embrace of persons who 
interact in the most perfect way is and remains a narrative of divine mystery. For human 
experience such perfection is impossible, it simply transcends the human condition. 
However, if this is kept in mind and if Trinity talk is always related to talk about the 
human condition in order to never lose sight of its limits, then the language proposed 
here is a meaningful contribution to theology: firstly, it describes meaningfully the 
ground of being and the horizon of our hope in familiar terms precisely as something 
that transcends the human condition and, secondly, it enables us to employ this 
language as a guiding framework for the exercise of human relationships. For human 
life as a reflection of divine trinitarian life, then, the task must be to work out the best 
possible embraces that steer their way through the pitfalls of exclusion and assimilation 
as it was set out in Chapter Three. This task leads beyond this chapter and will be taken 
up in the final part of the next chapter. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter attempted to give prominence to the interwovenness of human experience, 
the Bible, and the Trinity. If biblical stories are viewed through the lens of human 
expenence and if they are approached with an interstitial attitude that moves from 
expenence to revelation they open up space for Trinity talk. Placing myself in the 
interstices, I have tried to show how the different levels of human experience are 
connected with and nurture one another. The dialectical structure then can be 
maintained that biblical experience informs the Trinity and that belief in the Trinity 
informs the interpretation of biblical experience. This resulted in saying, firstly, that 
Israel's monotheistic belief in the one God of Jacob opened up towards God-talk in 
terms of persons-in-relation and, secondly, that Jesus' narrative theology built on this 
God-talk, extended it and received its most unique interpretation precisely within a 
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trinitarian framework. Moreover, the language of exclusion was elucidated in a 
meaningful way as signifying that which contradicts and denies the divine embrace 
between the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit as the source of all being. 
Acknowledging this, Jacob's experience of God and Jesus' talk about his Father pushed 
beyond the sameness structures of the human condition.99 God showed God's triune self 
in an experience of a personal embrace and in an event of a lasting and unbroken 
communion. In respect to both stories we observed that certain experiences of God are 
in need of the narrative in order to express how and who God is and that such narratives 
not only involve talk about persons in communion but also that within this communion-
talk relationships come first. From a theological starting point, this fact finds its ultimate 
cause in the Trinity itself. Looking through the prism of human experience, this 
circumstance is anchored in the human condition as it is given to us by God manifesting 
itself in experiences of the Spirit and of Jesus. 100 
Finally, being clear about the fact that Trinity talk utterly depends on human 
experience, the limits of theological discourse and therefore God's incomprehensibility 
always remain in sight. Space must be left open for divine and human otherness. While 
the human image of a loving embrace cannot completely get rid of the language of 
exclusion, the divine embrace utterly transcends this condition. Belief in the one God 
does not allow for exclusion as it is experienced within the human condition. Although 
we can say that God's otherness appears within human sameness structures, this does 
not mean that we get hold of God's otherness. Language remains metaphorical. 
Theology, so to speak, is a joint venture between both experience and revelation and 
between oneness and threeness. The notion of the mystery of God, which must be 
maintained within theological discourse, then can be seen precisely in this dialectic, 
namely, that belief in one God is in need of belief in the Trinity as a divine communion 
and that the reverse is also true. With these last remarks, however, I have already 
overstepped the limits of this chapter and opened the door to the next. 
99 Cf. Moberly's hermeneutical remark that the use of mystery 'should open up interpretation that moves 
beyond the possible position and meaning of such texts within a history of religious thought': The Bible, 
Theology, and Faith, 42. 
100 
'Jede Theologie ist auf ,positive Religion" angewiesen, und sei es, urn sie zu negieren. Theologie ist 
immer aufGeschichte angewiesen': JUnge!, Gott als Geheimnis der Welt, 311. 
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5 
AN INTERSTHTIAL TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION: 
DISCOURSE AS CREATIVE TENSION 
The previous chapter ended on a dialectical note. It was argued that belief in one God is 
in need of belief in the Trinity as a divine communion. This contention underlines the 
primary conviction of this chapter, namely, that theological discourse should be 
exercised as creative tension. In Chapter Two I argued that theology should be done 
from an open "in-between" place where the problem of identifying the relationship 
between experience and revelation is not yet solved. Such a methodology is not linear 
but rather spiral, it learns while it is on the road, integrating new insights, revisiting old 
ones, and correlating one with the other. Walking on this road, stopping at many 
different signposts of human life and examining various notions of God-talk, we have 
enhanced our understanding and the depth of revelation and human experience. Being 
placed in the interstice then means not only to relate the different levels of experience 
with one another but also to hold in tension the notions of the One and the Three. It is 
now time to draw the threads together and tum again more specifically to the field of 
systematic theology. 
In this final chapter I am now confronted with the task of finalising my account of 
an interstitial trinitarian theology. This endeavour demands what I want to call 
discourse as creative tension. 1 If trinitarian theology wants to keep the balance between 
the One and the Three and between the concept and the narrative it has to keep these 
poles in creative tension without dissolving the one into the other. Hence my intention is 
not, as is so common in contemporary trinitarian theology, to develop an integrative 
account in which one perspective is swallowed up by the other. What I rather attempt to 
do is to sustain this tension. Only then will one be able to relate creatively God-talk and 
talk about the human condition in a way that both inform each other on the common 
ground of human experience and thereby expand our understanding of the relationship 
between the Trinity and human life. In order to 9? ~~is, it is vital to refiQ.~ methodology. 
It is essential at this point to take up once again the question of hermeneutics and 
1 This is a corollary of Chapter Two, part 2.4. 
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include findings from the previous two chapters to work out in more detail how things 
hang together within trinitarian discourse as an exercise in maintaining creative tension. 
This will lead to a more fully developed interstitial theology. Once this is done, I will be 
able to draw on the conclusions from Chapter Three and Four and offer a final proposal 
of the Trinity and human life, both informing each other. 
The chapter is divided into four parts. In part one (5.2) I intend to revisit the old 
problem of the One and the Three with its inherent reductionisms. This analysis will 
help me to strengthen the case for interstitiality in accordance with insights from human 
experience. Building on Viktor von Weizsacker's contribution in part two (5.3), my aim 
is to offer a finalized account of a trinitarian Gesta/tkreis hermeneutics. This account 
will then be linked in the third part (5.4) with some reflections on the role of the 
doctrine of imago dei in order to clarify the relationship between the Trinity and human 
life, thereby giving the whole argument more weight. After having completed this task I 
will tum to the last part of this chapter (5.5) and propose an account of the Trinity in 
relation to human life. This part will summarize and conclude the argument of this 
work. 
5.2 THE ONE AND THE THREE: A MISLEADING DICHOTOMY 
1 cannot think of the One 
without immediately being surrounded by the radiance of the Three; 
nor can 1 discern the Three 
without at once being carried back to the One. 
GREGORY NAZIANZEN (Oratio 40.41) 
In his article 'Radical Monotheism and the Trinity' Christoph Schwabe] concludes that 
contemporary theology should reflect on the two-fold thesis: 'Only a radically 
monotheistic theology can be a proper trinitarian theology, and only a proper trinitarian 
theology can be a radically monotheistic theology. ' 2 This statement sounds similar to 
the one quoted above from Gregory Nazianzen which tries to keep the balance between 
the One and the Three. However, there seems to be a difference. How does Schwobel 
conceive of the relation between the One and the Three? Phrases like "relational 
trinitarian monotheism" and "the trinitarian structure of Christian monotheism"3 rather 
seem to imply a certain kind of logical priority of the oneness of God"s nature over 
against the threeness of trinitarian personhood. This exhibits an attempt to elaborate a 
2 Neue Zeitschrift fur Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 43 (200 I), 74. 
3 Ibid., 70.74. 
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unifying and universal concept in which the distinct Christian experience of God as 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is ultimately swallowed up by an account of structural 
relationality as a principle of the one God. This suspicion is strengthened if one 
becomes aware of the fact that Schwabe] draws heavily on Gunton's concept of 
"transcendentals", which ultimately dissolves the notion of one ousia into the notion of 
divine communion.4 His analogy rests on the divine persons who are, in their trinitarian 
context, constituted by their relations. In Gunton divine particularity and personhood 
gain priority as a means of developing a new conception of the notion of substance 
based on the idea of relationality.5 Hence, I would like to take up some problems from 
Chapter One and shed fresh light on them from the insights gained in Chapter Two and 
Three. My claim will be that unless we abandon any logical priority between the notions 
of ousia and hypostasis and treat them as equal poles of theological inquiry into the 
doctrine of God we will always end up violating human experience. This seems to be 
part of the problem that arises between so-called proponents of social doctrines of the 
Trinity and others who favour a strict monotheistic starting point for their enterprise. 
Those trinitarian theologians who attempt to reconcile both sides (for instance Gunton 
or Schwobel) still prioritise, although in a more subtle way, one notion over the other. 
To begin with let me turn once more to the concept ofrelationality. 
Relationality has been and still is one of the key concepts m contemporary 
trinitarian theology. It is used to emphasise the notion of hypostasis or person within the 
doctrine of God and to express God's being as a being-in-communion. However, as I 
have tried to show in the first chapter, this shift towards relationality turned out to be a 
replacement of one one-sided emphasis with another. Accusing many theologians of 
giving the notion of substance priority over the notion of person, contemporary 
trinitarian theologians who are in favour of some kind of social doctrine of the triune 
God give clear priority to the notion of three divine persons over against the one 
substance. Because revelation history has to be the point of departure for any reflection 
on God, they argue, God as he has revealed himself in the economy as Father, Son, and 
Spirit is what he really is in himself, namely and first of all a threeness of persons. 
Although this argument bears much validity, if taken too straightforwardly it neglects 
the consequence that any substance-talk that is derived from a threeness of persons must 
-
4 Gunton argues that the 'substance of God, "God", has no ontological content, no true being, apart from 
communion' (Promise, 9) and that the 'three do not merely coinhere, but dynamically constitute one 
another's being', they exist in 'reciprocal eternal relatedness' (The One, 164). For more details, see 
Chapter One, section 1.2.3. 
5 See Gunton, The One, 180-209. 
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necessarily lead to a unifying principle of the Three rather than an affirmation of the one 
God.6 A unifying principle has to be distinguished from the talk of one divine 
substance. But to avoid any misunderstanding, in saying this it should also be 
remembered that the same problem accompanies opponents of the social doctrine of the 
Trinity who favour a theistic approach in the name of divine oneness and simplicity. For 
any talk about the Trinity which is solely derived from the oneness of the divine being 
necessarily leads to the conclusion that the doctrine is nothing more than a helpful 
grammatical device.7 Both sides then rest on a misleading dichotomy, respectively 
presupposing their own starting point as prior to the other. 
This problem indicates a major weakness within trinitarian theology, namely, the 
one-sided employment of the concept of relationality. Reference to relationality tends to 
be essential only in regard of the three divine persons but not with respect to the divine 
ousia and as a theological hermeneutics regarding the relation between the oneness and 
threeness of God. The theological question, which arises out of this consideration, is 
whether a trinitarian theology that emphasises the notion of being-in-communion must 
necessarily lead to the suppression of the notion of ousia. To clarifY the matter let me 
briefly refer to Colin Gunton's theology. In Chapter One I have identified an ambiguous 
and misleading argumentation. 8 Gunton contends that because the three divine persons 
are what they are not due to a common substance but due to their mutual indwelling, in 
other words their perichoretic communion, they are what they are only by virtue of an 
eternal relatedness. Substance, therefore, does not indicate another underlying principle 
of deity but rather is constituted by three persons in communion. Because Gunton does 
not want to stress the singularity of each of the divine persons (and receive the same 
tritheism-critique as Moltmann) he has to lift the concept of relationality onto an 
ontological level over against the concept of substance. This shift leads him to the 
sublation of substance-talk by relationality-talk with the result that the notions of 
A 
oneness and substance are derived from the perspective of the particular as constituted 
6 Cf. Chapter One, section 1.2.2 on Moltmann. 
7 Nicholas Lash in his Believing Three Ways in One God (London: SCM Press, 2002) is a good example. 
He is convinced that - in following Augustine - 'the distinction between "substance" and "person" in 
Latin terminology is "purely and simply one of linguistic convention"' (p. 31 ). And he concludes: 'we 
have relationships, God is the relationships that he has ... God, we might say, is relationship without 
remainder, which we, most certainly, are not' (p.32). However, it should not be forgotten that due to the 
trinitarian distinctions ofF ather, Son, ~d Spirit in the evept of revelation,, characterizing divine reality, it 
is rath~er the unit)/of the divine substance whkll is hidden than the other way round. Cf. Pannenberg, 
Systematic Theology, I :340-1. 
8 Cf. Chapter One, section 1.2.4. 
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by the whole. Gunton anchors the reality of substance in the particular.9 His argument 
goes something like this. Since the particular gains its distinctiveness only through 
being placed within the whole it is the whole which constitutes the particular. Common 
to all particulars is that which makes the particular a distinct and unique particular, 
namely, the relations. In virtue of this, the single particular cannot have priority, 
because otherwise in respect to God-talk this would inevitably lead to tritheism. But 
since Gunton is reluctant to uphold the notion of ousia in a dialectic structure with the 
notion of three hypostaseis, he is forced to anchor the notion of God's oneness in the 
universal notion of relatedness. Each person is therefore constituted by relationality and 
hence eternal relatedness becomes the substance of God. What Gunton is effectively 
doing here is reducing the concept of substance to the concept of communion instead of 
keeping both concepts in a balanced dialectic. Although Gunton in his concern for 
practical and social implications in linking the doctrine of God with the human 
condition never loses sight of the particular person as an individual, the universal marks 
of being, the abstract and general notions of perichoresis and relatedness, receive 
priority in a way that begs the question of who or what does the relating. Such an 
approach lends itself easily to social-political projectionism, a criticism that is often 
charged against proponents of social doctrines of the Trinity. 10 Indeed one may rightly 
wonder how the general notions of perichoresis, indwelling, or relatedness do suddenly 
entail the implications of favouring certain social concepts or structures over against 
others. Richard Fermer in his critical reflections on Gunton's work and his use of the 
Greek Fathers confirms this suspicion, arguing that it is important to notice that the 
Greek Fathers do not equate ousia with koinonia. Fermer asks the question if it was not 
rather the balance between the two concepts with which they were concerned in order to 
safeguard God's being as three and one? 11 In a similar way John Meyer has persuasively 
9 See especially his discussion of substantiality and the particular: The One, 188-204. 
1
° Karen Kilby, 'Perichoresis and Projection: Problems with Social Doctrines of the Trinity' New 
Blackfriars 81 (2000), 432-45, criticises the proponents of social doctrines of the Trinity especially for 
being projectionist in both directions: 'Projection, then, is particularly problematic in at least some social 
theories of the Trinity because what is projected onto God is immediately reflected back onto the world, 
and this reverse projection is said to be what is in fact important about the doctrine' (p. 442). This is 
certainly true of Jung Young Lee in his The Trinity in Asian perspective (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 
1996). Although Kilby highlights some reasonable critique, her overall argument is not persuasive. Kilby 
seems in the end to 'renounce the very idea that the point of the doctrine is to give insight into God' (p. 
443). This -statement leaves one wondering whether-GOd's seW-revelation· iii history· irr''Jesiis-Ciiiist and 
through the Spirit does say anything at all about God. Kilby prefers to prioritise ousia over against 
hypostasis and hence compromises divine particularity in Jesus ofNazareth. 
11 
'The Limits of Trinitarian Theology as a Methodological Paradigm', NZSTh 41 ( 1999), 158-86. Cf. J. 
Lienhard, 'Ousia and Hypostasis: The Cappadocian Settlement and the Theology of"One Hypostasis"', 
inS. Davis, et. al. (eds.), The Trinity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 99-121. 
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argued in a discussion of Athanasian theology and the problem of the notion of 
monarchia that 'many of the difficulties we experience in reconciling Eastern and 
Western depictions of the Trinity stem from a misleading oversimplification of each 
tradition's presentation, especially the idea that one must assign logical priority to 
either the divine substance or the divine persons.' 12 
The problem of many contemporary trinitarian accounts is that the notion of 
relationality is somehow misconstrued as an overall ontological principle. 13 In my own 
account I have tried to show that the modem turn to relationality only correctly 
functions as a device against reductionism in our understanding of the universe and the 
human condition and should not be understood as a superior concept with universal 
status over against the dialectical and sometimes paradoxical experiences of human life. 
I argued in Chapter Three that clear distinctions between assumed opposites or orders of 
priority such as substance and relation, body and mind, subject and object become less 
evident when proper attention is given to the human condition and are seen in a new 
light that acknowledges an indispensable interdependency which does not permit a 
subordination of one to the other. Within the universe particles remain single entities 
while at the same time they depend on their relations. Within the human sphere persons 
always remain single entities despite their dependence on relations. Although it can be 
said that a human person becomes more distinctly herself through being placed in a 
specific part of space at a certain time in history as well as through her lived relations, 
the concept of a person cannot solely be reduced to these relations. An embodied person 
12 
'God's Trinitarian Substance in Athanasian Theology', Scottish Journal of Theology 59 (2006), 96. 
[My Italics.] Meyer opposes Richard Cross' view who argues that the divine substance is a numerically 
singular item and the metaphysical place where all three persons overlap and as such posterior to the 
persons themselves: 'On Generic and Derivation Views of God's Trinitarian Substance', Scottish Journal 
of Theology 56 (2003), 464-80. A similar problem exists when theologians try to argue against social 
doctrines of the Trinity: Kilby, 'Aquinas, the Trinity and the Limits of Understanding', International 
Journal of Systematic Theology 7 (2005), 414-27. In following Aquinas Kilby obviously prioritises the 
doctrine of divine simplicity which allows her to view the notion of relation only from the perspective of 
the one undividable divine substance. No wonder that she reaches the conclusion that the doctrine of the 
Trinity may have some important grammatical implications for theology 'whether or not it carries any 
insight. If in fact the doctrine of the Trinity is simply beyond our grasp, then it may be better, more 
helpful for theology to display this quite clearly, than to skirt the issue, to bluff its way along' (p.423). 
This boldness is rather puzzling because her whole argument grounds on the assumption that we have a 
grasp and reasonable comprehension of God's oneness and simplicity. But why should that be? Her logic 
is not any different than the one employed by trinitarian theologians who argue the other way round, 
namely that theology knows by revelation and the Christian tradition that God is first of all F(lther, Son, 
and Spirit, and that it is rather the concepts·of simplieitysaha''oneness wfiich are beyond our grasp. . 
13 See especially concepts of the Trinity which use relationality as an ontological category and speak of 
God as relationality: Ted Peters, God as Trinity: Relationality and Temporality in Divine Life (Louisville: 
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993); Elizabeth Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery ofGod in Feminist 
Theological Discourse (New York: Crossroad, 1994); David Cunningham, These Three Are One: The 
Practice of Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998). 
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nevertheless is also a single, and thus unique matter-mind-stuff, entity, which is also 
able to influence and constitute the relations and without which there would be no 
relations at all. 14 The concept of substance cannot be dissolved into the concept of 
relations but the reverse is also true. Relations are in need of parts. If this balance is lost 
we have nowhere to go. 15 
Gunton attempts to overcome this problem by claiming that 'a satisfactory 
conception of human particularity depends upon an acceptance of the fact that persons 
also are constituted in their particularity both by their being created such by God and by 
the network of human and cosmic relatedness in which they find their being.' 16 
However, he goes on to say that it is the pattern of relations which constitutes a person 
and what the person distinctively is. 17 This poses the question of how a person is at all 
capable of finding her own identity. If there are only relations which constitute my 
particularity as a person then I can think of only two possibilities to find and live my 
uniqueness as a person-in-relation. Either there is only one single, concrete and pre-
chosen place or there are no fixed places at all. In the former case I would have to look 
for a single and concrete place in time and history, i.e., a fixed setting, where my 
particular place is and always will be in order to live my life according to my created 
personality. In the latter case I would have to accept an open and rather arbitrary process 
because, since I am always in relations and find myself always constituted by relations, 
my place in the here and now always is what I am. However, if relatedness tells all 
persons what they are and where they find their true identity and meaning in life, who or 
what is that relatedness? This example on the level of human personhood shows that if 
the necessity of singularity which cannot be reduced to relations is neglected, we end up 
with a situation where we actually can go nowhere because ultimately there is nobody to 
tell us where to go. On this level it can be seen that any analogy with the Trinity must 
14 This is something that Moltmann has clearly seen. 'Man kann nicht sagen: Person ist Relation; die 
Relation konstituiert die Person ... Person und Relation mussen deshalb im Wechselverhaltnis verstanden 
werden. Es gibt hier keine Personen ohne Relationen, aber auch keine Relationen ohne Personen': 
Trinitiit, 189. 
15 A case in point is Cunningham's book These Three Are One. Cunningham suggests that we should 
view the Trinity as relations without remainder (cf. Lash, Believing Three Ways in God.). Hence, the 
notion of the subject tends to vanish completely and the notion of particularity gains its meaning solely as 
a derivation from the concepts of polyphony and participation. Bi.Jt how shall I give myself to the other 
and participate in the other if there is no unique part, a unique 1? Implications, which Cunningham draws 
on the ethical level, are therefore rather general leaving the individual Christian wondering what it 
actually is that he or she can do since it is the polyphonic community that determines their behaviour. 
16 The One, 202. 
17 Ibid., 203. 
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fail precisely because God could not even reveal himself if he Is regarded as pure 
I . 1. 1s re at10na Ity. 
In a nutshell, the concept of relationality must not evoke a new kind of universal, 
which immediately becomes a new form of reductionism, but rather must remind us to 
keep the balance between the concepts of ousia and hypostasis (and koinonia). This 
dialectic on the ground of human experience cannot be dissolved in a coherent superior 
view but rather has to steer our theological enterprise and hermeneutics within a 
balanced dialogue. 19 Considering the debates over the doctrine of the Trinity one 
wonders if this was and is properly kept in mind. Theologians accuse each other either 
of modalism or tritheism, confusing different levels of discourse by disregarding the 
main characteristics of the human condition. Human experience and language depend 
on both otherness and sameness and are in need of concept and narrative alike. If these 
insights bear any truth then there is for theological reflection no such thing as a unified 
systematic concept in respect of the doctrine of God?0 There is no secure place to start 
from either a clear cut concept of oneness, divine substance and simplicity or from 
threeness, personhood and communion. Discourse about the essence of divine being 
cannot be reduced to a concept of immaterial substance and discourse about divine 
personhood cannot be reduced to a concept of a single subject or autonomous 
individual. A narrative cannot be reduced to a concept and concepts long for narrative 
18 Paul Fiddes in his Participating in God: A Pastoral Doctrine of the Trinity (London: Darton, Longman 
and Todd, 2000) attempts to steer his way through these problems by invoking the notion of participation. 
Although I admire his laudable project I think his attempt fails partly precisely because of the above-
mentioned problems. Fiddes also grounds his approach in giving priority to the notion of being. Consider 
for example the following statement. 'The notion of "subsistent relations", properly understood, is at a 
third level of meaning. It proposes that relations in God are as real and "beingful" as anything which is 
created or uncreated, and that their ground of existence is in themselves. If we use the term hypostasis as 
the early theologians did for a "distinct reality" which has being, then the relations are hypostases' (p.34). 
Hence he deviates from Moltmann and Volf, abandons the possibility of 1•isualising the three divine 
persons as subjects who have relations, and suggests speaking of "movements of relationship" (p.37). 
Consequently one starts to wonder how the understanding of "divine persons as relationship" informs his 
talk about images of domination and about Fatherhood which does not oppress. 
19 Cf. Gregory of Nyssa's careful approach. 'The notion of uncreatedness and incomprehensibility applies 
in exactly the same way to the Father, to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit. No one of them is either more or 
less incomprehensible or uncreated than either of the others. Now in the case of the Trinity it is essential 
to keep the distinctions free from all confusion with the help of the particularizing characteristics. So in 
deciding what is particular to each, we shall leave out of account everything which the three are observed 
to have in common, such as being uncreated and being beyond comprehension. We shall look only for 
those things which allow us clearly and without confusion to distinguish our conception of each of the 
three individually from our conception of the three considered together': 'On the difference between 
ousia' arid hypostasis', in M. Wiles -·and tv1: Sailter··(eas:x Documents in Early Christian Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 33. 
20 Hence it is not surprising that John O'Donnell, after a long discussion of both Ogden's and Moltmann's 
systematic theology, suggests two elements that are important for a Christian solution to the problem of 
suffering in relation to the God-question: narration and praxis: Trinity and Temporality (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1983), 200-3. 
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expression?• Logical priority is no way out?2 Should we not rather fully endorse both 
the one ousia (which always implies modalism in regard of God's trinitarian self-
revelation in history) and the three hypostaseis (which always implies tritheism in 
regard of the Christian belief in the one God) as the two focal points of our theological 
reflections on God? In order to make sense of an understanding of God at all, a God 
who is both immanent and transcendent, should we not see them as two friends who 
walk hand in hand rather than two enemies who, assigning logical priority to either the 
divine substance or the divine persons, try to oppress each other? 
If my arguments bear any validity then we are confronted with a dialectical 
structure. In Chapter Two I have already employed an interstitial methodology in order 
to maintain a constructive balance and interaction between the concepts of revelation 
and experience. If God reveals himself in Jesus through the Spirit as he really is, then 
there exists real particularity and hence a personal threeness in God which signifies 
more than merely a conceptual or grammatical device. From this perspective it must be 
said that if God exposes himself to the human condition in the incarnation in a 
meaningful way, then, to speak of God cannot but be personal in a rather tritheistic 
sense. If one wants to make sense of Jesus' life, death and resurrection as divine 
incarnation as well as Jesus' sense of communion with the Father and the Spirit as 
expressed in the New Testament, then, I think, one cannot easily dismiss Moltmann's 
proposal of social trinitarianism. God then exists as a communion; he truly is a being-in-
communion. Encounters with Jesus as a human person and encounters with the Holy 
Spirit as God who actively lifts us up, sustains our lives, and fills us with hope and 
meaning can only be rendered intelligible in a personal and trinitarian way. Such 
theological discourse is in need of the narrative, of divine persons who interact with one 
another, who relate and shape a divine community that, although always transcending 
human analogies, nevertheless signifies a meaningfulness which is reflected in human 
21 Michel Rene Barnes, trying to overcome common misreadings of Augustine, makes an interesting point 
when he proposes that 'Augustine's theology of the Trinity is centred on divine unity conceived in terms 
of the inseparable activity of the Three ( ... ), the epistemic character of the Incarnation as the decisive 
revelation of the Trinity, and the role of faith in leading forward our reflection of the Trinity': 'Rereading 
Augustine's Theology of the Trinity', in S. Davis, et. al. (eds.), The Trinity, 175. A rather different 
approach is taken by Bruno Forte in his Trinittit als Geschichte. Der lebendige Gott - Gott der Lebende 
(Mainz: Matthias-GrUnewald-Verlag, 1 989): He narrateinheTrinity as story. However, 1his~leads to the 
same problem from the other side that, if one leaves out the conceptual side, one starts to wonder how we 
can still speak ofthe one God as Trinity in relation to humanity. 
22 For further examples of such confusion, Brian Leftow, 'Anti Social Trinitarianism', inS. Davis, et. al. 
(eds.), The Trinity, 203-49; Paul Louis Metzger, 'The migration of monism and the matrix of trinitarian 
mediation', Scottish Journal of Theology 58 (2005), 302-18. 
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experiences of communion.23 An understanding of what it is to be human as relational 
opens up space for such trinitarian God-talk because it reaches beyond reductionist 
accounts of subjectivity, individuality or individual substance.24 
On the other hand, if we want to maintain the distinction between immanence and 
transcendence and the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, then God, although embracing what 
is not creation, is and remains other. God utterly transcends our condition. God's 
freedom and otherness remains an important part of the doctrine of God. To believe in 
God as immanent and transcendent cannot be made intelligible without a notion of the 
one ousia. It is here, as I have tried to argue above, where all the communitarian 
analogies collapse if the notion of God's substance is reduced to communion?5 If 
relationality as the one substance, rather than a distinct and irreducible concept of ousia, 
is assumed to be the divine unifying principle of the three persons, one is still left with 
the question of how and who this God really is because abstract concepts like 
perichoresis and relatedness do not say very much in connection with a fragile and 
complex human condition?6 For human persons relations are always vulnerable 
precisely because the human self cannot be dissolved into pure relatedness. Hence we 
are in need of the notion of divine ousia and consequently of some descriptions of 
marks of God's essence which help us to picture our createdness in God's image and 
which steer us to structure our relations in a more fiuitful way. An interstitial theology 
is needed that moves beyond seeing these two poles as enemies.27 Hence the 
significance of Gregory's poetic words for any theological hermeneutics which is 
concerned with the doctrine of God: I cannot think of the One without immediately 
being surrounded by the radiance of the Three; nor can I discern the Three without at 
once being carried back to the One. Both sides form a constitutive part of human 
23 Arthur Wainwright's conclusion should be remembered, namely that the problem of the Trinity arose 
'because of the development of Christian experience, worship, and thought. It was rooted in experience, 
for men were conscious of the power of the Spirit and the presence and Lordship of the risen Christ': The 
Trinity in the New Testament (London: SPCK, 1962), 266. 
24 Cf. F. LeRon Shults, Reforming the Doctrine of God (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2005), 162. 
25 Giesbert Greshake rightly concludes that both modalism (or subordinationism) and tritheism root in a 
notion of totalitarian oneness or unity. 'Kurz: wei) Einheit und Vielfalt im tritheistischen wie auch im 
modalistischen und subordinatianistischen Verstandnis nicht miteinander vermittelt sind, kommt es zu 
einem stlindigen, sich gegenseitig zersttirenden Oszillieren zwischen zwei sich gegenseitig 
ausschlieBenden Polen': Der dreieinige Gott. Eine trinitarische Theologie (Freiburg: Herder, 1997), 459. 
26 Cf. Kathryn Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 200 I), 82: 'Ignoring appropriate differences among levels in the theological cosmos by 
modeling human relations directly on trinitarian ·ones;'theologians tend either to downplay~dle' difference 
between social relations and trinitarian ones, or lose a realistic sense of human relationships.' However, I 
do not see how her own account, building on a theological concept of"gift-giving" without engaging with 
the human condition, overcomes the problem she criticises. 
27 Cf. Thomas Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives: Toward Doctrinal Agreement (Edinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark, 1994), 18-9. 
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experience and language resonating and reflecting the relational structure of body and 
mind, which I explored in Chapter Three. The problem for any discourse is that neither 
of them can be dissolved into the other, both are capable of expressing truth, and any 
attempt at construing logical priority of one aspect over the other will necessarily lead to 
a reductionist system?8 
This insight seems to be appreciated by some of the Fathers who clearly 
differentiated between ousia and hypostasis without prioritising one notion over the 
other?9 As Meyer argues: 'The homoousios formula of Nicaea guarantees the divinity 
of the Son, and it also relocates the principle of unity in God from the Father to the 
triune co-inherence ofthe divine persons.'30 Essence talk, therefore, cannot be dissolved 
into talk about the communion of the three persons and vice versa. Rather one has to say 
that the 'perichoretic mutual love ofthe Father, Son and Spirit is not identical to God's 
essence or being but is a manifestation of his unity. ' 31 In virtue of this Torrance 
summarizes: 'Athanasius had such a strong view of the complete identity, equality and 
unity of the three divine Persons within the Godhead, that he declined to advance a view 
of the Monarchy in which the oneness of God was defined by reference to the Father 
alone or to the Person of the Father.'32 This view supports the insights mentioned above 
about the nature of relationality and the dialectic between the whole and the particular. 
Both sides form a constitutive part of human experience and must, therefore, also be 
kept in balance when theologians engage in an investigation of the doctrine of God. 
28 God simply is not one or three in human terms. As Nicholas Lash reminds us, 'God is not a member of 
a species, an individual with a nature': Believing Three Ways in One God, 24. And God is not three in the 
strict sense of three individuals. Hence 'we do not presuppose any precise knowledge of"what" God is in 
his One Being", or "how" he is llrree in One and One in Three': Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives, 19. 
Cf. Greshake who remarks that the notion of oneness and unity is a necessary idea of the human Spirit 
without which human beings could not correspond and be in agreement with themselves and the world. 
However, this must not overshadow the other fact that human life and experience is divers und plural. The 
One and the Many cannot be prioritised over against each other: Der dreieinige Gott, 443-53. 
29 Gregory Nazianzen's orations on the Son and the Holy Spirit might well be described as an interstitial 
theology oscillating between the One and the Three and between the concept and the narratives. Cf. esp. 
Oration 31.14, in F. Norris et.al., Faith gives fullness to reasoning: The Five Theological Orations of 
Gregory Nazianzen (Leiden: Brill, 1991). 
30 
'God's Trinitarian Substance in Athanasian Theology', SJT 59 (2006), 89. Meyer also argues that 
Athanasius kept a clear balance between the one ousia and the three hypostaseis. Cf. also Augustine's 
The Trinity. Given his starting point in Book 1.7 (the Three and the One) he explores both experience as it 
comes to speech in the manifold stories of scripture and human life and experience expressing itself in 
conceptual, linguistic and logical reflections. However, a word of caution might also be helpful at this 
point. Although I am in favour of Meyer's interpretation of Athanas ian theology, one has to bear in mind 
that-any interpretation of the 'Church'Fathers feinains· afubivalerit an<:f'is usually. driven oy one's own 
conviction in order to support a particular argument. Hence any straightforward connection between 
ancient and modem thought frameworks and concepts must be treated with caution. 
31 Ibid., 93. 
32 The Christian Doctrine ofGod: One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1996), 183. See 
also Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives, 18. 
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5.3 TRINITARIAN GESTALTKREIS HERMENEUTICS 
Taking the conditions of human experience seriously, the task for a trinitarian theology 
is to keep the balance between the notions of one ousia and three hypostaseis. To 
pursue this aim I now intend to employ Viktor von Weizsacker's highly suggestive 
notion of GESTALTKREIS, which is most helpful in elaborating a hermeneutic device for 
keeping this balance and which I will use to integrate fully in due course my 
conclusions from the previous two chapters.33 Weizsacker's concern within the context 
of medical anthropology was to describe the biological act as an inseparable 
interconnectedness between movement and perception, body and mind.34 Both are so 
interwoven with one another and depend upon each other that the biological act only 
makes sense if both aspects are seen simultaneously and kept in a continuous relation. 
Moreover, although every human being stands opposite its environment, it is also part 
of it and only due to an encounter between the I and its environment is perception and 
movement realized. In virtue of this the notion ofGESTALTKREIS defines the unity of the 
subject with its environment, which it creates constantly by moving and perceiving. 
MOVEMENT 
(BEWEGUNG) 
I 
(matter- mind) 
Environment 
Graph 11: Weizsiicker 's Gestalt/ere is 
PERCEPTION 
(W AHRNEHMUNG) 
Weizsacker wanted to highlight that the relation between matter and mind, movement 
and perception, I and environment is not strictly causal and deterministic. The 
relationship between body and soul or between two subjects must not be seen as a 
connection betw.een two separate entitie~ .. It. f.<!tht::r illuminates the charac;ter of mutual 
33 This is the case because Weizsacker does not elaborate a new metaphysics but simply follows the path 
that opens up before him by experiencing and investigating the human condition. 
34 Cf. Chapter Three, subsection 3.4.3.5. 
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representation and substitution. Within the realm of medical anthropology body and 
soul cannot simply be presupposed as two basic substances. Body and soul are not a 
tight unity but they rather inseparably live with, deal with, and encounter one another. 
This then points to a mutual hiddenness or concealment between body and soul within 
our scientific processes. If one focuses on the somatic dimension the psychological 
dimension slides into the background and is hidden from the methods of physiological 
investigation and vice versa. In this sense there is a certain kind of methodological 
indeterminism, which, for Weizsacker, is not the abandonment of scientific research and 
explanation but highlights the importance for the human sciences to take seriously the 
notion of the subject. If Weizsacker is correct in his analysis of the human condition 
then I would Jike to suggest that his insights also reflect a basic truth about any human 
linguistic discourse, which obviously must be understood on the ground of human 
experience as the interdependence between perception and movement, body and mind. 
Hence I will build on his model and use it as a hermeneutic model for an interstitial 
trinitarian theology. 
The first aspect about the inseparable unity of perception and movement can be 
compared with the already mentioned dialectic between ousia and hypostasis. The 
relationship between the two must not be seen as a connection between two separate 
entities. Both need each other in a way of mutual hiddenness and representation. On the 
one hand, to "perceive" God and therefore to speak meaningfully about the divine 
nature at all, presupposes that God somehow "moves", that is speaks and makes himself 
known within the human condition. This, however, as it was argued in Chapter Two, 
can only reasonably be claimed within the framework of the belief in a triune God. 
Without the Spirit (accommodating himselfto the thought framework of human beings) 
and Jesus as God incarnate it is hardly intelligible to maintain the notion of revelation 
and hence to speak within human discourse about the transcendent creator God. On the 
other hand, to speak of divine "movement" and therefore of the Spirit and of Jesus as 
truly God, one is in need of "perceiving" this "movement" as one and same thing. 
Hence theology needs ousia-talk in order to claim intelligibly, for instance, that Jesus 
really is God. Both must be said that God lets himself 'be perceived' in our theological 
reflections as the one ousia (using conceptual language to describe God's nature) and as 
three hypostaseis, as persons who are distinct (using narrative language in order to 
describe God's social behaviour). It is the one nature and simultaneously the three 
persons we reflect upon in theological discourse which depends on the process of 
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human experience. If one focuses on the ousia-dimension of God-talk, trying to depict 
the divine nature in a coherent system and thought framework, the hypostasis-
dimension slides into the background and the particularities and distinctions of the three 
persons are hidden. And if one focuses on the hypostasis-dimension of God-talk, trying 
to depict the divine communion as three distinct persons who interact with one another 
and as such with human beings, then the ousia-dimension slides into the background. 
This then might be characterised as mutual representation and substitution. Within such 
a GESTALTKREJS HERMENEUTICS one rather speaks of God as the circle of divine life 
allowing a fruitful relationship and creative tension within theological discourse 
between the two dimensions of ousia and hypostasis. 
The second aspect parallels Weizsacker's notion of the unity of the I and its 
environment despite their difference. Within anthropology it is his conviction that every 
human being stands opposite its environment but at the same time is also part of it and 
only due to an encounter between the I and its environment perception and movement is 
being realized. This point also emphasises the fact that although a human being is an 
individual and distinct from others, he only is and can be a person by way of being 
connected with the others in the act of movement and perception. Transferred to a 
theological hermeneutics it can be claimed that while God stands opposite the creation, 
he nevertheless is connected with it (in Jesus Christ and in his accommodation to the 
human condition through the Spirit) and can, on linguistic grounds, only be perceived 
and understood within the realm of language which is embedded in human experience. 
The point here is rather simple, namely to remember that theological discourse can only 
utter words about God because there is a creation. God is in relation with this creation 
and only due to this relatedness, although he remains the other, can we speak about God 
at all. God-talk and human-talk are fused with one another so that it seems advisable to 
develop any doctrine of God only in direct connection with discourse about the human 
condition. This also implies for both levels (talk about the human condition and talk 
about God) that one cannot speak of the whole of reality without simultaneously 
speaking about the particular persons and one cannot speak about the persons without 
simultaneously speaking about the whole of reality. 
Finally, the last aspect describes the GEST AL TKREJS as an open process. The 
biological act is a continuous flow of life in which every person has to find herself in 
every event anew. This does not mean relativity but rather that the outcome of the 
process of life always depends on the interaction of both perception and movement. 
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This outcome can never be resolved in advance and for all times. Since I am concerned 
with a hermeneutical device this aspect can be depicted as pointing towards the 
openness of every reflection on the doctrine of God. However, as I have shown with 
respect to Weizsacker, the task of the human person is to find its balance. And this 
balance will most likely be found and upheld, without it ceasing to be a process, the 
more attentive a person is to her relational structure. Theological discourse then is an 
open process in the sense that our perception of God always has to be reworked and 
restated in relation to the human condition. A more fully developed trinitarian 
GESTALTKREIS HERMENEUTICS can be visualised in the following way. 
0NE0USIA 
Being 
Concept 
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CONDITION 
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Narrative 
Graph 12: Trinitarian Gestaltkreis 
This graph summarizes what I now want to call an interstitial theology. Above all it 
clearly highlights the fact that for human discourse God never can be perceived as an 
objective entity, person, or principle outside of human experience. The theologian as 
one particular "I" stands within the human condition in the middle of the 
GEST AL TKREIS. First, looking at the inner field, in her enterprise to elaborate an 
understanding of God (depending on her embeddedness in human experience), she must 
be attentive to the human condition in distinction from God. Such attentiveness involves 
both the working out of how this condition determines her own project and the 
clarification of language, i.e. in what way her God-talk is m~aningful b,ecause it simgly 
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is a product of the human condition. Second, looking at the outer circle, she must 
creatively relate the notion of one ousia and three hypostaseis and let both inform each 
other, neither confusing nor creating a logical priority between them. Finally, although 
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this should be self-explanatory because it is automatically implied in the relationship 
between the I and the human other, this endeavour, being executed within the 
community of believers, learns from the tradition and simultaneously contributes to it, 
prompting and enhancing an enriching revelatory process in which God truly and 
meaningfully comes to speech.35 Retrospectively it can now be seen, and hopefully 
appreciated more fully, that all along the thesis was attempting to execute this 
GESTALTKREIS HERMENEUTICS which grew out of the retrieval of an appropriate 
concept of human experience. 
5.4 IMAGO DEI OR HOW THINGS HANG TOGETHER 
Before proposing a final reflection on the Trinity and human life I would like to change 
the perspective one last time and look at the GESTAL TKREIS through the lens of the 
doctrine of imago dei. Much has already been said about the interrelationship between 
experience and revelation and about the human condition in Chapters Two and Three. 
To revisit these issues here and to spell out how they shape an understanding of being 
created in the image of God will help us to see more clearly how things are related 
within an interstitial theology. The final proposal, then, will not only be seen as a 
justifiable way of presenting the doctrine of the Trinity but also as most promising if 
theologians attempt to draw practical implications for human life. 
To begin with it can be claimed that the doctrine of imago dei wants to say 
something about the close and inseparable relationship between God and human beings. 
Biblical anthropology when it talks about human life never disconnects the question of 
what it is to be human from the question of how and who God is. The Bible reflects on 
the role of human beings in relation to God or considers their place before God.36 To 
say something about God always implies saying something about the human condition 
35 Ian Markham in his recent work A Theology of Engagement (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003) has suggested 
that we understand engagement as an encounter that subsequently shapes the theology itself. Although I 
do agree with his longing for a more engaged theology that also learns from other religions and the 
secular world (my GESTALTKREIS model makes a lot of space for many ofhis issues), I disagree with his 
presupposition that an engaged theology has to work with theism disentangled from - and therefore in 
many parts leaving behind- the conviction that God is a trinity. Markham's assessment of trinitarian 
theology versus theistic theology is misconstrued and oversimplified and leads him to the false 
assumption that the doctrines of the Trinity and of the Incarnation are somehow opposed to "engagement" 
s~gjgg_ in th~ ~ay forproper dialogue ~i!h!ltb~r, r.«lligiQns.Jn. .. this.respect l think. that .my trinitarian 
interstitial theology is more capable of engagement because it can deal with the central beliefs of 
Christianity and also makes space for "the religious other" and "the secular other" as being part of the 
same human condition participating in the capacity for truth inherent in human experience. 
36 For a brief summary, Werner Schmidt, 'At.liche Anthropologie', Evangelisches Kirchenlexikon, Band 
I (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986), 156-8. 
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and vice versa. Human beings are seen as created by God and are marked by a special 
relationship with God. For the Old Testament in particular there is no interest in 
articulating an autonomous notion of humanness.37 Humanness is always Yahwistic 
humanness and unthinkable outside the relationship with Yahweh.38 Taking all this into 
account, it can be said that the biblical notion of being created in the image of God 
focuses on relationship and therefore does not signify something that human beings 
possess (for instance a particular body, gender, reason) which in turn would determine 
and signify them as having the image of God.39 Wilfried Harle summarizes that being 
created in the image of God means human existence face to face and in relation to God. 
This purpose is given to human beings with their existence and they correspond to it by 
living accordingly, that is by acknowledging this fact and thus living in a responsible 
relationship with God.40 This God, however, is trinitarian life. 'For Christian 
understanding, it is from the Trinity all things derive, within the Trinity all things exist 
and towards the Trinity all things are oriented. ' 41 Therefore, God is experienced and 
described by human beings in terms of loving relations, as a God who responds, cares, 
and loves. Being created in the image of God then means first of all that human beings 
as relational beings, who are capable of loving relationships, are an image of God. 
Image then means an illustration, a visualisation, and a form of realisation of God's 
trinitarian nature because human beings depend on and therefore live in this 
relationship, whether they acknowledge or deny it.42 In the light of the image of an 
embrace, which we have employed in the previous chapter, it might then be said that the 
notion "image of God" points to the fact that human beings are destined to exist as 
appropriate creaturely illustrations of the triune life43 and as such respond meaningfully 
to God's embrace. Consequently, the doctrine of being created in the image of God 
captures the crucial insight that human beings exist not as self-contained and isolated 
37 Cf. Hans Walter Wolff, Anthropologie des A/ten Testaments (MUnchen: Kaiser, 1973), esp. 233-5. 
38 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1997), 450. 
39 Cf. G. v. Rad's comments that the Old Testament statement about the image of God in Genesis 1.26-27 
does not contain any explanation of what concrete form this "being created in the image of God" takes. 
The main focus rather is on "created for what?", an intended purpose: Theologie des AT, I :148-51. See 
also Martin Honecker, Einfiihrung in die theologische Ethik (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990), 48-9; 
Ulrich Kortner, Evange/ische Sozia/ethik (GOttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 213-4. 
40 Dogmatik, 435. See also Jenson, Systematic Theology, 2:58-9. 
41 PauLMIJrray,,Reason, Truth andTheo/ogy in PragmatistPerspective, 193. 
42 Cf. Harle, Dogmatik, 436. See also Pannenberg who uses ,image of God" as a general signification for 
the intended purpose of human beings to be in communion with God: Anthropologie in theo/ogischer 
Perspektive, 71. 
43 Christof Gestrich, Die Wiederkehr des Gianzes in der Welt. Die christliche Lehre von der Sunde und 
ihrer Vergebung in gegenwartiger Verantwortung (TUbingen: Mohr, 1989), 69. 
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beings but as exocentric beings who only are what they are in relation to God and to 
other human beings. 
This interpretation can be linked with the discussion of the human condition in 
Chapter Three. On different levels we have seen that a human person is relational which 
means that she is not only exocentric in regard to its own psychological identity but also 
with respect to a transcendent reality.44 Pannenberg rightly concludes that human beings 
in their openness to the world and in their search for identity always remain exocentric. 
They are related to other selves and to a beyond being. The question of self-identity and 
the question of divine reality belong inescapably together.45 This was further affirmed 
on three different levels. First, Viktor Frankl's psychological analysis highlighted the 
will to meaning which was linked to a concept of Obersinn (super-meaning). To be 
human, he argued, means to be related to a meaning and to be capable of responding to 
it. This relationship, however, gains full intelligibility only if it is seen in combination 
with a notion of transcendence.46 Second, Viktor von Weizsacker's notion of 
GEWALTKREIS as the framework for human relationality and self-understanding pointed 
to a completion yet to come. Crisis as a key experience of human life longs for a 
balance which allows human beings to flourish and live meaningfully.47 Finally, 
Emmanuel Levinas drew our attention to the insight that "being" signifies the-one-for-
the-other. This "for-the-other" structure in responsibility is prior to ontology and thus 
the fundamental ground for being human before all questioning and knowing.48 If these 
insights are read through the prism of theological anthropology, taking into account 
what was said about the relationship between experience and revelation, one gains a 
clearer picture of how it may be claimed that everything hangs together in the doctrine 
of imago dei. By taking for granted that human beings only can wholly be themselves 
and find their true identity in relation to God by participating in God's embrace, I 
propose the following interpretation. 
First, if a) being, as Levinas suggests, signifies a "one-for-the-other structure in 
responsibility" that lies beyond all human knowing and if b) this being points to the 
level of reality which is constituted by God for self-experiencing subjects rather than to 
reality as merely experienced from within, then, the triune divine life comes 
immediately to the fore as the most appropriate description of this ground of being. To 
44 Cf. Chapter Three, sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3. 
45 Anthropologie in theologischer Perspektive, esp. 66-70. 
46 Cf. Chapter Three, subsection 3.4.2.4. 
47 Cf. Chapter Three, subsection 3.4.3.6. 
48 Cf. Chapter Three, subsection 3.4.4.3. 
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be created in the image of God, which can be understood as an inalienable gift, means to 
live out and enact this gift of human relationality in accordance with the divine life to 
the highest possible degree. The image of God as the gift of being destined to Jove and 
Jive reconciled relations cannot be taken away. However, the image of God can be seen 
more or Jess clearly among human beings: it can shine through us or be distorted. 
Moreover, to be human means to be relational, expressing truth about the reality of the 
human condition as it is given to us by God. This reality already reveals something 
about God's good intention for this world and consequently gives us a glimpse into the 
divine heart. Being created in the image of God then means to live human life in 
accordance to this condition and by doing so praising God for the gift of creation and 
human life. 
Second, if Frankl's notion of meaning, which depends on a transcendent Vbersinn 
and through which human persons are able to cope with their Jives in all circumstances, 
is a true interpretation of the human condition, then, the description of triune life as 
other embracing, hence transforming the language of exclusion with its inherent notions 
of fear and despair, suggests itself as the most appropriate interpretation for the ground 
of Frankl's Vbersinn. Meaning can be found everywhere, precisely because God as Jove 
which is opposed to exclusion that distorts human life, is responsive and attentive to aJI 
circumstances. To be created in the image of God from this perspective means to be 
able to relate one's own human wiJJ to meaning to the fuJiness of divine meaning and by 
doing so to experience a transformation of life which participates in God's purposes for 
human life. Additionally, to be relational also means to be in becoming and to be open 
towards an ultimate meaning. This meaning reaches beyond the reality that human 
beings experience from within and is therefore in need for revelation to occur. For 
human experience divine revelation finds its most appropriate theological expression 
and consequently its most meaningful description in God's trinitarian life. Hence, being 
created in the image of God means to Jive out human relational life as best as possible in 
relation to the divine triune life. The working out of a recognizable image of God, 
therefore, is in constant need of revelation to occur, which, as we have seen, depends on 
the process of experience. This is why an account of the trinitarian life and of human 
life should go hand in hand.49 
49 Cf. Miroslav Volf, 'The Trinity Is Our Social Program: The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Shape of 
Social Engagement', Modern Theology 14 (1998), 403-23. 'As I see it, the question is not whether the 
Trinity should serve as a model for human community; the question is rather in which respect and to what 
extent it should do so' (p. 405). Based on the limits of human creatureliness and sinfulness, Volf argues 
that conceptual construction of the correspondence between the Trinity and human life 'must go back and 
221 
5.5 THE TRINITY AND HUMAN LIFE 
The aim of this part is to present a final account of the Trinity in relation to human life. 
I will pursue this task by presenting four reflections. Each reflection is placed in the 
interstice between two opposite notions of human experience which are derived from 
the discussion in Chapter Four where the metaphors of "relationships come first", 
"unbroken relationship", "lasting embrace" and "third-party responsibility" came to the 
fore as characteristics of the divine triune life. Each reflection is divided into three 
paragraphs. While paragraph A in each case briefly attempts to describe the Trinity as a 
divine embrace, paragraph B intends to relate this Trinity-talk to the human condition, 
trying to spell out in which way they are correlated without abandoning their difference. 
The final paragraph C respectively then tries to draw practical implication for human 
life and the Christian community. However, it has to be kept in mind that human life, 
religious experience, and our perception of God are too complex and ultimately resist 
systematisation. Therefore, the following reflections have to be read as an open unity in 
which each reflection depends on and has to be viewed in the light of the others. 
5.5.1 Between reconciliation and brokenness 
A. The divine embrace between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit displays a communion of 
unbroken relationship. This "unbrokenness," because in God no un-fathering, un-
soning, and un-spiriting takes place, points to a oneness of integrated otherness and 
reconciled particularity. The triune life embraces within itself in the most meaningful 
way both particularity and otherness. To render such unbroken oneness meaningful I 
want to call the divine embrace a reconciled community. Admittedly, it is unusual to 
use the concept of reconciliation for the Trinity. We are so used to employing it 
exclusively either for inter-human relationships or within the doctrine of reconciliation. 
However, given the argument of the thesis as a whole, one should not shy away from 
using it. 50 If one employs the notion of reconciliation for the divine triune life, this 
forth on a two-way street, both from above and below' (p.405). For a negative example where this 
interstice is left and the distinctions between ousia and hypostasis as well as divine and human are 
confuseg: Tho.rnas Smail, 'In the Image of the Triune God', international Journal of Systematic Theology 
5 (2003), 22-32. 
5° Cf. Chapter Three, subsection 2.3.2:2 where I argued for a creative interaction between metaphorical 
and conceptual language in order to enhance our understanding of God. Cf. also Nicholas Wolterstorff's 
helpful discussion in regard to justice and the Trinity: 'Is there Justice in the Trinity', in M. Volfund M. 
Welker (eds.), God's Life in Trinity (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2006), 177-87. 
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crucial experience of human life can lead to a creative tension within theological 
discourse that might indeed augment our understanding of being created in the image of 
God.51 Hence particularity and otherness in God do not entail fragmentation, enmity, 
fear, or threat, indicating an unconditioned love and respect for-the-other, therefore, an 
eternal event of divine reconciliation. 
B. In relation to the human condition, God, in his unbroken oneness of integrated 
otherness and reconciled particularity, exercises an embrace which grants human beings 
the possibility of integrating the other into one's own life and of valuing each other's 
particularity. By participating in the divine embrace as the ground of being and through 
the will to meaning, human reconciliation becomes a real possibility. While integrated 
otherness and reconciled particularity characterise the divine life as a complete and 
perfected act of being-ness, within human life as the "spinning coin" integrated 
otherness amounts to reconciling particularity, which indicates personhood's essential 
need for balance within the human relational condition. This is always an open state of 
affairs, always under threat, never complete. Human life, therefore, exhibits both 
ambiguous otherness (including experiences of threat, strangeness, insecurity, and 
overstrain) and ambiguous particularity (including experiences of scarcity, competition, 
comparison, pride, envy). However, the possibility of experiencing reconciliation is a 
real possibility because of human being's relatedness to God's integrated otherness and 
reconciled particularity. This implies both the possibility of integrating the other into 
one's own life (without the necessity of reducing him to the same) and the possibility of 
relating one's own particularities to the fullness ofthe divine life (without the necessity 
of feeling inferior, deficient or incomplete). Thus human reconciliation can be 
experienced within broken human relationships as a concrete realisation of overcoming 
mutual threat, fear, and strangeness, or scarcity, devaluating competition, and envy. 
C. Being created in the image of the triune God means realizing one's own human 
integrated otherness and living towards reconciling particularity. This must be enacted 
within a human community by looking into each other's faces, that is to take others 
seriously and really engage with them. To reflect the divine embrace as a "running 
towards" and "hugging each other" means to make space for the other ~in order to 
51 Cf. Jenson, Systematic Theology, 1:161: 'the Father begets the Son and freely breathes his Spirit; the 
Spirit liberates the Father for the Son and the Son from and for the Father; the Son is begotten and 
liberated, and so reconciles the Father with the future his Spirit is.' 
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overcome enmity between persons or groups or at least to create peaceful balances. 
Christian communities, on the level of worship, might ask themselves if their services 
and various meetings leave room for looking into the other's face. The Holy 
Communion might be an ideal place to mirror divine reconciled otherness within the 
congregation as a social reality where God looks into our faces and transforms our lives 
precisely through us - looking into other faces, being responsive to others and valuing 
their presence. 52 On the level of leadership churches might ask whether or not they are 
aware of ambiguous particularity and the experiences of scarcity, competition, 
comparison, pride, and envy. Where and how do we make room and nurture the 
possibility for "reconciling encounters" and foster the integration of the other into one's 
own life?53 
5.5.2 Between love and fear 
A. The divine embrace between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit tells a story in which 
relationships come first. Because there is no un-fathering, un-soning, and un-spiriting, 
the other is always kept in the other's heart. The divine persons exercise caring and 
loving relationships and express a oneness of love. There is no space for any Angst-
structure and hence no space for any life distorting reality. To render this oneness of 
love meaningful I want to call the divine embrace a communal event where there is no 
fear but happiness and contentedness take place. This then points to an eternal event of 
divine love and happiness. 
B. In relation to the human condition, God, in his oneness of love exercises an embrace 
which grants human beings the possibility of overcoming and coping with fear and 
despair. While in God there is no Angst-structure, the human Angst-structure is part of 
the human condition. Hence, human beings have fear; they are in need of healing and 
happiness. However, human beings as exocentric and as being responsive have the 
52 This seems to be a pressing issue and must be addressed by churches especially within ecumenical 
dialogue. Cf. Roisin Hannaway, 'Eucharist and Reconciliation', in Michael Hurley, SJ (ed.), 
Reconciliation in Religion and Society (Belfast: Institute of Irish Studies, 1994), 189-93; John Pretty, 
'Eucharist and Reconciliation', in M. Hurley (ed.), Reconciliation, 194-98. 
53 This' connects with other concerns, for iristance;~ceceiU1Tiegg's ·assessment 'that Christfan d1i.liches 
and faith communities have largely left out of account the social dimension of a theology of 
reconciliation, preferring to concentrate on the personal dimension': 'Between Embrace and Exclusion', 
New Blackfriars 85 (2004), 83. Cf. also Gerry O'Hanlon, 'Justice and Reconciliation', in M. Hurley (ed.), 
Reconciliation, 48-67; Geoffrey Wainwright, 'Ecumenism and Reconciliation', in M. Hurley (ed.), 
Reconciliation, 72-88. 
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possibility of 'going beyond' creaturely reality and relate their experiences of fear to the 
divine life where creaturely fear will ultimately be sublated in God's love. Although this 
does not dissolve the Angst-structure, it increases the likelihood of positively dealing 
with experiences of ambiguous particularity and threatening otherness. Therefore the 
experience of overcoming fear and despair on the level of the "spinning coin 
dimension" is a real possibility. This possibility depends on a balanced correlation and 
interaction between, on the one hand, the acceptance of the human Angst structure and, 
on the other, the non-acceptance of the experience of fear as an ultimate reality by 
relating it to the divine life and thus transcending the human reality. Thus happiness and 
contentedness can be experienced within human life that is always exposed to fear. 
C. Being created in the image of the triune God means to open oneself up towards 
divine love and happiness and deal with the experience of human fear and despair 
accordingly. To reflect the divine embrace is to work towards the minimization of 
experiences of life-distorting fear and to provide space for exocentric human beings to 
experience divine salvation. Christian communities, on the level of worship, might ask 
themselves if they provide enough space within their liturgies (through participation, 
symbols, rituals, texts) to enhance the possibilities for people to relate their fears to 
God's love in order to find contentedness in God. On the level of leadership churches 
might ask themselves whether or not their structures, the distribution of power, and their 
execution of authority are instances and examples of "reconciling particularity" or 
rather feed on concepts of "threatening otherness" and hence increase experiences of 
fear, despair, and dissatisfaction. 54 
5.5.3 Between abundance and scarcity 
A. The divine embrace between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit pictures a lasting embrace. 
The divine communion is enduring and everlasting. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit 
exercise a lasting communion, celebrate a feast of life, therefore expressing a oneness of 
absolute meaning and abundance. In God there is no scarcity and fragmentation. To 
render this oneness of meaning and abundance significant I want to point to the notion 
of fullness which is often characterised in Jesus' narrative theology as a feast or a 
54 Theologians who are concerned with reconciliation between groups and peoples indicate the problem 
of threatening otherness: Mary Grey, 'To Struggle with a Reconciled Heart: Reconciliation and Justice', 
New Blackfriars 85 (2004), 56-73; Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 57-98. 
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wedding celebration. The Trinity then expresses divine love as overflowing abundance 
where meaning can be found. The triune life as overflowing abundance is opposed to 
scarcity which manifests itself as a distorting power in claiming insufficiency and lack 
of meaning as the essence of reality. This indicates a wholeness where nothing is lost, 
nobody is forgotten or excluded, and where complete meaning is realised, therefore, an 
eternal event of abundance. 
B. In relation to the human condition, God, in his oneness of meaning and abundance 
exercises an embrace which grants human beings the possibility of finding both 
meanmg despite the experience of fragmentation and plentifulness despite the 
experience of scarcity. While fullness in God in a11 its dimensions is an actual and 
perfect reality, within the human condition human life is subjected to the experience of 
fragmentation and scarcity. To be human means to be in becoming. Human life is never 
complete, therefore fragmented and open to meaninglessness and hopelessness. 
However, it also means to be open toward an ultimate meaning. Human experience of 
meaningful life, even in situations of despair and nothingness, when related to the 
divine fu11ness, becomes a real possibility. The experience of scarcity within the human 
condition, although not annihilated, is transformed by making space for experiences of 
"plentiful-ness" and "enough". In relation to the fact that to be human also means to be 
responsible for a reconciling social-system, the notion of abundance not only points to 
God's essence as fullness of life but also to the distorting power of the concept of 
scarcity if it is given ultimate meaning. In relation to God's triune life, divine 
abundance grants the possibility of a human social-system in which everybody is 
granted access to life and shares in the "enough" or "plentifulness" of human life as it is 
given by God. 55 Thus abundance can be experienced within scarcity as a concrete reality 
if a person anchors her incomplete and fragmented life in God's life and consequently 
participates in God's fullness and thereby receives meaning and purpose. 
C. Being created in the image of the triune God means to realize one's own openness to 
meaning and fullness by relating one's own experiences of fragmentation to divine 
fu11ness. This must be enacted within a human community by depriving claims of 
55 Cf. Douglas Meeks' account of"God and Scarcity" in his God the Economist: The Doctrine ofGod and 
Political Economy (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989), 170-7. These insights then certainly must infonn 
other discourses. Cf. Duncan B. Forrester, 'Politics and Reconciliation', in M. Hurley (ed.), 
Reconciliation, 111-22. 
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scarcity and fragmentation of any right and claim to represent the ultimate reality of the 
human condition. This includes, to name two powerful examples, one-sided notions of 
health as the absence of sickness - perceiving sickness and the process of senescence as 
diminished life and therefore as not as meaningful and valuable as healthy life - and 
one-sided notions of scarcity that function as engines for a global economy - portraying 
human beings as half empty glasses that are always in need for more in order to become 
happier and to find meaning. To reflect the divine embrace is to live out the 
meaningfulness of creaturely life and the plentifulness of creation. Christian 
communities, on the level of worship, might ask themselves whether or not their 
services are signs of hope, celebrations of divine life and abundance of human life 
despite experiences of scarcity and fragmentation in which people of all circumstances, 
young or old, full of energy or sick, are valued and cared for, finding meaning in life for 
their respective and various situations. On the level of leadership churches might ask 
themselves whether or not their structures are helpful in this respect and whether or not 
the various groups, clubs and meetings offered in a church are reflections of abundance 
where meaning can be found. 
5.5.4 Between exclusion and assimilation 
A. The divine embrace between Father, Son and Holy Spirit is enacted within a 
threeness (third party) that expresses a communion of responsibility. A divine person is 
always responsive to the second and to the third party. Hence they never lose sight of 
each other, expressing a oneness of non-exclusion and non-assimilation. To render this 
oneness meaningful we have to te11 a story in which the Father, the Son, and the Holy 
Spirit act in complete responsibility and live a communion in which the other is given 
enough space to be unique. The divine embrace leaves no space for exclusion and no 
space for assimilation. Otherness and particularity are neither reduced to sameness nor 
equated with estrangement. This indicates perfect responsibility, giving oneself freely to 
the other without losing oneself, therefore, an eternal event of responsiveness. 
B. In relation to the human condition, God, in his oneness of non-exclusion and non-
assimilatibn, exercises an embrace which grants- human beings who have fear and 
experience ambiguous otherness and particularity the possibility of human love as a 
growing together in mutual respect. While the loving divine embrace exhibits a perfect 
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balance between otherness and sameness and between "non-exclusion" and "non-
assimilation", human life is subjected to ambiguous otherness and particularity. While 
God is love, human beings have fear and in their re1ationships therefore rather exhibit 
"excluding otherness" and "assimilating sameness." Hence human beings love insofar 
as they lovingly deal with this condition and realize relationships of mutual respect. 
Human experience of love then manifests itself in human interactions which reflect the 
divine embrace. This is a real possibility and can be experienced among people as a 
concrete realisation of a mutual process of growing together. If human beings (due to 
their exocentric nature) acknowledge the relational structure of the "human coin" and 
thereby value and respect otherness and particularity and if they ground their lives and 
their perception of reality in God's triune life, then, to live a balanced relatedness 
between otherness and sameness becomes a real possibility. Thus love and mutual 
respect can be experienced as a peaceful and reconciled balance of human relationships 
within the conditions of exclusion and assimilation. 
C. Being created in the image of the triune God means to realize love in the interstice 
between exclusion and assimilation. This is enacted within a human community by 
working towards respectful relationships in which the other, as an essential part of one's 
life, is not perceived as a threat and hence given enough space to live, neither excluded 
from being part of my life nor absorbed into my life. This might be enacted within a 
human community by a mutual and respectful being-there-for-the-other attitude. To 
reflect the divine embrace is to tum towards each other, walk together, look into each 
other's eyes, and to face problems with each other rather than to turn away, walk 
against, look away, and to make faces. It means to make space for the other and foster 
and nurture possibilities of mutual dialogue in which (first of all) listening is exercised 
as an act of self-giving. Encounters are steered by a longing for mutual respect and an 
attempt to reduce fear (due to strangeness, unfamiliarity, oddity, novelty, and therefore 
often accompanied by misapprehension and prejudice) in order to create spaces where 
the other and I can live. Christian communities, on the level of worship, might ask 
themselves whether or not they respond to God by responding to each other's needs, 
fears, problems, and concerns. Are our services a one-way street or do they take up what 
really matters, relating human life to God's life and God's life to human life? Worship 
as an experience in the interstice? Furthermore, they might ask themselves whether or 
not they are aware of the problems of exclusion (God's or the human other's otherness 
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perceived as a threat and therefore excluded from the conversation) and assimilation 
(God's or the human other's sameness absorbed and domesticated and therefore 
perceived as my own). All this can be seen reflected in the church's liturgies: words that 
are used or abandoned, hymns chosen or left out, symbols included or excluded, 
participation made possible or impossible. On the level of leadership churches might 
ask themselves whether or not appropriate structures of accountability between persons, 
groups, committees, and churches are in place in order to realize a reconciling social 
reality. Do their meetings leave room for listening? Listening is in need of encounters; 
encounters are in need of looking into each other's face and of exercising responsibility. 
However, whether a mutual dialogue as a reflection of the divine embrace can de facto 
take place or not is very often decided by the table order: Who sits at the top and who at 
the bottom of the table? Who is invited? Whose agenda is on the table? What food is on 
the table? Whose table manners have to be followed? If these questions are answered in 
relation to the divine triune life then we can return full circle to the start of the first 
reflection. It is the triune God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, who sets the table, who 
invites human beings to sit at the table of life and who determines the table rules. 
Working out the agenda of the triune God for human life is not easy and will always be 
under construction, but it surely will lead to practical consequences for the construction 
ofhuman sociality. 
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CONCLUSION 
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 
The overarching aim of this work has been twofold: first, to challenge contemporary 
trinitarian theology because of its neglect of human experience and, second, simultaneously to 
develop a new approach that is more attentive to the human condition and theology's 
embeddedness in experience. This aim was nourished by the observation that trinitarian 
theologians who favour a social doctrine of the Trinity in order to draw practical implications 
for human life often end up with utopian or idealistic visions of what human communion in 
the light of the Trinity should look like (Chapter One). Not enough attention was given to the 
relationship between God-talk and the human condition as distinct from, yet related to, the 
divine triune reality. The task of elaborating a new trinitarian hermeneutics led me to an 
investigation of the concepts of experience and revelation (Chapter Two), the human 
condition (Chapter Three), and the importance of biblical narratives for God-talk (Chapter 
Four). This process resulted in proposing an interstitial theology as creative tension which, 
employing a Gestaltkreis Hermeneutics, enabled me to relate trinitarian God-talk to human 
life and vice versa in a way which is both meaningful for human experience and faithful to the 
Bible and the Christian tradition (Chapter Five). With respect to the question of truth such an 
interstitial theology remains intellectually honest in holding together both i) God's otherness 
(which escapes altogether human experience and language) and hence the tentativeness of all 
theological discourse and ii) God's sameness (which accommodates itself to human 
experience and language), expressed in the notion of experience's capacity for truth, and 
hence the adequacy and truth shaping meaningfulness of theological discourse within the 
human condition. 
In retrospect, then, the following comparison might be drawn. While Moltmann 
prioritises the narrative over the concept (trinitarian personhood language over against ousia 
language, developing a historic doctrine of the Trinity according to the New Testament), and 
LaCugna somewhere in a confusing middle position opts for the logical priority of Scripture 
as revelation over against general human experience and conceptual ousia language (a certain 
understanding of salvation history becomes equated with theology proper), it can be said that 
Gunton prioritises the concept over the narrative (elaborating a sophisticated ontology of 
relationality). In contrast, an interstitial theology as creative tension tries to be attentive to all 
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these different levels of discourse and places itself in the interstice not to opt for a new 
universal concept but to be aware of the fact that within theological discourse prioritising one 
dimension over the other (concept - narrative, revelation - experience, ousia - hypostasis) 
will not do. An interstitial theology avoids playing one dimension off against another. Due to 
the condition of human experience and its inherent language games both ousia and hypostasis, 
universality and particularity, the narrative and the concept irreducibly need each other. The 
consequence of all this is that a trinitarian Gestaltkreis hermeneutics when it comes to the 
relationship between the Trinity and human life attempts not to confuse the two realms but to 
leave enough space for divine and human otherness. Thus 1 conclude that contemporary 
trinitarian theology ultimately is not radical enough because it fails to sustain this vital "in-
between" place. lnstead of logical conclusions and the tendency either to downplay human 
experience in favour of metaphysics or to simply priorities revelation history over against 
more conceptual approaches, what is really needed is theological discourse that maintains a 
creative tension. Ironically, despite the many allusions to the mystery of God, many trinitarian 
theologians, by giving supremacy either to the One or to the Three, develop integrative 
accounts thereby rather explaining away the mystery of God which manifests itself precisely 
in the dialectic between one ousia and three hypostaseis. What really is required is an 
interstitial theology which claims that this creative tension is actually a part of the mystery of 
God. Trinitarian theology then is aware of its limits. ln acknowledging this tension as part of 
God's mystery the here presented trinitarian theology is able to engage more fully with the 
doctrine of the Trinity in relation to human life. This is particularly important with respect to 
practical implications for human life. 
To conclude, let me end on a note of prospect and give one example to highlight an avenue 
that seems particularly promising in taking this work forwards. This avenue leads in the 
direction of a social critique and an engagement with economy. 1t was already mentioned that 
Moltmann, although interested in political theology, neglected in his trinitarian work power 
structures and the question of authority as an inherent part of the human condition. This, 
however, is a crucial point for anyone who wants to constructively engage in a critique of 
social structures. An interstitial trinitarian theology concentrates on how the givenness of 
human relationality is and can be realised by persons who live their lives as being created in 
the image of the divine embrace. The notion of communion understood as an abstract 
ontological concept or as a general givenness of human life, therefore, slips into the 
background and makes way for other concepts which are more informative for human 
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experience. Building on the essential notions of otherness and particularity, which are 
constitutive for the human condition and also meaningful for God-talk, I was able to explore 
different core experiences of human life and relate them meaningfully to the divine triune life. 
An interstitial theology is now capable of drawing attention to the actual event of human 
relationships and how they are realised. Trinitarian reflections of human life then do not 
disregard the human condition as such. It is not helpful to simply stigmatise human 
experiences of power, authority, dependence, competition, and inequality. These experiences 
simply exhibit constitutive parts of the human condition and are not as such good or evil. 
Much more pressing is the question whether these experiences necessarily have to lead to 
distorting relationships, to experiences of fear, mistrust, exploitation, and the excJusion of 
some for the sake of others. A first step forward, therefore, would be to take up a dialogue 
with the concepts of power and authority in conversation with the insights from the human 
condition in Chapter Three and relate both with one another. The results can then be 
connected with the reflections about the Trinity and human life in order to sharpen the focus 
of the role of power and authority within a human community that consists of human beings 
who are created in the image of God. If the divine embrace, in respecting each other's 
particularity and valuing otherness, neither excluding nor assimilating, is a loving 
Gestaltkreis, then such discourse will influence our understanding of power and authority as 
the underlying concepts for any attempt in describing how Christian koinonia should take 
shape. 
As a second step and closely related to this, an examination of economic ideologies and 
structures could be attempted. To connect a trinitarian understanding of the divine triune life 
with economy might seem far off at first sight but, as I would like to argue, is not at all the 
case. One simply needs to remember that the divine embrace between Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit exhibits a portrayal of what theology calls the economic Trinity, that is God with us as 
he reveals himself within the human condition. In other words, talk about the economic 
Trinity is also talk about the ways in which the Father, the Son, and the Spirit manage the 
divine household in relation to humanity. The reflections on the divine embrace in the 
previous chapter, therefore, express essential characteristics of this household management. 
Consequently, human economy can be characterised as a global household of persons in 
communion that must be managed in the image of the triune God. Economic concepts ground 
very much in certain presuppositions about particUlarity (individualism), the understanding of 
the self and the other, as well as meaning and, as negative counterparts, fear and scarcity. 
Concepts of power and authority as well as economic structures, grounded in concepts of 
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sharing, of giving and receiving, presupposing a certain kind of gift theory, are part of any 
human community. But the question is, how are they shaped and what are the underlying 
presuppositions or ideologies? Human life is relational and therefore all communities have to 
come to terms with an understanding of the above-mentioned concepts. If a trinitarian 
understanding of God is the Christian way of demythologising God concepts and absolute 
frameworks of meaning that underlie ideological uses of power and economic assumptions, 
then we have to set an understanding of divine oneness as integrated otherness and reconciled 
particularity which gains meaning in trinitarian stories of love, healing, reconciliation, 
abundance and non-exclusion over against claims made about power and market rules in 
modern society. 1 The proposed reading ofthe Trinity and human life in this thesis then can be 
taken forward and lead to some relevant implications for human life in order to challenge our 
understanding of communitarian and economic life in the image of the Trinity. 
1 Douglas Meeks, God the Economist: The Doctrine of God and Political Economy (Augsburg: Fortress Press, 
1989), 9. See also Jorg Rieger (ed.), Liberating the Future: God, Mammon and Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1998). 
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